() – The world has long been aware of the scourge of apartheid — the systemic segregation or discrimination of people based on their race. But what about the institutionalized practice of singling people out for ill-treatment due to their gender?

The push to recognize “gender apartheid” under international law is gaining steam, with oppression against women and girls in Afghanistan and Iran fueling calls for immediate action, but tremendous obstacles remain.

What Do They Want?

Advocates want to clearly define gender apartheid as a crime under international law. Currently, only “persecution” on the basis of gender is recognized as a crime against humanity. But rights groups and activists say the concept of persecution does not fully capture the scope of the abuses committed under a system of institutionalized gender apartheid.

The goal is for the United Nations to make up for this gap by legally shielding women and girls from systemic abuse and violence.

Afghan women’s rights defenders are credited with being the first to articulate the concept of gender apartheid in the 1990s, during the Taliban’s first regime.

Since the Taliban returned to power in 2021, the hard-line Islamist group has reimposed its oppressive policies against women and girls, including severe restrictions on their appearances, freedom of movement, and right to work and study.

Hoda Khamosh, an Afghan women’s rights activist, says the recognition of gender apartheid would greatly benefit women’s rights in the country.

“We would be able to hold accountable the authorities and perpetrators of gender-based violence and discrimination against women,” Khamosh told RFE/RL’s Radio Azadi.

Meanwhile, Iranian women’s rights activists have said the institutionalized discrimination against women in the Islamic republic amounts to gender apartheid.

UN experts have said the violent enforcement of the hijab law and punishments on women and girls who fail to wear the head scarf could be described as a form of gender apartheid.

( RFE/RL ) – More than 60 percent of Iran’s electorate did not vote in the June 28 presidential election, despite it being billed as an important poll given the role that the next president could play in the succession to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

With no candidate managing to secure enough votes to win the election outright, a second round of voting will be held on July 5 between reformist hopeful Masud Pezeshkian and hard-line conservative and former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili.

The record-low turnout came after widespread calls by dissidents at home and abroad to boycott the election, arguing that no change has come from voting in past elections.

Iran has seen a trend of sliding voter turnout since 2020 that is driven in part by a growing frustration over a lack of freedoms, a faltering economy, and declining living standards.

Speaking to RFE/RL’s Radio Farda, Sweden-based Iranian political activist Mahdieh Golrou said the declining voter turnout in recent major elections was also the direct result of “a coordinated act of civil disobedience” that allows the disillusioned public to “communicate their dissent to the authorities.”

More than 50 political activists in Iran and other countries have called on the masses to continue their boycott going into the July 5 runoff.

“Any political participation or vote for handpicked and powerless candidates is a dark and bitter joke,” the activists, including imprisoned Nobel laureate Narges Mohammadi, said in a statement on June 30.

They argued that by shunning the Islamic republic’s “rigged scenarios,” the public would place itself in a position of power and facilitate the “fall of the regime.”

The Fear Factor

After the June 28 poll, analysts told RFE/RL that the fear of another hard-line president coming to power might compel some who boycotted the first round to vote for Pezeshkian in the runoff.

That now appears to be what Pezeshkian and his supporters on social media are focusing on to convince supporters of the boycott to vote for him.

“Reformist, ultraconservative in Iran presidential runoff as voters stay home” • FRANCE 24 English Video added by IC

Pezeshkian on June 30 wrote on X that “the future of Iran is in danger” and that only a high voter turnout could save the country.

Convincing them to cast their ballots will be no easy task, however. Observers have cast doubt on Pezeshkian’s credentials as a true reformist, noting that he has been largely supportive of Khamenei’s policies and is likely seen as relatively harmless to the aims of the clerical establishment.

Some have said that Pezeshkian would need to present a clearly outlined platform for reforms before opposition-minded voters could be expected to vote for him.

Others have highlighted the dangers of a Jalili presidency, warning that he could double down on the enforcement of the hijab, or Islamic head scarf, for women, and push Iran along a path of total global isolation akin to North Korea.

Former Telecommunications Minister Mohammad Javad Azari Jahromi vowed that Iranians “will not allow Iran to fall into the hands of the Taliban,” a suggestion that hard-line supporters of Iran’s Shi’ite clerical establishment did not take kindly to.

