Posted on 07/28/2007 by Juan
Al-Maliki Tensions Said Severe with Petraeus;
US Raid in Karbala
Steven R. Hurst and Qassim Abdul-Zahra of the Associated Press get the scoop that relations between Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and US Gen. David Petraeus are so tense that aides to al-Maliki say he has considered asking Washington to pull the general out of Baghdad. The two major sources of tension appear to be al-Maliki’s continued lack of control over all Iraqi military units and operations, and Petraeus’s policy of arming Iraqi Sunni Arab tribesmen willing to fight the foreign Salafi Jihadis. Al-Maliki fears that once the Sunni tribesmen have dispatched “al-Qaeda,” they will turn on the largely Shiite government with their new American weapons.
Ironically, al-Maliki himself got called a collaborator with Sunni Arab ‘terrorists’ on Friday, himself. Sawt al-Iraq, writing in Arabic, says that after Friday prayers the Shiites of Khalis (a city in Diyala Province) demonstrated against the prime minister. Al-Maliki had just met in Diyala’s capital, Baqubah, with the Sunni Arab leadership of the city, which the Shiites believe is full of al-Qaeda supporters (they mean Salafi Jihadis) who are implicated in the killing of Shiites.
The US military raided a rogue Mahdi Army cell in the Shiite holy city of Karbala on Friday. US troops captured the cell leader but then took small arms fire from his supporters, leading to a vigorous clash. Iraqi sources claimed that 9 militiamen and a civilian woman were killed and 25 persons were wounded, including women and children. The US maintained that the death toll was 6, all militiamen. Any foreigners fighting in Karbala are likely to raise tensions, but this action was almost certainly requested by the city’s power elite, which sides with the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and its Badr Corps paramilitary against the Sadrists and the Mahdi Army. US troops no longer routinely patrol downtown Karbala, but come in to the city from a base outside it when requested by Iraqi security forces.
US officials say that they are upset with Saudi Arabia for undermining the government of PM Nuri al-Maliki by charging him with being an Iranian secret agent and distributing faked documents to that effect.
On the other hand, I gather that the Bush administration is not too upset with Saudi Arabia, to which it is planning to sell billions of dollars of fancy new military equipment.
Tom Englehardt on how the idea of a US military withdrawal from Iraq became mainstream.
Shaikh Abdul Mahdi al-Karbala’i, in his Friday sermon at the mosque attached to the shrine of Imam Husayn in Karbala, warned of a “humanitarian catastrophe” in Diyala province. Al-Karbala’i is the representative of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and his sermons are thought to reflect Sistani’s thinking. He said Friday that numerous Diyala residents had contacted him urgently for aid, saying that they lacked services, even water, and that thousands faced death or displacement from their homes. He asked the government to help them. He said he was amazed that the prime minister and the Iraqi officer corps seemed afraid of launching a military campaign against the terrorists to rescue them. He interpreted their timidity as a fear on their parts of being seen as Shiite officials attacking Sunnis on behalf of Shiites, i.e. of acting out of merely sectarian concerns. He suggested in response that a joint Diyala military command be formed with nationalist officers drawn from the Shiite, Sunni, Kurdish, and Turkmen communities, which would not feel similar compunctions.
Sadr al-Din al-Qubanchi, preaching at the mosque of the shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf, showered praise on the US-Iranian talks held this week in Baghdad. Al-Qubanchi is a member of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, headed by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, which is the closest of all Iraqi parties to Tehran but also among the closest allies of the Bush administration in Iraq. He also praised Syria for having cancelled a planned meeting in Damascus of the Iraqi Baath Party in exile.
Al-Hayat, writing in Arabic, reports that the bombings in the once upscale, Shiite district of Karrada in central Baghdad have left the inhabitants shivering with fear. The neighborhood is a sort of second ‘Green Zone,’ with major politicians and parties based there, along with newspaper offices. Some residents are warning that it could become an arena for clashes among warring militias, especially after armed groups threw up checkpoints on the grounds of checking cars for bombs.
In funeral processions for those killed in the bombings and mortar attacks on Thursday, which killed 60 and wounded 94, mourners attacked US troops and threw stones at Iraqi troops in the district [i.e. blaming them for not forestalling the bombings.] Karrada has been hit by bombings 10 times in July. These were not for the most part suicide bombings but were rather coordinated detonations. In the aftermath, armed Shiite militiamen have come in and set up checkpoints, and there is a danger they will clash with Sunni Arab guerrillas. Big party “offices” have proliferated, actualy HQs for militias. Most merchants have left Karrada and other nice neighborhoods, given the rise in harassment and kidnappings for ransom. Hundreds of residential buildings now sit empty, their residents having fled.
