Dubai: Party on, Dude

Even though Dubai's boom has turned to bust, the emirate known for its gaudy exuberance, which comedian Jon Stewart once called 'the bastard child of Saudi Arabia and Las Vegas,' couldn't restrain itself from yet one more big bash.



South African casino owner Solomon Kerzner spent $20 million on fireworks and other party notions to celebrate the opening of his new Atlantis resort on Dubai's Palm Island, at an event bedecked by celebrities such as Robert DeNiro and Charlize Theron. As soon as the fireworks ended, there was a call for partying to begin, and Kylie Minogue led the way.

The fireworks at the grand opening were spectacular:



Still, real estate prices on Dubai's Palm Jumeirah island have fallen by 40%, since prospective buyers can no longer easily get loans, given the credit crunch.

You have to wonder whether the world's first "dynamic building" is still going to get built.

Joint Experts' Statement on Iran

Below is a statement on Iran that I and others are hoping will be adopted in Washington as a way forward. Any of my readers who has a way of getting this statement to decision-makers in Washington should please do so. Just Foreign Policy is doing it as a petition. Also, my blogger colleagues should please comment widely on it.

It was carried by wire services such as Reuters and also the Associated Press.

Gary Kamiya at Salon pointed to it.

Michael Theodolu covered the statement in the Gulf.

Jim Lobe has written about it, under the rubric "Obama urged to forego Iran threats."

The statement follows:

Among the many challenges that will greet President-elect Obama when he takes office, there are few, if any, more urgent and complex than the question of Iran. There are also few issues more clouded by myths and misconceptions. In this Joint Experts' Statement on Iran, a group of top scholars, experts and diplomats - with years of experience studying and dealing with Iran - have come together to clear away some of the myths that have driven the failed policies of the past and to outline a factually-grounded, five-step strategy for dealing successfully with Iran in the future.

Joint Experts' Statement on Iran


Despite recent glimmers of diplomacy, the United States and Iran remain locked in a cycle of threats and defiance that destabilizes the Middle East and weakens U.S. national security.

Today, Iran and the United States are unable to coordinate campaigns against the Taliban and al-Qaeda, their common enemies. Iran is either withholding help or acting to thwart U.S. interests in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Gaza. Within Iran, a looming sense of external threat has empowered hard-liners and given them both motive and pretext to curb civil liberties and further restrict democracy. On the nuclear front, Iran continues to enrich uranium in spite of binding U.N. resolutions, backed by economic sanctions, calling for it to suspend enrichment.

U.S. efforts to manage Iran through isolation, threats and sanctions have been tried intermittently for more than two decades. In that time they have not solved any major problem in U.S.-Iran relations, and have made most of them worse. Faced with the manifest failure of past efforts to isolate or economically coerce Iran, some now advocate escalation of sanctions or even military attack. But dispassionate analysis shows that an attack would almost certainly backfire, wasting lives, fomenting extremism and damaging the long-term security interests of both the U.S and Israel. And long experience has shown that prospects for successfully coercing Iran through achievable economic sanctions are remote at best.

Fortunately, we are not forced to choose between a coercive strategy that has clearly failed and a military option that has very little chance of success. There is another way, one far more likely to succeed: Open the door to direct, unconditional and comprehensive negotiations at the senior diplomatic level where personal contacts can be developed, intentions tested, and possibilities explored on both sides. Adopt policies to facilitate unofficial contacts between scholars, professionals, religious leaders, lawmakers and ordinary citizens. Paradoxical as it may seem amid all the heated media rhetoric, sustained engagement is far more likely to strengthen United States national security at this stage than either escalation to war or continued efforts to threaten, intimidate or coerce Iran.

Here are five key steps the United States should take to implement an effective diplomatic strategy with Iran:

1. Replace calls for regime change with a long-term strategy

Threats are not cowing Iran and the current regime in Tehran is not in imminent peril. But few leaders will negotiate in good faith with a government they think is trying to subvert them, and that perception may well be the single greatest barrier under U.S. control to meaningful dialogue with Iran. The United States needs to stop the provocations and take a long-term view with this regime, as it did with the Soviet Union and China. We might begin by facilitating broad-ranging people-to-people contacts, opening a U.S. interest section in Tehran, and promoting cultural exchanges.


2. Support human rights through effective, international means

While the United States is rightly concerned with Iran's worsening record of human rights violations, the best way to address that concern is through supporting recognized international efforts. Iranian human rights and democracy advocates confirm that American political interference masquerading as "democracy promotion" is harming, not helping, the cause of democracy in Iran.


3. Allow Iran a place at the table - alongside other key states - in shaping the future of Iraq, Afghanistan and the region.

This was the recommendation of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group with regard to Iraq. It may be counter-intuitive in today's political climate - but it is sound policy. Iran has a long-term interest in the stability of its neighbors. Moreover, the United States and Iran support the same government in Iraq and face common enemies (the Taliban and al-Qaeda) in Afghanistan. Iran has shown it can be a valuable ally when included as a partner, and a troublesome thorn when not. Offering Iran a place at the table cannot assure cooperation, but it will greatly increase the likelihood of cooperation by giving Iran something it highly values that it can lose by non-cooperation. The United States might start by appointing a special envoy with broad authority to deal comprehensively and constructively with Iran (as opposed to trading accusations) and explore its willingness to work with the United States on issues of common concern.


4. Address the nuclear issue within the context of a broader U.S.-Iran opening

Nothing is gained by imposing peremptory preconditions on dialogue. The United States should take an active leadership role in ongoing multilateral talks to resolve the nuclear impasse in the context of wide-ranging dialogue with Iran. Negotiators should give the nuclear talks a reasonable deadline, and retain the threat of tougher sanctions if negotiations fail. They should also, however, offer the credible prospect of security assurances and specific, tangible benefits such as the easing of U.S. sanctions in response to positive policy shifts in Iran. Active U.S. involvement may not cure all, but it certainly will change the equation, particularly if it is part of a broader opening.


5. Re-energize the Arab-Israeli peace process and act as an honest broker in that process

Israel's security lies in making peace with its neighbors. Any U.S. moves towards mediating the Arab-Israeli crisis in a balanced way would ease tensions in the region, and would be positively received as a step forward for peace. As a practical matter, however, experience has shown that any long-term solution to Israel's problems with the Palestinians and Lebanon probably will require dealing, directly or indirectly, with Hamas and Hezbollah. Iran supports these organizations, and thus has influence with them. If properly managed, a U.S. rapprochement with Iran, even an opening of talks, could help in dealing with Arab-Israeli issues, benefiting Israel as well as its neighbors.

***

Long-standing diplomatic practice makes clear that talking directly to a foreign government in no way signals approval of the government, its policies or its actions. Indeed, there are numerous instances in our history when clear-eyed U.S. diplomacy with regimes we deemed objectionable - e.g., Soviet Union, China, North Korea, Libya and Iran itself (cooperating in Afghanistan to topple the Taliban after 9/11) - produced positive results in difficult situations.

