Informed Comment

Fierce Firefight in Fallujah Leaves 13 Dead, 14 Wounded

AP reports that US Marines in Fallujah came under fire late Thursday, starting a firefight that continued through Friday and spilled over into an industrial area of the city. The Marines fired mortar rounds and called in close air support. AP writes, “Many of those wounded, including at least one child, appeared to be civilians injured by U.S. airstrikes, hospital officials said . . . Twelve auto repair shops and two houses were reported destroyed.”

A loud explosion also went off late Friday in downtown Baghdad, but no details were available.

AP reports of US casualties:

The latest identifications reported by the Defense Department:

- Army Spc. Joseph F. Herndon, II, 21, Derby, Kan.; died Thursday, in Hawijah, Iraq, when he was shot while on guard duty; assigned to the Army’s 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division (Light); Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.

- Army Pfc. Ken W. Leisten, 20, Cornelius, Ore.; died Wednesday, in Taji, Iraq, when his vehicle struck an explosive; assigned to the Army National Guards 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry; Corvallis, Ore.

909 US troops had died in Iraq as of Friday since the beginning of the war.

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Did al-Qaeda Game Bush into Iraq War?

Douglas Jehl of the New York Times explains how Ibn al-Shaykh Libi, a high al-Qaeda official of Libyan extraction, was captured in fall of 2001 and alleged to CIA interrogators that Iraq had provided al-Qaeda with training in chemical and biological weapons.

Later on, Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad were captured in Pakistan. Abu Zubaydah was wounded in the course of being captured and was put on heavy duty pain killers, and was interrogated in part while under their influence. Both he and KSM maintained that Bin Laden had forbidden any operational cooperation with Iraq, because it was ruled by an infidel secular Arab socialist regime.

When the CIA came back to Libi with these statements of his colleagues, he folded and admitted he had lied.

What is going on here? It has been suggested that Libi told the CIA whatever they wanted to hear because they tortured him. But there is another possibility, which is that he deliberately misled them. Libi is also the source of a report in January 2002 that al-Qaeda had targeted the US naval base in Bahrain. That allegation was never confirmed, and it is possible that it was also a lie, intended to draw US resources away from Afghanistan, or to make the US cautious about using the base.

I think Bin Laden and his lieutenants wanted to provoke wars between the US and Muslim states. I think they knew that the 9/11 attacks would guarantee a US war on Afghanistan, and that they were confident they could draw the US into the country and defeat it, as they had the Soviets.

That they were trying to provoke a US/Afghanistan war and knew their actions would provoke one is suggested in several ways. First, they made no effort to have the hijackers on 9/11 employ aliases or cover their tracks. A toddler could have traced Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdar back to al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. They made their reservations under their own names! All of the hijackers had. Counter-terrorism chief Richard Clarke was astounded that these men had even been let on the planes under those names, many of which were well known to US intelligence. Likewise, Bin Laden hand-picked the Saudi “muscle” that he sent along at the last minute, from among young men personally loyal to him, and who would be known to be his men. September 11 was a way of waving a huge red flag from Afghanistan at the American bull.

Two days before 9/11, al-Qaeda agents posing as Algerian newsmen blew up Ahmad Shah Masoud, the gallant leader of the Northern Alliance. Clearly, Bin Laden had gamed out the aftermath of 9/11 and understood that the US might well try to partner with the Northern Alliance against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and he wanted to reduce the military effectiveness of the NA by eliminating its most talented strategist, Massoud.

Bin Laden, in choosing the “muscle” to be 15 Saudis, also was clearly attempting to alienate the US from the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in hopes of weakening the regime in Riyadh and preparing it for overthrow by radical Islamists.

Libi’s story about Iraq training al-Qaeda, delivered after 9/11, is of a piece with the rest of this strategy. It was aimed at instigating a war by the US on Iraq.

All of these wars were intended to stir hatred of the US invader throughout the Muslim world, to weaken the “puppet” governments of the Middle East that were allied with the US and make them ripe for overthrow, and to mire the US in a series of Islamic quagmires that would sap its will and strength and ultimately force its withdrawal from the region.

In form, the Libi strategy resembles the Maoist hope that the rural third world could be brought into a confrontation with the industrialized capitalist countries, one in which contradictions would be sharpened and the capitalist minority ultimately surrounded and overwhelmed by socialist villagers. Substitute “radical Islamist” for “socialist” and you have the Libi plan.

If al-Qaeda wanted wars between the US and Muslim countries, why would Abu Zubayda and Khalid Shaikh Muhammad have told the US the truth? I can only speculate, of course. But Abu Zubayda may have been debriefed while badly wounded and heavily sedated, and may not have had his wits entirely about him, so that he reacted with anger and hatred at the Baathist regime when it was brought up. Khalid Shaikh Muhammad was not arrested until March of 2003, and may have delighted in revealing to the US that it had been duped after the war began on March 19.

