Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has condemned Israeli airstrikes on Lebanon that killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. However, in his official statement, Erdoğan did not directly mention Nasrallah or Hezbollah.

Instead, he criticized Israel’s actions, describing them as a “policy of genocide, occupation, and invasion.” Erdoğan also called on the United Nations Security Council to take immediate action, emphasizing Türkiye’s support for Lebanon. “We will continue to stand by the Lebanese people and government in these difficult days,” Erdoğan added.

Compared to the assassination of Hamas Political Bureau Chief Ismail Haniyeh, Turkish officials adopted a more cautious tone following the death of Nasrallah. Haniyeh’s assassination in July 2024 drew strong condemnation from Ankara, with officials referring to him as a “martyr.” Türkiye even declared a national day of mourning in Haniyeh’s honor.

This raises an important question: why has Türkiye been relatively quiet on Nasrallah’s assassination?

Background: Sectarianism and Syria

Türkiye’s desire to avoid statements that could be perceived as supportive of Hezbollah stems from sectarian differences and Hezbollah’s role in the Syrian Civil War.

Journalists Musa Özuğurlu, speaking on the pro-opposition channel Tele1, and Mehmet Ali Güller, from the pro-opposition newspaper Cumhuriyet, both highlighted the sectarian differences between Hamas and Hezbollah when discussing how Erdoğan distinguishes between the two organizations.

They both noted that Erdoğan is more supportive of Hamas than Hezbollah, as Hamas is a Sunni organization, while Hezbollah is primarily a Shia Islamist organization.

Additionally, with the start of the Syrian Civil War, Türkiye and Hezbollah found themselves on opposing sides. Hezbollah supported the Bashar al-Assad regime, while Türkiye supported Syrian opposition groups like the Free Syrian Army (FSA) seeking to overthrow Assad.

Hezbollah has occasionally clashed with Turkish-backed rebel groups in Syria, and during the Battle of Idlib, a rare direct confrontation between Türkiye and Hezbollah also occurred. At that time, Idlib was the last major stronghold of the Syrian opposition. Following the deaths of 34 Turkish soldiers in a Syrian-Russian airstrike on February 27, 2020, Türkiye launched ‘Operation Spring Shield.

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During the military operation, Turkish drones and artillery killed fourteen Hezbollah members. The Jerusalem Post reported that the IDF identified several Radwan operatives among the casualties and observed the battle to gather insights. Radwan Force is an elite unit within Hezbollah known for its highly trained operatives who operate in various theaters, including Lebanon and Syria.

While Erdoğan appears to keep his distance from Nasrallah and Hezbollah, he also has been striving to accelerate normalization talks with Damascus.

How does Türkiye view Hezbollah?

Although Ankara has been at odds with Hezbollah, it does not designate the group as a terrorist organization, unlike Türkiye’s Western allies.

In an interview with the state broadcaster TRT, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan revealed that he met with Nasrallah in Lebanon shortly after October 7 under difficult conditions.

Fidan described Nasrallah as a major regional figure, noting that his death will leave a void that will be difficult to fill. He also called Nasrallah’s death a significant loss for both Hezbollah and Iran.

While Turkish officials adopted a careful tone, pro-government media harshly criticized Hezbollah’s role in the region.

On a program aired by A Haber, retired Colonel and security pundit Coşkun Başbuğ claimed that Nasrallah was working for Mossad and that Hezbollah’s leadership was “sold out.” Başbuğ argued that Hezbollah could have turned the Israeli border into a “hell” but did not due to its compromised leadership.

Başbuğ stated that Nasrallah and other Hezbollah leaders were discarded by those who used them. Additionally, he referred to Hezbollah’s missile attacks as mere “firework displays.”

Yeni Şafak columnist and a former Justice and Development Party (AKP) MP Aydın Ünal said the assassination of Nasrallah was met with joy and excitement by the oppressed Syrians.

Ünal said that Nasrallah, following orders from Iran, had brutally and mercilessly carried out massacres of Muslims.

