"Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis still hopes to use the American position in Eastern Syria to ease al-Assad out of power, but his unwillingness to defend the Syrian Kurds from Turkey is driving the former into the arms of Damascus." At the very least, Syrian Kurds are scrambling to relieve Afrin from areal bombardment. The US needs to realize that Kurds from Afrin contributed to SDF and also fought to defeat ISIS in eastern Syria, not just in Afrin and surrounds. Erdogan has chosen to call the American hand in these dealings, and the American response has been weak.
"The 2011 youth revolt in Syria was turned by the al-Assad regime into a civil war. The regime deliberately used heavy weapons to target peaceful, civilian protesters, in hopes of making them militant so that they could be denounced to the outside world as terrorists. " I believe that Assad released many of the Iraqi Baathists that were being held in his prisons as part of that effort. This appears to have been a major tactical error, as these Iraqi Baathists went on to form the backbone of ISIS.
"The Democrats will suddenly be the party that defeated Daesh/ ISIL. This is kind of an October surprise of the sort that campaign managers dream of." I doubt this would happen; the Republicans will simply twist it somehow to their benefit.
What is surprising in all this is that ISIS left Jarabulus without a fight upon the approach of the Turkish-backed rebels. Where did they go to? Some say Al-Bab. Why did they leave without a fight? Were they warned that they should leave? Possibly Turkish Intelligence gave them notice. The whole thing stinks, including U.S. involvement.
It is interesting that the SDF (umbrella group for YPG and Arab fighters) are speculating that the leader of the Jarabulus Military Council was assassinated by Turkish intelligence operatives. (http://aranews.net/2016/08/kurds-accuse-turkish-intelligence-assassinating-military-leader-syrias-jarabulus/) The SDF may now elect to attack Al Bab, as the Jarabulus route has been severed. In any case, Northern Aleppo is inhabited by Turkmen, and they may have affinities to Turkey. On the other hand, taking Al Bab may bring the SDF into direct conflict with the regime. The SDF may be so ideologically oriented that it might cause it's own destruction.
The supply line for the SAA at Malah Farms is fairly stretched (https://twitter.com/Nawaroliver/status/753909757082304512).
If it weren't for Russian air support, I doubt that it could be maintained. Seems a toss up as to who will prevail.
It should be mentioned that Turkey-backed FSA near the border at Azaz and Marea have taken a licking from IS in recent days. Marea might have collapse if not for the resupply effort of the YPG. It would seem that these newest front should take some pressure off the Azaz/Marea front; the Turks doeth complain too loudly.
In my opinion, this article is a propaganda piece. It rests on the assertion that sense the PKK is designated a terrorist organization, its Syrian offshoot, PYD, must also be a terrorist organization; a very manichean conclusion. The real world is not manichean but multi hued. The author does not go into detail about the fight between the PKK and the AKP; the actuality of which side is more terrorist is clouded; Erdogan uses the terrorist designation to club Turkish Kurds into line. But here we see a piece that obviously puts the NATO alliance before moral clarity. Does this hearken back to the years when the AmericanS supported anticommunist dictatorships to perfidious democracies when it came to alliances?
Wladimir is reporting good cooperation between Arabs and Kurds, including FSA: https://twitter.com/vvanwilgenburg
However, he may have sympathies for the Kurds.
What you are really talking about is an international shaming court, where green-house gas emissions violators can be brought to be shamed. To some degree, this will work. A country like Poland, with extensive infrastructure built around cheap coal, is loathe to abandon it, in part due to high stranding costs. A shaming court could be helpful in prodding such countries to move in a more productive direction. However, under a Republican President, the US would likely be in the docket, and the President would use the shaming court as political fodder for the conservative masses. In other words, it might well be used in a counterproductive manner by the eloquent politician.
Concerning: "By refusing a future role of any sort for Syria’s president Bashar al-Assad, we have hindered the diplomatic process that might heal the civil war in that country." But then where do you draw the line? The Assad regime is responsible for more deaths in Syria than IS; with Russian help, this will not change. The Assad regime is the largest user of terror in Syria. Should the West negotiate with a criminal in the hopes of bringing a stable government to the region? Western Europe, through the refugee crisis, is paying for Assad's acts of indiscretion (albeit with many outside actors). It's not clear that the Syrian civil war has a negotiated solution, but it might help if all the outside actors would butt out. This isn't going to happen, so I expect several years more of carnage.
