Hamdullah Baycar – Informed Comment https://www.juancole.com Thoughts on the Middle East, History and Religion Mon, 09 Dec 2024 04:41:43 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=5.8.10 Assad’s Fall is a Reminder that Russia is not a Global power but a Regional One https://www.juancole.com/2024/12/assads-reminder-regional.html Mon, 09 Dec 2024 05:15:26 +0000 https://www.juancole.com/?p=221954 Trabzon, Turkey (Special to Informed Comment; Feature) – When former U.S. President Barack Obama referred to Russia as a “regional power” at the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, he minimized Moscow’s global influence while recognizing its ability to a have an impact on events within its immediate vicinity. Obama further downplayed the notion of Russia as a primary geopolitical threat, stating, “With respect to Mr. Romney’s assertion that Russia is our number-one geopolitical foe, the truth of the matter is that America has got a whole lot of challenges. … The fact that Russia felt compelled to go in militarily and lay bare these violations of international law indicates less influence, not more.” Many interpreted these remarks as a rhetorical slight, considering Russia’s significant role in shaping post-Soviet geopolitics.

Over the following decade, Russia’s military intervention in Syria appeared to contradict Obama’s assessment. Russia’s involvement in Syria during this period was often cited as evidence of its great power status. Nevertheless, the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime on December 7, 2024, highlights the limits of Russian power and its declining ability to exert influence on a global scale.

While Russia’s relations with its neighbors have frequently been strained owing to competition for influence and unresolved issues from the Soviet era, its involvement in Syria—a country neither adjacent to Russia nor part of the post-Soviet sphere—was significant. Russia’s direct engagement in the Syrian conflict marked a major shift in its Middle Eastern policy and was perceived as a challenge to the U.S. presence in the region. As Fadi Elhusseini noted, “Even at the peak of the Cold War, Russia’s (either the Soviet Union’s or the Russian Federation’s) role was limited to sending arms, military advisors, and logistical support to its Arab allies. This intervention represented a dramatic escalation in Russia’s involvement and signaled an extraordinary military engagement.”

The establishment of a military base in Latakia in 2015 represented Russia’s first substantial intervention outside its post-Soviet sphere of influence. This action not only sustained Assad’s regime for nearly a decade but also positioned Moscow as a key actor in the Middle East. Russia’s airstrikes and military presence forced Western powers, including NATO, to navigate the Syrian conflict cautiously. At the time, this was celebrated as a reassertion of Russia’s standing as a global power.


“Small Frog in Large Pond,” Digital, Dream / Dreamland v3, 2024

The events of early December 2024, however, have undermined this perception. A series of swift offensives by opposition forces reclaimed key cities, including Aleppo, Homs, and Hama, culminating in the fall of Damascus. Despite the continued presence of Russia’s military base, its inability—or reluctance—to prevent Assad’s downfall raises significant questions about the efficacy of its deterrence strategy. The Syrian opposition, while avoiding direct confrontation with Russian forces, demonstrated that Moscow’s influence in the region is far from absolute.

The implications of these developments are profound. For years, Russian military bases, like those of the United States, were regarded as a guarantee of security for allied regimes. However, the fall of Assad challenges the perception of Russian deterrence. Unlike the United States, which operates over 800 military bases worldwide and has a longstanding history of protecting client states, Russia’s military footprint is far more limited in scope and effectiveness. During the Cold War, U.S. bases served as a counterbalance to Soviet expansion, and they remain a cornerstone in countering both Russian and Chinese influence today. Russia’s failure in Syria suggests that its bases no longer function as a comparable strategic asset.

Russia may attempt to salvage its position through diplomacy or by leveraging its remaining influence in Syria. It could even claim to have facilitated the transition to protect its own interests. Yet, such efforts are unlikely to conceal the reality that Moscow failed to sustain Assad’s rule despite years of military and political investment. This failure will undoubtedly prompt potential allies to reconsider seeking security assurances from Russia, further diminishing its credibility as a global power.

A hallmark of great power status is the ability to operate effectively on multiple fronts. While Russia remains heavily engaged in the war in Ukraine, a true global power would possess the capability to uphold commitments in other regions simultaneously. Moscow’s inability to do so in Syria reinforces Obama’s 2014 characterization: Russia is not a global power but rather a regional one, capable of exerting influence in its immediate vicinity but falling short of broader global ambitions.