“The removal of Hezbollah will not only ensure Lebanon’s stabilization but will also mean the elimination of the buffer, barrier, and obstacle in the Palestinian resistance,” Ünal said.

Solidarity with Lebanon

Erdoğan met Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati on September 25 on the sidelines of the 79th UN General Assembly. He reportedly expressed Türkiye’s solidarity with Lebanon in the face of Israeli attacks. He emphasized the urgent need for the international community to implement a solution to halt Israel’s aggression.

As Israel intensified its attacks on Lebanon, Erdoğan stated on September 30 that if the UN Security Council fails to halt Israel’s actions in Gaza and Lebanon, the UN General Assembly should recommend the use of force, in accordance with a resolution it passed in 1950.

Hours after the Israeli ground invasion of Lebanon began, Erdoğan reiterated Türkiye’s support for Lebanon in an October 1 speech at the reopening of the Turkish Parliament following its summer recess.

He emphasized that Türkiye would support Lebanon with all its means. “After Lebanon, the next place he will set his sights on will be our homeland. Netanyahu is adding Anatolia to his dreams,” Erdogan added. Anatolia is a large peninsula in western Asia that makes up the majority of modern-day Türkiye.

Overall, Türkiye’s support appears to be directed more toward the Lebanese population and Lebanon as a state, rather than Hezbollah as an organization. Türkiye’s current foreign policy on Lebanon emphasizes humanitarian concerns, regional stability, condemnation of broader Israeli actions in the region, and criticism of Western support for Israel.

Note: Türkiye designates a separate Islamist group called “Kurdish Hezbollah” as a terrorist organization. This Sunni Islamist group operates primarily in southeastern Türkiye and is not connected to the Shia Lebanese Hezbollah. The two groups have distinct goals and ideological principles.

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Bonus Video added by Informed Comment:

Hindustan Times: “Turkey’s Erdogan Ups The Ante, Calls For UN To Use Force Against Israel Amid Lebanon, Gaza Conflict”

How did Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan go from labeling Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi a ‘murderer’ to referring to him as a brother?

Istanbul (Special to Informed Comment; Feature) – On Wednesday, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi made a historic visit to Turkey. This is the first time in 12 years that an Egyptian president has traveled to the country.

After years of tension, it appears that Cairo and Ankara are beginning to bury the hatchet. During Sisi’s visit, the two countries signed 18 memoranda of understanding on cooperation in various fields, including energy, defense, tourism, health, agriculture, finance, culture, education, and transport.

But why did Turkey and Egypt have a rift initially, and how did they manage to reconcile?

Timeline of Turkey-Egypt Rapprochement

After the 2011 revolution in Egypt, Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government supported the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and the election of Mohamed Morsi as Egypt’s president in 2012. Relations between Egypt and Turkey flourished since AKP had ideological affinities with the Muslim Brotherhood.

The relationship took a sharp downturn after Egypt’s military, led by General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, ousted President Morsi in July 2013. Turkey strongly condemned the coup, with President Erdoğan labeling Sisi’s government as ‘illegitimate’ and refusing to recognize the new administration.

After the coup, supporters of Morsi began protesting and demanded his reinstatement. On August 14, 2013, Egyptian security forces intervened to disperse the demonstrators at Rabia al-Adawiya Square (named for a female Muslim saint) and Nahda Square in Cairo. The crackdown resulted in a high death toll; estimates vary, but Human Rights Watch reported that at least 817 to 1,000 people were killed.

This massacre became one of the deadliest instances of mass killing of demonstrators in modern history.

The Rabia massacre had a significant impact on Erdoğan and Turkey’s foreign policy. The name ‘Rabia,’ shares a root with the word for ‘four’ in Arabic, leading to the widespread adoption of the Rabia hand sign (four raised fingers with the thumb tucked in) as a symbol of support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Erdoğan incorporated the Rabia hand sign into his domestic political rhetoric.

After the military coup, Turkey became a safe haven for exiled members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Istanbul hosts several Muslim Brotherhood-linked media outlets, which broadcast in Arabic and are critical of governments that oppose the organization.