Addressing the majority of the electorate who shunned the ballot box, pro-reform lawmaker Gholamreza Tajgardun said their “voices have been heard.” However, he urged them to turn out for the second round to “show that together we can” instigate change.

Even if the boycott is broken, voter apathy remains a serious obstacle.

Some in Iran who do not back the boycott have been asking whether there is any point in voting.

Hossein Dehbashi, a documentary filmmaker with ties to the pro-reform movement, asked on X if there was “a difference between bad and worse” if ultimately the government is restricted in what it can and cannot do.

This is a sentiment that many in Iran share, according to France-based sociologist Saeed Peyvandi.

“[Iranian] society no longer easily accepts promises because its trust has repeatedly been betrayed,” Peyvandi told RFE/RL’s Radio Farda. The Islamic republic has “never understood” people’s complaints, he added, and now “trust in the establishment has collapsed.”

With reporting by Elaheh Ravanshad of RFE/RL’s Radio Farda

Via RFE/RL

Copyright (c)2024 RFE/RL, Inc. Used with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

The ultraconservative Raisi was a longtime protege of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was widely believed to be grooming the former judiciary chief as his successor.

Raisi’s demise has boosted the prospects of other contenders, including Khamenei’s own son, landing the most coveted job in the Islamic republic.

With no obvious front-runner to be the next supreme leader, Raisi’s death in a helicopter crash on May 19 is likely to trigger a power struggle among members of the country’s clerical establishment, experts say.

“If Khamenei can’t control this power competition, then he might have to face a basic reality of the succession issue becoming a destabilizing factor for the regime while he is, in fact, still alive,” said Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran Program at the Washington-based Middle East Institute.

Who Are The Likely Contenders?

The 88-seat Assembly of Experts, whose members are elected for eight-year terms, is tasked with appointing the next supreme leader.

Dominated by hard-liners, the clerical body has been secretive about potential successors to the 85-year-old Khamenei, who became the supreme leader in 1989 after the death of the founder of the Islamic republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

A three-man panel in the assembly keeps a list of possible successors that has reportedly not even been seen by other members.

Some experts say Raisi’s death has boosted the chances of Mojtaba Khamenei, a cleric and the supreme leader’s second son.

The 55-year-old has shunned the limelight but is believed to have considerable influence behind the scenes and close ties with the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which plays a prominent military, political, and economic role in Iran.

But the younger Khamenei is seen as lacking the leadership skills and religious credentials for the post. He is widely referred to as a hojatoleslam, a title that refers to mid-ranking clerics, although a news agency affiliated with seminaries has since 2022 called him an ayatollah, an honorific title reserved for high-ranking clerics.

In February, a member of the Assembly of Experts said the supreme leader was opposed to hereditary rule, which would appear to rule out the younger Khamenei.

“The optics of having a son succeed his father perhaps resembles the optics of a monarchy,” said Farzan Sabet, a senior research associate at the Geneva Graduate School.

The Islamic Revolution in 1979 saw clerics loyal to Khomeini overthrow the U.S.-backed shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

WION: “Iran Presidential Elections: Up to 20 possible contenders gear up to become Iran’s next president”

Sabet said the younger Khamenei is still likely to “play an important role in a future iteration of the Islamic republic.”

Another cleric who is believed to be in contention for the role of supreme leader is Ayatollah Alireza A’rafi. The 67-year-old is close to Khamenei and serves as one of two deputy chiefs of the Assembly of Experts.

In 2020, Khamenei appointed A’rafi as the head of all of Iran’s seminaries, suggesting that he meets the religious criteria to become the next supreme leader.

A’rafi is not a household name and lacks name recognition, but that does not necessarily hurt his chances.

“Something we have to note about high-level leadership positions in the Islamic republic…is that a candidate may often emerge from, let’s say, relative obscurity,” Sabet said.

IRGC Playing Kingmaker

Analysts say the IRGC is likely to play a key role in picking Khamenei’s successor in an effort to protect its interests.