The fall of Assad serves as a stark reminder of the limitations of Russian power. It challenges the assumption that military bases alone can ensure sustained influence and raises doubts about Moscow’s ability to act as a reliable guarantor of stability. As the situation in Damascus stabilizes, the world is left to reassess the extent of Russia’s role in shaping global affairs. Indeed, this development may serve as a cautionary message for nations whose security heavily depends on the military bases of foreign patrons -— including those allied with the United States.

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What will Trump’s Second Term mean for the Middle East? https://www.juancole.com/2024/11/trumps-second-middle.html Sun, 24 Nov 2024 05:15:42 +0000 https://www.juancole.com/?p=221697 Trabzon, Turkey (Special to Informed Comment; Feature) – The U.S. presidential elections are among the most consequential for the Middle East, second only to elections within the region itself. Donald Trump secured a substantial victory against the current U.S. Vice President, Kamala Harris. While U.S. elections have always held significance for the Middle East, heightened tensions, including the current Israeli war  — under the pretext of fighting Hamas or Iranian “proxies” — on Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and other regions, made this election even more critical. The Middle Eastern public was not optimistic about either outcome.

In recent decades, Democrats have been more willing than Republicans to rein Israel in. However, the Biden administration demonstrated no determination to curb Israeli aggression, widely regarded as genocidal. The charge of genocide against Israel was even brought by South Africa to the International Court of Justice.

In the region, therefore, ambivalence and hesitation to openly support the Democrats was not an endorsement of Trump but rather a sign of disillusionment with the current administration’s grant of impunity to Israel. For example, US President Biden bear-hugged Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu in his visit to Israel to show his support, which Netanyahu and his cabinet took, along with the following unconditional support from Biden, as a green light to commit genocide. Gaining courage from the Biden administration  and European governments, Netanyahu’s ministers and officials began to reveal their plan of genocide openly. For instance, one headline read, “Israeli commander vows to flatten ‘entire’ Gaza Strip.” A UN Special Committee found Israeli actions since October 7 in Gaza “consistent with the characteristics of genocide.”

What waits for the Middle East in Trump’s Second Term?

The first test for Trump’s second term in the Middle East will be his response to Israeli aggression. During his campaign, it was reported that he does not want war, neither in Ukraine nor in Gaza. During his campaign, Trump expressed a desire to avoid war, whether in Ukraine or Gaza. Reports indicated that Trump informed Netanyahu he would end the Gaza conflict if elected, even before taking office in January. Following his victory, Trump reportedly called Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, expressing a willingness to end the war.


“Art of the Deal?” Digital, Dream / Dreamland v3, 2024

Despite his historically pro-Israel stance, there is a tenuous optimism in the Middle East rooted in Trump’s unpredictability. However, this hope has been steadily eroded by the names emerging for his cabinet. Dr. Mehmet Rakipoglu, Assistant Professor at Mardin Artuklu University, commented to the author, “Trump is the most pro-Palestinian member in the cabinet he announced.” This reflects a grim outlook, as his cabinet appointments have been characterized by a strong “Israel First” orientation.

Any optimism among American Muslims and the Middle East began to dim with the cabinet and roles that Trump announced. His appointments were dubbed “Israel First,” among many. Key appointments, such as Secretary of State, Defense Secretary, and ambassadors to Israel and the UN, exemplify this pro-Israel tilt.  Marco Rubio, nominated as Secretary of State, had criticized Trump’s first term for not providing enough support to Israel, despite significant moves like relocating the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, recognizing the Golan Heights as Israeli territory, and brokering normalization deals between Israel and Arab states.. Rubio also criticized Biden’s policies as insufficient, even though Biden backed Netanyahu’s genocide to the hilt.  This Biden appeasement policy was a reason for many Muslims and progressives not to support Biden.

Trump’s nomination of Pete Hegseth, a Fox News host, as Defense Secretary also signals a hawkish stance against Iran, which Hegseth has labeled an “evil regime.” He has always shown his support for Israel and displayed pro-Israeli coverage in his shows and documentaries asking for support for Israel. He considers the conflict biblical and has a fundamentalist view on the issue.

Trump nominated Mike Huckabee as US Ambassador to Israel. Similarly, Mike Huckabee, nominated as U.S. Ambassador to Israel, rejects the existence of Palestine, referring to the West Bank by the ideological names of “Judea and Samaria.” Similarly, Trump nominated Elise Stefanik, a Congress member known for advocating the defunding of UNRWA, as US Ambassador to the United Nations.

