(The Conversation) – Much recent media focus has rightly been on the anniversary of the October 7 attacks, where Hamas assailants murdered nearly 1,200 Israelis and foreign nationals and abducted a further 251.

Coverage has also centred on Israel’s expanding ground operation in Lebanon, which follows an intensive bombing campaign of the country’s south, east and capital, Beirut.

But meanwhile, the Israeli military has been continuing its operations in Gaza, where the death toll has risen to 42,000, according to the Hamas-run health ministry. Yet another instance of renewed Hamas paramilitary activity has emerged in Jabalia near Gaza City, an area that had reportedly been brought under the firm control of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF).

The Palestinian suffering has been massive and sustained, and Hamas has been severely damaged. But, in reality, the war in Gaza has become a violent stalemate with neither party able to win, yet neither likely to lose.

Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, though, is determined to press on in Gaza while extending the war to Lebanon.

Netanyahu’s main problem has been the depth of opposition facing him in Israel over the fate of the hostages. This was exemplified by a general strike in support of a hostage deal in early September and the sheer size of some of the demonstrations against his government in recent months.

However, that has changed with the start of Israel’s military actions in Lebanon, and has given Netanyahu breathing space. At the end of September, polling indicated that Netanyahu’s rightwing Likud party would now win more seats than any other if a general election was held.

That popularity may persist for now, depending partly on what the IDF does next. But the longer-term course of the war is probably contingent on the far-right components of Netanyahu’s governing coalition, and especially the rise of messianic Judaism.

Messianic Judaism is best seen as an amalgam of ultra-orthodox Judaism and religious nationalism. The movement, which has grown in Israel in recent years, seeks a pure Jewish state. This includes the rebuilding of the Temple of Solomon on the site of Islam’s third-most holy site, the Al-Aqsa Mosque, in the Old City of Jerusalem.

It has also become increasingly significant in the military. This is partly because many soldiers have been educated in religious military schools, and a high proportion of young army recruits come from religious families.

Indeed, some of the most active Israeli military units in the Gaza war are drawn specifically from such cohorts, an example being the Netzah Yehuda (Judah Forever) battalion.

Messianic Judaism is an element in Israeli politics that is underestimated in political analysis. This is despite the especially hard line it takes in terms of what is acceptable in ending the war, offering support to Netanyahu’s government on its own terms.

A state built out of conflict

In three distinct periods, the Israeli state has moved markedly to the right. The first followed the Yom Kippur war in 1973. The second occurred after the influx of hundreds of thousands of immigrants from the old Soviet bloc in the 1990s. And the third was a reaction to the second intifada (or uprising) in the early 2000s.

The latest move to the right was reflected by a growth in support for the Likud party, as well as smaller parties that were strongly Zionist and deeply opposed to any Palestinian influence on Israeli politics.

“Messianism,” Digital, Dream / Dreamland v3, 2024.

From 2010 onwards, there appeared to be a more stable period. The IDF maintained rigorous control over Gaza and the occupied West Bank, and there was a stalemate in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s rocket attacks into northern Israel were rare and Israeli troops stayed mainly south of the border.

However, the loss of life and the capture of hostages on October 7 was a massive and visceral shock. It was clear from the start that the government’s response would be overwhelming and focused on the destruction of Hamas.

A year later and that possibility seems diminished. But if there is ever to be a more peaceful coexistence between Israel and Palestine then the position of hardline Israelis has to be recognised, especially given their strong role in the current Netanyahu government.

To put it bluntly, in their view something has to be done about the Palestinians. As the Economist newspaper put it on August 29, the hardliners “want to annex the West Bank, topple the Palestinian Authority, permanently reoccupy and resettle Gaza, and push Palestinians abroad”.

They also want Israel to move away from secularism. According to the same article, Netanyahu’s aborted plan to curb judicial power in the early months of this government was only the first step to achieving this.

His government’s aim, the article argues, is to eradicate the secular “deep state” and seize control of the army, security agencies and courts. Their problem is that such an aim, if ever a possibility, is hugely constrained by the near-global perception of Israel as close to a rogue state.

What is already clear, though, is that Israeli society is becoming more hawkish. This is probably aided by substantial recent emigration, including a “brain drain” from the secular elite.

For now, the Netanyahu government may seem secure. But political stability is hard won and all too easily lost, especially at a time of accelerated war-making.

Paul Rogers, Professor of Peace Studies, University of Bradford

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

(The Conversation) – United Nations peacekeepers in southern Lebanon have reported a series of incidents over the past few days in which they have been endangered by Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) as Israel continues its incursion into southern Lebanon.

Two members of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil) were wounded on October 10 when an Israeli tank fired its weapon at Unifil’s headquarters in the city of Naqoura. They are reported to be receiving treatment in hospital for minor injuries.

This follows a series of other reports of IDF troops firing on other Unifil positions in recent days. A Unifil statement called on the IDF “and all actors to ensure the safety and security of UN personnel and property and to respect the inviolability of UN premises at all times.

For 44 years the presence of UN peacekeepers in southern Lebanon has provided a much-needed measure of predictability and stability on an international fault line that has the potential to trigger a larger war in the Middle East. Its value has often been to shine an international spotlight on events on the ground and to provide humanitarian assistance to the local population.

The Unifil peacekeeping mission is in an area of southern Lebanon that stretches from the de facto Lebanese border with Israel about 18 miles northwards up to the Litani River. In violation of UN security council resolution 1701, which was issued in 2006 and was designed to bring to an end the 33-day war between Israel and Hezbollah, Israeli tanks have been advancing into southern Lebanon since September 30. Hezbollah is fighting back – and casualties are mounting.

On October 5, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) pressed the Unifil Irish Battalion, stationed south-east of Marun al-Ras, to leave its position to allow the IDF to proceed with their invasion. On October 6, Unifil force commander Lt. Gen. Aroldo Lázaro Sáenz denied the request. A Unifil statement said: “Peacekeepers remain in all positions and the UN flag continues to fly.”

The IDF reportedly ceased their military operations in the area on October 8. This is most likely because their military goals have changed. The rapidly unfolding Israeli military action in Lebanon has now deployed an additional 15,000 troops. This raises questions about the “limited” nature of the IDF’s incursion and its goals.