Ali Alfoneh, a senior fellow at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, said Raisi was the ideal candidate for the IRGC because he was a “malleable yes-man devoid of independent ideas.”

“Ayatollah Khamenei, and the Revolutionary Guards must now try to identify an individual as artless as the late President Raisi,” Alfoneh said.

In the early 1980s, Khomeini appointed Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri as his deputy. But they fell out and the latter was cast side and his position abolished.

In 2018, amid rumors of Khamenei’s poor health, there was talk of reestablishing the position of deputy supreme leader but it led nowhere.

“This unwillingness to share the stage with anyone else — in fear of losing his authority — has kept everyone guessing about who might succeed Khamenei,” Vatanka said.

“Khamenei’s ambiguity around the succession issue is more likely now to be a liability for him than an asset.”

( RFE/RL) – The United States wants to force a gradual shift in Iran’s “decision-making calculus” by signing a defense deal with Saudi Arabia and securing the normalization of relations between Riyadh and Israel.

“We continue to work with allies and partners to enhance their capabilities to deter and counter the threats Iran poses, impose costs on Iran for its actions, and seek to shift Iran’s decision-making calculus over time,” a U.S. State Department spokesperson told RFE/RL.

The security package has several components, including a bilateral U.S.-Saudi defense pact aimed at enhancing the Sunni kingdom’s deterrence capabilities. But Washington is adamant that regardless of how close the Americans and the Saudis are to a bilateral agreement, the security package cannot materialize without Saudi-Israeli normalization.

Saudi Arabia has conditioned the normalization of ties with Israel on the establishment of a cease-fire in Gaza and a credible pathway to Palestinian statehood.

The administration of U.S. President Joe Biden sees a three-way deal key to ensuring a sustainable peace in the Middle East, which includes isolating Iran and making it costly for the Islamic republic to maintain its current regional policies.

“Iran’s isolation in the region and in the international community is a result of its own policies,” the spokesperson said in an e-mailed statement to RFE/RL.

Hindustan Times Video: “Iran’s Khamenei ‘Warns’ MBS; Lambasts U.S. For ‘Forcing’ Saudi Arabia To Normalise Ties with Israel”

A calculus shift will “definitely” happen, but not in the way that the United States wants, according to Hamidreza Azizi, a fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

“Any sort of coalition-building would result in Iran going for counter-coalitions,” he added.

But analysts maintain that for Saudi Arabia, isolating Iran is not the core objective of a security pact with the United States.

The Saudis see normalizing relations with Israel as a strategic leverage to help them extract substantial security commitments from Washington, “thereby balancing against Iranian influence without overtly antagonizing Tehran,” Azizi said.

Meanwhile, securing a path toward Palestinian statehood could help Saudi Arabia assert its leadership within the Muslim world and effectively end the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Iran has long opposed Arab normalization with Israel and is a staunch critic of the Abraham Accords, which saw Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) establish diplomatic ties with Israel in 2020.

On May 1, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei implicitly criticized Saudi Arabia for looking to normalize relations with Israel in the hopes of resolving the Palestinian question.

Anna Jacobs, a senior Gulf analyst at the Brussels-based International Crisis Group, argued that the U.A.E. model of balancing relations with Iran and Israel suggests that Saudi Arabia can do the same.

“Riyadh seems confident that normalization with Israel wouldn’t have a major impact on its relationship with Tehran,” she said. “The Saudi strategy with Iran right now is both containment and engagement.”

Copyright (c)2024 RFE/RL, Inc. Used with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Via RFE/RL

( RFE/RL ) – Iran is one of the most sanctioned countries in the world. But restrictions imposed by the United States have largely failed to stymie Iran’s oil exports, the backbone of its flailing economy.

U.S. sanctions have cut off Iran from most of its traditional customers, forcing Tehran to find new buyers and sell its oil at discounted prices.

But China’s willingness to buy record amounts of Iranian oil, Tehran’s mastery of sanctions-evading tactics, and Washington’s reluctance to strictly enforce sanctions have made U.S. measures against Iran’s energy exports ineffective, analysts say.

