Shiite Militias and Iran in Iraq
Another US soldier was killed on Christmas Day, bringing the number of GIs killed in Iraq to one more than the number of persons killed in the 9/11 attacks.
AP reports that the British raided a police HQ and prison in Basra when they heard that the unit was infiltrated by Shiite militiamen and planning to kill their prisoners. Some of the released prisoners showed signs of torture. The British destroyed the prison.
Police found some 47 bodies in Baghdad. Two major bombing operations were conducted in the city, killing 17 and wounding dozens.
The US military conducted raids against the Badr Corps militia of the Shiite Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, in the course of which it arrested four Iranian officials. It had to let two of them go when it transpired that they were diplomats invited into Iraq by President Jalal Talabani, a close US ally. SCIRI and Badr were in exile in Iran for over two decades and have close ties to the Iranian regime. Nevertheless, the Bush administration hosted SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim recently.
The US military has for the most part characterized the Badr corps as disciplined and not the main security problem in Iraq. US troops have never had an engagement with Badr. The Badr Corps has been accused of infiltrating the special police commandos of the Interior Ministry and of using that unit to engage in ethnic cleansing of Sunni Arabs they suspected of membership in the guerrilla movement.
That Badr had close ties to Iran was well known, so it is a little unclear what new developments could have provoked this raid.
The US has accused Iran of training Badr's Shiite rival, the Mahdi Army, in Lebanon and of providing it with shaped charges. That these officials were with Badr instead does not advance that case, and may weaken it.
Talabani's invitation is yet another wrinkle. I have long argued that Mam Jalal had close back channel relations with Tehran. Do the Peshmerga, the Kurdistan military, benefit from Iranian military advice, as well?
Stay tuned.
posted by Juan Cole @ 12/26/2006 06:27:00 AM
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7 Comments:
Even in the crazy underground world of covert relations it seems unlikely to me that Talabani and the Iranians have had a substantiative relationship. Persistent rumor has it that the Israelis are training the Peshmerga and that in return they are canvassing out of reach nuke facilities. This invitation to meet is therefore more likely an overture by Iran to undercut Israeli interest in their nuke program and is consistent with their plans to influence Iraq after the USA's departure more generally. One imagines that the Kurds would be in play and are already looking ahead, since after the US withdrawal their principal threat would be Turkey and Israeli assistance would be hard to come by. My guess is that if such a back channel exists it is recent and has more to do with Iranian nuclear ambitions and the Kurd's future aspirations than any past relationship.
Dear Professor Cole,
A few posts ago, I believe you suggested that your sources informed you that the Sadrists would sweep to power if local elections wer held in the south.
What exactly is your basis for saying this? I get the impression that people in the South, particularly in Basra, hate the militias (al-Mahdi, Badr). Why would they still support the parties tied to them?
Are you able to disclose you sources on this matter?
I would also be interested in your opinion on the presence of British troops in the South (I am a UK citizen). Do you believe that presence is largely helping the Iraqis - as the BBC by and large suggests?
Thank you for your time.
I think the theory that the US can maintain a historically 'small' army to fight and win quickly two simultaneous SMALL wars has been proven.
This theory was not devised to support occupations; rather is was designed for 'coup' style wars, as we saw with the ousting of the Taliban and the Tikritis.
That the smallness of the occupying armies now left to defend fixed positions is clearly the fault of the theory, so what has in fact happened is that politics has crept back into the voids that came in behind the inefficient Abrams and Stryker Brigades. The cost of these wars are not being measured in 'western' blood, rather it is measured in civilian blood and wasted 'western' treasure. The middle east is experiencing economic boom thanks to the invasion and the corelated oil price spike (though not historically record high).
The lesson for the US in Iraq is simple, the US cannot have its cake and eat it. It cannot have both a small army of the worlds greatest killing machines and expect to do well when those men are expected to sit still and maintain fixed positions.
They are not a police force.
So the 'fault' then lies in how this army was used, it was used for political ends, for the hubris of literally the 5 or 6 people who decided they wanted history to remember them. Who used academia as pawns (men such as Fukuyama) to create the myth of revolutionary democracy, much as Jacobins and Nepoleon did. The US had parliaments and Presidents long BEFORE they used the French navy to throw out George III.
Iraq and Afghanistan are really a case of 'reality bites'. The Brits have fought numerous wars in these regions already and ran afoul of all the same mistakes. When will the 'west' grow up?
Talabani’s relationship with Iran is interesting and nuanced. I really doubt his PUK peshmerga are being directly supported by Iran, out of fear of the US response. I also highly doubt that Talabani would join in any US effort to destabilize Iran. If Talabani's views are anything like those of every single Kurd I know, he wants more than anything to avoid getting caught between the US and Iran.