Despite these appointments, Trump may manage Middle Eastern crises more effectively than Biden. While he will not adopt a pro-Palestinian approach— which one cannot expect, given U.S. presidential history—Trump could handle the situation in a way that favors Israel without abetting the entire destruction of the Palestinians in Gaza. His unpredictable leadership style could also open doors to negotiations with Middle Eastern powers.

Middle Eastern Diplomacy Under Trump

Trump’s “America First” policies place significant responsibility on Middle Eastern leaders. Trump’s preference for personal diplomacy could provide an opportunity for these leaders to influence his approach. By emphasizing that unconditional U.S. support for Israel could damage bilateral relations, regional powers might prompt Trump to adopt a more balanced stance. Conversely, silence from Middle Eastern leaders could result in a presidency even less favorable to Palestinians than Biden’s.

The stakes are high for Middle Eastern rulers. Continued violence and devastation in the region could provoke large scale domestic unrest, threatening not only regional leaders but also U.S. interests in the area. If widespread dissatisfaction escalates, the U.S. risks losing friendly governments in the region. Prolonged unrest could tarnish America’s global image and jeopardize its strategic influence in the Middle East.  Thus, regardless of his cabinet’s pro-Israel leanings, Trump may consider that halting the destruction of the Palestinians aligns with U.S. interests.

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What does the Gaza Conflict Mean for the UAE, the Abraham Accords and Saudi Normalization? https://www.juancole.com/2023/11/conflict-abraham-normalization.html Sun, 19 Nov 2023 05:15:31 +0000 https://www.juancole.com/?p=215461 Exeter, UK (Special to Informed Comment; Featured) – When the United Arab Emirates (UAE), along with several Arab states such as Bahrain and Morocco, normalized their relationship with Israel, this was believed to create leverage against Israel. Moreover, the UAE claimed this was their attempt to salvage a two-state solution. Indeed, when the UAE signed the normalization agreement with Israel, UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Anwar Gargash, celebrated the Israeli halt of the annexation of Palestinian lands as “a significant diplomatic achievement,” which has been concretized thanks to Emirati “normal relations with Israel,” which is expected “to play a direct and constructive role in enhancing the region’s security and stability.” 


The commentators were also debating whether the deal would create leverage over Israel in their treatment of Palestinians. For example, Yoel Guzansky and Ari Heistein stated. The UAE has now gained significant leverage over Israel that will factor into Israeli decision-making in the Palestinian arena, particularly when Jerusalem is considering steps that do not align with Emirati interests.

However, contrary to the Emirati claim, Palestinians believe leverage would never come with normalization, but rather, it would only come by rejecting any engagement until the Palestinian state is concrete. Furthermore, Palestinians feared that “if [normalizations are] not conditioned on significant Israeli steps toward enabling the creation of a Palestinian state, [these kinds of normalization] debilitate the Palestinian national project.”

Guzansky and Heistein were also cautious about the Emiratis’ ability to influence the Israeli state. They warned that if it becomes clear that the UAE fails to change Israeli behavior over Palestine, this can hinder further normalization with other states. Guzansky and Heistein stated Should Israel and the UAE engage in a public spat on anything relating to the Palestinian issue, that would likely discourage those Arab or Muslim states weighing the prospect of normalization from moving ahead if it becomes apparent that these agreements are unable to influence Israeli policy in that regard.

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Three years since normalization: When will leverage arrive? UAE, the Arab Group & China on Gaza Humanitarian Corridor Resolution | United Nations

Since the UAE and Israel have normalized relations, many symbolic and concrete steps have been taken between the two parties that are evidence of warm relations, from appointing ambassadors to direct flights. However, three years of normalization did not prove much leverage when it came to Emirati influence over Israel’s treatment of Palestinians. As much as it is evidence of the October conflict in which Israel responded disproportionately by claiming over 5,000 Palestinians’ lives, the UAE could not play a significant role in influencing Israel in previous Israeli aggression either. This was the case during Israeli aggression in Sheikh Jarrah

Looking back three years after normalization, Qatar increased its leverage more than the UAE, not because it increased its relations with Israel; instead, it became almost the most significant actor in the Arab world, which has relatively warm ties with Hamas. Qatar’s engagement with Hamas and its close relations with the US gave Doha an intermediary role between Hamas, Israel, and the US. On the other hand, the UAE not only recognized Hamas as a terrorist organization but also questioned the authority of the leader of the Palestinian Authority, as it no secret< that the UAE supports Mohammad Dahlan over Mahmoud Abbas. Furthermore, despite Egypt and Jordan having normalized their relations much earlier in 1979 and 1994, respectively, they never had publicly warm relations like the UAE. Therefore, not only did Israel-UAE normalization have much influence over the Israeli side, but the Emirates also lost even further credibility with the Palestinian side. Even with the normalization, the UAE could have balanced the relations better by upgrading its relations with different stakeholders in Palestine.  