Oil Minister Hussein Shahristani says that Iraq’s oil unions are not legitimate.
0 Share 0 StumbleUpon 0 Printer Friendly Send via email
Posted in Iraq | Comments Off
Posted on 07/28/2007 by Juan
EPIC News Release: Responsibility to Iraqi Refugees Act
The Education for Peace in Iraq Center sent this news release on an important bill that is in danger of languishing in Congress:
“On June 14th, when we began building support for Congressman Blumenauer’s Responsibility to Iraqi Refugees Act of 2007 (H.R. 2265), only 14 representatives had signed on. EPIC hand-delivered more than 2,300 constituent letters to Congress, and now the bill has 49 cosponsors — an increase of 35 as of July 25th.
Iraqis are the third largest displaced population in the world, after Palestinians and Sudanese. Yet despite a rapidly deteriorating humanitarian and protection situation for many of the 4 million displaced Iraqis, the U.S. has only resettled 133 since October 2006. H.R. 2265 would provide support for Iraq and its neighbors to handle the crisis, and special visas for the most at-risk refugees — particularly those in danger for working closely with American soldiers and NGOs in Iraq.
EPIC’s actions are making a difference in Congress, and your help will strengthen our impact. You can check the list of cosponsors for H.R. 2265 here, and if your Representative has not signed on, please visit our Action Center and personalize your letter to Congress today.
Together, we have real power to help millions of innocent Iraqi civilians displaced by violence. But we all must work together to keep the pressure up. For more information about taking the next steps, click here.
Sincerely,
Emily Stivers
Education for Peace in Iraq Center
———-
The Education for Peace in Iraq Center works to build peace through the advancement of human rights, humanitarian relief and sustainable development that benefits all Iraqis.
Support EPIC online or send your contribution to:
Education for Peace in Iraq Center (EPIC)
1101 Pennsylvania Ave, SE
Washington, DC 20003
202-543-6176
0 Share 0 StumbleUpon 0 Printer Friendly Send via email
Posted in Iraq | Comments Off
Posted on 07/27/2007 by Juan
8 US Troops Killed
100 Casualties in Karrada Bombing
KRG MP: US oil Interests driving Iraqi Legislation
It was announced Thursday that Iraqi guerrillas had killed 7 US soldiers. The Daily Times say 8 died from Tuesday to Thursday. Among other violence against Iraqis, guerrillas detonated a massive car bomb in Central Baghdad that killed 25, wounded 75, and left rows of shops destroyed. Some 20 bodies were found in the streets of Baghdad on Thursday. South of Baghdad in Babil, a guerrillas used a roadside bomb to kill 5 policemen and wound two civilians. Al-Hayat writing in Arabic put the Iraqi death toll from direct civil war violence for Thursday at 65.
Sawt al-Iraq reports that member of the Kurdistan parliament, Nuri Talabani, insists that US economic interests are driving its heavy-handed push to make sure the Iraqi parliament signs a petroleum law in short order. He said that the US government wants special deals for US petroleum corporations in developing, producing and distributing Iraqi petroleum, and that is why it is in such a hurry. Since the US and its Iraqi allies have been involved in heavy negotiations with the Kurdistan Regional Government over the exact provisions of a petroleum law, it is plausible that Talabani has special knowledge of US goals.
Allegations are being made that the foreign workers building the massive US embassy in Baghdad have in some cases been Shanghaied (told they were going to Dubai but then taken to Baghdad instead) and, once in Iraq, have been abused. The charges are against the Kuwaiti contractor supplying the workers to the US government. It has been alleged before that forms of corporate slavery have underpinned some of the private contract work done in Iraq.
The Sunni Arab party, the National Accord Front carried through Thursday with its threat to suspend membership in the al-Maliki government again. The party leaders gave Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki one week to meet their demands, or they said the six cabinet members from the party would resign, and that Front would pull out of the so-called national unity government for good. (The National Accord Front has made these threats before and then withdrawn them, so it is hard to know how seriously to take them this time.) Sheikh Khalaf al-Ulyan of the Front explained its demands:
‘ Al-Elyan said the front’s demands included a pardon for security detainees not charged with specific crimes, a firm commitment by the government to human rights, the disbanding of militias and the inclusion of all parties as the government deals with Iraq’s chaotic security environment. ‘
As the AP article points out, one likely outcome of the NAI’s suspension of governmental activities is that the al-Maliki government will be able to make no further progress on passing the petroleum bill, the bill specifying how revenues are to be shared, the bill on revsion of debaathification measures, or on the process of Sunni-Shiite national reconciliation (Bush’s 4 benchmarks of last January, which were due in June. None has been met).
