The devastating war in Gaza is now in its sixth month, and the figures are alarming: more than 33,000 Palestinians have been killed. Almost one-third of the population is suffering catastrophic food insecurity and over two million (almost the entire population) have been displaced.

More than 9,000 Palestinians (including around 460 minors) have been imprisoned by Israel, and there are over 17,000 Palestinian children who have been separated from their parents. And most of the Israelis taken hostage by Hamas remain in Gaza.

As the war drags on, it threatens to spread to more countries. On April 1, Israel bombed the Iranian consulate in Damascus, Syria, killing Iranian military officials.

Since the war began, Israel has been engaged in an undeclared war against the broader Axis of Resistance which aims to resist the United States and its allies in the region. The axis, made up of Iran and allied armed groups in the region, aims to support Palestinian groups in Gaza by engaging Israel on multiple fronts.

In Yemen, Ansarullah (commonly known as the Houthis) have launched a blockade of the Red Sea targeting Israeli-connected vessels. While Iran-backed militias in Iraq have launched attacks on American troops in the region. Most notable however is the involvement of the Lebanese armed group Hezbollah, which has been directly engaging the Israeli military along the Israel-Lebanon border for months.

Al Jazeera English Video added by IC: “Hezbollah continues to exchange fire with the Israeli army across the border”

Who are Hezbollah?

Hezbollah was established on Feb. 16, 1985 during the Lebanese Civil War. The group was primarily founded in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and occupation of parts of the south, as well as the disappearance of religious leader Musa Al-Sadr in 1978.

Since then, Hezbollah has grown to become a state within a state, developing a complex religious and sociopolitical structure. Its political wing holds seats in the Lebanese parliament, and the group provides vital public services in many parts of the country, thereby consolidating its support base. Militarily, it has a powerful armed wing of around 100,000 fighters, outnumbering the official Lebanese army’s 84,000 soldiers.

After the civil war ended, Lebanese armed groups agreed to disarm as part of the peace process. However, Hezbollah did not, asserting that it will disarm when Israel is no longer a threat to Lebanon and when Palestinians are free.

Israel’s 2000 retreat from southern Lebanon, and Hezbollah’s willingness to confront it, has gained the group the support of many in Lebanon and the broader Arab world.

Some western countries like the United States, Canada and Australia classify Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, while the European Union has designated only its armed branch as such since 2013. This stems from Hezbollah’s alleged links to attacks on U.S. and other western targets in Lebanon, although it has always denied any involvement.

Border clashes

In his first speech after Oct. 7, Hezbollah’s secretary-general, Hassan Nasrallah, stated the group had been engaging Israel since Oct. 8.

Hezbollah has deployed along the entire Lebanese-Israeli border, plunging southern Lebanon and northern Israel into a state of informal war.

The border deployment constitutes a violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the 2006 war. While there have been skirmishes between Israel and Hezbollah over the past 18 years, they have always been contained and Hezbollah had not deployed along the entire border since 2006.

The group is not the only party to have violated Resolution 1701. Israel has regularly violated it including by destroying infrastructure.

Officials from Hezbollah and Israel have exchanged threats, heightening fears of a more destructive war. On Jan. 8, 2024, Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant threatened to “copy-paste” the destruction of Gaza onto Beirut if Hezbollah does not cease its attacks.

In a recent speech, Nasrallah labelled Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a “madman,” adding that Israel wants to wage war on Lebanon yet “can’t cope in Gaza.”

Nasrallah’s comments appear to be designed to indicate that any war in Lebanon could be just as disastrous for Israel. Hezbollah has the capability to target anywhere inside Israel with its missile arsenal.

Managing public perceptions

Lebanon is divided when it comes to support for Hezbollah. The country faces deep political and economic crises. The presidency has been vacant since 2022 amid political deadlock between political factions. Meanwhile, Lebanon faces an economic crisis that has pushed over 80 per cent of the population into poverty.

According to a November 2023 poll, 93 per cent of Lebanese Shiites had a positive opinion of Hezbollah, compared to only 34 per cent of Sunnis and 29 per cent of Christians. Support for Hamas was more widespread, with 79 per cent of Lebanese having positive opinions.

Since 2020, support for Hezbollah has strengthened among some Lebanese regardless of religious affiliations due to the welfare services it provides, however, that does not mean they agree with its politics or ideology.