‘Dark’ Fleet Of Tankers

The lifting of U.S. sanctions as part of the 2015 nuclear deal with world powers allowed Iran to sell its oil to customers in Europe and East Asia. Oil exports reached a peak in 2018.

But exports plummeted after then-President Donald Trump reneged on the nuclear agreement later that year.

Iran has boosted its sales in recent years by circumventing sanctions, including using its “dark fleet” of tankers to illegally transport oil shipments to China.

The tactic involves ship-to-ship operations to offload the oil, middlemen, hidden money transfers, and rebranding the oil to mask its Iranian origin and make it appear to come from a third country.

“Iran is continuously developing and expanding not just the network of middlemen and trading companies involved in the sale of its oil, but also its own fleet of tankers that it predominantly uses to move its crude,” said Nader Itayim, the Middle East editor at the U.K.-based Argus Media.

Chinese Appetite

Growing demand for Iranian oil in China has been key to the surge in Iran’s oil sales.

Ship tracking data collected by Argus shows Iran’s oil exports currently hovering at 1.5 million barrels per day, with around 85 to 90 percent going to China.

Tehran gives China a steep discount to take its banned oil, taking up to 15 percent off the price of each barrel to make it worthwhile for Beijing to take on the liability of skirting sanctions.

Al Jazeera English Video: “Latest round of sanctions against Iran unlikely to make major impact”

The discounts have raised questions about the long-term profitability of Iran’s business with China. But experts said that Tehran still stands to gain.

“Even at heavy discounts, selling Iranian oil is extremely profitable and sustainable,” said Steve Hanke, a professor of applied economics at Johns Hopkins University. “That’s because the marginal cost of production in Iran is roughly $15 or less per barrel.”

Gregory Brew, an Iran and energy analyst at the U.S.-based Eurasia Group, says U.S. sanctions were once effective at blocking oil exports to China, but that is no longer the case.

“China’s rising stature as a new global power lends it greater freedom to defy U.S. sanctions,” Brew said.

Reluctance To Enforce Sanctions

Some analysts said Washington has been reluctant to strictly enforce sanctions, while others maintain that sanctions in general have failed.

Resources are required to enforce restrictions while new sectors would need to be sanctioned to keep up the pressure, according to Itayim of Argus Media.

“Otherwise, the target finds ways to evade the sanctions, while at the same time the buyer becomes more complacent as it sees enforcement waning. In the case of Iran and China, I think we have seen a bit of both,” Itayim said.

Analysts also argue that Washington is reluctant to strictly enforce sanctions due to the risks associated with forcing Iranian oil off the world market.

“Apart from the impact such action would have on the price of oil, which carries political and economic importance to [U.S. President Joe] Biden in an election year, aggressive enforcement would provoke both Iran and China, at a time when the United States is trying to manage escalatory risk both in the Middle East and East Asia,” Brew said.

The lax enforcement of oil sanctions also extends to Venezuela and Russia, Itayim says, noting that it “has been key to keeping a lid” on oil prices.

U.S. Congress last month passed a security package that included the Iran-China Energy Sanctions Act, giving the government the authority to further restrict Iran’s oil exports.

But experts are not convinced that more sanctions will have an impact.

Hanke said any new measures “will join the long list of failed Western sanctions” on the Islamic republic.

“Sanctions are always subject to workarounds that render the enforcement of sanctions futile,” he added.

Via RFE/RL

Copyright (c)2024 RFE/RL, Inc. Used with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty ]]> https://www.juancole.com/2024/04/israels-escalating-conflict.html Sat, 20 Apr 2024 04:04:17 +0000 https://www.juancole.com/?p=218138 By Kian Sharifi

( RFE/RL ) – Israel had vowed to make Iran pay for Tehran’s unprecedented drone and missile attack on April 13.

But Israel’s suspected military response early on April 19 appeared to be limited in scale and scope and aimed at de-escalating tensions with Iran.

Tehran said it shot down three quadcopter drones outside the central city of Isfahan, which is home to key military and nuclear facilities. Unnamed U.S. officials said Israel used missiles in the attack.

Experts said the use of small quadcopter drones, which are unable to travel long distances, suggests the attack was carried out from inside Iranian territory.