It should be noted that the best paved road continuing route 47 through Syria passes to the northwest through Al Hawl and Hasakah, which are now under YPG control. Thus, this route from Al Raqqa to Mosul has been cut in multiple locations. Surely the Peshmerga knew that ISIS/ISIL, when confronted with such a large force, would flee Sinjar to the south, toward Al-Baaj and Ain Fathi. Yet, nothing was done to intercept the roads toward Al-Baaj and Ain Fathi south of Sinjar. This may have been intentionally on the part of Barzani so that he could win a political victory at little cost (notice the huge banners, prepared in advance, to celebrate the victory). Rather than pursue the fleeing ISIS/ISIL, Barzani's Peshmerga chose to stay put and celebrate their victory (I suspect that a few Peshmerga officers were chagrined by this). Max (above) is in my opinion correct; the Peshmerga should push on south to take Ain Fathi and Al_Baaj, thus more completely cutting ISIS/ISIL in the Tigris from ISIS/ISIL on the Euphates. However, the Barzanis, I fear, are more interested in making a political statement than a strategic one (and, to be fair, the region south of Sinjar is largely Arabic and thus more hostile). I suspect the next move to cut ISIS/ISIL supply lines will be the attack on Ash Shaddadi by the YPG and their Arab allies in Syria, perhaps in two to three months. Yet, Ash Shaddadi is deep in Syrian Arab territory, so it would represent a new direction, at least for the YPG.
I have some doubts as to the importance of cutting Iraqi route 47 through Sinjar by the Peshmerga. The continuation of route 47 into Syria is little more than a track following an old railroad grade until it connects with Syrian route 715 some distance to the southwest. However, route 715, From Ash Shaddadi, Syria, connects almost directly with the Syrian/Iraqi border to the east. It is possible to travel via farm roads from their through Al-Baaj, Iraq, and encounter the north/south road to Tel Afar, thus skirting most of route 47 to the south. Foreign Policy indicates that such a southern route has already been constructed by ISIS/ISIL .(http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/12/kurds-assault-isis-in-sinjar-with-eyes-on-mosul/)
Thus, I wouldn't lay much import on route 47 being a major supply route for ISIS/ISIL.
"The Alawite area around the port of Latakia would have trouble surviving on its own economically even if its Syrian interior would let it go, which they won’t."
However, it could exist as a Russian client state for quite some time.
The fact that there has been several accusations against the YPG concerning ethnic cleansing (Turkomen, Arab and Christian) is worrisome. Also, that basically Sunni Arabs from many locations in Tal Abyad Provence are principally the Syrians fleeing to Turkey indicates that the indigenous Arabs haven't complete confidence in the Free Syrian Army or YPG. Granted, in these situations it is difficult to sort out ISIS collaborators from the indigenous populations and an advancing force doesn't wish to leave a fifth column behind. The acceptance of the YPG/Free Syrian Army will likely be in the sort of governance that the organization leaves behind in conquered territories.
The political commentary indicating that Obama needs to show more leadership, I believe, is misplaced. There does need to be more leadership, but it seems to me that it has to be at the head of the Iraqi defense forces. By analogy with our own civil war, Lincoln went through several generals until he found one competent to lead Union forces. I -suspect- that Baghdad is having similar birthing problems; finding an army chief with conviction appears to be a major difficulty for Mr. Abadi and the Iraqi leadership. As in Lincoln's cabinet, there is likely a lot of infighting (some of it corrupt) about who should lead the Iraqi army. Although Ramadi has been a disaster, my thought is that the United States shouldn't change course now; we can insure that ISIS won't overrun Baghdad, but the Iraqis themselves need to resolve these leadership problems. Integrating more U.S. special forces into the Iraqi army will not resolve their problems.
"Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis still hopes to use the American position in Eastern Syria to ease al-Assad out of power, but his unwillingness to defend the Syrian Kurds from Turkey is driving the former into the arms of Damascus." At the very least, Syrian Kurds are scrambling to relieve Afrin from areal bombardment. The US needs to realize that Kurds from Afrin contributed to SDF and also fought to defeat ISIS in eastern Syria, not just in Afrin and surrounds. Erdogan has chosen to call the American hand in these dealings, and the American response has been weak.