The war creates more political instability, religious and social tensions, and further impacts the economy. As the economy and government services collapse, many Lebanese have turned to the humanitarian social services provided by Hezbollah.

This has maintained some stability and order amid the institutional disorder of the Lebanese state. Without these services, the system would risk further collapse, exacerbating the precariousness of the situation.

Pressure is mounting on Hezbollah to justify its strategy. To this end, Nasrallah has touted the impact of the group’s attacks, declaring that Israel was losing in the north. Over 200,000 Israelis have been displaced, with many refusing to return out of fear of Hezbollah attacks.

However, southern Lebanon is also paying a heavy price. Over 347 Lebanese have been killed by Israeli attacks, most of whom were Hezbollah members, but also over 50 civilians. According to the International Organization for Migration, almost 94,000 people have had to leave southern Lebanon to flee Israeli attacks.

The agricultural sector has suffered significant damage, with over 800 hectares of land damaged by Israeli bombings. This situation has a devastating impact on the economy of southern Lebanon where agriculture is a major industry.

Given this impact on civilian life, it is imperative to prioritize diplomatic solutions that end the violence, with special attention to securing food security and the agricultural sector in Lebanon. Simultaneously, efforts must be made to establish lasting peace among peoples exhausted by conflict.

Emilie El Khoury, Postdoctoral fellow at Queen’s University’s Centre for International Policy and Defence (CIDP), Queen’s University, Ontario

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

In October 2022, Lebanon and Israel signed a maritime border agreement brokered by the U.S., a move interpreted as the beginning of normalizing relations between two countries technically at war.

The next step would have been the settlement of the long-running land border dispute.

But then came the Hamas attack of Oct. 7, 2023, and Israel’s response in bombing Gaza. The following day, Hassan Nasrallah, secretary general of Lebanon’s political party and militant group Hezbollah, announced the faction had “entered the battle,” effectively dragging Lebanon into fresh, intensified fighting with Israel.

Since then, near-daily tit-for-tat strikes have seen Hezbollah fighters fire missiles into northern Israel and Israel Defense Forces responding in kind.

As a scholar who researches evolving issues in Lebanon and the Middle East, I worry that as regional violence escalates, the long simmering conflict between Israel and Lebanon is heading toward an unavoidable full-blown war. In such circumstances, hopes for a land settlement to accompany the historic maritime deal look, for now at least, dead in the water.

Lebanese–Israeli relations

For over 75 years, Israel’s border with Lebanon has been a source of conflict. Following the proclamation of the state of Israel in 1948, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were expelled or fled their land; many ended up as refugees in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan.

In 1964, the Palestine Liberation Organization was created and began to operate cells and recruit members from the Palestinian refugee camps in those three countries. In 1970, the PLO was expelled from Jordan.

It moved its headquarters into Lebanon, and by the mid-1970s over 20,000 PLO fighters were in Lebanon launching attacks on Israel. Their armed presence divided Lebanese public opinion between those who wanted to make peace with Israel and those who wanted to defend the Palestinian cause.

On April 13, 1975, violence erupted over the issue of Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon, and the country descended into chaos.

It resulted in a messy civil war in which Palestinian insurgents in Lebanon fought the country’s Christian population while also continuing to fire rockets into Israel. Lebanon thus became an unstable political and security threat to Israel.

TRT World Video: “Gaza conflict reignites Israel-Lebanon tensions

In 1982, Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon launched Operation Peace for Galilee. On June 6 of that year, Israel Defense Forces invaded Lebanon with the intent to eliminate PLO fighters. Nearly 18,000 people were killed and another 30,000 wounded during the invasion.

The Lebanese authorities called for help, and a multinational peacekeeping force composed of American, French, British and Italian troops arrived in August 1982. Its mission was to evacuate PLO fighters out of Lebanon into Tunisia.

But on Sept. 14, Lebanese President-elect Bashir Gemayel was assassinated. In retaliation, the Lebanese Christian Phalangist militia entered the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila and killed over 2,000 civilians. Evidence suggests Israel played a role in these massacres and was indirectly responsible for them.

Israel officially retreated from Beirut in September 1982, but it occupied southern Lebanon until 2000.