Israel has not claimed the attack in Isfahan. But experts said the suspected Israeli response sent a clear message to Tehran.

Raz Zimmt, a senior researcher at the Israeli-based Institute for National Security Studies, said Israel’s use of quadcopter drones, if confirmed, suggests its aim was to “expose the vulnerability of the Iranian security forces” on their own turf.

Zimmt said the attack was not without its risks, but out of all the options available to Israel, it was possibly the least risky.

“At this stage, deniability is vital to lower the risk. I think that if Israel takes responsibility for what happened — and there is sometimes this tendency among Israeli politicians – this would make it more difficult, not impossible but more difficult, for Iran not to retaliate.”

CNBC TV Video: “Israel launches strike on Iran: Here’s what to know”

Reuters quoted an unnamed Iranian official as saying that Tehran “has no plan to strike back immediately.”

Israel has been accused of previously attacking military sites in Isfahan with small drones. In January 2023, a military factory was hit. Three months later, Iran said it had foiled a drone attack on a Defense Ministry complex in the city.

Farzin Nadimi, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute, told RFE/RL’s Radio Farda that if Israel was behind the Isfahan attack, it was carried out in a manner “that carried the least risk of an Iranian retaliation.”

Iran’s April 13 attack was a response to the suspected Israeli air strike on the Iranian Embassy compound in Damascus on April 1 that killed seven Iranian commanders, including two generals.

Tehran said its attack showed that a “new equation” had been established and that Iran would not let Israeli strikes on Iranian interests abroad go unanswered.

But on the same day as the Isfahan attack, Israel was accused of targeting air defense systems in Syria, a key ally of Tehran where Iran’s powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps has a presence.

Zimmt said Israel wanted to send the message that “first, we retaliated, and second, we attacked in Syria and not just in Iran, meaning we are not ready to accept this so-called ‘new equation’ that the Iranians are trying to force on us.”

Mohammad Zarghami of Radio Farda contributed to this report.

Copyright (c)2024 RFE/RL, Inc. Used with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Via RFE/RL

( Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty ) – Iran’s strategy of deterrence against Israel has suffered greatly since the outbreak of the Gaza war — particularly after the brazen attack on its consulate in the Syrian capital on April 1.

Eighteen members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), including key generals, have been killed in Syria in suspected Israeli strikes since early December. But Iran has refrained from directly responding to Israel, instead opting to increase its support for the “Axis of Resistance” — its network of allies and proxies in the region — to take the fight to Israel.

But the deadly strike on its consulate in Damascus may compel Iran to take direct action, experts say.

Nestled between the Iranian and Canadian embassies, the building housing Iran’s consulate and the ambassador’s residence were reportedly struck by six missiles and demolished. Seven members of the IRGC, including top Quds Force General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, were killed.

( RFE/ RL ) – Iran’s parliamentary elections on March 1 witnessed a historically low turnout, in a blow to the legitimacy of the clerical establishment.

The official turnout of 41 percent was the lowest for legislative elections since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Critics claim the real turnout was likely even lower.

Hard-liners dominated the elections for the parliament and the Assembly of Experts, a body that picks the country’s supreme leader, consolidating their grip on power. Many reformists and moderates were barred from contesting the polls.

Experts said the declining turnout signifies the growing chasm between the ruling clerics and Iran’s young population, many of whom are demanding greater social and political freedoms in the Middle Eastern nation of some 88 million.

“These elections proved that the overriding imperative for the Islamic republic is strengthening ideological conformity at the top, even at the cost of losing even more of its legitimacy from below,” said Ali Vaez, the director of the Iran Project at the International Crisis Group.

‘Widening Divide’

Observers said disillusionment with the state has been building up for years and is reflected in the declining voter turnout in recent elections.

Turnout in presidential and parliamentary elections were consistently above 50 percent for decades. But the numbers have declined since 2020, when around 42 percent of voters cast ballots in the parliamentary elections that year. In the 2021 presidential vote, turnout was below 49 percent.

Ali Ansari, a history professor at the University of St. Andrews, puts that down to growing “despondency” in the country.

This is “the clearest indication of the widening divide between state and society, which has been growing over the years,” said Ansari.