What now? Will Saudi Arabia normalize with Israel? 
The recent event showed, one more time, that none of the Muslim/Arab majority states have much leverage over Israel when it comes to ceasing the tension and decreasing the violence against Palestinians. Not only the UAE and other Arab countries, which normalized in post-2020, but also countries such as Turkey, whose relations go back to the founding years of Israel, Egypt, and Jordan, which have decades of recognition and are significant actors for Israeli security, have limited influence, especially in the last few years. Therefore, if these normalizations serve as an example, it would be naive to think that Saudi normalization will have a different fate.  


It was reported that Saudi Arabia and Israel were in the normalization process when Hamas’s surprise attack occurred on October 7. Saudi Arabia softened its condition from an independent state for Palestinians in 2002 to “a good life for the Palestinians” in 2023, an interpretation that the Israeli occupation is no longer a deal-breaker.

The Biden administration is keen to finalize the deal to kill two birds with one stone. The first bird is US domestic politics. Biden wants a diplomatic achievement that will beat the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco’s normalization with Israel, which was masterminded by Biden’s predecessor and, most likely, his rival in the upcoming presidential election, Donald Trump. The international bird is to make Chinese-brokered Riyadh-Tehran normalization less relevant as the Israel-Saudi alliance might create a stronger anti-Iranian bloc.

However, Saudi Arabia should consider what the UAE has earned and lost domestically and internationally before inking any agreement. Also, even though both states have similar authoritarianism, Saudi Arabia should be more aware of such normalization’s domestic and global reactions. Contrary to the UAE, Saudi Arabia claims leadership for the Islamic world as it hosts the two holiest sites for Muslims and also due to the state’s founding ideology. However, the latter has been eroded in recent years. Therefore, the Saudi Arabian leadership should consider these conditions before committing to any deal.

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Expansion of BRICS, the anti-G7, in the Mideast: Is the Oil Gulf no Longer Pax Americana? https://www.juancole.com/2023/09/expansion-mideast-americana.html Sat, 16 Sep 2023 04:15:34 +0000 https://www.juancole.com/?p=214375 Exeter (Special to Informed Comment; Feature) – BRICS, a group of five developing countries that include China, Russia, and India, has invited another six countries to join the bloc, making the group 11 if all accept the invitation. Among 40 interested states in membership, of which 22 had already officially asked for admission, BRICS leaders agreed upon five Middle Eastern and African (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Ethiopia) and South American (Argentina) countries. Among these invited states, three are from either side of the Gulf, a significant signal to show the rise of Gulf states in global politics.

Analysts rushed to comment that the enlargement is anti-democratic and China-centric; however, a close look at the enlargement shows that the enlargement is not only about China but more of a consensus of the five powers, including, more importantly, India and Russia in addition to China. Of course, China is the most potent power in the bloc and might increase its influence over time. However, the current expansion shows that none of these countries are states that India and Russia reject, as they include Saudi Arabia and the UAE, two powers that have warm relations with India and an increasingly close relationship with Russia. Moreover, Brazil was already willing to accept Argentina as a member of BRICS in case it would help the neighbouring country in its quest for foreign reserves.

Indeed, these analysts ignore the warm relations between India and the two Gulf states, underestimate the tension between China and India, and tend to show the current members of BRICS under great Chinese influence, which is not necessarily true as India and China have significant issues, including but not limited to border crises. Otherwise, China President Xi Jinping’s meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the BRICS Summit in South Africa would not present a significant diplomatic incident.. The tension worsened in 2020 and cost the lives of 20 Indian soldiers.

Is BRICS+ the new G7?