It was during this Israeli occupation that Hezbollah, a Shiite political party in Lebanon and militant organization backed by Iran, was born. Hezbollah and the IDF have been engaged in fierce fighting ever since, including a 1996 war known as Operation Grapes of Wrath, in which an estimated 200 were killed.

Land and maritime border disputes

Much of the fighting between Hezbollah and Israel takes place along a border that has been contested since the creation of Israel. Matters became more complicated with the occupation of the Golan Heights – a former Syrian territory that borders Israel and Lebanon and was taken by Israeli forces during the 1967 Six-Day War.

In the past, there have been attempts to settle land disputes. In 1949, Israel and Lebanon signed the general armistice agreement, which adopted the boundaries of the mandatory territories of Palestine and Lebanon. This agreement continues to exist on paper.

In May 1983, Israel and Lebanon signed an agreement calling for the establishment of peaceful diplomatic relations between the two states. However, after the assassination of Gemayel and the Sabra and Shatila massacres, the agreement was not implemented.

Following the IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, a “Blue Line” was established by the U.N. It is not a real border but rather an imagined line separating the two states and monitored by the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.

Although the Blue Line acts as a buffer zone between Lebanon and Israel, it does not offer an accurate drawing of land boundaries and does not solve the issue of a key source of contention: the disputed Shebaa Farms.

Located between Israel, Syria and southern Lebanon, the Shebaa Farms have been contested lands for over two decades. While Lebanon and Hezbollah claim that it is Lebanese territory, Israel asserts that it is part of the Golan Heights, which it continues to occupy.

After appointing cartographers, the United Nations declared the Shebaa Farms Syrian territory captured by Israel in 1967.

In 2011, Syrian leader Bashar Assad recognized that the Shebaa Farms are Syrian, refuting Hezbollah’s claim over this land and Israel’s jurisdiction in the occupied Golan Heights.

Meanwhile, efforts led by the U.S. began to look at the issue of Lebanon and Israel’s disputed maritime boundary, starting in earnest in 2010.

The discovery of the Leviathan field, the largest gas reservoir in the Mediterranean, made it urgent to address the question of the maritime borders. With gas exploitation and economic growth a possibility, it was deemed important to lower security risks for investors.

In 2022, Amos Hochstein, the American envoy for energy affairs, met separately at the Blue Line with Israeli and Lebanese officials. Hezbollah was involved in the negotiations and gave the green light for the deal to be sealed. In October of that year, the U.N. was notified of the new Israeli and Lebanese maritime borders.

It came amid other signs of a lessening in tensions between Israel and Arab states. In September 2020, the United Arab Emirates signed the Abraham Accords in which it recognized Israeli statehood. Soon after, Sudan and Bahrain followed suit.

Moving forward

The maritime border agreement carried a potential for peace in the region, a deal that would, potentially, benefit both Lebanon and Israel.

The next step would have been drawing land boundaries. In fact, Hochstein had already held preliminary discussions over 13 land border points, including the Shebaa Farms, and had explicitly said that the U.S. is ready to help mediate between the two countries.

Hamas’ terrorist attack on Oct. 7, 2023, and the ongoing Israeli war in Gaza have, however, derailed the process.

It is hard to envision a land border deal in such circumstances, especially after the January 2024 assassination of Hamas leader Saleh al-Arouri in Beirut and Hezbollah’s vow to avenge the death.

The final nail in the coffin looks to be Saudi Arabia’s statement on Feb. 7, 2024, that it can have no diplomatic relations with Israel unless an independent Palestinian state is recognized with the 1967 borders and East Jerusalem as its capital.

It has ended hopes, for now at least, that Saudi Arabia will follow the UAE’s lead and normalize diplomatic relations with Israel.

The U.S. is still desperately trying to keep the land deal alive. Recently, Hochstein visited Lebanon and met with anti-Hezbollah parties in an attempt to end hostilities between Hezbollah and Israel and move forward with a land agreement.

One voice often neglected in all this is that of the Lebanese public. Many Lebanese have expressed their opposition to war. In one recent poll, a majority agreed that what the country needed was domestic and economic reforms more than involvement in foreign policy issues. A historic land deal accompanying the maritime settlement may have gone some way to achieve those goals. Instead, the danger now is a full-scale war that will scuttle any negotiations.