Erdoğan repeatedly called Sisi a “tyrant,” “murderer” and a “dictator.” Before the March 2019 Turkish local elections, Erdoğan even likened the Turkish opposition to Sisi: “Will we vote for (AKP candidate) Binali Yildirim or Sisi?” Erdoğan asked in an election rally.

Two years later, Turkey began repairing ties with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. In March 2021, Turkey and Egypt resumed diplomatic contacts at the level of the foreign ministry and the intelligence apparati.

As part of this foreign policy shift, Turkish authorities reportedly instructed three Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated TV channels operating from Istanbul — Watan TV, Al-Sharq TV, and Mekameleen TV — to reduce their criticism of the Egyptian government.

The following year, Sisi and Erdoğan shook hands at the 2022 FIFA World Cup reception in Doha, the capital of Qatar, and gradually, relations began to improve. Egypt and Turkey reappointed ambassadors for the first time in a decade in July 2023 and Erdoğan visited Cairo to meet with Sisi in February 2024.

Impact of the War in Gaza

Deutsche Welle suggested that the war in Gaza accelerated the rapprochement between Turkey and Egypt. Since the outbreak of the war, cooperation between the two states has become increasingly important.

While Turkey and Egypt agree on the Palestinian cause, Erdoğan’s sympathy for Hamas is not shared by Egypt.

Hamas was founded in 1987 as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, which Egypt designated a terrorist organization in 2013. Cairo also briefly classified Hamas as a terrorist organization in 2015, but this move was overturned by the courts on a technicality.

Nonetheless, Turkey and Egypt share a strong consensus regarding an independent Palestinian state based on 1967 borders. During their meeting, both Sisi and Erdoğan called for a ceasefire and humanitarian aid for Gaza.

They also called for an end to the ongoing escalation in the West Bank, where Israel had been conducting a military operation since August 28.

“Sphinx / Blue Mosque,” Digital, Dream, Dreamworld v3, 2024

Libya and Maritime Borders

In recent years, besides ideological differences, Egypt and Turkey have also had significant diplomatic tensions on regional issues.

Notably, Cairo and Ankara have backed opposing sides in the Libyan Civil War. Turkey has supported the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. Meanwhile Egypt, along with the UAE and Russia, has supported the Libyan National Army (LNA) led by General Khalifa Haftar.

The two countries have also had disputes over the Eastern Mediterranean maritime borders.

In 2019, Turkey signed a maritime boundary agreement with the GNA in Libya. The deal extended Turkey’s claims over large areas of the Eastern Mediterranean, including waters claimed by Greece, Cyprus, and Egypt. In response to Turkey’s deal with the GNA, Egypt signed a maritime demarcation agreement with Greece in 2020.

After Sisi’s visit, the pro-government media in Turkey discussed the possibility of new maritime deals between Egypt and Turkey, suggesting that Turkey offers a better deal compared to Greece and Cyprus. Hürriyet claimed that Turkey’s reconciliation with Egypt has scared Athens.

What makes Sisi’s visit to Turkey so significant is the decade-long rift between the two countries. Erdoğan has been a vocal critic of Sisi, and this led to significant personal animosity between the two leaders.

As Turkish political scientist Emrah Gülsunar explains, under normal circumstances, “U-turns” in foreign policy occur among states since interests determine inter-state relations. However, Erdoğan’s approach is quite different. He tends to personalize foreign policy and make grand statements, this is why the shifts in Turkish foreign policy sometimes seem “tragicomic.”

It remains unclear how closely Turkey and Egypt will cooperate. Economic collaboration between these two countries—given their control over key trade routes like the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, and the Suez Canal—could be mutually beneficial, especially as both face economic difficulties.

The Middle East has long been a center of geopolitical tensions and instability, and both Turkey and Egypt could benefit from enhanced cooperation on issues such as Gaza, Sudan, Libya, and Somalia. Despite significant challenges, the thaw in relations between Ankara and Cairo seems to signal a strategic recalibration in the region.