The LA Times reports that Baghdadis are down to one or two hours of electricity a day, but that the Bush administration will no longer be measuring or reporting on that sort of local data. It will give Congress only the general statistic for the entire country. But obviously whether the capital has electricity would help you know whether the current policies are working.
We had just learned from Reuters last week that the number of guerrilla attacks in Iraq in June reached an all-time high, suggesting that the surge isn’t actually going very well. CNN appears to have been one of the few news organizations, then, to pay much attention to Gen. Odierno’s allegation that the surge is obviously working because US combat deaths have fallen so far in July. I know it is the general’s job to spin things this way, but it is my job to call a spade a spade. In fact the secular trend of US combat deaths for April, May and June was significantly up:
‘ The previous three months were the deadliest three-month stretch in the war, with 104 deaths in April, 126 in May and 101 in June. ‘
This is up from 81 in February and March. So the quarterly average is still higher than in winter. Three weeks tells you nothing. (It is 130 degrees in Baghdad; what guerrilla in his right mind rolls out a big offensive in July or August?) Second, what kind of improvement is that, where over-all attacks rise but fewer US combat troops are affected by them? That sounds like US troops are having less contact with the enemy, which is hitting out more frequently than ever before at Iraqi security and civilian targets. That outcome does not point to “success” for the “surge”!
Al-Hayat reports that many Iraqis simply do not believe that the US congress is serious when it votes against permanent bases in Iraq. Members of parliament say that they see these enormous hardened bases being built, which is practical proof to the contrary. They think the Democratic Congress is just posturing because of its struggle with the Bush White House. Shiite MP Qasim Da’ud said that, however, even in future US troops would not be accepted in Iraq, in part because the country’s neighbors are afraid of Washington’s intentions. (He is referring to Iran.)
0 Share 0 StumbleUpon 0 Printer Friendly Send via email
Posted in Iraq | Comments Off
Posted on 07/26/2007 by Juan
Bombings Kill dozens in Street Crowds
Sunni Arabs threaten withdrawal from Parliament
Iraqis were unified for a brief period on Wednesday as they came out in the streets from the north of the country to its south, from Irbil to Baghdad to Basra, to celebrate the country’s soccer (football) victory in the Asian Cup. People danced in the streets, sang, waved Iraqi flags, and drove with car doors open and passengers celebrating. Iraqis have constructed a powerful nationalism during the 20th century that Western observers now often discount, but those celebrations were a glimmer of the pre-Bush Iraq.
Sunni Arab guerrillas must have been planning for these street celebrations, since they hit them powerfully and effectively in Baghdad, with two car bombs, killing 55 and wounding 135 according to late reports. There were other bombings and mortar attacks in the capital, and 18 bodies were found in the streets. A vehicle with Iranian pilgrims was attacked.
The Sunni Arab Iraqi Accord Front is threatening once again to suspend participation in parliament. This development would be a severe blow to PM Nuri al-Maliki, who is trying to put together a new political bloc of ‘moderates’.
The US House of Representatives voted on Wednesday overwhelmingly to bar permanent US military bases in Iraq or any attempt to control Iraqi petroleum. Some Republicans apparently voted for the measure somewhat insincerely, arguing that there are no such things as permanent US military bases abroad, because bases require the consent of the host country. The Republicans may feel that the vote will nevertheless give them some cover in the 2008 elections. House members have to contest elections every 2 years, and the American public is clearly becoming impatient with the war.
Work began on the joint US-Iranian-Iraqi committee on security in the wake of Tuesday’s meeting. The Iranians are also considering higher-level talks.
Catch Farideh Farhi’s important discussion of the talks between US Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker and his Iranian counterpart at our group blog. She argues that Crocker’s show of pique with the Iranians was designed to mollify US rightwingers who oppose such talks, while we should keep our eyes on the substantive outcome of the negotiations, i.e. the joint committee on Iraqi security that targets “al-Qaeda in Iraq.”