Mireille Rebeiz, Chair of Middle East Studies & Associate Professor of Francophone & Women’s, Gender & Sexuality Studies, Dickinson College

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

( RFE/RL ) – Iran’s so-called axis of resistance is a loose network of proxies, Tehran-backed militant groups, and an allied state actor.

The network is a key element of Tehran’s strategy of deterrence against perceived threats from the United States, regional rivals, and primarily Israel.

Active in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, the axis gives Iran the ability to hit its enemies outside its own borders while allowing it to maintain a position of plausible deniability, experts say.

Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has played a key role in establishing some of the groups in the axis. Other members have been co-opted by Tehran over the years.

Iran has maintained that around dozen separate groups that comprise the axis act independently.

Tehran’s level of influence over each member varies. But the goals pursued by each group broadly align with Iran’s own strategic aims, which makes direct control unnecessary, according to experts.

Lebanon’s Hizballah

Hizballah was established in 1982 in response to Israel’s invasion that year of Lebanon, which was embroiled in a devastating civil war.

The Shi’ite political and military organization was created by the Quds Force, the overseas arm of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), the elite branch of the country’s armed forces.

Danny Citrinowicz, a research fellow at the Iran Program at the Israel-based Institute for National Security Studies, said Tehran’s aim was to unite Lebanon’s various Shi’ite political organizations and militias under one organization.

Since it was formed, Hizballah has received significant financial and political assistance from Iran, a Shi’a-majority country. That backing has made the group a major political and military force in Lebanon.

“Iran sees the organization as the main factor that will deter Israel or the U.S. from going to war against Iran and works tirelessly to build the organization’s power,” Citrinowicz said.

Hizballah has around 40,000 fighters, according to the office of the U.S. Director of National Intelligence. The State Department said Iran has armed and trained Hizballah fighters and injected hundreds of millions of dollars in the group.

Photo by أخٌ‌في‌الله on Unsplash

The State Department in 2010 described Hizballah as “the most technically capable terrorist group in the world.”

Citrinowicz said Iran may not dictate orders to the organization but Tehran “profoundly influences” its decision-making process.

He described Hizballah, which is considered a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union, not as a proxy but “an Iranian partner managing Tehran’s Middle East strategy.”

Led by Hassan Nasrallah, Hizballah has developed close ties with other Iranian proxies and Tehran-backed militant groups, helping to train and arm their fighters.

Citrinowicz said Tehran “almost depends” on the Lebanese group to oversee its relations with other groups in the axis of resistance.

Hamas

Hamas, designated a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union, has had a complex relationship with Iran.

Founded in 1987 during the first Palestinian Intifada, or uprising, Hamas is an offshoot of the Palestinian arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist political organization established in Egypt in the 1920s.

Hamas’s political chief is Ismail Haniyeh, who lives in Qatar. Its military wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, is commanded by Yahya Sinwar, who is believed to be based in the Gaza Strip. Hamas is estimated to have around 20,000 fighters.

For years, Iran provided limited material support to Hamas, a Sunni militant group. Tehran ramped up its financial and military support to the Palestinian group after it gained power in the Gaza Strip in 2007.

But Tehran reduced its support to Hamas after a major disagreement over the civil war in Syria. When the conflict broke out in 2011, Iran backed the government of President Bashar al-Assad. Hamas, however, supported the rebels seeking to oust Assad.

Nevertheless, experts said the sides overcame their differences because, ultimately, they seek the same goal: Israel’s destruction.

“[But] this does not mean that Iran is deeply aware of all the actions of Hamas,” Citrinowicz said.

After Hamas militants launched a multipronged attack on Israel in October that killed around 1,200 people, mostly civilians, Iran denied it was involved in planning the assault. U.S. intelligence has indicated that Iranian leaders were surprised by Hamas’s attack.

Seyed Ali Alavi, a lecturer in Middle Eastern and Iranian Studies at SOAS University of London, said Iran’s support to Hamas is largely “confined to rhetorical and moral support and limited financial aid.” He said Qatar and Turkey, Hamas’s “organic” allies, have provided significantly more financial help to the Palestinian group.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad

With around 1,000 members, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is the smaller of the two main militant groups based in the Gaza Strip and the closest to Iran.

Founded in 1981, the Sunni militant group’s creation was inspired by Iran’s Islamic Revolution two years earlier. Given Tehran’s ambition of establishing a foothold in the Palestinian Occupied Territories, Iran has provided the group with substantial financial backing and arms, experts say.