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TRT World: “Türkiye and Egypt agree to work together on regional issues”

Although Turkey’s Information Technologies and Communication Authority (BTK) did not officially state the reason for the ban, the move came after Fahrettin Altun, the Presidential Communications Director, criticized Instagram for preventing users from sharing content related to the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas and a close ally of President Erdoğan.

Altun said on X: “I strongly condemn the social media platform Instagram for blocking people from posting condolence messages regarding Haniyeh’s martyrdom without providing any justification. This is an apparent and obvious attempt at censorship.”

In a similar incident, Meta, Instagram’s parent company, removed social media posts by Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim expressing condolences for Haniyeh. Meta designates Hamas as a “dangerous organization” and prohibits content that praises the group.

Ismail Haniyeh was killed in Tehran on July 31, where he had been attending the inauguration ceremony of Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian.

Historical Context of Social Media Bans in Turkey

Under Erdoğan, Turkey has previously blocked several social media platforms, including YouTube, Threads, EksiSozluk, Wikipedia, and X (formerly Twitter).

YouTube was first banned in Turkey in 2007 and again between 2008 and 2010, due to videos insulting Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the modern Republic of Turkey. The platform was briefly banned again in 2014 and 2015.

X (formerly Twitter) was banned in 2014 following the circulation of alleged leaked recordings implicating government officials in corruption.

Wikipedia was banned in Turkey from 2017 to 2020 due to entries that accused the country of having links to terrorist organizations.

Additionally, the government has imposed bans on social media and broadcasting in response to disasters, terrorist attacks, and social unrest.

In 2024, the number of blocked web pages in Turkey surpassed one million. Meanwhile, Hüseyin Yayman, head of the Turkish Parliament’s Digital Media Commission, claimed that many Turkish people want TikTok to be banned. “People who see me on the street say, ‘If you shut down TikTok, you will go to heaven,’” Yayman added.

Impact of the Instagram Ban

Following the Instagram ban in Turkey, online searches for VPN services surged. In response, pro-government media began publishing articles warning people about the risks associated with free VPN services.

Professor Yaman Akdeniz, co-founder of the Freedom of Expression Association (İFÖD) and a law professor, said: “This ban must have been requested by either the presidency or a ministry. The BTK is required to obtain approval from a criminal court.”

Akdeniz added, “The censorship imposed on Instagram is arbitrary and cannot be explained or justified. No judge should approve such a request.”

Human Rights Watch and İFÖD stated that the block on Instagram violates the rights to freedom of expression and access to information for millions of users. With 57.1 million users, Turkey ranks fifth worldwide in the number of Instagram users.

The ban had a significant impact on the Turkish economy, as Instagram plays a crucial role in Turkey’s e-commerce landscape, with approximately 10% of the nation’s total online sales being conducted through social media platforms.

According to Buğra Gökçe, head of the Istanbul Planning Agency (IPA), the ban also disrupted the service sector, including tourism, hospitality, and restaurants in reaching customers. The IPA projects that the ban could lead to a weekly economic loss of approximately USD 396 million.

On August 5, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan criticized opponents of the ban and used a racial slur to describe them. He claimed they care more about Western interests than Turkey’s sovereignty, stating: “The only purpose of the existence of ‘house negroes,’ who are both opportunists and losers, is to please their owners.”

Less than a week after the Instagram ban, Turkish authorities also prohibited access to the online video game platform Roblox. Ekrem İmamoğlu, the Mayor of Istanbul and a prominent opposition figure criticized the bans on Instagram and Roblox, stating: “Those who made this decision are ignorant of the new world, the economy, and technology.”

Israeli Response to Turkey’s Instagram Ban

Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz criticized Erdoğan, accusing him of turning Turkey into a dictatorship by blocking Instagram. Katz also tagged İmamoğlu in his comments, seemingly attempting to exploit the political polarization in Turkey to his advantage.

İmamoğlu responded by saying: “We have no need to receive lessons on democracy and law from those responsible for the suffering and deaths of countless innocents, including children.”

