Secret UK Dossier "Damning" of Iraqi Army
The narrative of the American Right about Iraq is that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is finally in control, that the Iraqi armed forces are performing well, and that in short things are now going swimmingly. This narrative is a variation on the "Good News" story that the Bush administration has used all along to propagandize the American press and public.
The supine US press even goes along with al-Maliki's assertion that he reestablished control without firing a shot in the big city (1.7 million) of Mosul, a stronghold of Sunni Arab resentment of his government.
McCain, continuing the deliberate falsehoods that Scott McClellan politely called a 'permanent campaign' even managed to praise the Iraqi forces as having done "pretty well" when they failed in a frontal assault on a small rag tag militia in Basra.
Occasionally the facade is accidentally pulled away and we see the hell hole that is Iraq under Bush more clearly. A senior intelligence official accidentally left a Secret dossier on a London train from Waterloo to Surrey. Another passenger found it, was alarmed by the contents, and passed it on to the BBC. The British government is trying to get it back.
One of the documents? A "'top secret and in some cases damning' assessment of Iraq's security forces."
Shh. Don't tell John McCain or Fred Kagan, but they've just been busted.
Labels: Iraq
posted by Juan Cole @ 6/11/2008 07:40:00 AM
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8 Comments:
Juan,
I hate to get on your case like this, but I wish you would clarify what your position is on Barack Obama's promise of an undivided Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Saeb Erekat has said it is the worst thing to happen to Palestinians since the Six Day War.
Un abrazo
David Seaton
Sorry Mr. Cole, we need to bring these SOFA terms to the forefront today. Will apreciate posting again. Thank you
1. US forces would be free to attack via Iraqi airspace, land or waterways any country which threatens global and regional peace and security, menaces Iraqi government and constitution, or instigates terrorist and paramilitary groups.
2. US forces would have the right to set up additional military bases and stations inside Iraq that will support the Iraqi army. The number of the bases would depend on several factors, including the security conditions the US government deems desirable, negotiations with the US Embassy in Baghdad and the US command as well as discussions with the Iraqi Defense Ministry and relevant authorities.
3. The Iraqi government and its judiciary would not have the right to prosecute American forces or individuals. The immunity measure would extend to the US military, security, non-military and logistics firms affiliated with the US Army.
4. The Iraqi government would not have the right to independently determine whether US forces inside Iraq are qualified, nor would it have the right to limit or determine the size of American military bases and their routes.
5. US security forces would have the right to build security centers, particularly their own special prisons, to maintain security.
6. US forces would have the right to use their privilege to arrest those who threaten peace and security without a warrant from the Iraqi government or its institutions.
7. The US government must be informed of and negotiated with on Iraq's regional and international relations as well as signing of agreements so as to safeguard the country's security and constitution.
8• US forces will control Iraq's defense, interior and intelligence ministries for 10 years to carry out efforts toward training and enabling their staff, a measure which would mean even the weapons used by Iraqi forces and their types must be employed with the consent of US forces.
9. The agreement to be signed would be a pact rather than a treaty.
10• US forces would remain in Iraq for an unspecified and presumably lengthy period depending on conditions in the country. Future reviews on the matter would depend on the US and Iraqi governments. Any review would only be made under certain preconditions, including that Iraq's security and military organizations improve their performance; the country's security situation improves; national reconciliation takes place; neighboring countries are warned; the Iraqi government regains complete control throughout the country; and put an end to the presence of paramilitary forces inside Iraq.
Juan Cole, you have no back up information for this post.
Do you have any data at all that suggests that any ISF units other than the Basrah IP, IA 51st Bde, or IA 52nd Bde performed poorly.
Based on what I can gather the following IA brigades performed as well or better than expected:
50th Bde (former 3-8 from Wasit) (level C1)
14th Bde (from Salahadin) (level C1)
2 Bdes from 1st IAD (from Al Anbar . . . although one was redeployed from Diyala) (two of the best brigades in the IA that won the fight in Al Anbar)
26th Bde from Ramadi (one of the best brigades in the IA that won the fight in Ramadi)
36th T55 Tank Armored Bde (one of only three C1/C2 operational tank armored brigades in the IA)
1st IAD division HQs
So did the the INP Basrah Palace brigade, and the Babil and Karbala IP Emergency response units.
Most of the IA performed better than expected. The militias that they fought against were unable to logistically resupply their forces or sustain their fight against the IA . . . forcing then to sue for a cease fire.