The PIJ, led by Ziyad al-Nakhalah, is designated as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union.

“Today, there is no Palestinian terrorist organization that is closer to Iran than this organization,” Citrinowicz said. “In fact, it relies mainly on Iran.”

Citrinowicz said there is no doubt that Tehran’s “ability to influence [the PIJ] is very significant.”

Iraqi Shi’ite Militias

Iran supports a host of Shi’ite militias in neighboring Iraq, some of which were founded by the IRGC and “defer to Iranian instructions,” said Gregory Brew, a U.S.-based Iran analyst with the Eurasia Group.

But Tehran’s influence over the militias has waned since the U.S. assassination in 2020 of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, who was seen as the architect of the axis of resistance and held great influence over its members.

“The dynamic within these militias, particularly regarding their relationship with Iran, underwent a notable shift following the assassination of Qassem Soleimani,” said Hamidreza Azizi, a fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

The U.S. drone strike that targeted Soleimani also killed Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the deputy head of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organization of mostly Shi’ite Iran-backed armed groups that has been a part of the Iraqi Army since 2016.

Muhandis was also the leader of Kata’ib Hizballah, which was established in 2007 and is one of the most powerful members of the PMF. Other prominent groups in the umbrella include Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat al-Nujaba, Kata’ib Seyyed al-Shuhada, and the Badr Organization. Kata’ib Hizballah has been designated as a terrorist entity by the United States.

Following the deaths of Soleimani and al-Muhandis, Kata’ib Hizballah and other militias “began to assert more autonomy, at times acting in ways that could potentially compromise Iran’s interests,” said Azizi.

Many of the Iran-backed groups that form the PMF are also part of the so-called Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which rose to prominence in November 2023. The group has been responsible for launching scores of attacks on U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria since Israel launched its war against Hamas in Gaza.

“It’s important to note that while several militias within the PMF operate as Iran’s proxies, this is not a universal trait across the board,” Azizi said.

Azizi said the extent of Iran’s control over the PMF can fluctuate based on the political conditions in Iraq and the individual dynamics within each militia.

The strength of each group within the PMF varies widely, with some containing as few as 100 members and others, such as Kata’ib Hizballah, boasting around 10,000 fighters.

Syrian State And Pro-Government Militias

Besides Iran, Syria is the only state that is a member of the axis of resistance.

“The relationship between Iran and the Assad regime in Syria is a strategic alliance where Iran’s influence is substantial but not absolute, indicating a balance between dependency and partnership,” said Azizi.

The decades-long alliance stems from Damascus’s support for Tehran during the devastating 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War.

When Assad’s rule was challenged during the Syrian civil war, the IRGC entered the fray in 2013 to ensure he held on to power.

Hundreds of IRGC commander and officers, who Iran refers to as “military advisers,” are believed to be present in Syria. Tehran has also built up a large network of militias, consisting mostly of Afghans and Pakistanis, in Syria.

Azizi said these militias have given Iran “a profound influence on the country’s affairs,” although not outright control over Syria.

“The Assad regime maintains its strategic independence, making decisions that serve its national interests and those of its allies,” he said.

The Fatemiyun Brigade, comprised of Afghan fighters, and the Zainabiyun Brigade, which is made up of Pakistani fighters, make up the bulk of Iran’s proxies in Syria.

“They are essentially units in the IRGC, under direct control,” said Brew.

The Afghan and Pakistani militias played a key role in fighting rebel groups opposed to Assad during the civil war. There have been reports that Iran has not only granted citizenship to Afghan fighters and their families but also facilitated Syrian citizenship for them.

The Fatemiyun Brigade, the larger of the two, is believed to have several thousand fighters in Syria. The Zainabiyun Brigade is estimated to have less than 1,000 fighters.

Yemen’s Huthi Rebels

The Huthis first emerged as a movement in the 1980s in response to the growing religious influence of neighboring Saudi Arabia, a Sunni kingdom.

In 2015, the Shi’ite militia toppled the internationally recognized, Saudi-backed government of Yemen. That triggered a brutal, yearslong Saudi-led war against the rebels.

With an estimated 200,000 fighters, the Huthis control most of the northwest of the country, including the capital, Sanaa, and are in charge of much of the Red Sea coast.