Katz’s attempt backfired, as despite the political polarization in Turkey, both sides of the spectrum largely voice support for Palestine, though in different ways—Islamists tend to back Hamas, while secularists in Turkey are more aligned with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) or other left-wing Palestinian groups.

How Was the Ban Lifted?

On Saturday, Transport and Infrastructure Minister Abdulkadir Uraloğlu announced that Instagram had accepted Turkey’s conditions. The ban on Instagram was lifted after Meta reportedly agreed to comply with Turkish law and remove content related to certain crimes or terrorist propaganda.

The independent news website YetkinReport noted that Meta had already been publishing transparency reports indicating that Instagram was implementing these measures even before the ban. The latest report was published on July 31, just two days before the platform was blocked.

The nine-day ban was Turkey’s longest on a major social media platform in recent years. Since Instagram still continues to ban pro-Hamas content, it appears that little has changed. It remains unclear why Instagram was banned in Turkey in the first place, why the ban was lifted, and what problem, if any, was resolved by imposing the ban.

—–

France 24 Video: “Turkish president slams social media ‘fascism’ amid Instagram battle • FRANCE 24 English ”

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s proposal to engage with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad marks a potential shift in a decade-long rift.

Istanbul (Special to Informed Comment; Featured) – Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan recently said “there is no reason” not to pursue normalization of diplomatic ties with Syria, and he said that he does not rule out a possible meeting with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Erdoğan added that Turkey had no intention of interfering in Syria’s internal affairs.

Erdoğan was responding to a question about Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s recent comments. In late June, Assad expressed openness to restoring ties between Turkey and Syria.

The United Arab Emirates took the lead in restoring diplomatic relations with Syria in 2018, and last year Syria was readmitted to the Arab League. Saudi Arabia has also announced steps to reopen its embassy in Damascus.

As a quid pro quo for rapprochement, Ankara wants Damascus to take action against Syrian Kurdish groups that Turkey alleges are affiliated with the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which the US also considers a terrorist group. Meanwhile, the Assad government has consistently demanded the withdrawal of Turkish forces from northern Syria and an end to Turkey’s support for rebel factions as a prerequisite for restoring relations.

Protests in Syria and Turkey

Just as Erdoğan signaled a possible rapprochement with Syria, protests erupted in rebel-held territory in northwestern Syria against the reopening of the Abu al-Zandin crossing near Al Bab city. The crossing connects rebel-held areas with Syrian government-held territories, and the protesters rejected the Turkish-Russian agreement to reopen the crossing.

Armed protesters, Turkish forces clash in north Syria • FRANCE 24 English Video

Then anti-Syrian protests broke out in Kayseri after a Syrian man was arrested for allegedly sexually abusing a minor. During the riots, angry mobs set vehicles and Syrian-run shops on fire. The riots spread to various cities in Turkey, with a 17-year-old Syrian boy being stabbed to death in Serik, Antalya.

Interior Minister Ali Yerlikaya announced that the police had detained 474 people involved in attacks targeting the Syrian community.

The unrest occurred amidst a recent increase in criticism of the government’s migration policies. According to UNHCR, Turkey hosts the largest number of refugees worldwide, most of them from war-torn Syria, and a recent Ipsos survey found that 77% of respondents in Turkey support closing the country’s doors to refugees, compared to a global average of 44%.

The riots in Turkey, coupled with Erdoğan’s conciliatory statements about Assad, fueled anti-Turkish protests in rebel-held northern Syria. The BBC reported that in Afrin, at least four people were killed in an exchange of fire between Turkish troops and armed protesters.

Syrian protesters attacked Turkish military vehicles, government buildings controlled by Turkey, and burned Turkish flags. According to AFP, some armed protesters also targeted Turkish trucks and military posts. They attempted to storm crossing points, resulting in clashes with Turkish border guards.

A border official stated that the Bab al-Hawa and Bab al-Salam border crossings and other smaller crossings were “closed until further notice.” It was reported that seven people were killed in the protests, which escalated into clashes.