“It is quite clear that the despondency is extending even to those who are generally sympathetic to the regime,” he added, referring to reformist former President Mohammad Khatami choosing not to vote in the March 1 elections.

Voter apathy was particularly evident in the capital, Tehran, which has the most representatives in the 290-seat parliament. In Tehran, only 1.8 million of the 7.7 million eligible voters — or some 24 percent — cast their votes on March 1, according to official figures.

Up to 400,000 invalid ballots — many believed to be blank — were cast in Tehran alone, a sign of voter discontent.

AP Archives Video: “Iran begins voting in first parliament election since 2022 protests amid questions over turnout”

Ahead of the elections, nearly 300 activists in Iran had called on the public to boycott the “engineered” elections.

Beyond Boycott

The March 1 elections were the first since the unprecedented anti-establishment protests that rocked the country in 2022.

The monthslong demonstrations, triggered by the death in custody of a young woman arrested for allegedly violating Iran’s hijab law, snowballed into one of the most sustained demonstrations against Iran’s theocracy. At least 500 protesters were killed and thousands were detained in the state’s brutal crackdown on the protests.

Iran has been the scene of several bursts of deadly anti-establishment protests since the disputed presidential election in 2009. Many of the demonstrations have been over state repression and economic mismanagement.

But experts said that the 2022 protests alone did not result in the record-low turnout in the recent elections.

“This is a reflection of a deeper malaise that extends back to 2009 and traverses through 2017, 2019, and 2022,” Ansari said. “It has been building for some time.”

Despite the historically low turnout, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei praised the “epic” participation of the public. State-run media, meanwhile, spun the elections as a victory over those who called for a boycott.

By claiming victory, the clerical establishment “overlooks the growing absence of support from 60 percent of its population,” said Vaez.

“Such self-approbation [mirrors] the regime’s previous dismissal of the 2022 protests as the result of foreign intrigue rather than reflection of deep discontent,” he said, adding that it represents the Islamic republic’s “continuation of ignoring simmering public discontent.”

Hard-Line Dominance

Around 40 moderates won seats in the new parliament. But the legislature will remain dominated by hard-liners.

The elections were largely seen as a contest between conservatives and ultraconservatives.

“We can say that a more hotheaded and previously marginal wing of the hard-liners scored a victory against more established conservatives,” said Arash Azizi, a senior lecturer in history and political science at Clemson University in South Carolina.

“This is because the former had a more fired-up base and in the absence of popular participation were able to shape the results,” he added.

A more hard-line parliament could have more bark but “certainly” not more bite than its predecessors, according to Vaez.

“The parliament is subservient to the supreme leader and rubber stamps the deep state’s strategic decisions, even if grudgingly,” he added.

Since the ultraconservative Ebrahim Raisi, a close ally of Khamenei, was elected as president in 2021, Iran’s hard-liners have dominated all three branches of the government, including the parliament and judiciary.

Other key institutions like the Assembly of Experts and the powerful Guardians Council, which vets all election candidates, are also dominated by hard-liners.

“There is not much left of the system’s republican features,” Vaez said. “The Islamic republic is now a minority-ruled unconstitutional theocracy.”

RFE/ RL

( RFE/RL ) – Iran’s so-called axis of resistance is a loose network of proxies, Tehran-backed militant groups, and an allied state actor.

The network is a key element of Tehran’s strategy of deterrence against perceived threats from the United States, regional rivals, and primarily Israel.

Active in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, the axis gives Iran the ability to hit its enemies outside its own borders while allowing it to maintain a position of plausible deniability, experts say.

Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has played a key role in establishing some of the groups in the axis. Other members have been co-opted by Tehran over the years.

Iran has maintained that around dozen separate groups that comprise the axis act independently.

Tehran’s level of influence over each member varies. But the goals pursued by each group broadly align with Iran’s own strategic aims, which makes direct control unnecessary, according to experts.

Lebanon’s Hizballah

Hizballah was established in 1982 in response to Israel’s invasion that year of Lebanon, which was embroiled in a devastating civil war.