Fred Kaplan reviews the leaked Crocker-Petraeus security plan covering through 2009 and finds it unlikely to succeed. Kaplan is skeptical about the ability of Iraqi security forces to “hold” neighborhoods in Baghdad. And, he cannot see how a temporary alliance of convenience with fractious, Shiite-hating Sunni tribesmen of al-Anbar Province against al-Qaeda in Iraq can produce a stable partnership or end sectarian fighting. He quotes military historian Stephen Biddle giving the plan only a 1 in 10 chance of success.
The military historian Tom Collier here in Ann Arbor wrote me on this plan,
” In its schools, the Army teaches a format for the study of any problem. It starts with “1. Assumptions,” and then goes on to facts bearing on the problem, conclusions, and recommendations. Students are taught that if the assumptions are incorrect, then the rest of the study will be invalid.
The “detailed plan” that Michael Gordon reported seems to be based on two shaky assumptions:
1. U.S. troops can use force to create “sustainable security” for the Iraqi government to function, and
2. Given that security, the Iraqi government *will* function and will reach “political reconciliation” among “disparate factions,” provide basic services, and stop the violence.
In other words, 1. we hope that we can put wings on a frog and, 2. we hope that the frog will then fly to paradise. And based on those assumptions, the “detailed plan” calls for U.S. troops to fight and die “until at least ’09.” Wow!!!” –Tom Collier
An audit has shown that only 42% of Bechtel’s reconstruction projects in Iraq was completed. Bechtel maintainst that changing priorities of key funder, the US Agency for International Development, caused 10 of 24 projects to be abandoned.
I wrote Wednesday about the disappointing harvests in the southern province of Dhi Qar, which the Arabic press attributed in large part to soil salinization.
Here are expert comments I received on this issue, which profoundly affects Iraqi food security. Not my field, and I did not realize how full of salts fresh water is, such that if it isn’t drained properly it salinizes the soil, too. I think I was probably misled by what I had read on Egypt, because its peasants and government appear to have been much more expert in dealing with this problem even after the Nile was dammed. So my correspondent wrote:
“Salinization of the soils in southern Iraq is very severe, perhaps even more severe than the Indus basin in Punjab or Sindh. The reason is the combination of poor drainage in the southern part of Mesopotamia and reduced flow of water due to damming of the rivers upstream. There are huge tracts of land in Dhi Qar, Basra, Missan, Babil, Diwaniyah and even Najaf and Karbala that are white with salt and thus unsuitable for agriculture. The fix, install good drainage and flush the soil of salt, will require large sums of money and a deliberate and thoughtful plan. The money at least theoretically exists but thoughtful planning is no where to be found.
The Ministry of Science and Technology worked with the Ministry of Agriculture and an American group to test a salt tolerant wheat variety in areas south of Baghdad. Farmers who participated were able to reap an economic crop for the first time in many years, some noted that it was magic. What happened to that variety is anybody’s guess. The chaos that engulfed the south and which paralyzed the government after 2005 ruined plans for large scale reproduction of the seed. Thus what you report in Dhi Qar is really nothing new. Agriculture in the southern part of Iraq was ruined long ago by poor stewardship of resources and deliberate destruction.
In Egypt, rice production in the delta is promoted to guard against salt water intrusion. The construction of the Aswan High Dam has compelled farmers and authorities to be watchful of creeping salinization all along the Nile basin because the Nile does not act as the ultimate drain it once was. But the issue with respect to salt is minor compared with Iraq and it is under control. ”
At the Napoleon blog, Bonaparte’s letters to his brother Joseph in spring-summer 1798.
0 Share 0 StumbleUpon 0 Printer Friendly Send via email
Posted in Iraq | Comments Off
Posted on 07/26/2007 by Juan
:
Trix: Tale of Three Villages: Kosova, 2007
With the status of Kosova uncertain after a Russian veto of a UN Security Council plan for its independence, its leaders are calling for elections this fall anyway. This volatile region in the Balkans is extremely important. We are lucky to have a guest editorial today on it. – Juan
Anthropologist Frances Trix writes:
| As we approached Krushe e Vogel, a village in southwestern Kosova, we met a tractor pulling a cart with workers going to the fields. A common enough scene in rural Kosova except that the driver of the tractor and all the workers were women. We entered a typical Albanian compound with high wooden gate and walls. Inside was a garden, chickens pecking around, a rusty tractor, the house, and again, only women.
The Kosovar Albanian woman I was with, Marte Prenkpalaj, had a special relationship with these village women. On March 26, 1999, she had looked out her family’s window across the Drini River to see women and children running toward the icy river on the other side. “Don’t go out,” her mother cautioned her, “there are paramilitaries.” But Marte, an elementary school principal knew something was wrong. She took the family tractor with its cart and drove down and across the wide riverbed with its shallow river. Four times she made this trip to pick up all the women and children from Krushe e Vogel and bring them to her village on the other side of the Drini.