The Huthis’ disdain for Saudi Arabia, Iran’s regional foe, and Israel made it a natural ally of Tehran, experts say. But it was only around 2015 that Iran began providing the group with training through the Quds Force and Hizballah. Tehran has also supplied weapons to the group, though shipments are regularly intercepted by the United States.

“The Huthis…appear to have considerable autonomy and Tehran exercises only limited control, though there does appear to be [a] clear alignment of interests,” said Brew.

Since Israel launched its war in Gaza, the Huthis have attacked international commercial vessels in the Red Sea and fired ballistic missiles at several U.S. warships.

In response, the United States and its allies have launched air strikes against the Huthis’ military infrastructure. Washington has also re-designated the Huthis as a terrorist organization.

Copyright (c)2024 RFE/RL, Inc. Used with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1250 Connecticut Ave NW, Ste 450, Washington DC 20036.

Via RFE/RL

Israel’s Defense Minister called the Palestinians of Gaza “human animals” when he announced a “complete siege” of Gaza after the horrid Hamas terrorist attack of October 7.

Galant’s willingness to destroy most of the homes in northern Gaza and to displace over a million people, leaving them cold, hungry, thirsty and increasingly victims of disease, surely was enhanced by his conviction that he is dealing with animals rather than human beings. Some might defend him, saying that he only called Hamas “human animals.” But if that were true, why is he treating all Palestinians in Gaza worse than dogs?

The Nazi dehumanization of Jews is notorious. They called them rats, lice, cockroaches, foxes, vultures

Such language proliferates in times of tension and war. The impulse to it should be resisted by ethical persons, and even just by normal non-psychopathic human beings.

Prominent New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman, alas, fell victim to the seductions of such language in his Friday column. He openly said that he approaches the Middle East at times from the perspective of the Warner Brothers’ Animal Planet channel.

Friedman actually wants a two-state solution and so wants something for Palestinians more than what they now have, and he is hated by the Israeli far right (which is increasingly the Israeli mainstream) for these stances. So it is unfortunate that he deployed the language of insects for Iran and Hamas members. He might defend himself by pointing out that he called the United States an “old lion” of which no one in the region is afraid any more, or that he caricatured Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu as a lemur. But in his column, the old lion and the lemur are not depicted as vicious or disgusting.

The Majority Report with Sam Seder Video: “Journalist Gives Heartbreaking Report From Gaza As Explosions Ring Out Around Her”

The three-time Pulitzer prize-winner compares Iran to a parasitoid wasp that lays its eggs in caterpillars. He says that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps is like the wasp, and the caterpillars are Lebanon’s Hezbollah, the Iraqi Shiite militias, and Yemen’s Helpers of God (Houthis).

How does this language add to understanding? If he is saying that Iran has fostered Shiite militias in nearby countries on the model of its Revolutionary Guards, this is true.

But why would Lebanese be interested in Iranian training, weapons and monetary support?

In 1947-1948 Zionist militias ethnically cleansed over half of Palestinians, expelling them from their homes and farms and forcing some of them to Lebanon, where they dwelled in camps. As a liberal Zionist, I presume that Friedman applauds this ethnic cleansing, though the liberal part of the equation makes him sympathetic to Palestinians getting a state on 22% of the land of the British Mandate of Palestine, all of which was promised to the Palestinians by the British White Paper of 1939.

By the 1970s some of the younger generation were radicalized and formed armed bands to strike across the border into Israel. Many lived in south Lebanon among the Shiite population there. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon, ostensibly to deal with the Palestinian attacks but actually to reshape Lebanese politics and install a far right wing Christian puppet government. The 1982 invasion left about 50,000 Lebanese and Palestinian civilians dead. Then the Israelis occupied about 10% of Lebanese soil for 18 years, subjecting the southern, largely Shiite population to their military rule in alliance with an artificially created Christian militia. Some Shiites, determined to resist the latest Israeli land-grab, formed Hezbollah in 1984 and began a long struggle to get the Israelis back out of their country. By 2000, they had succeeded.

No one in Lebanon, however, trusted the Israelis to cease attempting to dominate Lebanon, and so the rest of the Lebanese appointed Hezbollah as the border guards of the south.

Israel created Hezbollah by its occupation of Lebanon and its attempt to control it.