Since 1978, Unifil has provided medical services, electricity, generators, language courses, financial aid and water to local communities. The peacekeeping force has also helped to clear millions of square meters of land from anti-personal mines and cluster bombs, releasing farmland for cultivation and preventing injuries or deaths since the 2006 war.

In 2006, the Unifil mission adopted a new mandate under UN Resolution 1701. Like all newer UN peacekeeping mandates, it contained a protection of civilians clause which authorises Unifil to “protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence”.

Israel contends that Hezbollah missile attacks into northern Israel are an indication that Unifil has never fully implemented 1701 – hence the need to invade and destroy the militant group**. But protection of civilians is central to Unifil’s mandate. While the IDF claims it is targeting Hezbollah’s military infrastructure and leadership, thousands of civilian lives in southern Lebanon remain at risk.

Image by Michel van der Vegt from Pixabay

It has recently been reported that more than 2,000 civilians have died in the latest Israeli incursion, with more than 9,000 injured and over 608,000 displaced. So, implementation of this protection clause has never been more important.

Unifil must not become collateral damage

Unifil’s ability to protect civilians during Israeli incursions has often been challenged because the IDF refused to guarantee the safety of fleeing civilians, either in convoys out of the villages, or in UN compounds.

The most notorious incident was the Qana incident of 1996, when 106 civilians died while sheltering in the Fijian UN compound. In July 2006, the IDF used a precision guided aerial bomb on a Unifil post. The attack killed four international unarmed military observers working under Unifil operational control, despite repeated verbal warnings from Unifil headquarters to avoid the post. The IDF has also damaged Unifil positions in times of peace. In January 2005 an unarmed French UN observer was killed by IDF tank fire. In January 2015 IDF artillery killed a Spanish peacekeeper.

So the challenge for Unifil has always been that if they allow civilians to take shelter in their compounds, they risk becoming part of the IDF’s collateral damage.

Similarly, Hezbollah is also no friend of Unifil. In December 2022, Hezbollah supporters killed an unarmed Irish peacekeeper who ventured accidentally into a village just outside the area of operation.

International witness

Despite these challenges, Unifil still has a powerful role to play in southern Lebanon. As the fog of war engulfs all the protagonists, Unifil has the ability to bring the world’s attention to the current conflict which may help constrain the parties. It is critical at this time to have an international force bear witness to events on the ground and provide basic humanitarian assistance, monitor and report potential violations and guarantee shelter to the local population whenever possible to help the displaced people that remain within the Unifil area of operation.

On October 7, the US State Department warned the IDF that it did not want to see military action taken against Unifil or for the peacekeepers to be put in danger in any way. This warning is welcome given the recent disregard for the UN demonstrated by Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. who, when speaking to the UN general assembly on September 27, labelled the UN “contemptible in the eyes of decent people everywhere”. On October 2, the Israeli government barred UN secretary general António Guterres from entering Israel.

Israel’s allies must increase the pressure for the IDF to allow Unifil to exercise the protection of civilians clause contained in its mandate. This would mean allowing the peacekeeping force the freedom of movement in south Lebanon to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. The IDF must also guarantee the safety of civilians escaping with Unifil’s assistance from the villages. And the IDF must allow Unifil to establish safe zones for civilians trapped in the conflict, to compensate for the absence of air raid shelters and bunkers in Lebanon.

While Unifil may not be able to prevent the bloodshed, for now it can continue help to stem the flow, just as it always has.

Chiara Ruffa, Professor of Political Science, Sciences Po and Vanessa Newby, Assistant Professor, Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

(The Conversation) – In 2016, British photographer James Morris published Time and Remains of Palestine. The images in this book bear witness to an absence of architectural monuments, and to the invisible moments of history buried in the rubble and wastelands of Palestine.

Situated at the crossroads between Asia and Africa, Palestine has always been an area of great strategic importance, and it has been populated by various civilisations throughout history. Its emptiness can therefore only be explained by a false history, one that stems directly from the Israeli settler movement, which seeks to destroy the material traces of other cultures that point to a much more complex past than they would like to admit.

St. Porphyrios Church, Gaza: Photo by form PxHere

This complexity has been painstakingly proven in a Forensic Architecture report on an archaeological site known as Anthedon Harbour, Gaza’s old maritime port, which was first inhabited somewhere between 1100BC and 800BC.

October 2023: human cost takes precedence over cultural losses

On 7 October 2023, the day after the 50th anniversary of the Yom Kippur war, Israelis celebrated the Simchat Torah holiday. While this was happening, the wall built by Israel inside the Gaza Strip was breached by more than 1,200 Hamas members in a surprise attack. They kidnapped more than 200 people, and left at least 1,200 dead and almost 3,500 injured.

Israel swiftly declared a state of war for the first time since 1973. The conflict, which has just passed its one year mark, has become an unprecedented humanitarian catastrophe for 2.3 million Palestinians. The numbers are appalling: over 41,000 dead, including more than 14,000 children, almost 100,000 wounded and more than two million displaced.

A month after the outbreak of the war, UNESCO, at its 42nd General Conference, stated that “the current destruction and eradication of culture and heritage in Gaza is yet to be determined, since all efforts are now being concentrated on saving human lives in Gaza.”

Monitoring the disaster

The scale of Gaza’s humanitarian catastrophe has meant that the extensive destruction of significant elements of Palestinian history and identity could easily be overlooked. However, in April 2024, the United Nations Mine Action Service estimated that “every square metre in Gaza impacted by the conflict contains some 200 kilogrammes of rubble.”

Cultural property has been a target of the Israeli offensive since the beginning of the conflict and, as early as November, the devastation of the cities of northern Gaza far exceeded that caused in the infamous bombing of Dresden in 1945. We cannot forget that the Gaza Strip is just a narrow area of coastal land measuring some 365 km², rich in archaeological and historical sites, that the international community has recognised as occupied territory since 1967.

Research over the last century has counted at least 130 sites in Gaza that Israel, as an occupying power, is obligated to protect under international law along with the rest of the area’s cultural and natural heritage. These obligations are laid out in the following conventions: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948); the Geneva Conventions (1949) and their annexes, and the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1954).