In its current form, BRICS represents around 40.72 percent of the world population; if the new members accept the offer, the representation will rise to 45.95 percent, a significant rate as China and India’s share is around 35.48 percent. Similarly, the current GDP share of the BRICS is around 25.77 percent, while the expansion would bring it to around 28.99 percent, another significant increase as 17.86 percent of the current club’s GDP comes from China alone. On the other hand, the G7 represents around 27 percent of the world’s GDP and around 10 percent of the world’s population.

BRICS has long been considered an alternative initiative to the Western system as it includes Russia and China as leading powers, despite its loose institutionalization. One of the BRICS targets is to de-dollarise trade and bypass US sanctions on global trade. Indeed, BRICS created a development bank to encourage trade in local currencies and support developmental projects, an alternative to the Western-centric IMF and World Bank.

While BRICS, in its current form, does not challenge UN-based institutions, it can be considered an alternative to the G20 or G7, if not a rival. The G20, too, is not a very effective platform but a place where world leaders discuss significant issues and attempt to form a global agenda. Indeed, G20 meetings have recently been defined as “empty talks” by analysts.

China and the Gulf

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Reuters: “BRICS: What is it, who wants in and why?”

While none of the new members states that China would reject their membership, showing their membership as pure Chinese influence is inherently wrong as they include two members of the GCC with India who already share close ties. The close ties between India and the GCC can be seen from the G20, too, as India invited the UAE and Oman as this year’s G20 guests, in addition to Saudi Arabia, a permanent member of the G20.

 

While India is particularly close to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates because of the number of expatriates in the Gulf, China is interested in these states for more strategic reasons. China made headlines in May when it brokered a normalisation agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, inviting Iran and its regional rivals Saudi Arabia and the UAE together to the bloc is interesting as the bloc does not want to include only the “isolated” countries from the Western system, preventing it from being a platform of excluded powers.

Even though the existence of Russia and China and their influence in the bloc signal anti-Americanism, BRICS, even in its 11-member form, is not inherently anti-American. Indeed, Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, stated, “We do not want to be a counterpoint to the G7, G20, or the United States.” This is an important message for Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as they do not want to exclude themselves from the American security umbrella but also want to diversify their security and strategic importance to gain leverage against the US. Thus, by joining this kind of organisation, they hit two birds with one stone.

Not long ago, in 2022, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were granted dialogue partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, an even bigger anti-Western organisation than the BRICS. Iran was granted full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Council in 2023. Therefore, despite Iran and its Gulf rival Saudi Arabia and the UAE not sharing warm relations and having situated themselves on different poles, if Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s role is upgraded to full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Council and Saudi Arabia accepts BRICS offers, these two non-Western organisations would be platforms where they can have dialogue and use it as leverage with the West. As these two clubs will be new platforms where non-Western states have leadership, they can offer more equal negotiations between Iran and its Gulf neighbours, as none would have better privileges over others.

Of course, considering the new members, including the closest US MENA partners such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, one wonders if they are really asking for an alternative to US hegemony. In its 11-state form, the new bloc can benefit the organisation and the new members, including those directly linked to the US security umbrella. While Russia and China attempt to counterbalance the US-based Western system, most of the new members, most importantly in our case, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, attempt to diversify their geopolitical engagements with the rest of the world while still giving greater attention to the US and the West. The greater attention paid to the US and the West can be seen from their reactions to the offer, particularly Saudi Arabia’s. While UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed published a statement showing his appreciation of the offer, Saudi Arabia is yet to accept the offer and stated it will study the deal and give an appropriate decision,” a message to its Western allies that their priorities are still the West and also could be a bit disappointed by the offer to Iran too.

In short, considering the share of China and India’s oil and gas exports from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, along with India’s warm relations with these states, the invitation of these two states can be considered Indian-influenced as much as Chinese. Moreover, considering South Africa’s relations with Ethiopia and Brazil’s relations with Argentina, one can say BRICS’s enlargement is not solely Chinese dictation but more of a common ground for all members.

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‘Rightly’ as a New Soft Power Tool: The Motivation behind Al Jazeera’s American Right-Wing Platform https://www.juancole.com/2021/03/motivation-jazeeras-american.html Mon, 08 Mar 2021 05:04:51 +0000 https://www.juancole.com/?p=196491 Exeter (Special to Informed Comment) – Al Jazeera announcement to launch a right-wing media platform, Rightly, in the US surprised many people, including its employees. Over 100 hundred employees from Al Jazeera penned an open letter to the Al Jazeera administration asking the halt of the platform based on not fitting their ‘values.’ Michael Weaver, a senior employee involved in launching the Rightly platform, believes that the creation of this platform perfectly matches Al Jazeera’s mission as he believes the right-center ideology are not heard and represented enough in mainstream media in the US. Regardless Weaver’s claim, it is believed that the move to launch Rightly fits Qatar’s soft power agenda. The question, then, remains why Al Jazeera initiates a move that even its employees do not believe in and have a potential to harm its current brand which was built over 25 years.

