1: Russia generally sees DAESH as pretty overhyped. This has a couple of reasons:
A) Joining DAESH means bowing or kneeling to Al-Bagdadi. Anyone with experience in the North Caucasus will tell you that the people there arent into kneeling or bowing before anyone. There are Chechens (because Chechens like Al-Shishani run things in DAESH to an extent) who join it as well as ethnic Russian convertites. For Jihad minded Dagestanis/Lezgians etc., Al-Nusra is the prefered option.
B) The Russian services are quite well versed on Salafist ideology, and are aware that DAESHs salafist ideology has a couple of points (they are ideologically forced to accept a pitched battle at Dabiq for example, also, their Kalif doesnt have the proper number) which could be easily exploited.
Nusra does not share these weaknesses, because Nusra is not claiming to be a Caliphate.
C) DAESH itself is a pretty factious coalition. You have an agglomeration of Sunni tribesmen, former Baath specialists, Chechens, other foreigners and professional Jihadists. One reason why DAESH commits such public massacres is to create cohesion between its various factions, after all, if you massacred prisoners together on live TV, you are stuck with each other because the rest of the world wants to kill you. Despite that, these factions can be played against each other, and frictions can be gained and exploited by some proper disinformatsiya.
Nusra meanwhile effectivly acts as a Jihadi foreign legion equivalent (it is in the name even, "Front of assistance"), they do not claim to be a Kalifate, meaning that accepting their support does not neccesarily mean subordination under them (in practice, Nusra is running a lot of stuff, but part of that is because of increased levels of military competence compared to other Syrian rebel factions), they can thus pretty easily interface with restive moslem populations, quickly set up shop elsewhere and cannot be forced into pitched battles for ideological reasons.
This is a major reason why Russia is bombing Nusra far more heavily then DAESH, they simply regard them as vastly more dangerous.
The Russian campaign by the way has major other aspects. Quite a number of surrenders, retreat and reconciliations of rebel groups, or of "neutral" groups such as Armenian militias in Aleppo, were negotiated with Russian involvement. In this case, the involvement likely took the shape of Russia guaranteeing that Assad will honor comitments to amnesties etc. he makes to individual rebel groups. Assad isnt exactly trusted (and for quite legitimate reasons) and having Russia as a third party in such regime minor rebel negotiations is a faciliator.
Many of the "neutrals" are often in a desperate position, being between the loyalist Skylla and the Jihadi Charybdis. Being able to assure Russian guarantees in return for yielding to the loyalists can make such yieldings (the actual terms vary wildly) far more attractive then fighting to the death.
Russia also has pretty good relations with the Syrian Kurds, and in some cases, may have negotiated the switch of a minor rebel group from being islamist to going under the Kurdish umbrella. The Kurdish formation of the "Union of democratic forces" is very usefull in this regard.
I also wish to echo the dismay at using the term "minions".
The Assad "loyalists" often dont fight for Assad, they fight for their own survival. Defeat for them will mean nearly certain genocide, and most Alawites were, as a matter of fact, not privileged compared to Sunnis.
Being Alawi mattered for very high positions (Ambassador, Colonel etc.), but not for the kind of careers most people would actually enter.
If you end up in the hands of Nusra, being Alawi means death.
The ascension of the Assad clan meant the end of the Alawites centuries long status as third class citizens, and so one can argue that they did benefit from the Assad clans rule, but this "benefit" is not something the deserve being murdered for.
Apart from that, I can understand why Hafez Al Assad and the Alawites couped. Put yourself in their shoes, Alawis did not have enough money to bribe themselfs out of the military, so they were overwhelmingly drafted and used as Cannon fodder in a number of lost wars against the might of the IDF. Alawi lifes were wasted with reckless incompetent abandon by their Sunni superiors, and while I am far from whitewashin Hafez, Syrian military performance in the Yom Kippur war under Assad was vastly improved compared to Syrias performance vs. Israel under Sunni leadership.