As of 17 September 2024, UNESCO has verified damage to 69 sites: 10 religious sites, 43 buildings of historical and artistic interest, two repositories of movable cultural property, six monuments, one museum and seven archaeological sites. Other reports give a much higher number of affected sites. These assessments are made in very difficult situations, in the midst of constant bombardment, thanks to testimonies and studies on the ground and supported by satellite images.

One especially striking example of a site reduced to rubble is the Great Mosque of Gaza, considered by many to be the oldest mosque in the territory and a symbol of resilience. The Church of Saint Porphyrius – the oldest Christian church in Gaza, built by the Crusaders in 1150 – has also been hit by Israeli airstrikes.

While Israel is not a member of UNESCO – it left in 2018, when the Trump administration pulled the US out – it is still obligated under the 1954 Hague Convention to preserve cultural property. Article 4 of the Convention states that:

“The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect cultural property situated within their own territory as well as within the territory of other High Contracting Parties by refraining from any use of the property and its immediate surroundings or of the appliances in use for its protection for purposes which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict; and by refraining from any act of hostility, directed against such property. ”

The Hague Convention turned 70 in 2024, but cultural heritage sites are still woefully underprotected from armed conflict around the world.

Humanitarian and cultural genocide

The destruction of Gaza’s cultural heritage is intertwined with the ongoing humanitarian crisis. This link is recognised by the International Criminal Court, which states that:

“Crimes against or affecting cultural heritage often
touch upon the very notion of what it means to be human, sometimes eroding
entire swaths of human history, ingenuity, and artistic creation.”

Many independent reports and articles have begun to break down specific elements of the destruction in Gaza, speaking not just of genocide, but also of cultural genocide, urbicide, ecocide, domicide and scholasticide.

On 29 December 2023, the Republic of South Africa brought a case before the International Court of Justice, accusing Israel of violating its obligations under the 1948 Convention on Genocide with regard to Palestinians in Gaza.

Among the evidence supporting South Africa’s claim, Israel is accused of attacking infrastructure to bring about the physical destruction of the Palestinian people, with their attacks leaving some 318 Muslim and Christian places of worship in ruins, along with numerous archives, libraries, museums, universities and archaeological sites. This is all in addition to destroying the very people who created Palestine’s heritage.

Gaza: one big military target

In her report, published on 1 July 2024, Francesca Albanese, the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories, highlights how Israel has turned Gaza in its entirety into a “military target”. The Israeli military arbitrarily links mosques, schools, UN facilities, universities and hospitals to Hamas, thus justifying their indiscriminate destruction. By declaring these buildings legitimate targets, it does away with any distinction between civilian and military targets.

Although Israel’s attacks against the cultural heritage of Palestine are not a new phenomenon, the current destruction in Gaza’s city centres is unprecedented.

As far as Albanese is concerned, Israel is trying to mask its intentions by using the terminology of international humanitarian law. In doing so, it justifies the systematic use of lethal violence against any and all Palestinian civilians, while simultaneously pursuing policies aimed at the widespread destruction of Palestinian cultural heritage and identity.

Her report unequivocally concludes that the Israeli regime’s actions are driven by a genocidal logic, a logic that forms an intrinsic part of its colonisation project. Its ultimate aim is to expel the Palestinian people from their land, and to wipe away any trace of their culture and history.

Pilar Montero Vilar, Profesora Titular, investigadora principal del Observatorio de Emergencias en Patrimonio Cultural www.oepac.es, Universidad Complutense de Madrid

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The hardship of war does not end when the shooting stops, as every wartime death leaves behind family members whose struggle will go on for decades, if not generations. Millions of these bereaved survivors have lost their kin, including parents, children, siblings, cousins, spouses and friends, with scores being added daily by wars like those currently ravaging Gaza, Lebanon, Ukraine and Sudan.

As well as plunging lives into mourning and sorrow, wars destabilise the basic foundations of wellbeing, health, and family care. They can also fuel desires for retribution and, coupled with intimate familiarity with violence and feelings of injustice, propel cycles of war far into the future. If we are to break these deadly patterns, we need to pay close attention to bereavement among the survivors of war.

Measuring war bereavement

In our recent study, we quantified the extent to which family bereavement outnumbers war casualties, as each wartime death entails the loss of a relative for various members of the surviving population. This is exacerbated in the context of protracted wars in which people can accumulate bereavements – someone might lose a parent to war when they are young, and then a child to the same war in old age.

In Palestine, one of the regions most affected by war in the last decade, there were an estimated 10,500 conflict fatalities between 29 September 2000 and 6 October 2023, and more than 41,000 fatalities since October 7, 2023. On average, each of these deaths has resulted in 1.7 grieving parents and 1.9 grieving children. This means that around 1 in every 43 surviving Palestinians has lost a child to the conflict, and 1 in every 59 Palestinians has lost a parent to war during their life.

These are, of course, population-level averages: some individuals have experienced a great deal more family deaths than others. The real numbers may also be much higher – a Lancet study accounting for indirect deaths estimates over 186,000 lives have been lost in Gaza since 7 October 2023.

Psychological and social damage

War bereavement leaves long-lasting scars in populations because bereaved survivors carry the experience of loss throughout their lives. Wars end, but the trauma endures.

Consider the case of the ongoing war in Gaza. According to our calculations, bereavement levels in the territory will remain extremely high in the decades to come, regardless of the war’s future development. Even if all hostilities were to cease immediately, we estimate it would take 50 years of uninterrupted peace to reduce the proportion of bereaved individuals in the Palestinian population to a quarter of current levels.

This population of bereaved survivors of war deserves special attention. Studies have shown that they are at a higher risk of prolonged grief disorder, depression, suicidal ideation, substance use disorders, and physical diseases.

The sudden death of kin is not only an emotional shock, it can also result in the loss of resources and support for those left behind. For instance, the death of a parent deprives young children of important financial and emotional resources at a key stage of their emotional and physical development. This can be highly detrimental for the child, or even fatal when coupled with the destruction of infrastructure like schools and health clinics.