After many years of mutual hostility, no one should expect that engaging Iran will be easy. It may prove impossible. But past policies have not worked, and what has been largely missing from U.S. policy for most of the past three decades is a sustained commitment to real diplomacy with Iran. The time has come to see what true diplomacy can accomplish.


Annex
Basic Misconceptions about Iran


U.S. policies towards Iran have failed to achieve their objectives. A key reason for their failure is that they are rooted in fundamental misconceptions about Iran. This annex addresses eight key misconceptions that have driven U.S. policy in the wrong direction.

Myth # 1. President Ahmadinejad calls the shots on nuclear and foreign policy.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has grabbed the world's attention with his inflammatory and sometimes offensive statements. But he does not call the shots on Iran's nuclear and foreign policy. The ultimate decision-maker is Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the commander-in-chief of Iran's forces. Despite his frequently hostile rhetoric aimed at Israel and the West, Khamenei's track record reveals a cautious decision-maker who acts after consulting advisors holding a range of views, including views sharply critical of Ahmadinejad. That said, it is clear that U.S. policies and rhetoric have bolstered hard-liners in Iran, just as Ahmadinejad's confrontational rhetoric has bolstered hard-liners here.

Myth # 2. The political system of the Islamic Republic is frail and ripe for regime change.

In fact, there is currently no significant support within Iran for extra-constitutional regime change. Yes, there is popular dissatisfaction, but Iranians also recall the aftermath of their own revolution in 1979: lawlessness, mass executions, and the emigration of over half a million people, followed by a costly war. They have seen the outcome of U.S.-sponsored regime change in Afghanistan and in Iraq. They want no part of it. Regime change may come to Iran, but it would be folly to bet on it happening soon.

Myth # 3. The Iranian leadership's religious beliefs render them undeterrable.

The recent history of Iran makes crystal clear that national self-preservation and regional influence - not some quest for martyrdom in the service of Islam - is Iran's main foreign policy goal. For example:

• In the 1990s, Iran chose a closer relationship with Russia over support for rebellious Chechen Muslims.

• Iran actively supported and helped to finance the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.

• Iran has ceased its efforts to export the Islamic revolution to other Persian Gulf states, in favor of developing good relations with the governments of those states.

• During the Iran-Iraq War, Iran took the pragmatic step of developing secret ties and trading arms with Israel, even as Iran and Israel denounced each other in public.


Myth # 4. Iran's current leadership is implacably opposed to the United States.

Iran will not accept preconditions for dialogue with the United States, any more than the United States would accept preconditions for talking to Iran. But Iran is clearly open to broad-ranging dialogue with the United States. In fact, it has made multiple peace overtures that the United States has rebuffed. Right after 9/11, Iran worked with the United States to get rid of the Taliban in Afghanistan, including paying for the Afghan troops serving under U.S. command. Iran helped establish the U.S.-backed government and then contributed more than $750 million to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Iran expressed interest in a broader dialogue in 2002 and 2003. Instead, it was labeled part of an "axis of evil."

In 2005, reform-minded President Khatami was replaced by the hardliner, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. But the same Supreme Leader who authorized earlier overtures is still in office today and he acknowledged, as recently as January 2008, that "the day that relations with America prove beneficial for the Iranian nation, I will be the first one to approve of that." All this does not prove that Iran will bargain in good faith with us. But it does disprove the claim that we know for sure they will not.
Myth # 5. Iran has declared its intention to attack Israel in order to "wipe Israel off the map."

This claim is based largely on a speech by President Ahmadinejad on Oct. 26, 2005, quoting a remark by Ayatollah Khomeini made decades ago: "This regime that is occupying Qods [Jerusalem] must be wiped off/eliminated from the pages of history/our times." Both before and since, Ahmadinejad has made numerous other, offensive, insulting and threatening remarks about Israel and other nations - most notably his indefensible denial of the Holocaust.

However, he has been criticized within Iran for these remarks. Supreme Leader Khamenei himself has "clarified" that "the Islamic Republic has never threatened and will never threaten any country" and specifically that Iran will not attack Israel unless Iran is attacked first. Ahmadinejad also has made clear, or been forced to clarify, that he was referring to regime change through demographics (giving the Palestinians a vote in a unitary state), not war.

What we know is that Ahmadinejad's recent statements do not appear to have materially altered Iran's long-standing policy - which, for decades, has been to deny the legitimacy of Israel; to arm and aid groups opposing Israel in Lebanon, Gaza and the West Bank; but also, to promise to accept any deal with Israel that the Palestinians accept.

Myth # 6. U.S.-sponsored "democracy promotion" can help bring about true democracy in Iran.

Instead of fostering democratic elements inside Iran, U.S.-backed "democracy promotion" has provided an excuse to stifle them. That is why champions of human rights and democracy in Iran agree with the dissident who said, "The best thing the Americans can do for democracy in Iran is not to support it."

Myth # 7. Iran is clearly and firmly committed to developing nuclear weapons.

If Iraq teaches anything, it is the need to be both rigorous and honest when confronted with ambiguous evidence about WMDs. Yet once again we find proponents of conflict over-stating their case, this time by claiming that Iran has declared an intention to acquire nuclear weapons. In fact, Iranian leaders have consistently denied any such intention and even said that such weapons are "against Islam."

The issue is not what Iran is saying, but what it is doing, and here the facts are murky. We know that Iran is openly enriching uranium and learning to do it more efficiently, but claims this is only for peaceful use. There are detailed but disputed allegations that Iran secretly worked on nuclear weapons design before Ahmadinejad came to power, concerns that such work continues, and certainty that Iran is not cooperating fully with efforts to resolve the allegations. We also know that Iran has said it will negotiate on its enrichment program - without preconditions - and submit to intrusive inspections as part of a final deal. Past negotiations between Iran and a group of three European countries plus China and Russia have not gone anywhere, but the United States, Iran's chief nemesis, has not been active in those talks.

The facts viewed as a whole give cause for deep concern, but they are not unambiguous and in fact support a variety of interpretations: that Iran views enrichment chiefly as a source of national pride (akin to our moon landing); that Iran is advancing towards weapons capability but sees this as a bargaining chip to use in broader negotiations with the United States; that Iran is intent on achieving the capability to build a weapon on short notice as a deterrent to feared U.S. or Israeli attack; or that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons to support aggressive goals. The only effective way to illuminate - and constructively alter - Iran's intentions is through skillful and careful diplomacy. History shows that sanctions alone are unlikely to succeed, and a strategy limited to escalating threats or attacking Iran is likely to backfire - creating or hardening a resolve to acquire nuclear weapons while inciting a backlash against us throughout the region.

Myth # 8. Iran and the United States have no basis for dialogue.