Even though Libi recanted his earlier disinformation, Vice President Dick Cheney has continued to rely on his allegations. Note that it should no longer be necessary for the US to depend on a single unreliable source such as Libi, since it has captured the Baath intelligence files and should by now know pretty much exactly what the Baath government was up to with regard to terrorism. If the US does not know, it would be because it irresponsibly gave those intelligence files to Ahmad Chalabi.

Chalabi was playing the US from the other side, feeding it disinformation about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and al-Qaeda ties that was just made up out of whole cloth.

Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz allowed themselves to be manipulated by Libi and Chalabi because it suited them.

The question is whether letting ourselves be duped in this way suits the American public.

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Muqtada warns Muslim Nations

In his Friday prayer sermon on Friday before hundreds of followers in Kufa, radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr warned Muslim nations not to send troops to Iraq, warning that they would be considered collaborators with the US Occupation, and would risk being hit as such by Iraqis.

His warning was echoed by radical Sunni clergymen, as well.

Al-Zaman says that Muqtada also explained his two month long disappearance in part by reference to a schism within the Sadr movement, begun by his father. (He may have been referring to the opposition of many Sadrists, including his former mentor Ayatollah Kadhim al-Haeri in Qom, to the uprising he launched in April against the US in response to Washington’s attempt to arrest or kill him.)

Muqtada also vehemently criticized the government of caretaker PM Iyad Allawi for failing to provide services and security.

He complained that the United States had succeeded in globalizing the world (`awlamat al-`alam). He called for resistance not just in Iraq but everywhere people were suffering oppression.

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Humanitarian Crisis looms in Basra

Reuters reports that a high UN official has raised the specter of a serious humanitarian crisis (i.e. lots of people dying) in Basra this summer. The problem is that there is only half as much potable water as people need for a population of 1.3 million, and the temperature has soared to 50 C / 122 F. Reuters writes:

“We are confronting a potential serious humanitarian crisis,” Ross Mountain, acting special representative of the U.N. Secretary General for Iraq, told Reuters in Amman on Thursday.

“We have no indication that there is anywhere else in the country that is facing this kind of crisis. Nobody is facing 50 degree (Celsius) temperatures with less than half the supply of water required … There is nowhere as bad as the Basra area.”

Lack of potable water in a city like Basra can cause large numbers of deaths in several ways. Simple e. coli bacteria in the water can give babies and small children diarrhea so bad that they can easily die of it if parents don’t know how to keep them hydrated (spoonfuls of filtered, boiled water with sugar and salt in it will usually work). You could also get a cholera epidemic and hepatitis. And, if people run out of boiled water because they lack or can’t afford fuel to prepare more, they can be driven by the 122 temperatures to risk drinking bad water.

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National Congress Postponed

Fighting in Nasiriyah

In a sign that the political situation in Iraq is even worse than anyone had suspected, the caretaker Iraqi government has had to postpone the holding of national congress until mid-August. The complicated selection process for choosing delegates had favored the expatriate parties and politicians, and had stirred up bad feelings by important players who felt excluded. The Sunnis of largely Shiite Basra are among those constituencies that felt shortchanged by the process. So far no press reporting I have seen has given the full details of the floor fights in key cities, but apparently in some cases they have been vicious.

One group that feels shortchanged is the religious Shiites, whose parties have not been given the sort of representation their size and influence would merit. An aide to Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, according to NPR, has urged Iraqi Shiites to be patient, and to put their hopes in the January 2005 elections.

The problem is that this postponement is not a good sign for the country’s ability to hold one person, one vote parliamentary elections only five months from now.

Meanwhile, Italian troops in Nasiriyah clashed with militiamen who tried to take control of two bridges into the city. The militiamen were not identified but are likely to be followers of Muqtada al-Sadr. These sorts of incidents suggest that PM Allawi really is just the mayor of downtown Baghdad, and that neither the Iraqi government nor the US-led coalition really are in control of Iraq’s cities. (-ash-Sharq al-Awsat)

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The Kerry Plan on Iraq:

How it Could Work if the UN were Brought In

In his speech to the National Democratic Convention, John Kerry devoted a few passages to Iraq. He said:

“I know what we have to do in Iraq. We need a president who has the credibility to bring our allies to our side and share the burden, reduce the cost to American taxpayers, and reduce the risk to American soldiers. That’s the right way to get the job done and bring our troops home.

Here is the reality: that won’t happen until we have a president who restores America’s respect and leadership – so we don’t have to go it alone in the world.

And we need to rebuild our alliances, so we can get the terrorists before they get us.”