Similarly, wellbeing in old age can be irreversibly damaged by the loss of children who act as caregivers. In fact, older adults are becoming increasingly at risk in wars around the world.

The political impact of family bereavement

The collective experience of losing kin affects shared perceptions of a conflict. While bereavement is a fact of life, war deaths are massive, untimely, unexpected and violent, creating the ideal conditions for collective trauma to take root and endure over time.

This is compounded by the fact that war casualties tend to be clustered within family groups and, as a result, some families experience the loss of multiple members to war. The targeted bombing of residential buildings in Gaza, for example, has brought about bereavement hotspots in which individuals experience much higher levels of bereavement compared to other members of the population.

“Mourning,” Digital, Dream / Dreamland v3, Clip2Comic, 2024.

(The Conversation) – Hurricane Milton went from barely hurricane strength to a dangerous Category 5 storm in less than 24 hours as it headed across the Gulf of Mexico toward Florida.

As its wind speed increased, Milton became one of the most rapidly intensifying storms on record. And with 180 mph sustained winds on Oct. 7, 2024, and very low pressure, it also became one of the strongest storms of the year.

Less than two weeks after Hurricane Helene’s devastating impact, this kind of storm was the last thing Florida wanted to see. Hurricane Milton was expected to make landfall as a major hurricane late on Oct. 9 or early Oct. 10 and had already prompted widespread evacuations.

So, what exactly is rapid intensification, and what does global climate change have to do with it? We research hurricane behavior and teach meteorology. Here’s what you need to know.

What is rapid intensification?

Rapid intensification is defined by the National Weather Service as an increase in a tropical cyclone’s maximum sustained wind speed of at least 30 knots – about 35 mph within a 24-hour period. That increase can be enough to escalate a storm from Category 1 to Category 3 on the Saffir-Simpson scale.

Milton’s wind speed went from 80 mph to 175 mph from 1 p.m. Sunday to 1 p.m. Monday, and its pressure dropped from 988 millibars to 911.

The National Hurricane Center had been warning that Milton was likely to become a major hurricane, but this kind of rapid intensification can catch people off guard, especially when it occurs close to landfall.

Hurricane Michael did billions of dollars in damage in 2018 when it rapidly intensified into a Category 5 storm just before hitting near Tyndall Air Force Base in the Florida Panhandle. In 2023, Hurricane Otis’ maximum wind speed increased by 100 mph in less than 24 hours before it hit Acapulco, Mexico. Hurricane Ian also rapidly intensified in 2022 before hitting just south of where Milton is projected to cross Florida.

What causes hurricanes to rapidly intensify?

Rapid intensification is difficult to forecast, but there are a few driving forces.

• Ocean heat: Warm sea surface temperatures, particularly when they extend into deeper layers of warm water, provide the energy necessary for hurricanes to intensify. The deeper the warm water, the more energy a storm can draw upon, enhancing its strength.

• Low wind shear: Strong vertical wind shear – a rapid change in wind speed or direction with height – can disrupt a storm’s organization, while low wind shear allows hurricanes to grow more rapidly. In Milton’s case, the atmospheric conditions were particularly conducive to rapid intensification.

• Moisture: Higher sea surface temperatures and lower salinity increase the amount of moisture available to storms, fueling rapid intensification. Warmer waters provide the heat needed for moisture to evaporate, while lower salinity helps trap that heat near the surface. This allows more sustained heat and moisture to transfer to the storm, driving faster and stronger intensification.

• Thunderstorm activity: Internal dynamics, such as bursts of intense thunderstorms within a cyclone’s rotation, can reorganize a cyclone’s circulation and lead to rapid increases in strength, even when the other conditions aren’t ideal.

Research has found that globally, a majority of hurricanes Category 3 and above tend to undergo rapid intensification within their lifetimes.

How does global warming influence hurricane strength?

If it seems as though you’ve been hearing about rapid intensification a lot more in recent years, that’s in part because it’s happening more often.

A 2023 study investigating connections between rapid intensification and climate change found an increase in the number of tropical cyclones experiencing rapid intensification over the past four decades. That includes a significant rise in the number of hurricanes that rapidly intensify multiple times during their development. Another analysis comparing trends from 1982 to 2017 with climate model simulations found that natural variability alone could not explain these increases in rapidly intensifying storms, indicating a likely role of human-induced climate change.

How future climate change will affect hurricanes is an active area of research. As global temperatures and oceans continue to warm, however, the frequency of major hurricanes is projected to increase. The extreme hurricanes of recent years, including Beryl in June 2024 and Helene, are already raising alarms about the intensifying impact of warming on tropical cyclone behavior.

Zachary Handlos, Atmospheric Science Educator, Georgia Institute of Technology and Ali Sarhadi, Assistant Professor of Atmospheric Science, Georgia Institute of Technology

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

(The Conversation) – Hurricane Helene caused deadly and destructive flooding when it swept through the Southeast on Sept. 26-29, 2024. Across a broad swath of western North Carolina, where the worst flooding occurred, the amount of rainfall exceeded levels that would be expected on average only once every 1,000 years.

But this wasn’t the first 1,000-year rainstorm in North Carolina this year. In mid-September, an unnamed slow-moving storm produced more than a foot of rainfall closer to the Atlantic coast. This storm inundated areas that had already been drenched by Tropical Storm Debby in August.

As atmospheric scientists and state climatologists, we believe it’s important for the public to understand the risk that extreme events may occur. That’s especially true as climate change alters the conditions that create and feed storms. Here’s how scientists calculate storm probabilities, and why events like a 1,000-year storm can happen much more frequently in some places than that term suggests.

Forecasting the future based on the past

Estimates of rainfall return periods – how long it will be, on average, between storms of a given size – come from the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the home of the National Weather Service. NOAA publishes these projections in a series of reports called Atlas 14. Architects and engineers use them to design buildings, dams, bridges and other facilities to withstand heavy rainfall.

The estimates use past rainfall data to calculate how frequently rainstorms of various sizes occur at given locations. In places where historical rainfall observations have been collected for decades, it’s possible to calculate the amount of rain that is exceeded, on average, one or two times per year with very high confidence.