Those who favored refusing Iran's offers of dialogue in 2002 and 2003 - when they thought the U.S. position so strong there was no need to talk - now assert that our position is so weak we cannot afford to talk. Wrong in both cases. Iran is eager for an end to sanctions and isolation, and needs access to world-class technology to bring new supplies of oil and gas online. Both countries share an interest in stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan, which border Iran. Both support the Maliki government in Iraq, and face common enemies (the Taliban and al-Qaeda) in Afghanistan. Both countries share the goal of combating narco-trafficking in the region. These opportunities exist, and the two governments have pursued them very occasionally in the past, but they have mostly been obscured in the belligerent rhetoric from both sides.

About the Experts

* Ambassador Thomas Pickering (Co-chair)
* Ambassador James F. Dobbins (Co-chair)
* Gary G. Sick (Co-chair)
* Ali Banuazizi
* Mehrzad Boroujerdi
* Juan R.I. Cole
* Rola el-Husseini
* Farideh Farhi
* Geoffrey E. Forden
* Hadi Ghaemi
* Philip Giraldi
* Farhad Kazemi
* Stephen Kinzer
* Ambassador William G. Miller
* Emile A. Nakhleh
* Augustus Richard Norton
* Trita Parsi
* Barnett R. Rubin
* John Tirman
* James Walsh

For more about the experts see the bottom of this page.


Disclaimer


This statement is the product of a large group of experts with diverse knowledge, experience and affiliations. While all members strongly support the general policy thrust and judgments reflected in this statement, they may not necessarily all concur with every specific assertion or recommendation contained therein.

Zawahiri: Obama is the anti-Malcolm X

Ayman al-Zawahiri attacked Barack Obama in a video released on the internet on Tuesday. Fox News reprinted the whole transcript here. I'm a little bit confused by this step, since I thought the US networks had agreed under pressure from Bush only to carry excerpts from al-Qaeda, and the US elite has been deeply critical, to say the least, of Aljazeera for carrying 2-minute clips. (Of course, all this brouhaha is hypocritical, since Rupert Murdoch's satellite service in Asia carries both Aljazeera and Aljazeera English; Murdoch owns Fox News). Fox seems to be the only network carrying the full English text (which was provided by al-Sahab, the al-Qaeda video production company (see the videos below).

The headline in most comments on the video was that al-Zawahiri used a racist slur against Obama, calling him a "house Negro" and referring to the distinction Malcolm X made between pro-white slaves who lived next to the mansion, and the "field Negros" who toiled beneath the whip and hated their master.

In the video, al-Zawahiri does pointedly refer to Malcolm X's distinction. But he speaks in Arabic of "`abid al-bayt," "the house slave," and does not use the word "Negro" (which the al-Sahab translators are rendering 'zinji.') The connotations and implications are much the same, but it is not exact to say that al-Zawahiri used the phrase "house Negro" himself.

The Egyptian physician and mass murderer made a key error in his analysis, however, since if we were to take Malcolm X's parable seriously, Barack Obama would have to be assigned the role of the master.

In the past 50 years, the United States has, by dint of enormous daily ethical struggle, altered the dynamics of race. It is no longer the case that African-Americans only have a choice of serving under a white elite or rebelling against it. They can be senator or president in their own right. There is still a great deal of economic and educational inequality, and one election will not suddenly change that, but America's Apartheid days are gone. Al-Zawahiri, formed intellectually in the late 1960s, is stuck in a paradigm, of a worldwide revolution of people of color against the white global ruling class, which is nonsensical when Japan and China have the second and fourth largest economies, respectively, and when the United States has an African-American president.

Ironically 89 percent of the true heirs of Malcolm X, the contemporary American Muslim community, voted for Obama; and they had a 95 percent turnout, the highest in their history.

Al-Zawahiri celebrates what he sees as the US admission of defeat in Iraq (insofar as it has committed to leave by 2011). That al-Zawahiri can gloat about the withdrawal in this way underlines how foolish Bush and his cronies were to attempt to militarily occupy, over a period of several years, a major Arab Muslim country with a strong history of popular resistance to imperialism. Bush by his arrogance and ignorance granted this talking point to al-Qaeda.

Still, it has to be said that radical Sunni fundamentalism was never a majority tendency among Iraqi Sunnis, and appears to be spiralling down into insignificance. The real victor in Iraq is not al-Qaeda and its ideological soul mates, but rather the pro-Iranian Shiite government of Nuri al-Maliki. Al-Zawahiri viciously attacked Iran in his last video, and spoke darkly of an Iranian alliance with the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan.

So if Bush was defeated in Iraq, so was al-Zawahiri and al-Qaeda (insofar as their ideological soul mates, the Sunni radical fundamentalists there, have been largely rolled back).

Al-Zawahiri complains about Barack Obama's warm feelings for Israel and his willingness to pray alongside Jews, characterizing that gesture as a declaration of enmity toward Muslims. But Egypt and Jordan are majority-Muslim and they have peace treaties with Israel; and 65 percent of American Muslims believe that a peace settlement can be reached with Israel that is also fair to the Palestinians. So the issue cannot be one of simply enmity toward Islam (are Egyptians and Jordanians self-hating Muslims?)

The terrorist mastermind is even more scathing toward Obama's hopes of talking to Iran and of sending more troops to fight in Afghanistan. "That has failure written all over it," al-Zawahiri pronounced.

It is absolutely clear toward the end of the video that al-Zawahiri is petrified of Obama's popularity and is very afraid that he will be a game-changer in relations between the Muslim world and the United States. Hence his flailing around talking about house slaves, as though Obama were not (as of Jan. 20) himself the most powerful man in the world, catapulted into his position by nearly half of American whites (who voted for him in higher proportions than they did for Clinton and Kerry).

Al-Zawahiri has seen a lot of Muslim politics, and if he is this afraid of Obama, it is a sign that the new president has enormous potential to deploy soft power against al-Qaeda, and al-Zawahiri is running scared, trying to pretend it is still the 1960s, when it just isn't.

Hassan al-Subaihi argues that before the election, Arabs overwhelmingly supported Obama, but that his appointment of Israeli-American Rahm Emanuel as White House Chief of Staff has divided them into a number of camps, each with a different view of the new president. Ironically, he finds that Palestinian intellectuals are among the most realistic and yet positive about Obama. The least hopeful are the radical fundamentalists (e.g. Hamas) and the poorly educated.

Obama has the opportunity to be the most popular US president in the Middle East since Eisenhower. If he is wise, he will defeat al-Zawahiri not just by military means but by stealing away al-Zawahiri's own intended constituency. Obama is about building communities up; al-Zawahiri is about destroying them. If Obama can convince the Arab publics of this basic fact, he will win.