A couple of points:
1: Russia generally sees DAESH as pretty overhyped. This has a couple of reasons:
A) Joining DAESH means bowing or kneeling to Al-Bagdadi. Anyone with experience in the North Caucasus will tell you that the people there arent into kneeling or bowing before anyone. There are Chechens (because Chechens like Al-Shishani run things in DAESH to an extent) who join it as well as ethnic Russian convertites. For Jihad minded Dagestanis/Lezgians etc., Al-Nusra is the prefered option.
B) The Russian services are quite well versed on Salafist ideology, and are aware that DAESHs salafist ideology has a couple of points (they are ideologically forced to accept a pitched battle at Dabiq for example, also, their Kalif doesnt have the proper number) which could be easily exploited.
Nusra does not share these weaknesses, because Nusra is not claiming to be a Caliphate.
C) DAESH itself is a pretty factious coalition. You have an agglomeration of Sunni tribesmen, former Baath specialists, Chechens, other foreigners and professional Jihadists. One reason why DAESH commits such public massacres is to create cohesion between its various factions, after all, if you massacred prisoners together on live TV, you are stuck with each other because the rest of the world wants to kill you. Despite that, these factions can be played against each other, and frictions can be gained and exploited by some proper disinformatsiya.
Nusra meanwhile effectivly acts as a Jihadi foreign legion equivalent (it is in the name even, "Front of assistance"), they do not claim to be a Kalifate, meaning that accepting their support does not neccesarily mean subordination under them (in practice, Nusra is running a lot of stuff, but part of that is because of increased levels of military competence compared to other Syrian rebel factions), they can thus pretty easily interface with restive moslem populations, quickly set up shop elsewhere and cannot be forced into pitched battles for ideological reasons.
This is a major reason why Russia is bombing Nusra far more heavily then DAESH, they simply regard them as vastly more dangerous.
The Russian campaign by the way has major other aspects. Quite a number of surrenders, retreat and reconciliations of rebel groups, or of "neutral" groups such as Armenian militias in Aleppo, were negotiated with Russian involvement. In this case, the involvement likely took the shape of Russia guaranteeing that Assad will honor comitments to amnesties etc. he makes to individual rebel groups. Assad isnt exactly trusted (and for quite legitimate reasons) and having Russia as a third party in such regime minor rebel negotiations is a faciliator.
Many of the "neutrals" are often in a desperate position, being between the loyalist Skylla and the Jihadi Charybdis. Being able to assure Russian guarantees in return for yielding to the loyalists can make such yieldings (the actual terms vary wildly) far more attractive then fighting to the death.
Russia also has pretty good relations with the Syrian Kurds, and in some cases, may have negotiated the switch of a minor rebel group from being islamist to going under the Kurdish umbrella. The Kurdish formation of the "Union of democratic forces" is very usefull in this regard.
I also wish to echo the dismay at using the term "minions".
The Assad "loyalists" often dont fight for Assad, they fight for their own survival. Defeat for them will mean nearly certain genocide, and most Alawites were, as a matter of fact, not privileged compared to Sunnis.
Being Alawi mattered for very high positions (Ambassador, Colonel etc.), but not for the kind of careers most people would actually enter.
If you end up in the hands of Nusra, being Alawi means death.
The ascension of the Assad clan meant the end of the Alawites centuries long status as third class citizens, and so one can argue that they did benefit from the Assad clans rule, but this "benefit" is not something the deserve being murdered for.
Apart from that, I can understand why Hafez Al Assad and the Alawites couped. Put yourself in their shoes, Alawis did not have enough money to bribe themselfs out of the military, so they were overwhelmingly drafted and used as Cannon fodder in a number of lost wars against the might of the IDF. Alawi lifes were wasted with reckless incompetent abandon by their Sunni superiors, and while I am far from whitewashin Hafez, Syrian military performance in the Yom Kippur war under Assad was vastly improved compared to Syrias performance vs. Israel under Sunni leadership.