The Shi’ite political and military organization was created by the Quds Force, the overseas arm of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the elite branch of the country’s armed forces.

Danny Citrinowicz, a research fellow at the Iran Program at the Israel-based Institute for National Security Studies, said Tehran’s aim was to unite Lebanon’s various Shi’ite political organizations and militias under one organization.

Since it was formed, Hizballah has received significant financial and political assistance from Iran, a Shi’a-majority country. That backing has made the group a major political and military force in Lebanon.

“Iran sees the organization as the main factor that will deter Israel or the U.S. from going to war against Iran and works tirelessly to build the organization’s power,” Citrinowicz said.

Hizballah has around 40,000 fighters, according to the office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence. The State Department said Iran has armed and trained Hizballah fighters and injected hundreds of millions of dollars in the group.

Photo by أخٌ‌في‌الله on Unsplash

The State Department in 2010 described Hizballah as “the most technically capable terrorist group in the world.”

Citrinowicz said Iran may not dictate orders to the organization but Tehran “profoundly influences” its decision-making process.

He described Hizballah, which is considered a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union, not as a proxy but “an Iranian partner managing Tehran’s Middle East strategy.”

Led by Hassan Nasrallah, Hizballah has developed close ties with other Iranian proxies and Tehran-backed militant groups, helping to train and arm their fighters.

Citrinowicz said Tehran “almost depends” on the Lebanese group to oversee its relations with other groups in the axis of resistance.

Hamas

Hamas, designated a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union, has had a complex relationship with Iran.

Founded in 1987 during the first Palestinian Intifada, or uprising, Hamas is an offshoot of the Palestinian arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist political organization established in Egypt in the 1920s.

Hamas’s political chief is Ismail Haniyeh, who lives in Qatar. Its military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, is commanded by Yahya Sinwar, who is believed to be based in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is estimated to have around 20,000 fighters.

For years, Iran provided limited material support to Hamas, a Sunni militant group. Tehran ramped up its financial and military support to the Palestinian group after it gained power in the Gaza Strip in 2007.

But Tehran reduced its support to Hamas after a major disagreement over the civil war in Syria. When the conflict broke out in 2011, Iran backed the government of President Bashar al-Assad. Hamas, however, supported the rebels seeking to oust Assad.

Nevertheless, experts said the sides overcame their differences because, ultimately, they seek the same goal: Israel’s destruction.

“[But] this does not mean that Iran is deeply aware of all the actions of Hamas,” Citrinowicz said.

After Hamas militants launched a multipronged attack on Israel in October that killed around 1,200 people, mostly civilians, Iran denied it was involved in planning the assault. U.S. intelligence has indicated that Iranian leaders were surprised by Hamas’s attack.

Seyed Ali Alavi, a lecturer in Middle Eastern and Iranian Studies at SOAS University of London, said Iran’s support to Hamas is largely “confined to rhetorical and moral support and limited financial aid.” He said Qatar and Turkey, Hamas’s “organic” allies, have provided significantly more financial help to the Palestinian group.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad

With around 1,000 members, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is the smaller of the two main militant groups based in the Gaza Strip and the closest to Iran.

Founded in 1981, the Sunni militant group’s creation was inspired by Iran’s Islamic Revolution two years earlier. Given Tehran’s ambition of establishing a foothold in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, Iran has provided the group with substantial financial backing and arms, experts say.

The PIJ, led by Ziyad al-Nakhalah, is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union.

“Today, there is no Palestinian terrorist organization that is closer to Iran than this organization,” Citrinowicz said. “In fact, it relies mainly on Iran.”

Citrinowicz said there is no doubt that Tehran’s “ability to influence [the PIJ] is very significant.”

Iraqi Shi’ite Militias

Iran supports a host of Shi’ite militias in neighboring Iraq, some of which were founded by the IRGC and “defer to Iranian instructions,” said Gregory Brew, a U.S.-based Iran analyst with the Eurasia Group.

But Tehran’s influence over the militias has waned since the U.S. assassination in 2020 of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, who was seen as the architect of the axis of resistance and held great influence over its members.