That day the local Serbs, for there were about thirty Serb families living in the village and they were armed, had forced the Albanian men and older boys at gunpoint into a stable. The NATO bombing had begun two nights before, and conditions on the ground were precarious. The Serbs had ordered the women and children to go drown themselves in the river and chased them in that direction.
Three days later all the Albanian people of the region, including the women and children of Krushe e Vogel, went on the trek out of Kosova to Albania to wait out the war. Three months later they returned to find that all their menfolk had been killed that day in March, their bodies burned in the stable, and the remains dumped in the river. But the story does not end there.
Several years later, in line with its central directive to “build a multi-ethnic society,” KFOR (Kosovo International Security Force) troops from the Ukraine escorted a group of local Serbs for a “go and see” trip back to Krushe e Vogel. They could see their former homes and consider whether they wanted to become “returnees.”
But the Albanian women of Krushe e Vogel, when they understood what was going on, sat down in the road of their village to block their entrance. The KFOR commander ordered them to get up and let them pass. They refused. Tear gas was used on the women and sticks. Someone made a mobile phone call to Iqballe Rogova of Motrat Qiriazi, a women’s group that had worked with the women. Iqballe sped to the scene and was able to head off the convoy. Two weeks later an apology was received and the Ukrainian KFOR commander sent back to the Ukraine.
This brings us to our second “village” in Kosova, well delineated on a hillside of Prishtina, and known colloquially as Dragodan. I lived here during the early years of Milosevic and my son attended the local school, but Dragodan today is much built up, much changed since then. What were empty fields are now filled with multi-story homes with white UN Toyota jeeps and other more impressive vehicles parked nose to nose along the winding road.
For today Dragodan is a mini-green zone, peopled by the internationals who have actually governed Kosova in all matters of consequence since 1999. They work for the UN, UNHCR, EU, and OSCE–collectively known as UNMIK–the UN Mission in Kosovo. They write reports, publish colored brochures, and garner salaries that allow for fine Greek vacations and regular weekend trips to London. Many served earlier in Bosnia before they came to Kosova.
One of the main official concerns of this “village” is measuring the extent to which Kosova is meeting “standards.” There are eight major “standards,” set up by one of the better SRSGs, that is, Special Representative to the Secretary General, Michael Steiner, in 2001. Unfortunately Steiner did not involve Kosovar leaders early in the process of delineating these “standards.” In addition, they were set up three years after the war so none of the impressive humanitarian work or the rebuilding done by the Albanians in the early years counted. Instead, only the harder issues, like that of ethnic relations between Albanians and Serbs, remained, and the focus came here. Indeed, one main way to measure progress has been in numbers of Serb returnees.
This is deeply frustrating for Albanians, who see the 5% Serb minority as thereby favored by the internationals. Many local Serbs were part of the oppressive Serb regime of the 1990′s whose police and local paramilitaries killed 10,000 Kosovar Albanians between 1998 and 1999 and expelled over 800,000 Albanians from Kosova in 1999. A Norwegian church group, in concert with UNHCR, spent eight months after the end of the war in 1999, extracting corpses from wells in Kosovar Albanian villages (Martinsen, Josef. Puset e Vdekjes ne Kosove, “Wells of Death in Kosova,” Grafoprint: Prishtina, 2006). But this was done too quickly to figure in the “standards,” let alone the knowledge of those implementing them.
Steiner also came up with the slogan–”Standards before Status”–that is, the eight major “standards” must be met before talks on political status could begin. “Status” for Albanians has always meant independence from Serbia. This slogan can be seen as a way of motivating people; it was also a delaying tactic at a time when the UN Security Council was in no mood to consider Kosova, and the more common delaying and distracting tactics of municipal and general elections had already been used more than once. In classic bureaucratic mode, the eight “standards” morphed into hundreds of “activities” whose success was color-coded in thick booklets of charts for all municipalities.