Similar protests had occurred in rebel-held territory in Northwestern Syria in August 2022, following Turkey’s then-Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu’s call for reconciliation between the Syrian opposition and the Assad government.

Will the reconciliation efforts continue despite the unrest?

Pro-government media in Turkey accused different sides of the violent anti-Turkish protests. While Yeni Şafak (New Dawn) accused the Syrian fundamentalist militant group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Sabah (Morning) claimed the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) was responsible. Both HTS and PKK are designated as terrorist organizations by Turkey, the European Union, and the United States.

On Tuesday last week, President Erdoğan labeled the anti-Syrian protestors provocateurs. “Neither we nor our Syrian brothers will fall into this trap. I want to say that we will not bow to vandalism and racism. Just as we know how to break the filthy hands that reach for our flag, we also know how to break the hands that reach for the oppressed who have taken refuge in our country,” Erdoğan said.

He also signaled that the normalization attempts would continue, stating: “We don’t desire anybody’s land. The territorial integrity of Syria is a priority for Turkey, because we want a strong Syria, not one where terrorist organizations run rampant. To achieve this, we will not hesitate to meet with whomever it is necessary. Turkey is not a state that abandons its friends and will not become one.”

Erdoğan then traveled to Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. During the SCO summit, Erdoğan met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, al-Asad’s main patron. After their meeting, Erdoğan emphasized the importance of ending instability, including the unresolved aftermath of the Syrian Civil War, and stated that Turkey is ready to cooperate in finding a solution.

Before the Syrian Civil War strained Turkish-Syrian relations, President Erdoğan of Turkey and President Bashar al-Assad of Syria had notably close personal ties. Their relationship extended beyond diplomatic meetings and included personal interactions such as joint family vacations or attending football matches.

After the outbreak of the civil war in 2011, Turkey began to support Syrian opposition groups seeking to overthrow al-Assad’s regime. Diplomatic relations between Ankara and Damascus were severed in 2012.

While Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan asserts that Hamas is defending Turkey, opposition voices within the country challenge this narrative.

Istanbul (Special to Informed Comment) -On May 15, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan claimed that Israel will “set eyes on Turkish territory” after Gaza.

Erdoğan made these remarks during his ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) parliamentary group meeting, stating: “Don’t think that Israel will stop in Gaza. Don’t think that Ramallah will be safe. If this aggressive state, this terror state, is not stopped, sooner or later they will set their eyes on Anatolia with the delusion of promised lands.”

He added, “Israel is not only attacking Palestinians in Gaza. They are attacking us. Hamas is defending the front lines of Anatolia in Gaza.”

In his address, Erdoğan referred to Anatolia, the vast peninsula in Western Asia that largely encompasses modern-day Turkey.

The Times of Israel commented, questioning Erdoğan’s assertions: “Israel has never claimed any part of Turkey belongs to it, and it is unclear what Erdogan is basing his claims on.”

This isn’t the first instance of Erdoğan suggesting Israeli intentions to invade Turkey. In November 2023, he remarked, “Israel is testing our patience with threats of nuclear weapon use, fueled by delusions of promised lands that include our country’s territories.”

Concepts such as “promised lands” or “Greater Israel” have been used by various political parties in Turkey, including the AKP. These political notions suggest that Israel has secret plans to expand its territory far beyond its current borders. This theory often claims that Israel, driven by historical, religious, and strategic motivations, aims to annex large parts of the Middle East, including significant portions of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, and Turkey.

According to a survey by MetroPOLL, 34.5% of Turkish citizens surveyed want Turkey to stay neutral in the Hamas-Israel conflict, 26.4% want Turkey to act as a mediator between the two sides, 18.1% want Turkey to support the Palestinians but to remain distant from Hamas, 11.3% want it to support Hamas, and 3% want it to support Israel.