The Zawahiri video is subtitled in English:

The Zawahiri video, Part I:



And, here is Part II:

Parliament Session on Security Agreement Interrupted by Altercation

Al-Zaman reports in Arabic that the Iraq parliament's Committee on Security and Defense voted in favor of the Iraqi-US security agreement. That committee is headed by Hadi al-Amiri, the leader of the Badr Organization (the paramilitary wing of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq). Badr's willingness to vote for the agreement is a clear sign that the United Iraqi Alliance, the ruling coalition of Shiite fundamentalist groups, has swung behind it. Faryad Rawanduzi, a member of the Kurdistan alliance who also serves on the committee, confirmed that a majority of its members voted for the agreement.

The second complete reading of the agreement in the full parliament was interrupted on Wednesday by an altercation. Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari had come forward to give an explanation of it provisions. He was approached by a Sadrist MP, Ahmad al-Mas`udi. The Sadrists maintain that Zebari's bodyguards suddenly attacked al-Mas`udi. The Sadrist version of the story was supported by the Iraqi list, by the Arab Bloc for National Dialogue, and by the Fadhila or Islamic Virtue Party. The Sadrists announced that they would boycott parliament sessions in protest against the assault on al-Mas`udi, and would initiate legal action against Zebari's guards.

Zebari, a Kurd, is known as very pro-American and a champion of the security agreement, some of which he helped negotiate. (He was allegedly sidelined by the prime minister himself in the later stages of negotiations because he was felt to be too accommodating to Washington). The Sadrists, Shiite nationalists, reject the very notion of a bilateral security agreement between Iraq and what they see as an army of foreign occupation.

In contrast, Kurdish MP Mahmud Osman said that the parliament had postponed its session until Thursday after the Sadrists had interrupted its deliberations. He said that the Sadrist MPs had crowded to the front of the room just as Zebari had begun explaining the provisions of the agreement. They began protesting, which impelled the guards to push them away, and the shoving caused the session to be called off.

Parliamentarians continued to dispute whether enabling legislation was required to set the terms of a parliamentary vote on a foreign treaty. (At the moment, a simple majority of the quorum of MPs present would be sufficient; the Sadrists want to require a 2/3s majority).

The Islamic Virtue Party, with a base in Basra and the south, came out against the security agreement on Wednesday.

But if the Kurdistan Alliance, with 58 seats, and the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance, with 83 seats, can get their MPs to show up, the two of them have the votes to approve the agreement. It is said that Prime Minister al-Maliki would prefer that there be a wide consensus on it, and Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani has stipulated such a consensus as among the prerequisites for its legitimacy. But the Iraqi preference for consensus is not always realistic in the game of parliamentary politics, and the agreement may have to be submitted for an up and down vote.

Some observers,in the wake of Wednesday's altercation, suggested that the agreement was in trouble. There are two scenarios where it does not pass through parliament. The first is one where al-Maliki declines to bring it up for a vote because the Sunni Arabs unanimously reject it, and he wants it to have backing from all three major etho-religious groups. The second is one where Iran wheedles or bribes enough members of the United Iraqi Alliance to oppose it that they ensure it does not have a majority.

There are differeing opinions among Iraqi insiders on whether Iran is still working to undermine the agreement, or whether it has accepted it (as government spokesman Ali Dabbagh maintains) because it forbids the use of Iraq as a staging ground for attacks on other countries.

Hundreds of Iraqis from the Tribal Support Councils, established by PM Nuri al-Maliki as loyal to him personally, demonstrated in favor of the agreement in Basra, Muthanna and Karbala provinces on Wednesday.

McClatchy says that despite official Pentagon support for the agreement, some high DoD officials are dismayed at how much authority the agreement gives away to the Iraqis and blame the White House for being so eager for the agreement that they caved in to Iraqi demands.

There were bombings in Baghdad's Karrada district and in the northern city of Mosul on Wednesday, leaving 8 persons wounded, including several soldiers.

On Tuesday, Reuters reported the following political violence:

'BAGHDAD - Police found 15 decomposed bodies in a mass grave in northern Baghdad's Ur district, police said. Some still had visible marks of gunshot wounds, they said.

* BAGHDAD - Two roadside bombs exploding in quick succession wounded two police in Baghdad's southwestern Dora neighbourhood, police said.

SINJAR - One person was killed and 13 others wounded in a bomb blast in Sinjar, 390 km (240 miles) northwest of Baghdad, police said.

BAIJI - A militant accidentally blew himself up planting a roadside bomb on Monday in central Baiji, 180 km (120 miles) north of Baghdad, police said. Two others were wounded.

BAGHDAD - A roadside bomb wounded two people in the district of Nahda, in central Baghdad, police said.

BAGHDAD - A roadside bomb planted near the house of general inspector of the Electricity Ministry wounded his son and wife in Qadissiya, southwestern Baghdad, police said.

SAMARRA - Five militants were killed and three others wounded in a four hour gunbattle between al Qaeda fighters and a U.S.-backed Sunni Arab security patrol near Samarra, 100 km (62 miles) north of Baghdad, said Samarra police Colonel Abdul-Khaleq Saleh al-Samarraie.'

Security Agreement Requires all US Troops Out of Iraq by 2011; Blocs in Parliament Maneuver to Defeat It

McClatchy has published an English translation of the draft security agreement between the Iraqi government and the Bush administration.

Leila Fadel of McClatchy's reads the agreement as calling for all US troops to be out of Iraq by the end of 2011:

' If Iraq's parliament endorses the agreement, in six weeks American forces would have to change the way they operate in Iraq, and all U.S. combat troops, police trainers and military advisers would have to leave the country by Dec. 31, 2011. President-elect Barack Obama's campaign plan to leave a residual force of some 30,000 American troops in Iraq would be impossible under the pact. Unless the agreement is amended, which would require the formal written approval of both sides, in three years there no longer would be any legal basis for U.S. armed forces or civilian contractors of the Department of Defense to remain in Iraq. If Iraq wants American forces to leave earlier, it could terminate the agreement with one year's notice. The United States has the option to do the same. '

Also, of course, the agreement can be immediately altered if both sides mutually agree to do so.

PM Nuri al-Maliki went on Iraqi t.v. to push for passage of the security agreement. The problem with t.v. in Iraq is that the electricity is off so much of the day that a lot of people cannot see any particular such program.

Al-Hayat reports in Arabic that controversy rages in raging in Baghdad over the security agreement with Washington that was passed by the Iraqi cabinet on Sunday. The Kurdistan Alliance, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), and the Islamic Da'wa (Missionary) Party were all attempting to line up the votes in parliament to pass it. In contrast,the Sadr Movement was seeking to put together a coalition of parties to oppose the agreement and stop it from being passed by parliament.

The Iraqiya Party of Iyad Allawi has announced that it has severe reservations about the agreement, and would prefer that Iraq go back to the UN Security Council for an extension of its mandate to the multinational forces rather than signing a bilateral treaty with the US.

The Sunni fundamentalist Iraqi Accord Front also announced that it had reservations about the agreement on Tuesday. Adnan Dulaimi demanded that the remaining thousands of Iraqi Sunnis in US custody be released as part of the price for IAF support of the measure.