In my many interviews with people from this “village,” I was struck with their singular lack of knowledge of recent history of the region. They tended to know of or to own Noel Malcolm’s Short History of Kosovo, but it was clear they hadn’t read it. If they were readers, they had read Robert Kaplan’s distorted Balkan Ghosts, a journalistic account that plays off Rebecca West’s beautifully written but distinctly pro-Serb account of her 1937 trip through former Yugoslavia. They were not familiar with recent books on Kosova and former Yugoslavia. They had little understanding of the 1998-1999 war, let alone the preceding decade of the 1990′s during which time Albanian Kosovars had all been fired from their jobs and expelled from high schools, institutions of higher learning, and medical facilities. The earlier period of renewed growth of Serbian nationalism under Milosevic in the 1980′s was also foreign terrain, although Milosevic had played off the fears of Serbs in Kosova and staged his major media event in 1989 on the field of the 1389 Battle of Kosovo, a short taxi ride south of Prishtina.
None of the many official internationals I met had bothered to study Albanian, an Indo-European language spoken by 95% of the people of Kosova. I asked an international high up in media relations who had been in Kosova for eight years whether he had studied Albanian. “I started,” he said, “but my employer wouldn’t pay for it and it was too expensive.” There is 44% official unemployment in Kosova with massive under-employment of educated people, so this is not credible. Another long-term international remarked that if you were going to learn a foreign language, Serbian made more sense since you could count it as three languages on your resume (Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian). These are the people running Kosova.
The third village is a Serbian one, Babin Most, that I have never seen mentioned in the news. It is off the road from Mitrovice heading south. It is a farming village and the gardens and fields are well tended. The farming equipment however looks aged; the official who drove me there pointed this out, explaining that Serbs tended to invest in central Serbia rather than in Kosova. Nor was there a teahouse or coffee shop in the village, but there was a video game shed with young people. What was most remarkable however was that none of the homes or barns had been damaged after the war. Rather this village had kept away from Serb military and police, and had kept good relations with its Albanian neighbors who had also protected it. No international cadre would have been capable of promoting or implementing this.
Rather, Serb enclaves that international cadres, including the international press, tend to find are places like Lipjan. A recent New York Times article (Craig Smith, June 25, 2007) quoted a Serb from Lipjan, south of Prishtina, who, while sitting under the family grape arbor, acknowledged he had served in the Serb army but said he never took part in the fighting or any war crimes.
This reporter must have been escorted around Kosova by internationals like those I too met, internationals who did not know the meaning of Lipjan for Albanians, or he would not have included it in the article. Lipjan prison, just west of town, was the major prison in eastern Kosova used by the Serbs for Albanians. There they were brought, tortured, and sometimes sent on to prisons in central Serbia. During May 1999, there were 34 Albanian prisoners in each 4 by 5 meter cell, totaling well over 3,000 people. Conditions were deplorable. But memory of this, only eight years old, never reached our green zone “villagers.” It is like interviewing someone from Dachau about difficulties of being an East Prussian refugee after World War II, and not knowing what Dachau was.
Also in Lipjan was a paper mill. Kosovar Albanians remember that over 1,000 Albanian books from the National Library in Prishtina were taken there by Serb officials in the mid-1990′s and turned into pulp. But this too appears unknown to the international escorts of our New York Times reporter. Like the Ukrainian KFOR escort to Krushe e Vogel, they did not know where they were taking people or what transpired there, if they cared.
Frances Trix
|
Frances Trix is a professor of linguistics and anthropology at Indiana University. She was an IREX fellow at the University of Prishtina 1987-1988, speaks Albanian, and recently returned from research work in Kosova.
0 Share 0 StumbleUpon 0 Printer Friendly Send via email
Posted in Uncategorized | Comments Off
Posted on 07/25/2007 by Juan
US-Iran Alliance Against Sunni Guerrillas?
US Security Plan Envisages Troop Presence to 2009
The headlines will probably concentrate on the shouting match between US Ambassador Ryan Crocker and Iranian diplomat Hassan Kazemi Qomi at their meeting in Baghdad. Crocker accused the Iranians of giving training and weapons to Shiite militias, some of which ended up being used against US troops in Iraq. The Iranian diplomat denied the charges. But in my view the money graf in this Telegraph report is this one:
‘ he two countries did agree to form a security committee, with Iraq, to focus on containing Sunni insurgents. The committee would concentrate on the threat from groups such as al-Qa’eda in Iraq, officials said, but not those[Shiite] militia groups the US accuses Iran of funding and training. ‘
If the US is allying with Iran against the Sunni insurgents and al-Qaeda, this is a very major development and much more important than some carping over Shiite militias. (My guess is that 98% of American troops killed in Iraq have been killed by Sunni Arab guerrillas). If the report is true and has legs, it will send Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal ballistic. The Sunni Arab states do not like “al-Qaeda” in Iraq, but they are much more afraid of Iran than of the Iraqi Sunni Arabs who are fighting against US military occupation.