Media pundits are already charging that these passages are vague and lack specifics. I thought I would try to envision how this plan might work in the real world.

The first problem with involving the international community is that the US effort in Iraq lacks international legitimacy. Moreover, the Bush administration has insisted that the troops of its coalition partners (some of whom, like the Poles, are being paid by the US to be in Iraq) remain under over-all United States military command. This demand is unacceptable to most countries that might plausibly supply troops.

For instance, Colin Powell has been speaking with the Saudis about the possibility of a Muslim military force to help stabilize Iraq. But most Muslim countries would refuse to go under a US military command, as this report from the Scotsman notes:

‘ In Jakarta yesterday, Indonesian foreign ministry spokesman Marty Natalegawa said: “Our position remains that any possible Indonesian involvement, including dispatching our military personnel to Iraq, has to be within and under a UN framework.”

Yemen had offered earlier this month to help in a UN mission in Iraq, provided all coalition forces withdraw . . .

Commenting on the Muslim force proposal, Arab League envoy to Britain Ali Hamid said in London that the idea could gain international support as long as it was accompanied by a clear US commitment to withdraw from Iraq and was mandated by the United Nations Security Council.

Many Arab countries have indicated they would be willing to get more involved in Iraq if they can do so under the UN, rather than a perceived US, umbrella. ‘

So the big stumbling block is the US auspices of the foreign occupation of Iraq, and Bush administration insistence on the US leading the over-all military command.

Another problem is that the European Community simply does not have many spare troops to send abroad, so the EU is unlikely to be the solution here. (They are likely to be busier and busier with Afghanistan, anyway).

So here is how the Kerry plan could work, with specifics.

Let us say that Iraq really does hold parliamentary elections in January of 2005, and that the new government elects a prime minister. The resulting Iraqi government would have full international legitimacy, and would be in a position to play a strong role at the UN, on the Arab League, and other international bodies.

Let us say that the new Iraq Prime Minister gets the backing of his cabinet and parliament to go to the United Nations Security Council and ask for a UN peace-enforcing effort. (Bosnia is an analogous precedent). The Kerry Administration ambassador to the UN supports this effort, as do the UK, France, China and Russia, along with the rotating members.

The UN Resolution should specify that UN troops in Iraq have the right to use force to enforce the peace. That is, they would not be mere observers or peacekeepers, but active peace enforcers.

The UN peace enforcing military mission in Iraq would be funded by a special fund, to which the US, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries would contribute, since it is in all their interests that Iraq be stabilized.

The UN Security Council and the Iraqi government would then go the Arab League seeking a commitment from it to support peace-enforcement in Iraq. At this point, Egypt gets on board, and swings the others to support the proposal.

The Iraqi government, the UNSC and the Arab League then go to non-neighbor Muslim and other countries and ask for about 10,000 men from each. Each two such half-divisions would allow the US to rotate out a division of its own. If 10 countries could be convinced to come in, all but two US divisions could leave. If the effort were seen as one of ending the US occupation by supplanting the US with a UN/Arab League force, many governments that now fear to buck their own public opinion by collaborating with the US might be in a much better position to send troops. Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Yemen and Morocco could all easily spare 10,000 troops each, and more such partners could be found. Perhaps under these conditions even the French and the Russians would be willing to come in, as well. The British would stay for as long as necessary, though likely the Poles and others would want to rotate out early in 2005. That would be all right, since under this plan they could be replaced. Some countries might supply police or gendarmes rather than military troops, as needed in the provinces to which they were assigned (Samawah might just need civilian police for a while; al-Anbar probably needs military troops).

Remember that the poorer countries involved would receive substantial reimbursement for coming aboard. They would also be in line to receive “strategic rent” from the US and other wealthy countries–debt forgiveness, favorable trade treaties, etc. Countries like Russia and France would enhance the access of their companies to the Iraqi market once the security situation had settled down.

This genuinely multinational force could intervene wherever order broke down so badly that Iraqi police and security forces could not handle it. They would be backed up where necessary by US air power for as long as the Iraqi government and the UN wanted it.

The UN force would have as its mandate to help negotiate a final settlement with the Kurds and to supervise the integration of the peshmerga and the Shiite militias into the new Iraqi army, which would have mixed units for national cohesion. It would also work to develop safeguards for minority rights so as to mollify the Sunni Arabs in places like al-Anbar. (That there would be a strong Sunni Muslim presence among the UN troops might help in this mollifying process, though it would not change the fact that the parliament is Shiite-dominated).