Prominent journalist Fatih Altaylı criticized Erdoğan’s statements on his YouTube channel and pointed out inconsistencies. He questioned why, during Erdoğan’s mentor Necmettin Erbakan’s tenure, projects involving tank and F-4 fighter jet modernizations were given to Israel if Turkey perceived a threat of Israeli aggression. Altaylı also highlighted past military cooperation, such as Israeli Air Force pilots training at Turkey’s Konya Air Base, suggesting Turkey wouldn’t engage in such partnerships if it perceived a genuine risk from Israel.

Hindustan Times Video: “Erdogan’s Big Prediction On Israel’s Next Move If It Defeats Hamas; ‘Will Set Sights On…’”

Erdoğan compares Hamas to Kuvâ-yi Milliye

In his speech, Erdoğan also criticized those who were uncomfortable with his comparison of Hamas to Kuvâ-yi Milliye, stating: “Those who label Hamas as a ‘terrorist organization’ today would have called Kuvâ-yi Milliye the same a hundred years ago.”

Kuvâ-yi Milliye was a Turkish nationalist militia during the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923). Formed in response to the occupation and partitioning of the Ottoman Empire by Allied forces following World War I, Kuvâ-yi Milliye was composed of various local resistance groups and irregular fighters.

Kuvâ-yi Milliye was not a formal army but rather a loosely organized collection of local militias. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the leader of the Turkish National Movement, integrated the Kuvayi Milliye into the newly formed regular army in 1921.

Erdoğan repeatedly likened Hamas to the Kuvâ-yi Milliye. Besides Hamas, Erdoğan previously likened the Free Syrian Army (FSA) to the Kuvâ-yi Milliye in 2018.

This analogy was harshly criticized by the opposition, as the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) rejected such a similarity between the two organizations. CHP spokesperson Deniz Yücel said, “Have you ever heard of Kuvâ-yi Milliye killing civilians? Defending Anatolia is not Hamas’ concern as long as we are here.”

Örsan Öymen, a columnist for the secularist opposition Cumhuriyet, said such comparisons are completely contrary to historical facts and realities, and they constitute an insult to Kuvâ-yi Milliye and Atatürk because Kuvâ-yi Milliye adopted secularism as an ideology while Hamas is an Islamist organization.

How is Hamas perceived in Turkey?

The debate surrounding the comparison between the Kuvâ-yi Milliye and Hamas is mainly based on how Hamas is perceived by different political groups in Turkey. Turkey does not designate Hamas as a terrorist organization, in contrast to many Western countries.

Hamas is generally perceived positively by those with Islamist or conservative leanings. These groups often view Hamas as a resistance movement. President Erdoğan labeled Hamas as a group of freedom fighters and mujahideen who are striving to protect their lands and their citizens.”

Meanwhile, Turkey’s secular opposition tends to criticize Hamas and instead praise leftist Palestinian organizations. Istanbul’s opposition mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu and CHP leader Özgür Özel labeled Hamas as a terrorist organization.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, numerous Turkish leftists, including notable figures like Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan, and Hüseyin İnan, joined armed Palestinian organizations. This is the reason why the main opposition party CHP tends to mention the legacy of Deniz Gezmiş while expressing solidarity with Palestine.

Public opinion in Turkey is overwhelmingly supportive of the Palestinian cause. This support is influenced by a combination of political, religious, and humanitarian reasons. However, there are different views within the country, and some segments of the population and political opposition are more critical of Hamas, its armed wing Al-Qassam Brigades, and their methods.

The Turkish Ministry of Trade said: “Export and import transactions related to Israel have been suspended for all products. Turkey will implement these new measures strictly and decisively until the Israeli Government allows an uninterrupted and sufficient flow of humanitarian aid to Gaza.”

This move follows a previous trade restriction announced last month, during which Turkey restricted exports in 54 categories, including iron and steel products, jet fuel, construction equipment, machinery, cement, granite, chemicals, pesticides, and bricks.

In 2023, trade between Turkey and Israel amounted to $6.8 billion, with 76% representing Turkish exports to Israel. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK), Israel ranked 13th on Turkey’s list of export destinations in 2023, with $5.4 billion in exports.