So Iranian influence in southern Lebanon is not a “natural” phenomenon of “injecting eggs.” It is a political alliance by the poor and the weak seeking a patron to help protect them from a serial predator.

If the Israelis had permitted a Palestinian state to emerge in the West Bank and Gaza, the Palestinians in Lebanon would have moved there. They told me so enthusiastically when I interviewed them in 2008. Then the whole history of Israel interventions in Lebanon would have been obviated and perhaps Hezbollah would never have been formed.

Likewise, several of the Iraqi Shiite militias were formed in response to the US occupation of that country for which Friedman was among the foremost cheerleaders. When the US occupation led to the formation of ISIL (ISIS, Daesh), the Shiite militias were the only force that could take it on in 2014-2015, and the US gave them air support at Amerli and Tikrit.

Had Bush, with Friedman cheering him on, not invaded Iraq, any Shiite militias in that country would be small and covert, as they were in the 1990s.

Then the Houthis in Yemen are rural Zaydi Shiites who reacted against Saudi dominance of their country and their region. The Saudis were trying to convert them to Wahhabism and were buying the Yemeni government to allow them to extend their influence. The Zaydis minded, and some in the north rebelled.

Mr. Friedman told us that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman, who bombed Yemen for seven years, further radicalizing the Houthis and driving them into Iran’s arms, is the greatest thing since sliced bread.

Then he compared Hamas to a trap-door spider because it took hostages.

But we all know how the Palestinians in Gaza turned to Hamas and in what conditions the Israelis have kept the Palestinians of Gaza — virtually as prisoners in a concentration camp. 70% of the families in Gaza are refugees from southern Israel, from which the Zionists expelled them.

So the biggest problem with Friedman’s glib column isn’t even its racism. It is the illusion of explanation created by the use of insects as metaphors for human beings. By sidestepping imperialism, settler colonialism, and capitalist exploitation, by ignoring social class and history, Friedman can skate away with his facile sociobiology, having elucidated nothing, having understood nothing . . .

and having sidestepped the ways in which his own commitments, to liberal Zionism, exploitative forms of leveling capitalism, and to American imperialism in places like Iraq, created the mess he now dismisses as a nature documentary.

The Party of God Brigades were founded by Abu Mehdi al-Muhandis. The organization is not related to the Hezbollah in Lebanon, though the two have a collegial relationship. Al-Muhandis was assassinated by President Donald Trump on January 3, 2020 along with the Iranian general, Qasem Soleimani. Ever since, the Brigades have sought to force out of Iraq the remaining 2500 US troops there and to force out of Syria the remaining 900 US troops stationed in that country. US troops were put into those two countries by the Obama administration during the fight against the ISIL (ISIS, Daesh) terrorist organization, 2014-2018. In those years, the US was often de facto allied with Shiite militias such as the PGB and with their sponsor, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. In 2018, Trump destroyed the Iran nuclear deal of 2015 and placed a “maximum pressure” economic siege on the Iranian economy. That and his assassination of Soleimani and al-Muhandis set Iran and its allies, the Shiite militias of the Middle East, on an increasingly belligerent footing.

The Party of God Brigades and other Iraqi Shiite militias have launched around 150 attacks on bases housing US troops since the Gaza conflict broke out on October 7.

Al-Zaman [The Times of Baghdad] printed the communique it received from the God’s Party Brigades:

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

“Leave is given to those who fight because they were wronged — surely God is able to help them .” [Qur’an 22:39].

Continuing our path of resisting the American occupation forces in Iraq and the region, and in response to the massacres of the Zionist entity against our people in Gaza, at dawn today, Sunday 1/28/2024, the fighters of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq attacked four enemy bases with unmanned aerial vehicles — three of them in Syria and they are Al-Shaddadi, al-Rukban and al-Tanf bases, and the fourth inside our occupied Palestinian lands, and it is the US Marines’ Zafulun Facility. The Islamic Resistance affirms that it will continue to destroy enemy compounds.

“Victory is only from God. God is Almighty, All-Wise.” [Qur’an 8:10].