The Sadrists have 30 seats in parliament, the Iraqiya has 25, and the Iraqi Accord Front has 44, for a total of 99. They need 138 of 275 (though since not all the MPs are likely to show up, they need 51 percent of the quorum of MPs that does attend the session). It is not clear to me where the Iraqi Dialogue Front, with 11 seats, stands (ex-Baathist secular Sunnis). If they reject the agreement, that would bring the opposition to 110. They would need to pick up 28 Shiite independents in order to block the agreement.

But if ISCI and Da'wa strongly support the agreement, these two powerful parties may well be able to sway the independent Shiites to vote for it..

Al-Hayat reports in Arabic that Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani's office announced that he is studying the text and will only grant his approval once he is satisfied that it preserves national sovereignty and that a national consensus forms around it. He charged the Iraqi parliament with investigating whether it met those two conditions.

The text of the announcement said, "Sistani informed various political leaders in past days and weeks of the necessity that any agreement must aim at ending the foreign presence in Iraq and removing the country from Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter, on two bases. The first is that it must preserve the highest interests of the Iraqi people, past and future, recover for Iraq its complete sovereignty, and bring security and stability. The second is that there must be a national consensus about it. Without these two, no such agreement can be acceptable."

Meanwhile, the speaker of the Iranian parliament, Ali Larijani, came out against the agreement. (The rest of the Iraqi establishment seems happy with the 2011 deadline for withdrawal of all US troops. Larijani will probably run for president next spring-summer, and he may be adopting a hard line stance on this issue in hopes of gaining propularity with the Iranian voters.

Al-Hayat also says that in advance of the provincial elections in Iraq now scheduled for 31 January, a conflict has broken out among Shiite parties in the south. The struggle was provoked by the High Electoral Commission, which granted the request of MP Abd al-Latif al-Wa'ili (Independent, supported by Fadhila or Islamic Virtue Party) that a referendum be held on whether Basra should be transformed into an autonomous Federal Region. This move is opposed by the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, led by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, who wants all 9 of the southern provinces to become a Federal Region or confederacy.

The Da'wa (Islamic Mission) Party of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki is genrally opposed to the creation of any new Federal Regions that would detract from the authority of the central government. Al-Maliki is currently embroiled in a struggle with the Kurds insofar as he is attempting to reduce the prerogatives of the Kurdistan Regional Government.

The fourth major Shiite group, the Sadrists led by Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr, rejects all federal regions, insisting on the primacy of the central government. They sent a letter to the Arab League detailing the points in the agreement that they believed to be unlawful.

In the Iraqi constitution, federal regions are provincial confederacies that enjoy semi-autonomy and have complete ownership of any new natural resource finds (including oil and gas).

Another plan against which the Basra scheme is competing envisions a union of Basra, Nasiriyah and Amara, for which a campaign has been launched to gather signatures from at least 2 percent of the voters in those three provinces.

In other news, a recently retired senior law lord in the UK has blasted the Iraq War as a serious violation of international law.

Ghoul's Glossary: Vice President

Vice President: n. Political chief in charge of committing vice.

The official can fulfill his public duties by committing a wide range of sins or crimes, including murder and treason (see Burr, Aaron and Breckenridge, John). Lazier and greedier incumbents have satisfied themselves with mere extortion, tax evasion, bribery, and conspiracy (see Agnew, Spiro). Energetic and conscientious vice presidents have engaged in the whole range of vice, including subverting the constitution, committing war crimes, engaging in treason through betrayal of covert intelligence operatives, or owning shares in abusive private prisons. (See Cheney, Richard Bruce). Some holders of the office have misunderstood its requirements, neglecting to distinguish themselves by any form of criminality and so dooming themselves to complete oblivion rather than the profound obscurity that is generally granted their more venal counterparts.

Is al-Maliki Creating a Personal Militia in Iraq?

The USG Open Source Center translates an article from the Kurdish press complaining that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has been busily creating his own tribally based private militias, called 'Isnad,' and is using them to project his authority through brute force in various parts of Iraq.

Iraq: What after Al-Maliki's (Support) Councils?
Kurdistani Nuwe
Tuesday, November 18, 2008
Document Type: OSC Translated Text

Iraq: What after Al-Maliki's (Support) Councils?

Text of report by Iraqi Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) newspaper Kurdistani Nuwe on 12 November

Article by journalist Latif Fatih Faraj: Kirkuk, Militia and Al-Maliki

Throughout its own history, Kirkuk has never had so much police force. For it has 11,000 policemen, apart from the army and different sorts of security forces and other institutions. Instead of opening special courses and workshops in military awareness, how to deal with the citizens and in the field of activities, instead of strengthening them with advanced and modern weapons and arsenals, instead of reminding them that they are the servants of the people and not impediments and obstacles before the freedom of the citizens, instead of cooperation, organization and deepening the spirit of brotherhood and peaceful compatibility amongst them, efforts are made on dividing them, turning them into party members and destroying the relations among them.

Not only that, the prime minister of Iraq has been for a long time busy creating his own special militia named (Isnad) 'Support'. The Isnad force, which nobody knows what Maliki wants it for, he wishes to deploy it everywhere in this country without calling it a militia. This will turn into an absolute question for all of us when Al-Maliki and without taking into account the change in Iraq as well as the role of the other political, ethnic and religious components in Iraq speaks in a rough manner of the centre's gaining strength. As if that were not enough, he has a project for the reoccupation of the severed regions and only God knows where else he has project so as to expel the Kurds from the delicate places, or, at least, to take back authority from the Kurds and enfeeble them, Al-Maliki is trying all methods of harassment. This is while we are still determined to take the dilapidated ship 'Iraq' to the shores of security. I know that more than any other time now Al-Maliki should be ousted and expelled from power, if he does not deal with the conditions carefully.

Al-Maliki's threats in the formation of the 'Support' council, picking on Kirkuk and his constant threatening looks are not solely directed towards Kurds. Therefore a council for the confrontation of the crisis has to be thought of, a council that can set limits to Al-Maliki and contain him. In these new circumstances, they make us forget one fight for the sake of another fight, neglect one question for another. Presumably, this is what Al-Maliki wishes. In the game of trimming Khanaqin's wings, he put back Jalawla, Sa'diyah and their neighbouring regions under the Iraqi army's control. And now he is coveting for Jabara. All this and the naive Kurds are against each other in many issues. This is conspicuous in our policies and measures here and there and even the blind can perceive them.

Today the preliminaries of the same policy of trimming are in sight, particularly what is taking place in Khurmatu, Daquq, Huwayjah and the other places. Efforts are incessantly being made to make the components of these places look dubiously at each other. At present, Al-Maliki's activities cannot be disregarded. Besides, approximately one month ago, Dr Adil Abd-al-Mahdi candidly and openly pointed to the threats.