"The 2011 youth revolt in Syria was turned by the al-Assad regime into a civil war. The regime deliberately used heavy weapons to target peaceful, civilian protesters, in hopes of making them militant so that they could be denounced to the outside world as terrorists. " I believe that Assad released many of the Iraqi Baathists that were being held in his prisons as part of that effort. This appears to have been a major tactical error, as these Iraqi Baathists went on to form the backbone of ISIS.
Related: http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/11/21/tehran-is-winning-the-war-for-control-of-the-middle-east-saudi-arabia/
I suspect that Erdogan's deal with Putin will be to maintain control over northern Aleppo for sometime into the future.
Yet he fills his administration with neocons ...
"The Democrats will suddenly be the party that defeated Daesh/ ISIL. This is kind of an October surprise of the sort that campaign managers dream of." I doubt this would happen; the Republicans will simply twist it somehow to their benefit.
What is surprising in all this is that ISIS left Jarabulus without a fight upon the approach of the Turkish-backed rebels. Where did they go to? Some say Al-Bab. Why did they leave without a fight? Were they warned that they should leave? Possibly Turkish Intelligence gave them notice. The whole thing stinks, including U.S. involvement.
It is interesting that the SDF (umbrella group for YPG and Arab fighters) are speculating that the leader of the Jarabulus Military Council was assassinated by Turkish intelligence operatives. (http://aranews.net/2016/08/kurds-accuse-turkish-intelligence-assassinating-military-leader-syrias-jarabulus/) The SDF may now elect to attack Al Bab, as the Jarabulus route has been severed. In any case, Northern Aleppo is inhabited by Turkmen, and they may have affinities to Turkey. On the other hand, taking Al Bab may bring the SDF into direct conflict with the regime. The SDF may be so ideologically oriented that it might cause it's own destruction.
The supply line for the SAA at Malah Farms is fairly stretched (https://twitter.com/Nawaroliver/status/753909757082304512).
If it weren't for Russian air support, I doubt that it could be maintained. Seems a toss up as to who will prevail.
It should be mentioned that Turkey-backed FSA near the border at Azaz and Marea have taken a licking from IS in recent days. Marea might have collapse if not for the resupply effort of the YPG. It would seem that these newest front should take some pressure off the Azaz/Marea front; the Turks doeth complain too loudly.
In my opinion, this article is a propaganda piece. It rests on the assertion that sense the PKK is designated a terrorist organization, its Syrian offshoot, PYD, must also be a terrorist organization; a very manichean conclusion. The real world is not manichean but multi hued. The author does not go into detail about the fight between the PKK and the AKP; the actuality of which side is more terrorist is clouded; Erdogan uses the terrorist designation to club Turkish Kurds into line. But here we see a piece that obviously puts the NATO alliance before moral clarity. Does this hearken back to the years when the AmericanS supported anticommunist dictatorships to perfidious democracies when it came to alliances?
Wladimir is reporting good cooperation between Arabs and Kurds, including FSA: https://twitter.com/vvanwilgenburg
However, he may have sympathies for the Kurds.
A list of brigades participating in the front can be found here: http://en.hawarnews.com/what-platoons-are-participating-in-freeing-raqqa-campaign/
A fair number of them do appear to be non Kurdish, but that doesn't say much about trust.
In Turkey, the Diyanet appears to be a formal office in the government (http://warontherocks.com/2016/05/the-theological-battle-between-isil-and-the-turkish-state/). Of course, in some Western countries (France, Germany), the church is funded by state collected taxes. If the state funds the church or mosque, is it truly separate?
What you are really talking about is an international shaming court, where green-house gas emissions violators can be brought to be shamed. To some degree, this will work. A country like Poland, with extensive infrastructure built around cheap coal, is loathe to abandon it, in part due to high stranding costs. A shaming court could be helpful in prodding such countries to move in a more productive direction. However, under a Republican President, the US would likely be in the docket, and the President would use the shaming court as political fodder for the conservative masses. In other words, it might well be used in a counterproductive manner by the eloquent politician.
