The greatest accomplishment of the protestors so far, curiously, is that after showing its true face the regime (*cough* Egyptian Army) now has to force Mubarak from power to curtail embarrassment. If the Egyptian military didn't have close ties with the US I think this probably would have ended in some Tiananmen-like crackdown. The US isn't driving the process but it has effectively set limits to what the regime can do. Think there is now a decent chance relatively free elections will occur this year.
How is it that members of the US foreign policy establishment (and, I think, also the military) routinely express their belief/wish that the SOFA agreement will be renegotiated given how complete US withdrawal from Iraq was Obama's signature campaign promise during the 2008 election? I'm still baffled, frankly, why Obama isn't himself setting up a big victory parade--this is one "Mission Accomplished" proclamation which can't later be undone. Or that journalists won't probe the inconsistency between the stated goals of Obama and Maliki, on the one hand, and the seeming contrary wishes of so many American commentators. What gives?
When Maliki told Iraqis that their country was sovereign and independent, did anyone else see this as foreshadowing that he might attempt a coup? Such tactics, after all, are the right of sovereign nations (ie. if such a thing happened this would be none of Obama's business).
I think Obama does genuinely want to withdraw all US troops from Iraq before 2012 (the political cost of not doing so would be immense--his base is disillusioned enough). Who knows if he'll succeed. The interests which would prefer the US to stay, clearly, are capitalized in the tens--and possibly hundreds--of billions of dollars.
Maliki, I predict, won't surrender the prime ministership until he has no other choice. And, frankly, I don't see what combination of forces will push him out.
There is no society where leaders at the political apex surrender power ungrudgingly. Many of Iraq's current problems stem from decisions made during the drafting of that country's constitution. One could have created a system which produced neat results (for every election, dispute, or question, a flow chart leads to one unambiguous conclusion). In the British parliamentary system, 50% + 1 gives a ruling party near total control over the government (with the only two contraints being back benchers and the next election). Because Iraq is a fractious society, the drafters of that country's constitution created a system with greater ambiguity (not every dispute leads to a specified outcome).
While this lack of clarity has been beneficial in some respects, from the get go the danger was, well, the situation we have today: the system won't be able to produce the clear result necessary to force an incumbent from power. When will Iraq get its new government subject to constitutional limitations? My prediction: never. What we're going to get now is an ad hoc sharing of the spoils (or, worst case, a drift back to civil war).
The greatest accomplishment of the protestors so far, curiously, is that after showing its true face the regime (*cough* Egyptian Army) now has to force Mubarak from power to curtail embarrassment. If the Egyptian military didn't have close ties with the US I think this probably would have ended in some Tiananmen-like crackdown. The US isn't driving the process but it has effectively set limits to what the regime can do. Think there is now a decent chance relatively free elections will occur this year.
How is it that members of the US foreign policy establishment (and, I think, also the military) routinely express their belief/wish that the SOFA agreement will be renegotiated given how complete US withdrawal from Iraq was Obama's signature campaign promise during the 2008 election? I'm still baffled, frankly, why Obama isn't himself setting up a big victory parade--this is one "Mission Accomplished" proclamation which can't later be undone. Or that journalists won't probe the inconsistency between the stated goals of Obama and Maliki, on the one hand, and the seeming contrary wishes of so many American commentators. What gives?
al-Maliki Declares Independence
When Maliki told Iraqis that their country was sovereign and independent, did anyone else see this as foreshadowing that he might attempt a coup? Such tactics, after all, are the right of sovereign nations (ie. if such a thing happened this would be none of Obama's business).
I think Obama does genuinely want to withdraw all US troops from Iraq before 2012 (the political cost of not doing so would be immense--his base is disillusioned enough). Who knows if he'll succeed. The interests which would prefer the US to stay, clearly, are capitalized in the tens--and possibly hundreds--of billions of dollars.
Maliki, I predict, won't surrender the prime ministership until he has no other choice. And, frankly, I don't see what combination of forces will push him out.
There is no society where leaders at the political apex surrender power ungrudgingly. Many of Iraq's current problems stem from decisions made during the drafting of that country's constitution. One could have created a system which produced neat results (for every election, dispute, or question, a flow chart leads to one unambiguous conclusion). In the British parliamentary system, 50% + 1 gives a ruling party near total control over the government (with the only two contraints being back benchers and the next election). Because Iraq is a fractious society, the drafters of that country's constitution created a system with greater ambiguity (not every dispute leads to a specified outcome).
While this lack of clarity has been beneficial in some respects, from the get go the danger was, well, the situation we have today: the system won't be able to produce the clear result necessary to force an incumbent from power. When will Iraq get its new government subject to constitutional limitations? My prediction: never. What we're going to get now is an ad hoc sharing of the spoils (or, worst case, a drift back to civil war).