The initiation of Rightly can be justified by looking to recent Qatar-US relations. Qatar was isolated during the four-year presidency of Republican Trump both by its neighbors and by the US Presidency. Trump, who had problems with liberal media, was not a fan of Al Jazeera either. Because Qatar’s rivals (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) think-tanks, lobbies, and media were closer to the right than left, they had more space and voice in the Trump administration. Qatar’s move in this sense seems more strategic as it does not want to be left out one more time when Republicans come to power.

Al Jazeera as a soft power

Even though the platform’s halt is not expected, one should remember that this move is not Al Jazeera’s first of its kind in the US. The Doha-based media network launched the Al Jazeera American in 2013 and closed it down in 2016 after spending around 2 billion dollars. Al Jazeera is one of the successful examples of ‘soft power.’ Qatar is a small but rich country thanks to its enormous gas reserves. The gas revenues transformed the tiny monarch into one of the most influential powers in the region. Internal and external investments accumulated the influence. Internally, Qatar invested in arts, sports, and public diplomacy, transforming the country into one of the regional hubs. Externally, Qatar invests in many countries’ real estate, finance, sports, and other sectors with the hand of its state investment funds. With these internal and external investments, Qatar not only became visible and known to the international audience but gained influence in the world.

Other than these investments, Qatar’s successful tool was its soft power strategy. Al Jazeera can be considered one of the most known and successful examples of its kind, not only for Qatar but for almost all ‘Global South.’ As a matter of fact, Al Jazeera has been considered as the voice of the Global South. The channel mostly undertakes a ‘liberal’ stand which is considered left in the US. Al Jazeera’s broadcasts of the Palestinian intifada, US occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq, and finally the Arab Spring were remarkable to the degree that it raised tension between the parties. George Bush, for example, revealed his wish to bomb Al Jazeera’s center due to its coverage. Al Jazeera’s, once again, proved its effectiveness in Arab Spring protests in which it sided with the protesters over the dictators.

Al Jazeera’s Motivation on ‘Rightly’

Al Jazeera’s motivation to create a right-wing channel is twofold: American domestic politics and the other is Qatar’s motivation to increase its influence and bargaining power. The 2020 US election was one of the most unconventional elections in recent years. The sitting president rejected the outcome and suggested that the votes were stolen. What was more interesting was Twitter’s ban on Trump. Twitter had been the sole medium for Trump’s communication during his 4-year presidency. Thus, such a move caused Trump’s silence.

‘Silence’ was a frequently used term for Trump, suggesting that he was the voice of the silenced crowd, the voice of the voiceless. The fact that even the right-wing media platforms internal division increased the silent state of the right-wing. Fox News, for example, did not cover Trump as he wished so. At the same time, the left-wing media was flourishing both in traditional and social media. In this sense, Al Jazeera’s new move can be considered a pragmatic move aiming to fill the lacune. If Rightly succussed to the same degree of Al Jazeera Arabic or Al Jazeera English, then Doha will significantly influence the American right-wing audience.

The second motivation was the Al Jazeera Network’s ineffectiveness in 3.5 yearlong blockades to Qatar by its neighbors, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. As the right-wing President Trump exclusively and openly prioritized the material gains over everything, liberal platforms such as Al Jazeera English found it very difficult to influence Trump as Trump’s material gain was more in siding with the Saudi Arabi bloc. By creating the Rightly, Qatar aims to invest in influencing the right-wing politicians, including future Republican Presidents, to avoid the repeat of the same isolation. If Rightly achieve to gain the American right-wing audience, Qatar would be able to diversify its influence and secure its interests whomever it is power.

The question, however, is not limited to whether the Rightly will be visible but is the possible harm that it will create for the existing brands. As Al Jazeera has been the voice of Palestinians, Afghans, and Iraqis who suffer most from the Republican President’s decisions, will it be able to prevent its prestigious status for long?

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