This is nothing new. Talabani has spent a lifetime trying not to piss off the Iranians, or at least preserve a lifeline to Iran. He shifted sides two or three times during the Iran-Iraq war, either to gain a little advantage or avoid annihilation at the hands of forces fighting for Saddam or Khomenei - both of whom he despised. Abdurrahman Qassemlou, the Iranian Kurdish leader who the Iranians assassinated in Vienna in the 1980's, influenced Talabani’s own political development. Like Qassemlou, Talabani is a socialist and a secularist.
At the end of the day, Talabani has affection for Iranian culture – an affection which is mirrored in Suleymaniya, which has grown into a hybrid city, still recognizably Iraqi but in terms of fashion, music and general ambiance, a little like a mid-size Iranian city without the mullahs. Young people there are more likely to learn Farsi as a second language than Arabic. Iraqi Kurds don’t hate Iran or Iranians. They by and large reject the Iranian system of governance, but feel much closer to Iranian culture than Turkish culture. It's probably the only place in the world where most people actually like both the US and Iran, and I hope it stays that way.
Since 1991, Talabani's PUK has sheltered at least 20,000 Iranian Kurdish refugees in Iraqi Kurdistan, mostly KDPI and Komala supporters - including many of Qassemlou's friends and advisors. The US would probably love to use KDPI and Komala to destabilize the Iranian government. All of the Kurdish officials I know, but especially the PUK, are opposed to this. The Kurdistan Regional Government seems to be treading a fine line, protecting Iranian Kurdish refugees while preventing them from attacking Iranian targets. This was working until recently, when a local Iranian offshoot of the PKK seems to have begun attacking Iranian border guards and pasdaran on the Iranian side of the border. The PUK has been somewhat sympathetic to the PKK in the past, and I suspect would extend the same deal to them that they have granted to Komala and KDPI – namely, you can remain in Iraqi Kurdistan as refugees, but please don’t keep pissing off the neighbors. KDPI and Komala (and Syrian Kurds in Dohuk) have accepted that deal, but the PKK has not. During my last trip to the region, PUK forces attacked some PKK camps in the mountains above Raniya, and they are almost certainly providing intelligence to the Iranians on PKK locations.
For now, the PUK policy seems to be working. Khatami wisely followed a hands-off approach to the Kurds in Iran. Ahmedinejad is deeply distrusted by Iranian Kurds, but as long as he follows Khatami's more gentle approach and avoids antagonizing them, there's not going to be a lot of mainstream interest on either side of the border in resuming conflict. Let’s hope the US doesn’t stir the pot, and let’s hope the Iraqi Kurds continue to pursue neutrality with Iran and the US.
Talabani is a slippery character, but a fascinating one - as would be expected for a man who survived nearly 50 years in a truly Darwinian political environment. He’s a very smart and subtle man, and he is capable of courting both the US and Iran simultaneously. It’s Barzani who I worry about. He’s not half as clever and is much more susceptible to the divide and conquer sort of politics that has always bedeviled the Kurds. I worry that Barzani could be more easily seduced by the US into some foolish scheme against Iran. Barzani has some sway with Karim Khan, the warlord of Baradost on the extreme NE corner of the border with Iran, an area with 14,000 foot mountains and rugged terrain, where one could easily start some trouble.
The raid is reminiscent of the one on Chalabi's compound a long time ago. It served as a clear signal to the Iraqis around Chalabi that he was out of favor with the US and can no longer offer patronage, leading to his total failure in the elections.
Another very interesting accusation came from the Interior Minister. He said that a 'regional power' is responsible for the mass abductions in Baghdad, aiming to destabilize the Iraqi government! This can only be Iran.
I also suspect that The Decider is mighty unhappy about the collapse of the 'moderates' group in parliament for which he must have received assurances from Hakim; Barzani; and Hashimi as he invested to publicly in it. Only to look like a fool (again) so quickly afterwards when Sistani torpedoed it.
That Badr had close ties to Iran was well known, so it is a little unclear what new developments could have provoked this raid.
The Baker-Hamilton commission report? The NYT's report on the raids cites some unnamed Bush administration sources (Team Cheney?) as saying the raids will yield proof of Tehran's meddling in Iraqi affiars. What better reason to forego the commission's recommendation for increased dialog with the Iranians?
For quaker in a basement above:
The ISG report calls for a deal with Iran precisely because it is meddling in Iraq. Why bother otherwise?
Moreover, the USA is virtually a lawless country and does not need evidence. The VP declared in August 2002 that Iraq was 6 months away from a nuclear bomb and Ms Rice talked about mushroom clouds over US cities, both with the full knowledge that the IAEA had declared Iraq nuclear-free years before and continued to have full access even after the inspectors were told to leave by the USA.
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