Concerning: "By refusing a future role of any sort for Syria’s president Bashar al-Assad, we have hindered the diplomatic process that might heal the civil war in that country." But then where do you draw the line? The Assad regime is responsible for more deaths in Syria than IS; with Russian help, this will not change. The Assad regime is the largest user of terror in Syria. Should the West negotiate with a criminal in the hopes of bringing a stable government to the region? Western Europe, through the refugee crisis, is paying for Assad's acts of indiscretion (albeit with many outside actors). It's not clear that the Syrian civil war has a negotiated solution, but it might help if all the outside actors would butt out. This isn't going to happen, so I expect several years more of carnage.
It should be noted that the best paved road continuing route 47 through Syria passes to the northwest through Al Hawl and Hasakah, which are now under YPG control. Thus, this route from Al Raqqa to Mosul has been cut in multiple locations. Surely the Peshmerga knew that ISIS/ISIL, when confronted with such a large force, would flee Sinjar to the south, toward Al-Baaj and Ain Fathi. Yet, nothing was done to intercept the roads toward Al-Baaj and Ain Fathi south of Sinjar. This may have been intentionally on the part of Barzani so that he could win a political victory at little cost (notice the huge banners, prepared in advance, to celebrate the victory). Rather than pursue the fleeing ISIS/ISIL, Barzani's Peshmerga chose to stay put and celebrate their victory (I suspect that a few Peshmerga officers were chagrined by this). Max (above) is in my opinion correct; the Peshmerga should push on south to take Ain Fathi and Al_Baaj, thus more completely cutting ISIS/ISIL in the Tigris from ISIS/ISIL on the Euphates. However, the Barzanis, I fear, are more interested in making a political statement than a strategic one (and, to be fair, the region south of Sinjar is largely Arabic and thus more hostile). I suspect the next move to cut ISIS/ISIL supply lines will be the attack on Ash Shaddadi by the YPG and their Arab allies in Syria, perhaps in two to three months. Yet, Ash Shaddadi is deep in Syrian Arab territory, so it would represent a new direction, at least for the YPG.
I have some doubts as to the importance of cutting Iraqi route 47 through Sinjar by the Peshmerga. The continuation of route 47 into Syria is little more than a track following an old railroad grade until it connects with Syrian route 715 some distance to the southwest. However, route 715, From Ash Shaddadi, Syria, connects almost directly with the Syrian/Iraqi border to the east. It is possible to travel via farm roads from their through Al-Baaj, Iraq, and encounter the north/south road to Tel Afar, thus skirting most of route 47 to the south. Foreign Policy indicates that such a southern route has already been constructed by ISIS/ISIL .(http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/12/kurds-assault-isis-in-sinjar-with-eyes-on-mosul/)
Thus, I wouldn't lay much import on route 47 being a major supply route for ISIS/ISIL.
"The Alawite area around the port of Latakia would have trouble surviving on its own economically even if its Syrian interior would let it go, which they won’t."
However, it could exist as a Russian client state for quite some time.
The fact that there has been several accusations against the YPG concerning ethnic cleansing (Turkomen, Arab and Christian) is worrisome. Also, that basically Sunni Arabs from many locations in Tal Abyad Provence are principally the Syrians fleeing to Turkey indicates that the indigenous Arabs haven't complete confidence in the Free Syrian Army or YPG. Granted, in these situations it is difficult to sort out ISIS collaborators from the indigenous populations and an advancing force doesn't wish to leave a fifth column behind. The acceptance of the YPG/Free Syrian Army will likely be in the sort of governance that the organization leaves behind in conquered territories.
Concerning: leadership
The political commentary indicating that Obama needs to show more leadership, I believe, is misplaced. There does need to be more leadership, but it seems to me that it has to be at the head of the Iraqi defense forces. By analogy with our own civil war, Lincoln went through several generals until he found one competent to lead Union forces. I -suspect- that Baghdad is having similar birthing problems; finding an army chief with conviction appears to be a major difficulty for Mr. Abadi and the Iraqi leadership. As in Lincoln's cabinet, there is likely a lot of infighting (some of it corrupt) about who should lead the Iraqi army. Although Ramadi has been a disaster, my thought is that the United States shouldn't change course now; we can insure that ISIS won't overrun Baghdad, but the Iraqis themselves need to resolve these leadership problems. Integrating more U.S. special forces into the Iraqi army will not resolve their problems.