"Syria does have stockpiles of toxic gas, but these cannot be easily delivered any significant distance and are not effective weapons except against a massed military formation."
This seems to understate the lethality of sarin or VX warheads, the range of the Scud-C or Shahab-2 missiles in Syria's inventory and the number of casualties that might be inflicted if they were targeted at a population centre.
Your third assumed premise is controversial, "that the US is ‘exceptional’ and bears a special responsibility to intervene in Syria after the chemical weapons use."
Its clear that the US is a country like any other, and certainly no more virtuous than most. And like most it will always act strictly in its own interests, sometimes accompanied by plausible narratives of generosity and sometimes in the face of the protest and obvious detriment of others. The issue is how to clarify, as citizens, what is truly in our own interests as opposed to what is selfish, short-sighted or ill-advised. We sometimes recruit great minds to ponder these issues and argue their conclusions for our consideration.
For almost a century the notion of "collective security" has rated highly as an aspiration of Great Powers and the League of Nations was founded, and foundered, on our understanding of the usefulness of that idea. We failed and tried again.
Would it be safe to say that collective security underpins the rationale of the United Nations and the chemical warfare convention? And the NPT and any one of a number of other international agreements which we enjoy? We have enjoyed the benefits of this security without, perhaps, always seeming willing to pay the premium when it comes due.
Your sympathy for the notion that intractability has hobbled the Security Council is helpful, as is the idea that multilateral action can possibly be a useful alternative at times. And one supposes collective security is still applicable to a degree.
But let us say that in this instance there seemed to be no other Great Power willing to step forward; what then? Is the notion of collective security negated because it has only one champion?
As you point out the crafting of the UN Charter and the composition of the Security Council was intentional. Where would the diplomatic support of the UK and France stand without the arguably essential leverage provided by the unilateral position the US had already staked out on this issue? It is a difficult question.
We now have a majority of the permanent members of the Security Council in support of this recent proposal which will probably undergo a number of revisions and alterations before it can provide a resolution to this incident. This is arguably how the process is intended to work, is it not?
We will never know if we would have gotten to this point in other circumstances but is this really the moment you would suggest the US stand down and surrender the option of a unilateral military response?
The second assumed premise of the administration you have posited is "that a US strike would deter Syrian military chemical units from deploying their deadly weapons again."
Your argument is simply that if local military units already have decentralised access to sarin and delivery systems they won't be deterred by cruise missile attacks. If this is true it is also arguable that these weapons are also already in the hands of the opposition factions or soon will be. This is a very bad situation and if we have any evidence that this is the case it seems a problem for the Russians to resolve with their errant ally, and promptly. They have Sunni insurgents too. I could see considerable leverage brought to bear on this point and an awakening of support for action among those who have correctly argued that some opposition factions are aligned with al-Qaeda.
On circumstantial evidence this seems unlikely, however. Anyone who has looked into the physical evidence of the likely rockets and launchers would assume it required an overt logistics 'tail' to support these weapons and that if they did get away from the regime's tactical control they would not physically get very far in operational order without being noticed or traceable. Watching the video of the loading and launch process it seems rather protracted and clumsy and the range of these weapons is short.
If there are no other arguments against this assumed premise it would seem a reasonably plausible one; the real issue is whether it is wiser not to target the actual chemical weapons themselves. Fulfilling this precaution while actually degrading the ability to use these weapons seems a more immediate challenge for planners.
It might be pointed out also that between August 21st to present the use of these weapons has been de facto prohibited by the claim of innocence by the regime, on the one hand, and the threat of attack on the other. In the face of the unfulfilled US threat the one makes their use counter-productive and the other arguably is disrupted by dispersal of infrastructure. This calculus might have changed with the defeat of the AUMF in Congress, for example.
Arguing against the assumed first premise of the administration you have posited, "that a US strike would be relatively risk-free, since the Syrian regime has limited abilities to mount reprisals, and probably wouldn’t dare," you mention a number of things; uncertainty, asymmetrical terrorist counter-attacks, tilting the outcome of the conflict and consequent public opinion in the Middle East.
One is tempted to add the very real possibility of escalating military confrontation with Russia, as has been noted elsewhere by your readers.
Excluding generic uncertainty as an ever-present hazard and overhead of military action, while noting the risk, let's look at the rest more closely. The threat of retaliatory action by asymmetrical actors is very real but can the US in good conscience let this be a determining factor in its geopolitical activities? Obama argued, plausibly, that we face these threats in any case. But even where they are increased by a controversial action doesn't allowing one's options to be governed or constrained validate exactly the strategy of the perpetrators? One might argue that we should seek the optimal strategy for the correct reasons and pursue it irrespective of the violent attempts of our adversaries to deter or distract us.