A document leaked to the New York Times reveals that US Ambassador Ryan Crocker and Gen. David Petraeus have a two-year plan for security in Iraq, aiming for a pacification of Baghdad by summer of 2008.
My own suspicion is that summer, 2009 is about when most of the troops will be brought out of Iraq. I can’t imagine the anti-war forces getting 2/3s of both the House and the Senate and being able to over-ride Bush’s vetoes, and he seems determined to keep the US presence in Iraq for the rest of his presidency. There may be a drawdown (to 100,000?) in summer-fall of 2008, both because it will be needed in order not to break the army and because the plan will either have worked or not worked by then. (It would also generate headlines that would not hurt the Republicans, and I think some Iraq policy is made on that partisan basis). It seems likely that anti-war candidates of both parties will capture both houses of congress in ’08, and only a dramatic and unexpected development could throw the White House to a pro-war Republican such as Giuliani. So, the leaders on the ground there may as well plan that far out. But so far the surge has not stopped guerrilla attacks from rising to unprecedented levels, has not stopped guerrillas from striking elsewhere when they are blocked in Baghdad, and has not in fact provided space for political progress or reconciliation. So whether things will actually be better in summer of ’08 is murky to say the least. Certainly, I hope this horrible daily violence can end, for the sake of the Iraqis themselves. Ironically, if there were an end to violence, it might impel the Iraqi public and politicians, having begun to feel more secure, to ask the US forces to leave. I think fear of the Sunni Arab guerrillas is the only thing that has forestalled Grand Ayatollah Sistani from issuing a fatwa or ruling that the foreign forces must leave Iraq.
Women are increasingly being targeted for violence in Iraq, forcing some women aid workers to stay inside.
In addition to the massive suicide bombing in the southern Shiite city of Hilla, which killed at least 26 and wounded 66, police found 24 bodies in the streets of Baghdad, victims of sectarian death squads. McClatchy reports a much wider range of violence on Tuesday, including several bombings and mortar attacks in Baghdad and this item: “Three mortar shells targeted al Sadr hospital in Basra today. 3 were killed and 14 were injured.” If al-Sadr Hospital belongs to the Sadr movement, and if another Shiite militia attacked it, both facts would tell you something important about the situation in the far-southern Shiite port city of Basra (pop. 1.5 mn.)
Support for bombings of enemy civilians as a means of defending Islam has dropped dramatically in most Muslim countries since 2002, often being halved. The dramatic rise in Muslim victims of such tactics, not only in Iraq but also in Saudi Arabia, Morocco and elsewhere, no doubt influenced this change of attitude. The polling demonstrates that essentialist views of Muslims are always wrong. If their views of this matter can fluctuate so wildly, then it has nothing to do with their core identity. The other thing to remember is that if you asked most Americans whether it is legitimate to blow up enemy civilians to defend the United States, you’d likely get a big proportion saying ‘yes.’
For the genesis of an earlier Western invasion of a major Muslim Arab country, see today’s posting at my Napoleon blog.
0 Share 0 StumbleUpon 1 Printer Friendly Send via email
Posted in Iraq | Comments Off
Posted on 07/25/2007 by Juan
Bush Falsehoods about Al-Qaeda in Iraq
Bush gave a speech on Tuesday in which he made a large number inaccurate statements. Likely the recent Pentagon and White House practice of referring to all “insurgents” in Iraq as “al-Qaeda” was intended to lead up to this speech.
Bush maintained in his speech that the members of “al-Qaeda in Iraq” have pledged fealty (bay’at) to Usama Bin Laden. There is no evidence for this allegation. The foreign fighters who make up “al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia” are successors to previously-existing radical Muslim groups such as Ansar al-Islam and Monotheism and Holy War, both of which had distinct identities from al-Qaeda. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi even at one point forbade members of Monotheism and Holy War to give money to al-Qaeda. It is unlikely that they have all swung around behind Bin Laden, though some among the Saudi volunteers may have. As far back as 2005, Ansar al-Sunnah clearly feared the influence of Bin Laden and asked foreign volunteers to stop coming.
Bush made al-Qaeda in Iraq the central group in the insurgency. In fact, Pentagon statistics indicate that the US holds in captivity 19,000 Iraqis suspected of insurgent activities, whereas it has only 135 foreign fighters currently in custody. “Al-Qaeda in Iraq” is mostly foreign fighters. Obviously, it just is not that important, though it gets off some bombs, which is not to be taken lightly.