Experts then use statistical methods to estimate how frequently larger rain amounts would occur. As the amounts get bigger, the calculations become less precise. But it’s still possible to make reasonable estimates of very rare rain events.

The results are average probabilities that a certain amount of rain will fall in a given location in any given year. If a storm that produces 6 inches (15 centimeters) of rain within 24 hours has a 1% chance of occurring in any year, then we would expect such a storm to happen once in 100 years, so its return period is said to be 100 years. An event with a 0.1% chance of happening in any given year could be expected to occur once in 1,000 years on average, so it is referred to as a 1,000-year event.

It’s not ‘one and done’

The problem with terms like 100-year event or 1,000-year event is that many people hear them and assume they mean another storm of that size shouldn’t occur for another 99 or 999 years. That’s a reasonable conclusion, but it’s incorrect. Each storm is an individual event, so just because one becomes unusually large doesn’t mean that another storm a year later can’t exceed the odds as well.

Imagine you’re rolling a pair of dice. The odds of throwing a pair of sixes is small – just 1 in 36, or slightly less than 3%. But if you roll the dice again, the odds don’t change – they are the same for that roll as the one before.

A more accurate way to communicate storm odds is to think about the annual exceedance probability – the chance that a rainstorm of a given size could occur in any single year. A 1,000-year storm has a 0.1% chance of occurring in any year, and the same probability of occurring again the next year, and the year after.

Since the U.S. is a big country, we should expect to see a bunch of 0.1% probability rainstorms every year. The chance of such a storm occurring at any specific location is extremely low, but the chance of one occurring somewhere becomes quite a bit higher.

Put another way, even if you are unlikely to experience a 1,000-year storm at your location, there likely will be 1,000-year storms somewhere in the country every year.

Different areas see different kinds of storms

In the real world, actual rainstorms aren’t randomly distributed; they are a result of atmospheric processes like thunderstorms and hurricanes, which are produced by local and regional climate patterns. So a map of actual 1,000-year rainstorms would show clusters reflecting hurricanes along the East Coast, atmospheric rivers along the West Coast, and thunderstorm complexes in the Great Plains, where thunderstorm systems form.

Storm types matter because they have different durations. Almost all rare 1-hour extreme rainfall events are associated with thunderstorms, while those that last 48 or 72 hours often are caused by hurricanes or their remnants.

North Carolina and South Carolina, which are frequently affected by hurricanes and tropical storms, have seen numerous extreme rainfall events in recent years. They include record-setting rainstorms in October 2015 in South Carolina; Hurricane Matthew in 2016; Hurricane Florence in 2018; the aforementioned nameless storm in September 2024; and now, Hurricane Helene.

In fact, since 2002, the three U.S. storms that have dropped 1,000-year magnitude rainfall on the largest areas have all hit the Carolinas: the October 2015 storm, Florence and Helene.

Loading the weather dice

Why have so many storms that, historically and statistically, should be exceedingly rare, struck the Carolinas in just a few years? There are two main reasons, which are related.

“Cyclone,” Digital, Dream / Dreamland v3 / Clip2Comic, 2024

First, estimating the probability of rare events requires increasingly large amounts of data. NOAA’s Atlas 14 was last updated for the Carolinas in 2006, and those calculations only used data through 2000.

As more storms occur and more data is collected, the estimates get more robust. Given that reliable rainfall measurements only extend back about 100 years, the true probability of this much rain in the Carolinas may have been underestimated up until now.

Second, these statistics assume the climate isn’t changing, but we know that it is. Especially in regions near the coasts, the frequency of heavy rainfall has increased as a result of human-caused climate change. Warmer air can hold more moisture, and warmer oceans provide that moisture as the fuel for heavy rainfall.

As a result, climate change is making rainstorms that had been extremely rare now somewhat more likely. While the Carolinas may have been especially unlucky in recent years, the dice are also becoming loaded toward heavier rain – a trend that poses major challenges for emergency preparedness and recovery.

NOAA is currently developing Atlas 15, which will update current estimates with more recent data and will incorporate the effects of climate change. The agency also plans to modernize its estimates of a related quantity known as probable maximum precipitation, which is an estimate of the worst-case rainfall that could occur in a location.

Engineers use these estimates to design large critical facilities, such as dams, that can withstand the flood that would occur with the worst-case scenario rainfall at their sites. North Carolina has developed its own version of Atlas 15, due to the pressing need to plan transportation infrastructure to handle more events like Florence and Helene.

These updates will provide information that can be used for better planning and decision-making. Even so, extreme rainfall will still be a major hazard, with significant impacts on many U.S. communities.

Russ Schumacher, Professor of Atmospheric Science and Colorado State Climatologist, Colorado State University and Kathie Dello, Director, North Carolina State Climate Office, North Carolina State University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

(The Conversation) – The Lebanese armed group Hezbollah confirmed on Sept. 28 that its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, had been killed in an Israeli airstrike in Beirut a day earlier. Nasrallah is the highest-ranking Hezbollah leader to have been killed since Israel began targeting the group’s leadership.

Several Hezbollah commanders, and hundreds of Lebanese civilians, have been killed in Israeli attacks in recent weeks. On Sept. 20, Israel launched its heaviest aerial bombing on Lebanon since 2006, killing hundreds of civilians. The attack followed the Sept. 17 coordinated explosions of hand-held wireless pagers allegedly carried by members of Hezbollah (but still also carried by many medical professionals). That assault maimed thousands of Lebanese people.

Israel says the violent strikes were necessary to preemptively thwart Hezbollah from launching rockets into northern Israel. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed the Lebanese population: “Israel’s war is not with you, it’s with Hezbollah,” which has long “been using you as human shields.”

The Telegraph in the United Kingdom proclaimed Israel’s war against Hezbollah as a brave move on behalf of the “West” to “uphold civilization.” Other news outlets, both western and Israeli, also framed the conflict as one for civilization. They also mentioned religion.

Wars have always required these types of false dichotomies: Christian and Muslim, civilization and barbarism, West and East.

Generations of Orientalists from the “West” constructed the “East” as a place with distinct cultural identities and values, and one over which the West must triumph.