“The dynamic within these militias, particularly regarding their relationship with Iran, underwent a notable shift following the assassination of Qassem Soleimani,” said Hamidreza Azizi, a fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

The U.S. drone strike that targeted Soleimani also killed Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the deputy head of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organization of mostly Shi’ite Iran-backed armed groups that has been a part of the Iraqi Army since 2016.

Muhandis was also the leader of Kata’ib Hizballah, which was established in 2007 and is one of the most powerful members of the PMF. Other prominent groups in the umbrella include Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat al-Nujaba, Kata’ib Seyyed al-Shuhada, and the Badr Organization. Kata’ib Hizballah has been designated as a terrorist entity by the United States.

Following the deaths of Soleimani and al-Muhandis, Kata’ib Hizballah and other militias “began to assert more autonomy, at times acting in ways that could potentially compromise Iran’s interests,” said Azizi.

Many of the Iran-backed groups that form the PMF are also part of the so-called Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which rose to prominence in November 2023. The group has been responsible for launching scores of attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria since Israel launched its war against Hamas in Gaza.

“It’s important to note that while several militias within the PMF operate as Iran’s proxies, this is not a universal trait across the board,” Azizi said.

Azizi said the extent of Iran’s control over the PMF can fluctuate based on the political conditions in Iraq and the individual dynamics within each militia.

The strength of each group within the PMF varies widely, with some containing as few as 100 members and others, such as Kata’ib Hizballah, boasting around 10,000 fighters.

Syrian State And Pro-Government Militias

Besides Iran, Syria is the only state that is a member of the axis of resistance.

“The relationship between Iran and the Assad regime in Syria is a strategic alliance where Iran’s influence is substantial but not absolute, indicating a balance between dependency and partnership,” said Azizi.

The decades-long alliance stems from Damascus’s support for Tehran during the devastating 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War.

When Assad’s rule was challenged during the Syrian civil war, the IRGC entered the fray in 2013 to ensure he held on to power.

Hundreds of IRGC commander and officers, who Iran refers to as “military advisers,” are believed to be present in Syria. Tehran has also built up a large network of militias, consisting mostly of Afghans and Pakistanis, in Syria.

Azizi said these militias have given Iran “a profound influence on the country’s affairs,” although not outright control over Syria.

“The Assad regime maintains its strategic independence, making decisions that serve its national interests and those of its allies,” he said.

The Fatemiyun Brigade, comprised of Afghan fighters, and the Zainabiyun Brigade, which is made up of Pakistani fighters, make up the bulk of Iran’s proxies in Syria.

“They are essentially units in the IRGC, under direct control,” said Brew.

The Afghan and Pakistani militias played a key role in fighting rebel groups opposed to Assad during the civil war. There have been reports that Iran has not only granted citizenship to Afghan fighters and their families but also facilitated Syrian citizenship for them.

The Fatemiyun Brigade, the larger of the two, is believed to have several thousand fighters in Syria. The Zainabiyun Brigade is estimated to have less than 1,000 fighters.

Yemen’s Huthi Rebels

The Huthis first emerged as a movement in the 1980s in response to the growing religious influence of neighboring Saudi Arabia, a Sunni kingdom.

In 2015, the Shi’ite militia toppled the internationally recognized, Saudi-backed government of Yemen. That triggered a brutal, yearslong Saudi-led war against the rebels.

With an estimated 200,000 fighters, the Huthis control most of the northwest of the country, including the capital, Sanaa, and are in charge of much of the Red Sea coast.

The Huthis’ disdain for Saudi Arabia, Iran’s regional foe, and Israel made it a natural ally of Tehran, experts say. But it was only around 2015 that Iran began providing the group with training through the Quds Force and Hizballah. Tehran has also supplied weapons to the group, though shipments are regularly intercepted by the United States.

“The Huthis…appear to have considerable autonomy and Tehran exercises only limited control, though there does appear to be [a] clear alignment of interests,” said Brew.

Since Israel launched its war in Gaza, the Huthis have attacked international commercial vessels in the Red Sea and fired ballistic missiles at several U.S. warships.

In response, the United States and its allies have launched air strikes against the Huthis’ military infrastructure. Washington has also re-designated the Huthis as a terrorist organization.

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