Bush says that tribal sheikhs in al-Anbar province have now taken on the foreign jihadis. But if that is so, why should we worry about them taking over Iraq? They cannot and the Iraqis would not let them (even the Sunni Iraqis would not let them, much less the Shiites or Kurds!) 1200 foreign volunteers cannot take over a country, and the US does not need 160,000 troops in Iraq to fight this small group. In fact, Bush risks raising the question of why 160,000 US troops have not made better progress against the small cohort of foreign fighters.
Bush alleged that the “al-Qaeda” fighters in Iraq are professional terrorists. He said that if he had not invaded Iraq, they would even so have been busy engaging in violence.
An analysis of persons named as fighters on internet sites 18 months ago vigorously contests Bush’s allegation:
‘out of 429 fighters only 22 (5.1%) have had fighting experience in other regions, demonstrating that the foreign fighters in Iraq do indeed constitute the third generation of Salafi-jihadists. . . It is worth noting that 17 out of 31 fighters [on which there was education data] quit their education to join the fight against the American occupation. This is also evident in the high percentage of BA degree holders (19.4%), which is different from what typically occurs in Salafi-jihadist movements, whose ideologues are normally the ones with high levels of education while the fighters are mostly young men who have not completed their education. . . Another interesting fact is that 22 of those fighters are married, and among those whose career status is known, 8 out of 18 (44%) work in the private sector, with some even being investors. This lends further credence to the notion that the occupation of Iraq, and all the excesses that surrounds it, is generating new developments in erstwhile socio-economically stable Salafi-jihadi networks.’
The small band of some 1200 foreign fighters in Iraq are not for the most part career terrorists as far as anyone can tell. They are too young, at an average of 27, for that description. They are a new generation. They were college students and financiers who became angry about Bush’s military occupation of a Muslim Arab country. In the absence of that invasion, they would still be at ordinary ho-hum jobs.
Bush says that his occupation of Iraq cannot explain the violent tactics of the “al-Qaeda insurgents” there. He says that the US was not in Iraq during the Embassy bombings of 1998, the attack on the US Cole in 2000, or September 11.
This talking point is pure propaganda on many fronts. First of all, Bush has not established that the foreign jihadis in Iraq are “al-Qaeda” in any significant sense. So his attempt to sneak in a continuity here is not legitimate. Second, while it is true that nothing justifies the violence of al-Qaeda (especially against a ship named the Cole!), it is not true that it lacks all context or motive or that US actions in Iraq were irrelevant to it. Muslim activists believed that US sanctions on Iraq were responsible for the deaths of 500,000 Iraqi children in the 1990s, and the US continued from time to time to bomb the country.
I wrote this earlier:
‘ That continental rift is the reason for the great interest in Republican Presidential Candidate Ron Paul’s argument with his rival Rudi Guiliani. Paul said in the recent debate that the US was attacked on 9/11 in part because of its prior involvement in Iraq.
Rudi Giuliani interrupted him, claimed he had never heard of that, and misrepresented Paul as justifying the attack.
But Paul was factually correct. In his 1996 fatwa declaring war on the United States, Bin Laden had said ” . . .the civil and the military infrastructures of Iraq were savagely destroyed showing the depth of the Zionist-Crusaders’ hatred to the Muslims and their children . . .”
Paul was saying that terror has a context, that the post-Gulf War US sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s that allegedly caused the deaths of 500,000 children helped produce hatred for this country in the Middle East.
In his reply to Giuliani’s demand for a retraction, Paul said,
‘ “I believe the CIA is correct when it warns us about blowback. We overthrew the Iranian government in 1953 and their taking the hostages was the reaction. This dynamic persists and we ignore it at our risk. They’re not attacking us because we’re rich and free, they’re attacking us because we’re over there.” ‘
The final thing to say is that in 2001 you could argue that Bush was not responsible for al-Qaeda, though he did not take it seriously for the first 8 months (and his father had something to do while Vice President in the 1980s with helping create it to fight the Soviets). But in 2007, if al-Qaeda is still there, if Bin Laden is still there to accept oaths of fealty, if it forms a major threat to the US– as Bush alleges– then it is his fault for not doing a better job against it in the past 6 years.
Bush’s falsehoods are unlikely to get much play or make any converts. The American public already knows the things I am saying (a big difference from 2003!) A few professional pundits who get rich off pandering to warmongers will trumpet the speech.
0 Share 0 StumbleUpon 0 Printer Friendly Send via email
Posted in Iraq | Comments Off