This UN force, with vastly reduced US participation under a UN general, would give the new, elected Iraqi government time to rebuild its own armed forces and national guard. As effective Iraqi divisions were trained and equipped, they could begin relieving UN troops, allowing all the multinational forces, including those of the US, gradually to rotate out of the country as they were no longer needed. At the end of this process, Iraq would have an army of 60,000 men, able to maintain order in the country but posing no threat to neighbors. It would be an independent country, midwifed by the United Nations. The US would have finally gracefully exited the country, since it is unlikely that an elected Iraqi government would want foreign troops on its soil any longer than necessary.

I would be the first to admit that the plan is not perfect. Sometimes UN troops have not performed very well. Iraq is a complex and highly armed society, and would be the biggest challenge ever faced by the UN. But I think the plan has at least a chance of working. And, it is hard to see how it could produce results worse than those produced by the Bush administration in the past miserable 16 months.

Addendum 2:00 pm Friday 7/30: In response to some of my mail about this post:

1) Someone said that Bush might do this sort of thing if he were elected, anyway. The answer is no. He will not and cannot. My model presupposes a willingness to surrender military command of the multinational force to the UN, which Bush will never, ever do. In the absence of that step, you cannot pick up the Indonesian, Malaysian, etc. troops. They have elections and it would guarantee their governments to be kicked out of office by the voters if they put their troops under US command in Iraq.

2) Someone else said that the Russians and the French are unlikely to come in. That may be so, but we cannot know without trying. The combination of UN leadership and the opportunity to enhance business opportunities for their firms in Iraq and the Gulf, plus the assertion of a geo-strategic role and an American acknowledgment of their necessity as allies could all work together to persuade. Still, their participation would not be absolutely essential.

3) It was asserted that the 3rd world military contingents are likely to be lightweights and not up to the job of facing down the Sunni insurgents. This assertion is unfair. The Pakistani, Egyptian and other militaries are professional and have had experience with counter-insurgency against radical Islamists, and their governments are still there because they have won. The Arabic-speaking units would be in a much better position than the Americans to develop good intelligence on the insurgency. Moreover, my model assumes that the Sunni Arab insurgency will greatly subside, given the legitimacy of a UN military mission and the participation of many Sunni troops. Likewise, it assumes that the Kurdish north and the Shiite south remain relatively stable.

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120 Dead in Bombings, Clashes in Iraq

4 US Troops Killed

Wire services report that 120 persons died in separate incidents in Iraq on Wednesday, the one-month anniversary of the “transfer of sovereignty” to the caretaker government of Iyad Allawi.

The NYT says that guerrillas detonated a truck bomb outside a police recruiting station in the eastern city of Baqubah, killing 70 and wounding 55. NPR reported that the mood in the city was condemnatory of the attack, and that many feel that the Iraqi police are not collaborators with the US but rather Iraqi patriots. But NPR uncharacteristically missed the point, which is that the guerrillas do not care with whom people sympathize. The key question is whether they will be afraid to go sign up to serve in Allawi’s police, and to cooperate with the caretaker government in general.

In the south-central city of Suwariyah, multinational forces and Iraqi police battled guerrillas, killing 35 of them. The guerrillas killed 7 Iraqi policemen. Rumors swirled that some of the guerrillas had come over from Iran, but the Polish military spokesman said he had no evidence of this. It would matter whether Suwariyah is mainly Sunni or Shiite, not something I was able to find out (the area south of Baghdad is mixed). Why don’t reporters ask these questions?

Guerrillas used roadside bombs to kill two US troops, and two others died in small arms fights in al-Anbar province. Their deaths raised the toll to 906 since the war began, according to AP.

Guerrillas killed two Pakistani hostages, saying that the Pakistani government was considering sending troops to Iraq (to guard the UN HQ, to be headed by a Pakistani diplomat).

The Guardian adds, “There were also shootings and clashes in the western city of Ramadi and the northern city of Kirkuk. Central Baghdad descended into chaos after a rocket hit a busy street, killing two people and wounding four, including three children.”

Guerrillas kidnapped three sons of the governor of al-Anbar Province, Abdul Karim Burghis al-Rawi, in Ramadi. The provincial governors have largely been chosen in a complicated process over which the Americans and British had a great deal of influence, and many guerrillas consider them puppets.

In an important Australian Broadcasting Co. interview, Anthony Cordesmann explains in some detail why Iraqi forces cannot deal with the guerrilla insurgency, lacking proper equipment and even communications. It is not a pretty picture.

According to Reuters, on Wednesday Iraq weapons inspector David Kay said that

U.S. officials should give up the “delusional hope” that Iraq has weapons of mass destruction so they can move forward with reform . . . “I think it’s most important that the president of the United States recognizes that in fact the weapons are not there,” Kay told reporters after speaking at The Government Security Expo and Conference. “It’s because until you do that you will not take this fundamental reorganization of the intel community on board,” he said. Officials such as acting CIA Director John McLaughlin “hold out the delusional hope that eventually you’ll find weapons,” Kay said.

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