At the time, I expressed very early my own observations on Article 140. Now that Al-Maliki's dream in passing that period of time came true and the election law for the governorates' councils is on the right track, the beginning of a division is appearing in the horizon and Maliki is busy experimenting with the other paths, it is time we asked, then who can identify the differences between Saddam's Al-Quds Army and Dr Nuri al-Maliki's the 'Support Councils'? It is a simple question, is it not?

(Description of Source: Al-Sulaymaniyah Kurdistani Nuwe in Kurdish -- daily newspaper published by Iraqi Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK))

Bakshi: Is No News Really Good News?: On the road to peace between Israel and Palestine

Gitanjali Bakshi writes in a guest op-ed for IC:

After months of slow but substantive progress, recent developments in Occupied Palestine, Israel and the U.S. have been largely unproductive. If we continue along this path in 2009, it will lead to a collapse in the on-going Israel-Palestine peace process.


There are currently three main obstacles in the way of an Israel-Palestine roadmap to peace – A factional split within the Palestinian administration, the instability currently plaguing Israeli politics and the uncertainty of the future U.S. administration’s stance on what many consider to be the central tenet of Mid-East peace. The last few weeks have witnessed some disappointing developments in all three of these areas, leading to a rather moribund picture of future peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian entity.

To begin with, conciliatory talks between the Hamas and Fatah factions within Palestine have come to what seems to be a screeching halt. Despite insistent remarks by both sides that peace talks have not collapsed but have simply been deferred, the fact remains that Egyptian brokered negotiations have been postponed twice already due to obvious disagreements. The two rival Palestinian blocs have voiced their discontent in the media about recent political prisoner exchanges, they have bickered over the extension of Mahmoud Abbas’ presidential term and they have both accused each other of being funded and influenced by external actors.

The peace proposal produced by Cairo aimed to create a transitional government acceptable to all parties as well as restructure the Palestinian security forces under Arab oversight – thereby dealing with contentious issues that led to the Gaza-West Bank split in the first place. However negotiations based on this proposal, last set for November 9th, have been postponed indefinitely. Who knows if Fatah and Hamas will meet before the year end and whether the Egyptian proposal will stand the test of time.

One thing is certain however – President Mahmoud Abbas’ four year term technically expires on the 8th of January 2009 and unless the two most important parties currently in Palestinian politics agree upon an extension and subsequent synchronization of Presidential and Legislative elections in 2010, there will be utter pandemonium in the occupied territories.

Overall the situation for reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah does not look promising but without a unity government at the helm of affairs in Ramallah it will be impossible to mount any considerable effort against continued Israeli occupation and the crippling blockade over Gaza.

As for the Israeli side of the peace-coin, all efforts towards a possible land for peace proposal were flung out the door when foreign minister Tzipi Livni and her center Kadima party failed to form a sizeable coalition government in October. This development has brought Israeli politics back to the drawing board, with 2009 elections ushering in a period of pandering to the public whim. It has been a proven fact in past Israeli politics that any talk of compromise on the Palestinian territories is strictly taboo during the campaign process. Peace deals have worked more for outgoing heads of state in Israel, rather than incoming ones.

Besides, two out of three contenders for the post of PM in the upcoming elections do not have the best records when it comes to the peace process. Likud party head Benjamin Netanyahu will never stand for a division of the occupied territories, especially not Jerusalem, thus dashing all hopes of a two-state solution and his last term in office has been categorized as the period in which the “Oslo agreement received its mortal blow.” In addition, Israeli polls conducted in May 2008 portend a bleak future for peace negotiations between Israel-Palestine with Netanyahu’s hard-line Likud party winning a clear majority of seats in parliament during these polls.

Our next contender Ehud Barak is known for his hawkish position in the three decade long conflict between Israelis and the Palestinians and his recently orchestrated incursion into the Gaza strip when the rest of the world stood focused on the US presidential elections displays him in a less than favorable light when it comes to the future peace processes.

Even foreign minister Tzipi Livni refrained from any bold statements in favor of the peace process during recent negotiations held in Sharm El Sheikh. Livni made it very clear in interviews to the Israeli press that she would not be presenting any dramatic reports on progress and that her main aim was to keep international pressure off Israel as the elections approached. Perhaps the only beacon of peace in current Israeli politics is President Shimon Peres but whether he will be able to carry the newly elected parliament towards a possible peace deal with the Palestinians, yet remains to be seen.

Finally the last hurdle in the pathway of Israel-Palestine peace negotiations is the current U.S. President elect and his administrations’ approach to the Middle East. With the U.S. as the top facilitator and sponsor of the peace process, the region waits with bated breath, refusing to move forward without the U.S. at the helm. The current appointment of Rahm Emanuel as chief of staff was surprisingly faced with skepticism within both Arab and Jewish quarters. Although Rahm is the son of an ex-Irgun militia supporter and has voiced his opposition towards Hezbollah and Hamas as totalitarian entities, he is considered to be a skeptic by his Jewish counterparts in Israel and during his time under the Clinton administration he forged ties with Rabin’s aides…not Netanyahu’s. In any case the chief of staff was chosen for his expertise on domestic issues in order to deal with the current financial crisis.

The two most important posts that we need to look at as indicators to future US-Middle East policy are the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense currently held by Condoleezza Rice and Robert Gates respectively. Some of the popular candidates for Secretary of State include Sen. John Kerry who propounded a theory of negotiation during his own presidential run, Sen. Chuck Hagel who follows a Reaganist theory of international politics but was one of the outspoken Republicans against the war in Iraq, Governor Bill Richardson a Nobel Peace Prize nominee and Sen. Richard Lugar who supports the down-sizing of military troops in Iraq and has extensive expertise in the field of nuclear disarmament.

Candidates for the Secretary of Defense position include Robert Gates himself although his reluctance towards unfettered negotiations with Iran seems incongruent with Obama’s message of change and dialogue, John Hamre who is currently president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and wields much experience in war budgeting and rehabilitation efforts and Sen. Jack Reed who has made extensive trips to assess the situation in Iraq and was one of Obama’s close advisors on his trip to the Middle East.

All these choices seem reasonable but the point remains that whatever the outcome, we will still have to wait till January 20th 2009 before the new administration even comes into power let alone starts taking decisions that will influence the region. Secondly we all know that the financial crisis currently stands as the top most priority on the U.S. ‘to do list’ right now. With over 240,000 jobs lost in October alone pushing the unemployment rate to 6.5%, it comes as no surprise that the Middle East will just have to wait in line.

The end of 2008 marks the end of a benign and desperate endeavor for peace in the Middle East, known as Annapolis and resumption of hostilities between Hamas and Israel. So what do we have to look forward to? - Further friction between Hamas and Fatah, a potential regression in peace efforts in Israel and a cautious and frankly terribly busy US administration? If we continue along this trajectory in 2009 it could be detrimental to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and the potential for a two-state solution.