The way East and West has historically been framed in Lebanon can help us understand the way the conflict there is being discussed in the Global North. To do this, I briefly outline three time periods to attempt to shed some light on how this framing can be used to justify violence against the nation.

1. Premodern times: Caught between two empires

Lebanon has frequently been a battleground between West and East. For aristocracies and clergies in France and Italy, Lebanon first became part of the East under Byzantium (the eastern half of the Roman empire). Later, Lebanon became part of the Islamic and Ottoman empires. It was not religion that defined these West/East splits but aspirations for wealth, resources, power and hegemony.

Following the collapse of the Roman Empire, in which modern-day Lebanon was situated, economic and political power remained in Christian hands but was transferred from Rome to Constantinople (modern day Istanbul). After eight major waves of Crusades, notorious for their pillages and “collateral damage” even in Christian cities, Western observers came to regard the East as a “treasure” that had been regained.

In his seminal book Europe and Islam, first published in French in 1978, pre-eminent Tunisian historian Hichem Djaït showed how Christianity in Europe was, from its inception, a political project aimed to both unite against and catch up to Islamic cultural, scientific and economic advancement.

The East, Djaït emphasized, was regarded as a deformed West, a “parvenu” and “a primitive newcomer” whose civilization was an aberration in Medieval Christian eyes. They regarded Islam’s prophet Muhammad as an internal traitor rather than an external threat. For example, in Dante’s Inferno Muhammad is punished for contributing to the West/East schism.

Western interest in the East was also, for Djaït, rooted in an envy for how diverse groups co-existed for centuries in the east but not the west.

II. Caught within colonial expansion

Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, Lebanon came under French rule. By this point, the Ottomans had been regarded as “the Sick Man of Europe” since at least the mid-19th century. Global powers exploited this characterization of Lebanon and were activated to send missionaries, build missionary schools, and revamp ports. The French also intervened with the work of sectarian groups. Therefore, especially in the 1920s, the French led a rapid modernizing of Lebanon, characterized as a trade-off between West and East.

The Syrian playwright Saadallah Wannous dramatized this trade-off in The Drunken Days in a dialogue between an old Lebanese man in his Eastern headwear, the tarbush, and a young Lebanese woman urging him to wear a Western hat:

Him: The tarbush is a symbol of religion.

Her: The hat is a symbol of urbanization.

Him: The tarbush indicates devotion.

Her: The hat indicates civilization.

Lebanese intellectuals at the time were aware of this dangerous equation of West with civilization. Palestinian-Lebanese writer May Ziadeh actively worked in the 1920s and 1930s to dispel the false dichotomy between West and East. She encouraged her students to “learn Western languages without forgetting their own” and she believed that “not a single nation in the world has been able to create itself without the input of others.”

Ziadeh belonged to a time referred to as the Nahda, or Arab Renaissance, when Arab writers wanted to revive the human flourishing once experienced in the medieval Islamic world. These intellectuals favoured a balanced approach between West and East and recognized the modernity the West ushered as a continuation of Eastern achievements.

“Multicultural Lebanon,” Digital, Dream / Dreamland v3 / Clip2Comic, 2024

III. 1975-2005: Caught between civil war and 9/11

Whereas questioning the West/East divide united a previous generation of Lebanese Christians and Muslims, the generations that went through the Lebanese civil war (1975–1990) affirmed that divide.

Western media capitalized on the newly divided allegiances of Lebanese Christians and framed them as torn in a West/East clash.

Some Lebanese political leaders also promoted this narrative and appealed to the West for support. Meanwhile, the emergence of Hezbollah after Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon became synonymous with a resistance against the West.

But this narrative obscures the realities of how and why these divides were created. These divides are created by Lebanese groups, including Hezbollah, as well as the West. They boosted, hindered and created each other. For example, in 2018, western media ignored claims of election fraud in Lebanon and instead sensationalized Hezbollah’s victory.

In a 1985 piece for the London Review of Books, Edward Said, author of Orientalism, cautioned against seeing Beirut as the Paris of the Middle East and Lebanon as its Switzerland, comparisons popular since the 1960s. Such comparisons have been recently recirculated and mourned by both Israeli and Lebanese media.

For Said, this representation of Lebanon threatened solidarity movements with Arabs and Palestinians by characterizing it as something fundamentally different from the rest of the Arab world.

But two years after the end of the Lebanese Civil War, American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington promoted the simplistic logic Said warned against and declared a clash of civilizations. The aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks saw a resurgence of Huntington’s theory. It revived in the West the Medieval Christian view of the East, and a desire to act as crusaders who export human rights and defend the world against terrorists.

We need to once and for all dispose of the West and the East as a clash of civilizations. Militaries and militias should not have to race to eliminate either side. They should instead realize that their fate is as intertwined as their past, and that only dialogue can solve conflict.

Rayyan Dabbous, PhD student, Centre for Comparative Literature, University of Toronto

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

(The Conversation) – Iran fired at least 180 ballistic missiles at Israel on Oct. 1, 2024, amplifying tensions in the Middle East that are increasingly marked by “escalation after escalation,” as United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres put it.

Iran’s attacks – which Israel largely deterred with its Iron Dome missile defense system, along with help from nearby U.S. naval destroyers – followed Israel’s killing of Hassan Nasrallah, the longtime leader of the Tehran-backed Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, on Sept. 27.

Hezbollah has been sending rockets into northern Israel since the start of the Gaza war, which began after Hamas and other militants invaded Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, and killed nearly 1,200 people. Hezbollah’s rocket attacks have displaced around 70,000 people from their homes in northern Israel.

Amy Lieberman, a politics and society editor at the Conversation U.S., spoke with counterterrorism expert Javed Ali to better understand the complex history and dynamics that are fueling the intensifying conflict in the Middle East.

How much more dangerous has the Middle East become in recent weeks?

The Middle East is in much more volatile situation than it was even a year ago. This conflict has expanded far outside of fighting primarily between Israel and Hamas.