In what way did the IA perform poorly?
I would also note that the British trained brigades in Basrah (38th and 51st Bdes) were the two worst quality brigades in the entire IA among the original 40 IA brigades (excluding the former Strategic Infrastructure Brigades that came from the facilities protection service.) The 10th IAD is the worst of the original 10 IA divisions, and it was trained by the Brits. (It is based in Maysan, Muthanna, Sammara.) There is no province in all of Iraq where the provincial IP were as mishandled as they were in al Basrah by the Brits, Fadheela Sadrists and ISCI.
It is possible that some British officers might have tried to malign the superior US trained IA units.
McCain, containing US casualties is his prime strategy. In McCain's view the prime metric for success or failure in Iraq is the US casualty rate. Evidently the casualty rate for Iraqis is a "What me worry?".
But before we get to worked up about McCain's indifference to the suffering of the indigenous, look at the Democratic comments, They too express no concern for the Iraqis.
Of course Gen Patraeus and his political machine early on told us to focus on US casualties (and Iraqi casualties in Bagdad alone)when the Surge began. And the Mass media dutifully did as told.
Without any clearcut US political objective or outcome in Iraq our military is pretty free to use any type of violence it chooses. The increasing use or aerial bombardment is an excellent example. Bombing can be done with virtually no US casualties. (We bombed Serbia and Kosovo daily for a month and never lost a man or woman). The US public has no idea who is killed, wounded or left homeless when these bombs explode. All we get is a starched shirt military news release about militants, extremists, al Qaeda, safe houses, etc. being destroyed.
We kill then bribe Sunnis, bribe then kill Shiites, help Turkey kill Kurds, then name Iran as the overarching enemy, which we would like to destroy but can't come up with the right pr campaign.(Bring Scotty back?)
So with the right combination of drones, fighter bombers, helicopter gunships, cruise missiles, long range artillery, and anything else the Pentagon can buy, we can wage McCain's painless occupation. We can sleep well knowing that only Iraqis are being killed.
To paraphrase: The only thing we have to fear is waking up. Will Obama have the guts and moral fiber to tell us otherwise?
The troops "performed badly" when they were asked to attack densely populated areas, or when they faced resistance. Only a tiny percentage of the commissioned officers are professional, the rest are militia members who were given the same ranks they had in their terror groups, with some being illiterate. Music to the ears of both the puppet government and their puppeteers who want to use their weakness as an execuse to stay.
But the Iraqi forces do not need to be good at all when the locals help them out with leads. That is what has been happening in Basra, Mosul, and Sadr City.
As for the Brits, they are not in a position even to assess what has been happening being stuck in a hole at the airport. Being critical of the Iraqis and the Americans is therapy. They went in as "the best in the world, the envy of the world" to restore a modern version of the British Empire. They performed amazingly badly, and would have gone home if it wasn't for Bush ordering the abismal PM Brown to keep them put.
"The troops "performed badly" when they were asked to attack densely populated areas, or when they faced resistance. Only a tiny percentage of the commissioned officers are professional, the rest are militia members who were given the same ranks they had in their terror groups, with some being illiterate."
I wouldn't say that in front of an Iraqi army soldier, at least if you want to have teeth afterwards.
In what way has the Iraqi Army "performed badly." The primary purpose of the IA is population protection. Sometimes they choose to slowly remove the enemy from population centers to avoid civilian casualties.
Almost all the junior officers of the IA have been through Lieutenant school (similar to what the Brits have.) Almost all the higher rank officers are professional officers from the old IA. Most of the mid and higher level officers in the new IA have been through staff college (school for mid to high level officers.)
The IA is already better quality than most Arab armies. As any observer from the Russian or Indian or Chinese army that has spent substantial time with the IA in the last few months. “Anonymous” you haven’t a clue about the IA.
The officers in the new IA are doing well. There is a shortage of good officers at the Major, Lt. Colonel and Colonel level. (The captains are soldiers who began officer school in 2003 and 2004.)
The primary challenge in the IA is NCOs, not officers.
Prof. Cole:
Your link points to an article that gives no info about what the documents said. Was the original article pulled?
Didn't T.E. Lawrence of British intelligence also lose his draft of Seven Pillars: a Triumph at Reading Station?
He then had to re-write the prose from memory (not that the document could be considered historiographically accurate - it resembles more an idyll)
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