Gitanjali Bakshi
Strategic Foresight Group
C-306 Montana Bldg.
Lokhandwala Complex
Andheri (W)
Mumbai, India

Daily Beast

Check out the terrific new politics and news site The Daily Beast.

Iran's Sudden Support for Iraq-US Security Pact

Omid Memarian explains Iran's turnaround on the Iraqi-US security agreement, which it was rejecting only last month:

'Obama's victory disarms leaders such as Ahmadinejad, who for decades have used inefficient American foreign policies as excuses to justify their own failures, mismanagement and corruption. Earlier this year, Ahmadinejad said that the "U.S. (political) establishment will not let Obama win the presidential election." This was believed because in none of the Muslim countries, including Iran, does a man of a minority ethnicity like Obama have even a slim chance of getting a position in a high office. But American democracy allow this.'

McClatchy has more: "Reports from Iran's state news agency called an Iraqi Cabinet vote that advanced the security compact a "victory for the ruling party and its Kurdish partners," referring to the Shiite lawmakers who supported the agreement."

Me, I agree with Memarian that the turning point was the election Obama. The Iranians would never have trusted McCain enough to hope for any good outcome from a security pact. But I think they are convinced that Obama really does want US troops out of Iraq, and that he wants to talk to Iran.

The Iranians haven't changed their minds about the goal,of getting US troops out of Iraq,but they can now afford to be a little patient.

Somali Pirates Take Saudi Tanker

Somali pirates have hijacked a Saudi oil super-tanker off the coast of Kenya and are steering it toward a Somali port.


Somalia


Riyadh

Is Obama Wise to Make getting Usamah bin Laden so Central to his Public Policies?

My column at Salon.com is out:

"Should Obama chase Osama?

On Sunday the president-elect told "60 Minutes" he wants to capture or kill bin Laden. Is he setting himself up for failure?"

I argue that while actually stepping up pressure on al-Qaeda and quietly going after Bin Laden more vigorously would be all to the good, speaking so publicly and frequently about this goal is unwise.

If Bin Laden cannot be found, Obama will be blamed for not living up to his own rhetoric.

And, trying to get at Bin Laden may backfire if US air strikes and incursions further dismay the Pakistani public, the support of which is important to the US fight against extremists. (Pakistanis largely voted for the center-left, secular-leaning Pakistan People's Party in February's election).

So this is an instance in which 'speak of it seldom and wield a big stick behind the scenes' is the better policy.

Read the whole thing.

New Regional Struggle between Iran & al-Qaeda?

Some observers are speculating that the abduction of an Iranian diplomat in Peshawar, northern Pakistan, may signal a new conflict between Iran and al-Qaeda or the Taliban.

In the growing diplomatic tiff between Pakistan and Iran over the kidnapping in Peshawar of an Iranian diplomat, Hishmatullah Atharzadeh, the Pakistani authorities have blamed the Tehrik-i Taliban of Baitullah Mahsud. This is the group, based in the tribal agencies, that is known as the "Pakistani Taliban."

Meanwhile, the Italian AKI news service reports a senior al-Qaeda militant as saying that the abduction was payback in reprisal for Iran's hostile actions against al-Qaeda and the Taliban:

' The militant said Atharzadeh's abduction was due to "the arrest of top Al-Qaeda leaders in Iran, for facilitating the US invasion on Iraq through pro-Iran militias and last but not the least for waging the war on the Taliban in Pakistani Khurram agency where Iran provided arms and ammunition to the Shia tribal groups to fight against the Taliban," '

h/t In One Ear . . .

Taliban: Obama same as Bush

A Taliban suicide bomber detonated his payload at the entrance of a government building in Dand near Qandahar, killing 2 policemen and a civilian.

Aljazeera English reports on Taliban activities near Qandahar and speculates that the movement is aiming to come back into the city of its birth. The report quotes a member of the Taliban saying that Obama is no different than Bush and that both are longstanding enemies of his group. The piece also alleges that the Taliban in that area are making over $300 million a year from drug smuggling. $1.5 billion worth of poppy seeds that were to become heroin were seized on Monday.

Iraqis View Security Agreement as having a Flexible Timetable

Al-Zaman reports in Arabic that the Iraqi cabinet approved the security agreement between the Bush administration and the Iraqi government. It will now go to the Iraqi parliament, where it will be voted on on November 24. Out of 36 cabinet members, 28 were present for Sunday's vote (a lot of Iraqi politicians actually live in Amman or London because of the poor security situation). Of the 28, 27 voted in favor.

Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) was in Tehran. He sent word back that ISCI cabinet secretaries should vote for the agreement. Iran had earlier opposed the agreement, but appears to have been persuaded to cease lobbying Shiite members of parliament against it. Al-Hakim's group, along with the Islamic Mission (Da'wa) Party of the prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, controls many of the Shiite votes in parliament.

Despite some reservations, the Kurdistan Alliance also voted for the agreement. Kurds were afraid it would limit their quest for semi-autonomy and control of more of Iraq. On the other hand, they very much want the US troops to stay, since they see them as protectors against Arab dominance.

Typically, the Kurdistan Alliance and the major Shiite parties can put together a parliamentary majority, so the agreement looks likely to pass.

Two members of the Sunni Arab fundamentalist coalition, the Iraqi Accord Front also voted for the agreement. (Update: Time says 2 IAF members voted for it, one against, and 3 were absentees.) One of the three parties in that coalition, the Iraqi Islamic Party, wants the agreement to go not only to parliament but also to a national referendum. Al-Zaman says that the leader of the IIP, Tariq al-Hashimi, is asking for the referendum because Shaikh Abdul Karim Zaydan, the spiritual counselor of the Muslim Brotherhood of Iraq, has given a fatwa against the agreement. The Iraqi Islamic Party is a branch of the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood, and al-Hashimi is therefore in the uncomfortable position of defying his own party's spiritual guide. If the measure went to a referendum, the IIP would be off the hook.

There is a dispute among Iraqi parliamentarians as to whether the agreement can be passed by a simple majority (i.e. 51% of those MPs present, assuming there is a quorum) or by a supermajority of 2/3s. Some are saying that they should pass legislation specifying which it is. The al-Maliki government maintains that this issue is decided by the president.

Al-Zaman says that President-Elect Barack Obama was shown the agreement and agreed to be bound by its provisions.

In contrast, the secretary-general of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, expressed dismay that he was not shown the agreement before the cabinet vote. Iraq is a member of the Arab League, and the latter feels that any treaty that affects the sovereignty of one of its members is in its purview.

Al-Hayat reports in Arabic that Iraqi government spokesman Ali Dabbagh said that as soon as the agreement is passed, Iraq will go to the United Nations Security Council to ask to be removed from Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and for permission to abrogate Order 17 issued by US viceroy Paul Bremer.