Now, Israel and Hezbollah have a conflict that has developed over the past year that appears more dangerous than the Israel-Hamas one. This involves the use of Israeli special operations units, which have operated clandestinely in Lebanon in small groups since November 2023. In addition, Israel has been accused by Hezbollah of conducting unconventional warfare operations – like the exploding walkie-talkies and pagers – and launched hundreds of air and missile strikes in Lebanon over the past few weeks. The combination of these operations has destroyed Hezbollah’s weapons caches and military infrastructure and killed several senior leaders in the group, including Hassan Nasrallah.

The human costs of these attacks is significant, as more than 1,000 people in Lebanon have died. Among this total, it is unclear how many of the dead or wounded are actually Hezbollah fighters.

Israel and Hezbollah last had a direct war in 2006, which lasted 34 days and killed over 1,500 people between Lebanese civilians and Hezbollah fighters. Since then, Israel and Hezbollah have been in a shadow war – but not with the same kind of intensity and daily pattern that we have seen in the post-Oct. 7 landscape.

Now, the conflict has the potential to widen well outside the region, and even globally.

What does Iran have to do with the conflict between Israel and Hamas and Hezbollah?

Iran has said it fired the missiles into Israel as retaliation for attacks on Hezbollah, Hamas and the Iranian military.

A coalition of groups and organizations has now been labeled as Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.” Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khameini, and senior military commanders in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, or the IRGC, have issued unifying guidance to all the different elements, whether it is Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the Houthi rebels in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon or Shia militias in Iraq and Syria.

Before Oct. 7, 2023, all of these groups were ideologically opposed to Israel, to a degree. But they were also fighting their own conflicts and were not rallying around supporting Hamas. Now, they have all become more active around a common goal of destroying Israel.

Iran and Hezbollah, in particular, have a deep relationship, dating back to the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In 1982, Israel invaded southern Lebanon in order to thwart cross-border attacks the Palestinian Liberation Organization and other Palestinian groups were launching into Israel. The newly formed Iranian IRGC sent advisers and trainers to southern Lebanon to work with like-minded Lebanese Shiite militants who were already fighting in Lebanon’s civil war. They wanted to fight against the Israeli military and elements of the multinational force comprised of U.S., French and other Western troops that were originally sent as peacekeepers to put an end to the fighting.

How does Hezbollah’s history help explain its operations today?

The relationships between these Iranian experts and Lebanese militants during Lebanon’s 15-year civil war led to the formation of Hezbollah as a small, clandestine group in 1982.

During the following few years, Hezbollah launched a brutal campaign of terrorist attacks against U.S., French and other Western interests in Lebanon. The group, then known as Islamic Jihad, first attacked the U.S. embassy in Beirut on April 18, 1983. That attack killed 52 Lebanese and American embassy employees. However, at the time, U.S. intelligence personnel and other security experts were not clear who was responsible for the embassy bombing. And given this lack of understanding and insight on Hezbollah as an emerging terrorist threat, the group aimed even higher later in 1983.

Following the embassy attack, Hezbollah carried out the October 1983 Marine barracks bombing that killed 241 U.S. service personnel. Before the 9/11 attacks, this was the biggest single act of international terrorism against the U.S.

Hezbollah was also responsible for the kidnapping and murder of American citizens, including William Buckley, the CIA station chief for Beirut. And it carried out airplane hijackings, including the infamous TWA 847 incident in 1985, in which a U.S. Navy diver was murdered.

So, Hezbollah has a long history of regional and global terrorism.

Within Lebanon, Hezbollah is a kind of parallel government to Lebanon. The Lebanese government has allowed Hezbollah to be this state within a state, but they don’t collaborate on military operations. Currently, the Lebanese military is not responding to Israel’s attacks on Lebanon. This shows how dominant of a force Hezbollah has become.

How damaging are Israel’s attacks on Hezbollah?

Hezbollah has clearly taken losses in fighters, but Hezbollah is a far bigger group than Hamas and operates on a much bigger physical territory across Lebanon.

It has far more inventory of advanced weapons than Hamas ever did, and a large fighting force that includes 40,000 to 50,000 regular forces organized into a conventional military structure. It also has 150,000 to 200,000 rockets, drones and missiles of varying range. It operates a dangerous global terrorist unit known as the External Security Organization that has attacked Israeli and Jewish interests in the 1990s in Argentina and Jewish tourists in 2012 in Bulgaria.

The Israeli military assesses they have destroyed at least half of Hezbollah’s existing weapons stockpile, based on the volume and intensity of their operations over the past few weeks. If true, this, would present a serious challenge to Hezbollah’s long-term operational capability that took decades to acquire.

What security risks does this evolving conflict present for the U.S.?

Looking at how Hezbollah demonstrated these capabilities over a 40-year stretch of time, and based now on how Israel has hit the militant group, it would not be a stretch to speculate that Hezbollah has ordered or is considering some kind of terrorist attack far outside the region – similar to what the group did in Argentina in 1992 and 1994. What that plot would like look, how many people would be involved and the possible target of any such attack are not clear.

Hezbollah’s leaders have said that they blame Israel for the attacks on it. About a week before Nasrallah’s death, he said that Israel’s exploding pager and walkie-talkie operations in Lebanon were a “declaration of war” and the “the enemy had crossed all red lines.”

Since then, Hezbollah has remained defiant, in spite of the significant losses the group has sustained by Israel these past few weeks. Questions also remain about how Hezbollah’s leadership will likewise hold the U.S. responsible for Israel’s actions. And if so, would that mean a return to the type of terrorism that Hezbollah inflicted on U.S. interests in the region in the 1980s? As recent events have shown, the world is facing a dangerous and volatile security environment in the Middle East.

Javed Ali, Associate Professor of Practice of Public Policy, University of Michigan

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Bonus Video added by Informed Comment:

India Today: “Iran’s Missile Attack On Israel Ignites Massive Tensions In West Asia | Iran Israel War Escalates”

(The Conversation) – The death of Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in an Israeli airstrike in Beirut on September 27 has left the militant Lebanese organisation leaderless at a critical time. Two days earlier in a speech broadcast around the world, the head of the Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF) northern command, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, had told his soldiers to prepare for a possible incursion into Lebanon.