Turkish exports played a crucial role in Israel’s economy. Before the embargo, Turkey had been Israel’s largest steel and cement exporter. Azerbaijani oil and even barbed wire were shipped to Israel through Turkish ports. Additionally, Zorlu Holding, a Turkish company, produced 7 percent of Israel’s annual electricity.

A Move to Regain Domestic Support?

During the campaign for the elections held on March 31, Erdoğan’s governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) faced criticism for maintaining trade relations with Israel despite the ongoing conflict in Gaza.

TRT World Video: “Türkiye halts trade with Israel until Gaza ceasefire”

Meanwhile, pro-government voices were claiming that the shipments to Israel were actually destined for Palestine. In December 2023, Trade Minister Ömer Bolat stated: “Goods arriving in Israel are destined for Palestine. [On the shipments], the destination must be written as Israel. Unfortunately, trade with Palestine must necessarily be conducted through Israel.”

AKP’s former ally, the hardline Islamist New Welfare Party (YRP), repeatedly criticized the government’s Gaza policy, using the slogan “Trade with Israel is a betrayal to Palestine.”

Before the local elections, Erdoğan criticized YRP by accusing them of harming AKP by dividing their votes. In response, YRP leader Fatih Erbakan said, “We are not making you lose; continuing trade with Israel is what is causing you to lose.”

While Turkey’s economic problems, such as decreasing pensions and salaries amidst soaring inflation, were the main factors behind AKP’s electoral loss, Turkey’s ongoing trade with Israel also played a role among conservative voters. This was even acknowledged by Erdoğan himself during a party meeting discussing the election results, as reported by party insiders.

On April 7, a week after the elections, police violently dispersed demonstrators on Istanbul’s Istiklal Street who were protesting trade with Israel. Despite the peaceful nature of the pro-Palestine protests, police detained 43 people.

Economic Impact

Israeli-Turkish relations under Erdoğan have been characterized by significant fluctuations and tensions. In the early 2000s, relations between Israel and Turkey appeared to be warming until the Gaza flotilla incident in 2010.

Despite strained diplomatic relations since 2010, trade between Israel and Turkey has flourished. In 2022, the two countries restored diplomatic relations, but their relationship has been deteriorating again since October 7.

Turkish investigative journalist Metin Cihan has been highlighting Turkish shipments to Israel since the beginning of the war. After the Ministry of Trade announced the trade suspension, Cihan claimed that he identified ships in Turkish ports that reported their destination port as Israel.

And, on May 5, Good Party (IYI) MP Turhan Çömez shared port records from his X account, revealing that Turkon Istanbul, a cargo vessel, departed from Iskenderun port and arrived in Haifa two days after the trade suspension with Israel.

According to the Israeli financial newspaper Globes, Azerbaijani oil was still being loaded onto tankers bound for Israel at the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Azerbaijani oil is transported via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, and from Ceyhan, it is transported to Haifa.

Moreover, Reuters reported that Turkish exporters are exploring alternatives to resume trade with Israel by considering routes through third countries such as Egypt, Jordan, or Lebanon. Four owners of export companies said that Turkey’s decision to suspend trade with Israel caught them off guard.

Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz criticized Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s decision to halt trade with Israel, saying “This is how a dictator behaves, disregarding the interests of the Turkish people and businessmen, and ignoring international trade agreements.”

Katz also added that he instructed the Israeli Foreign Ministry Director General Yaakov Blitshtein to “immediately engage with all relevant parties in the government to create alternatives for trade with Turkey, focusing on local production and imports from other countries.”

In conclusion, Turkey’s decision to suspend trade with Israel amid the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Gaza may be seen as a genuine expression of solidarity with Palestine. However, given the timing following an election loss and amidst protests, it’s plausible that this drastic policy change could also be interpreted as an attempt by Erdoğan to regain support from conservative voters.

Moreover, Turkey has stated that the trade suspension will continue until Israel permits an uninterrupted and sufficient flow of humanitarian aid. Whether Israel will reconsider its policies towards Gaza in light of international isolation remains uncertain.