The same applies in lesser degree to public opinion, such as it is, in the Middle East toward American policy and actions though acknowledging that gaining trust and tolerance is something that our optimal policy should embrace where possible. We could argue further how badly that effort has failed and where a military response in Syria would fall on the popularity scale but it might be suggested that our status could barely worsen. It seems hard to argue that local public opinion is the principal issue at stake in a military strike threatened primarily as leverage behind a determined diplomatic effort to contain a chemical weapons stockpile. And of course there is the public opinion of other nations to consider.
One doubts that tilting the war in favour of one or another of the factions is really at issue here, whether it is intended or not, though one supposes that disabling the regime to some degree is necessary to legitimise the punitive nature of the attack.
Assuming the complete breakdown of diplomacy the issue also arises of a possible military escalation by the Russians and to a lesser degree the rump Syrian regime. We need to think hard about this and it surprises me that it is not been mentioned more often; it doesn't seem likely but yet the possibility must remain part of our calculus.
Of course then it comes down to a pretty naked choice about power; the sleeping giant of superpower confrontation awakens and we remember what 'blink' really means. Personally I don't think the Russians are fully prepared to go there but with a leader like Putin it is hard to say.
Given the apparent military and naval ambitions of the Russian leadership if this is going to be a problem going forward we might want to consider dealing with it now as against later. There is no point proceeding without resolve and if we are going to baulk at such a confrontation we need to soberly consider the consequences of that too. The 20th century is rich with examples of both.
With no argument about 'condign punishment' there are some issues regarding the pursuit of those responsible for the attack which might be addressed. It seems the ICC referral condition in the proposed resolution is merely a negotiating ploy, for reasons you point out, but it may also be a helpful declaration of intent by the proposing powers.
Taking the recent administration claims not to be seeking regime change at face value it seems that if Assad, his brother or the regime did not directly order the chemical attack then we should be satisfied if they offer or are made to provide those actually responsible along with corroborating evidence. A strong case could be made that this is a management change they need to make in any instance.
If they can't do even this then it seems Russia needs to be formally pressured to intercede with its ally and bring their stockpile under sovereign control as a matter of urgency. One senses an authority dynamic something like this already emerging from close parsing of recent statements by Lavrov and al-Mouallem.
Even though the ICC referral may be moot as a condition of this resolution the legal prosecution of the incident would seem to be worthwhile though not urgent, whomever is responsible, as a matter of justice and a deterrent. The proposing powers seem to have set, at least, a useful marker here. It would also probably be a good idea to continue examining motive and opportunity and collecting evidence as circumstances permit in consideration of a future case.
"Syria does have stockpiles of toxic gas, but these cannot be easily delivered any significant distance and are not effective weapons except against a massed military formation."
This seems to understate the lethality of sarin or VX warheads, the range of the Scud-C or Shahab-2 missiles in Syria's inventory and the number of casualties that might be inflicted if they were targeted at a population centre.
Your third assumed premise is controversial, "that the US is ‘exceptional’ and bears a special responsibility to intervene in Syria after the chemical weapons use."
Its clear that the US is a country like any other, and certainly no more virtuous than most. And like most it will always act strictly in its own interests, sometimes accompanied by plausible narratives of generosity and sometimes in the face of the protest and obvious detriment of others. The issue is how to clarify, as citizens, what is truly in our own interests as opposed to what is selfish, short-sighted or ill-advised. We sometimes recruit great minds to ponder these issues and argue their conclusions for our consideration.
For almost a century the notion of "collective security" has rated highly as an aspiration of Great Powers and the League of Nations was founded, and foundered, on our understanding of the usefulness of that idea. We failed and tried again.
Would it be safe to say that collective security underpins the rationale of the United Nations and the chemical warfare convention? And the NPT and any one of a number of other international agreements which we enjoy? We have enjoyed the benefits of this security without, perhaps, always seeming willing to pay the premium when it comes due.
Your sympathy for the notion that intractability has hobbled the Security Council is helpful, as is the idea that multilateral action can possibly be a useful alternative at times. And one supposes collective security is still applicable to a degree.
But let us say that in this instance there seemed to be no other Great Power willing to step forward; what then? Is the notion of collective security negated because it has only one champion?
As you point out the crafting of the UN Charter and the composition of the Security Council was intentional. Where would the diplomatic support of the UK and France stand without the arguably essential leverage provided by the unilateral position the US had already staked out on this issue? It is a difficult question.
We now have a majority of the permanent members of the Security Council in support of this recent proposal which will probably undergo a number of revisions and alterations before it can provide a resolution to this incident. This is arguably how the process is intended to work, is it not?
We will never know if we would have gotten to this point in other circumstances but is this really the moment you would suggest the US stand down and surrender the option of a unilateral military response?
The second assumed premise of the administration you have posited is "that a US strike would deter Syrian military chemical units from deploying their deadly weapons again."