There is every reason to believe Friday’s airstrike, which targeted Hezbollah’s headquarters building in the southern Beirut suburb of Dahiyeh, was in preparation for a possible incursion. It came after days of strikes which Israel claims have eliminated much of Hezbollah’s senior leadership.

Halevi told his troops on September 25 that they would “go in, destroy the enemy there, and decisively destroy” Hezbollah’s infrastructure. As Hezbollah is embedded within the Lebanese population, this strategy promises the deaths of innocent civilians.

Since 2006, both Hezbollah and the IDF have sought to avoid a direct confrontation. For years, they have played tit-for-tat with the rationale of proportionality to prevent an all-out war.

Although the horrific October 7 attacks on Israel by Hamas triggered a resumption of hostilities, until last week both sides were calling for restraint. What has changed? Is a ground invasion now inevitable? And if so, what would that mean for Hezbollah and Lebanon?

Israel has a track record of engaging in military adventures in Lebanon that have only ever served to make its opponents stronger in the long term. The destruction of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) did not prevent the emergence of Hamas – indeed, it helped to create it. Similarly, Israel’s pursuit of the PLO in south Lebanon triggered the creation of Hezbollah. Despite five invasions since 1978, Israel has shown itself incapable of successfully occupying even the smallest sliver of Lebanese land.

While both sides have been preparing for a new conflict for years, the trigger for the escalation began on September 18, when Israel struck the first blow by detonating thousands of pagers and mobile devices owned by Hezbollah operatives, killing at least 32 and injuring several thousand people.

This technological attack had been years in the making and could be described as a strategic masterstroke to disable the enemy. The timing appears to have been because Hezbollah was becoming suspicious about the devices, so the IDF had to act or lose the “surprise”. This suggests operational considerations are taking precedence over strategic and political ones, which research suggests is rarely a good idea.

Nonetheless, these strikes are believed to have crippled Hezbollah’s command in the short term, and emboldened the IDF’s leadership. On September 18, Israel’s defence minister, Yoav Gallant, told Israeli troops: “We are at the start of a new phase in the war — it requires courage, determination and perseverance.” While he made no mention of the exploding devices, he praised the work of Israel’s army and security agencies, noting their results were excellent.

A tactic used in recent days by the IDF is one that has been developed over many years on the “Blue Line” – the de facto border that divides Israel and Lebanon. Emboldened by the failure of the IDF to defeat it in the July war of 2006, Hezbollah’s senior operatives have been active and visible on the Blue Line, which is monitored closely by the IDF.

This has enabled the IDF to photograph, identify and track senior Hezbollah leadership, which is why since October 7 we have seen a succession of assassinations of its key operatives, including Ibrahim Aqeel, a commander of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan force, and more recently, Mohammed Sarour in Beirut, as well as many others.

The IDF now believes it has Hezbollah on its knees – or at least, on one knee. The escalation we are currently witnessing is because the IDF is driving home its advantage and applying the same strategy as in Gaza: bombing any area it can plausibly claim to be a Hezbollah target.

This has had devastating consequences for the Lebanese population. The Health Ministry stated on Friday that 1,540 people had been killed since October 8 2023, with thousands of innocent civilians injured. Over 70,000 civilians have reportedly registered in 533 shelters across Lebanon, with an estimated 1 million people having been displaced from their homes.

Can Hezbollah fight back?

The death of Nasrallah has left Hezbollah temporarily leaderless, while the killing of several of its senior figures has deprived it of seasoned commanders, many of whom had recent combat experience in Syria. And the bombing of south Lebanon is reducing Hezbollah’s supply of rockets and other weapons.

However, Israel should not assume that Hezbollah is out of the game or underestimate the group. Hezbollah’s real strength has always lain in its ability to melt into the population – and it will be ready to commence a war of attrition with hit-and-run tactics if the IDF makes the mistake of putting boots on the ground again. The fact that all five previous invasions failed should be an indication that the outcome may be a repeat of what occurred between 1982 and 2006.

Furthermore, while Iran’s response to the escalation has been muted thus far, it is unlikely to abandon Hezbollah. A long, drawn-out, low-intensity conflict would favour the kind of asymmetric tactics used by the “axis of resistance”, which also includes Lebanon’s neighbour, Syria.

By bombing and displacing the Lebanese population, the IDF aims to reduce morale. It is now destroying private homes and public buildings on the grounds they are Hezbollah ammunition and weapons depots.

“Invasion,” Digital, Dream / Dreamland v3 / Clip2Comic, 2024.

In Lebanon, the Palestine issue has always been regarded as the primary cause of the civil war that took place from 1975 to 1990. As such, the IDF is banking on Lebanese people turning against Hezbollah for bringing a new war down on them as a result of its rocket barrages into northern Israel, in solidarity with Hamas since the October 7 attack.

But, while there are many people in Lebanon who do not support Hezbollah and its activities in south Lebanon, the IDF should remember the past. Even if sentiment against Hezbollah is high today, indiscriminate bombing of the kind we are currently witnessing in Lebanon will not be tolerated by the population indefinitely.

It’s worth noting that in 1982, when the IDF invaded south Lebanon, some Lebanese welcomed them with rice and flowers – viewing them as liberators from the PLO. But that welcome did not last long.

In 2006, the IDF applied a similar strategy, targeting civilian evacuation convoys and UN compounds. And once again, the tide of public opinion swiftly swung back in favour of “al-muqawimah” (the resistance).

The stated IDF aim is to drive Hezbollah back north of the Litani river, to force it to comply with UN resolution 1701 and allow displaced people in northern Israel to return to their homes. But it is naive of Israel and the IDF to think that an invasion or a bombing campaign, no matter how successful in the short term, will enable Israeli civilians to live in peace along the Blue Line for the long term.

Ultimately, the only way forward is for both parties to come to the table and negotiate. The human cost of Israel’s current strategy in Lebanon is appalling to contemplate, and in all likelihood will create more hatred – fostering a new generation of anti-Israel fighters, rather than creating the basis for a durable peace.

Vanessa Newby, Assistant Professor, Institute of Security and Global Affairs, Leiden University and Chiara Ruffa, Professor of Political Science, Sciences Po

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.