Of order 17, , Tom Engelhardt wrote:

' Order 17 is a document little-read today, yet it essentially granted to every foreigner in the country connected to the occupation enterprise the full freedom of the land, not to be interfered with in any way by Iraqis or any Iraqi political or legal institution. Foreigners--unless, of course, they were jihadis or Iranians--were to be "immune from any form of arrest or detention other than by persons acting on behalf of their Sending States," even though American and coalition forces were to be allowed the freedom to arrest and detain in prisons and detention camps of their own any Iraqis they designated worthy of that honor.'

The Iraqi government believes it can by signing this bilateral agreement with Bush get back its full sovereignty and escape the humiliation of being in receivership to the United Nations and having Bremer's law give foreign carpetbaggers the run of Iraq. This belief explains why even the proud Nuri al-Maliki is willing to sign on the dotted line.

Dabbagh was emphatic at a news conference that "The Iraqi government has the right to request the abrogation of the agreement when its own security forces are ready, even if it is before the end of the stipulated timetable."

Some Western observers have assumed that the 2011 date is non-negotiable once the agreement is signed, but that is not true. Insisting on a provision that any side could bring certain articles of the agreement to a premature close was one reason the Iraqis sent the agreement back to the US a month ago.

In other news, the Iraqi High Electoral Commission has permitted the placing on the ballot of a measure that would amke Basra a regional government in its own right, analogous to Kurdistan. If this measure went through, Basra would own all new oil fields that are discovered and developed.

Obama 'Commander-in-Chief' on Fox?

Since Bush was elevated by the Supreme Court in 2000, we've heard Fox Cable News (a failed conspiracy of media billionaire Rupert Murdoch to move the US public to the far right) refer to George W. Bush ad infinitum as 'commander-in-chief.'

In fact, Bush was just the president; the Constitution did not envisage that there would be a standing army, and 'commander-in-chief' is a subsidiary, occasional function of the president, not a title. There is something deeply fascist about calling the civilian president the CINC all the time. But at least they should be consistent.

Aside from Sean Hannity complaining that Obama will be commander-in-chief, we haven't heard so much of that epithet applied to the new president.

So how about, it Fox Cable News? Are we going to hear that "Commander-in-Chief Barack Obama ordered US troops in Afghanistan to find terrorist mastermind Usamah Bin Laden today?' Will that sentence be broadcast by the unfair and unbalanced network?

Or are only some presidents commanders-in-chief?

Maybe some people are part-time patriots?

If Fox won't use this diction, shouldn't we send them emails complaining about the inconsistency? If they call a Euro-American president "Commander-in-Chief" and not an African-American one, wouldn't that be a form of racism?

Afghan article says US Bin-Ladin hunt phoney

The USG Open Source Center translates an article from the Persian Afghan press alleging that French troops were at one point close to capturing Usamah Bin Ladin in Afghanistan, but that American forces stopped them from doing so. It says that a forthcoming French documentary containing interviews with the French soldiers provides proof for the allegation. The argument is that the Bush administration needed Bin Ladin to be at large in order to justify its military expansionism.

Afghan article says US Bin-Ladin hunt phoney
Hasht-e-Sobh
Friday, October 3, 2008
Document Type: OSC Translated Text

Afghan article says US Bin-Ladin hunt phoney

Text of article, "Bin-Ladin on the run? The rumour which was fact", by Afghan independent secular daily newspaper Hasht-e Sobh on 29 September

So, the rumour was right: French soldiers trapped Usamah Bin-Ladin, but were not allowed by the Americans to arrest the apparent fugitive leader of Al-Qa`idah. A Bin-Ladin documentary just released by French documentary cinema examines this issue, an issue which has led to heated debate in the French media.

This French documentary shows how the Americans are interested in continuing the game, a bloody and expensive game whose victims are only the unprotected and local people of our dry and dusty country. It was last year that rumours spread about this report in Kabul, but it has not been taken seriously by the media. But watching this revealing French documentary changes the rumours into disturbing facts. "Bin Laden, the failings of a manhunt", produced by Emmanuel Razavi and Eric de Lavarene, two French filmmakers and reporters, assesses and confirms the claims of French soldiers that they could have killed Usamah within two operations, but the American forces prevented them. This film has not been broadcast publicly yet and is to be broadcast by Planet, a French network.

Even though French soldiers have insisted on this in the battlefield many times, the Elysees Palace in Paris and the White House in America have rejected this, and the Afghan leadership does not have any information about it yet!

The main question that arises is the extent to which the "Bin Laden on the run" project is a problem for America and Afghanistan. Seven years of suicide bombing and explosions, blood and violence, unmanned fighter planes, and old vehicles full of explosives, all to catch a long-bearded Arab whom America apparently hates? And an Arab who worked for the CIA in the name of Allah, and who now, also in the name of that same Allah, has conducted a jihad against that same CIA?

Facing the facts in this Usamah film is a bitter and disturbing experience and will make you nervous and wish that what it is that you are watching is just a baseless rumour, or a figment of Hollywood's imagination. But it is not. The pictures are real and you are facing a debate in documentary form. The only justification for the bloody presence of America in Afghanistan is the ambiguous existence of Usamah Bin-Ladin and the Al-Qa'idah terrorist network.

George Bush, with his "war on terror" project, has transformed the middle east and Afghanistan into an inflamed bomb ready to explode, but has not found out anything about his beloved lost Usamah Bin-Ladin so far.

What is seen, and the film also emphases this, is that all these slogans, this fighting and killing are a game, a painful and prolonged game whose end even the players do not know and which is running out of control. Apparently, it is a game of cat and mouse, just like "Tom and Jerry", the famous cartoon. But it is a reality that the stubborn one from Texas does not want to catch the mouse - unlike credulous Tom - and that the long-bearded Wahhabi Arab does not want to hide - unlike the intelligent and roaming Jerry. Their prolonged game has made not only the audiences tired but has also transformed the playground into a big pool of blood.

There have always been questions that neither the politicians have been willing to answer, nor the independent western media to raise. If Usamah is not the lost one of the Americans, then who is? What are the Americans searching for in Afghanistan and who are they looking for? The main media in the West remained silent before the report of the Usamah Bin-Ladin arrest by French soldiers. And, through a news boycott, they reduced a certain fact to a rumour.

Certainly, they will do the same before this film, too. But instead they will try to complicate the scenario. More painful than anything else is the political fair in Kabul, a poor fair where everyone offers his despicable commodity - a combination of generous western customers and thankful sellers of the country. Everyone knows the fact, like "an obvious secret", but no one wants to irritate the delicate minds of their nervous guests, guests who will be staying at home until the new year.
Politicians try to forget such news in Kabul, and this is the advice they give to the people. Forgetting and ignoring such facts is possible, but how can we forget and ignore the bombs exploding next to our houses every day?

Bombs which sometimes rise from the ground and sometimes descend from the air.
(Description of Source: Kabul Hasht-e-Sobh in Dari Kabul Hasht-e Sobh in Dari - Eight-page secular daily launched in May 2007; editor-in-chief, Qasim Akhgar, is a political analyst and Head of the As