I think this is a crucial point that is often overlooked; this conflict and the UNSC decision has created a greater problem of legitimacy of the UNSC decisions than we realize. In either of the scenarios above, UNSC ends up shooting itself in the leg. The solution the US is pushing for now, it seems, is to quickly build a coalition that includes other Arab nations and have the NATO carry out the enforcement and execution of its decisions, albeit it a limited fashion.
By the way. I am pretty sure that Professor Cole is not an apologetic of the militarism. And the comparison of Iraq and Libya is one of the first things that comes to mind. However, to separate the wheat from the chaff, so to speak, the moral question here, especially for the French, is to how to justify that Libya is not Yugoslavia, and how to justify the lack of intervention to Bosnia between 1992-95 versus a swift intervention in Libya.
This was a very interesting piece to read. Unfortunately, the analysis is very naive, and the argument it presents lacks critical self-reflectivity about its advocacy for intervention.
Their pretensions for being a 'regional power broker' aside, Erdogan and Davutoglu have been amazingly consistent in their approach to the crises in Egypt and Libya. In fact, the policy towards conflicts in Egypt and Libya is perhaps the most consistent moment of Erdogan's foreign policy. But one has to be able to put himself/herself in Turkey's position in order to appreciate that moment.
AKP, here, is guided not by its neo-liberalism but by its nationalism. In the eyes of the many in Turkey, the possible intervention into Libyan conflict would be simply taking sides in an armed conflict, but domestic conflict nevertheless, initiated by defected generals.
Turkey's goal is to establish stability in the region, and in doing so, it's goal is almost identical to that of the U.S. Erdogan cautioned Mubarek, because Mubarek's attempts to cling to power were becoming the source if instability. Erdogan is critical of the military intervention into Libya, because such an intervention would almost certainly lead to further instability, conflict, and wars.
Turkey's business interests could explain how vocal Erdogan might become in regards to the intervention in Libya, but it cannot explain the substance of Turkey's objection and criticism.
I strongly urge those who are interested in constitution making in Turkey to take a look at Andrew Arato's writings on the constitutional debates in Turkey!
Professor Cole: If you had a chance to follow the details of the process and the outcome of the referendum, I believe you'd agree that this new 'patchwork' passed as an amendment will create even more serious problem of legitimacy. For the sake of brevity, let me just remind you that in quite number of districts, the 'no' vote was over 70 percent !
58 % vs 42 % is not an expression of "overwhelming support" as many of the media outlets claim, when the issue is the Constitution. What is even more worrisome is that, three of the amendments will simply eliminate the independent judiciary and will put it under AKP's political power, and it is not as trivial of an issue as you seem to be making it in your recent commentary.
What AKP have done was not to undo the authoritarian Constitution of 1982 but to capitalize on it.
I think it is time that we leave behind understanding the religious politics in Turkey simply as "the democratic nature of the pious vs authoritarian secularists." And it is just too simplistic to understand Turkish case through an analysis developed for Latin America.
Turkey does need a new constitution. I've never heard anybody in his/her right mind arguing against it. But that's not the question here. Can a political party in Turkey make a constitution without creating even a greater problem of legitimacy?
I think this is a crucial point that is often overlooked; this conflict and the UNSC decision has created a greater problem of legitimacy of the UNSC decisions than we realize. In either of the scenarios above, UNSC ends up shooting itself in the leg. The solution the US is pushing for now, it seems, is to quickly build a coalition that includes other Arab nations and have the NATO carry out the enforcement and execution of its decisions, albeit it a limited fashion.
By the way. I am pretty sure that Professor Cole is not an apologetic of the militarism. And the comparison of Iraq and Libya is one of the first things that comes to mind. However, to separate the wheat from the chaff, so to speak, the moral question here, especially for the French, is to how to justify that Libya is not Yugoslavia, and how to justify the lack of intervention to Bosnia between 1992-95 versus a swift intervention in Libya.
This was a very interesting piece to read. Unfortunately, the analysis is very naive, and the argument it presents lacks critical self-reflectivity about its advocacy for intervention.
Their pretensions for being a 'regional power broker' aside, Erdogan and Davutoglu have been amazingly consistent in their approach to the crises in Egypt and Libya. In fact, the policy towards conflicts in Egypt and Libya is perhaps the most consistent moment of Erdogan's foreign policy. But one has to be able to put himself/herself in Turkey's position in order to appreciate that moment.
AKP, here, is guided not by its neo-liberalism but by its nationalism. In the eyes of the many in Turkey, the possible intervention into Libyan conflict would be simply taking sides in an armed conflict, but domestic conflict nevertheless, initiated by defected generals.
Turkey's goal is to establish stability in the region, and in doing so, it's goal is almost identical to that of the U.S. Erdogan cautioned Mubarek, because Mubarek's attempts to cling to power were becoming the source if instability. Erdogan is critical of the military intervention into Libya, because such an intervention would almost certainly lead to further instability, conflict, and wars.
Turkey's business interests could explain how vocal Erdogan might become in regards to the intervention in Libya, but it cannot explain the substance of Turkey's objection and criticism.
I strongly urge those who are interested in constitution making in Turkey to take a look at Andrew Arato's writings on the constitutional debates in Turkey!
Professor Cole: If you had a chance to follow the details of the process and the outcome of the referendum, I believe you'd agree that this new 'patchwork' passed as an amendment will create even more serious problem of legitimacy. For the sake of brevity, let me just remind you that in quite number of districts, the 'no' vote was over 70 percent !
58 % vs 42 % is not an expression of "overwhelming support" as many of the media outlets claim, when the issue is the Constitution. What is even more worrisome is that, three of the amendments will simply eliminate the independent judiciary and will put it under AKP's political power, and it is not as trivial of an issue as you seem to be making it in your recent commentary.
What AKP have done was not to undo the authoritarian Constitution of 1982 but to capitalize on it.
I think it is time that we leave behind understanding the religious politics in Turkey simply as "the democratic nature of the pious vs authoritarian secularists." And it is just too simplistic to understand Turkish case through an analysis developed for Latin America.
Turkey does need a new constitution. I've never heard anybody in his/her right mind arguing against it. But that's not the question here. Can a political party in Turkey make a constitution without creating even a greater problem of legitimacy?
Reha