Your argument is simply that if local military units already have decentralised access to sarin and delivery systems they won't be deterred by cruise missile attacks. If this is true it is also arguable that these weapons are also already in the hands of the opposition factions or soon will be. This is a very bad situation and if we have any evidence that this is the case it seems a problem for the Russians to resolve with their errant ally, and promptly. They have Sunni insurgents too. I could see considerable leverage brought to bear on this point and an awakening of support for action among those who have correctly argued that some opposition factions are aligned with al-Qaeda.
On circumstantial evidence this seems unlikely, however. Anyone who has looked into the physical evidence of the likely rockets and launchers would assume it required an overt logistics 'tail' to support these weapons and that if they did get away from the regime's tactical control they would not physically get very far in operational order without being noticed or traceable. Watching the video of the loading and launch process it seems rather protracted and clumsy and the range of these weapons is short.
If there are no other arguments against this assumed premise it would seem a reasonably plausible one; the real issue is whether it is wiser not to target the actual chemical weapons themselves. Fulfilling this precaution while actually degrading the ability to use these weapons seems a more immediate challenge for planners.
It might be pointed out also that between August 21st to present the use of these weapons has been de facto prohibited by the claim of innocence by the regime, on the one hand, and the threat of attack on the other. In the face of the unfulfilled US threat the one makes their use counter-productive and the other arguably is disrupted by dispersal of infrastructure. This calculus might have changed with the defeat of the AUMF in Congress, for example.
Arguing against the assumed first premise of the administration you have posited, "that a US strike would be relatively risk-free, since the Syrian regime has limited abilities to mount reprisals, and probably wouldn’t dare," you mention a number of things; uncertainty, asymmetrical terrorist counter-attacks, tilting the outcome of the conflict and consequent public opinion in the Middle East.
One is tempted to add the very real possibility of escalating military confrontation with Russia, as has been noted elsewhere by your readers.
Excluding generic uncertainty as an ever-present hazard and overhead of military action, while noting the risk, let's look at the rest more closely. The threat of retaliatory action by asymmetrical actors is very real but can the US in good conscience let this be a determining factor in its geopolitical activities? Obama argued, plausibly, that we face these threats in any case. But even where they are increased by a controversial action doesn't allowing one's options to be governed or constrained validate exactly the strategy of the perpetrators? One might argue that we should seek the optimal strategy for the correct reasons and pursue it irrespective of the violent attempts of our adversaries to deter or distract us.
The same applies in lesser degree to public opinion, such as it is, in the Middle East toward American policy and actions though acknowledging that gaining trust and tolerance is something that our optimal policy should embrace where possible. We could argue further how badly that effort has failed and where a military response in Syria would fall on the popularity scale but it might be suggested that our status could barely worsen. It seems hard to argue that local public opinion is the principal issue at stake in a military strike threatened primarily as leverage behind a determined diplomatic effort to contain a chemical weapons stockpile. And of course there is the public opinion of other nations to consider.
One doubts that tilting the war in favour of one or another of the factions is really at issue here, whether it is intended or not, though one supposes that disabling the regime to some degree is necessary to legitimise the punitive nature of the attack.
Assuming the complete breakdown of diplomacy the issue also arises of a possible military escalation by the Russians and to a lesser degree the rump Syrian regime. We need to think hard about this and it surprises me that it is not been mentioned more often; it doesn't seem likely but yet the possibility must remain part of our calculus.
Of course then it comes down to a pretty naked choice about power; the sleeping giant of superpower confrontation awakens and we remember what 'blink' really means. Personally I don't think the Russians are fully prepared to go there but with a leader like Putin it is hard to say.
Given the apparent military and naval ambitions of the Russian leadership if this is going to be a problem going forward we might want to consider dealing with it now as against later. There is no point proceeding without resolve and if we are going to baulk at such a confrontation we need to soberly consider the consequences of that too. The 20th century is rich with examples of both.
With no argument about 'condign punishment' there are some issues regarding the pursuit of those responsible for the attack which might be addressed. It seems the ICC referral condition in the proposed resolution is merely a negotiating ploy, for reasons you point out, but it may also be a helpful declaration of intent by the proposing powers.
Taking the recent administration claims not to be seeking regime change at face value it seems that if Assad, his brother or the regime did not directly order the chemical attack then we should be satisfied if they offer or are made to provide those actually responsible along with corroborating evidence. A strong case could be made that this is a management change they need to make in any instance.
If they can't do even this then it seems Russia needs to be formally pressured to intercede with its ally and bring their stockpile under sovereign control as a matter of urgency. One senses an authority dynamic something like this already emerging from close parsing of recent statements by Lavrov and al-Mouallem.
Even though the ICC referral may be moot as a condition of this resolution the legal prosecution of the incident would seem to be worthwhile though not urgent, whomever is responsible, as a matter of justice and a deterrent. The proposing powers seem to have set, at least, a useful marker here. It would also probably be a good idea to continue examining motive and opportunity and collecting evidence as circumstances permit in consideration of a future case.