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq
Sunday 16 Rajab 1445

God knows what Zafulun is, but apparently it is their term for the place that Tower 22 stands. It is interesting that the group views the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as part of occupied Palestine. Palestine and the Transjordan were conquered by the British army during World War I and Britain subsequently ruled the West Bank and the rest of Palestine as a League of Nations Mandate, while giving charge of the Transjordan to the family of the Sharif Hussain, the Naqib or leading noble of Mecca, who claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad and his clan, the Banu Hashem. Hussain and his sons had supported the British against the Ottomans during WW I because the British lied to them and promised them an independent Arab state after the war. In any case, this Shiite militia appears to view the Hashemite Dynasty (King Abdullah II is a descendant of Sharif Hussain) as illegitimate.

In return, the highly capable and effective Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate, or GID, is even as we speak making plans to help track down and kill the PGB cadres behind this attack on Jordanian soil. Jordan will also have some harsh words for Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al Sudani, who came to power with the support of the Shiite militias and is thought to be close to them.

Aljazeera English Video: “Three US service members killed in drone attack on US post in Jordan near Syria”

The Ma`refa site says that al-Muhandis was born in 1954 or 1955 in Basra, originally named Jamal Jaafar Muhammad Ali Al Ibrahim. He married an Iranian woman. In 1973 he was in Baghdad, where he entered the Technological University in the Engineering School, being graduated with an engineering degree in 1977. While working as an engineer he did further degrees in political science. He also took off some time to study at a Shiite seminary in Basra that was part of the establishment of Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakim, the clerical leader of Iraq’s Shiites in the 1960s.

Right from the time he was in high school in the early 1970s, he joined the Da`wa Party. Some say that Da`wa, or “the Call,” was founded in 1958 to compete with the Communists and Baathists, who were appealing to Shiite youths. Baathism is a mixture of socialism and Arab nationalism with a strong secularist cast, and it instituted an authoritarian Stalinist-style one-party state in Iraq from 1968. The Da`wa party, in contrast, theorized a Shiite state as a believers’ paradise in opposition to the Communists’ workers paradise. Its leaders made room for consultative government.

In 1979, the Islamic Revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran began radicalizing Iraqi Shiites. Saddam Hussein came to power in an internal Baath Party putsch in 1979. In 1980 he outlawed the Da`wa Party, executed its clerical leader Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, and made belonging to it a capital crime. For the past twenty years the post-Baath government has been finding mass graves in the Shiite south of Iraq, where the Baath secret police shot down suspected Da`wa members.

Al-Muhandis, his nom de guerre, which means “the engineer,” was forced to flee to Kuwait. There, he was part of a Da`wa cell that turned radical and committed acts of terrorism against the US and French embassies, given the hostility of those countries to the Islamic Republic. He then appears to have gone to Iran, where he left the Da`wa Party for the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), an even more radical organization founded by Iraqi expatriates in Tehran in 1982 at the suggestion of Khomeini. Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, the son of Muhsin al-Hakim, became the head of it in 1984. Thousands of Iraqi Shiites defected to Iran during the 1980s, and SCIRI organized them. Those who remained loyal to the Da`wa Party, who mostly rejected Khomeini’s vision of a clerically ruled Muslim state, tended to make their way to London instead. The Supreme Council developed a paramilitary branch, the Badr Corps, which was trained and funded by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, and which carried out operations against Baath installations in Iraq. Al-Muhandis Joined the Badr Corps and rose to become one of its commanders.

The independent Shiite site al-Khanadeq in Lebanon says that the Party of God Brigades was founded by al-Muhandis in 2003 when the US, as I wrote about, invaded Iraq, with the aim of forcing the occupiers back out. He appears to have broken with the Badr Corps at that point and formed his own militia, primarily out of armed groups based in the Shiite holy city of Karbala (the Ali Akbar Brigades, the Karbala Brigades and the Abu al-Fadl Abbas Brigades). By 2007, they had begun jointly calling themselves the Party of God Brigades. They mounted some attacks on US bases. I also wrote about the role of the Shiite militias in that era

The organization became prominent in 2014 when Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani called on Iraqi young men to rise up to defend the country from ISIL, which had taken Mosul, at a time when the Iraqi Army built by the Bush administration had collapsed. The Party of God Brigades and other Shiite militias armed themselves and went to fight, with training and support from the iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps and Gen. Soleimani, against ISIL in Amerli and later in Tikrit and Fallujah. They helped ensure that ISIL was defeated. The militias developed political parties which got a fair-sized bloc of seats in parliament. In 2018 parliament recognized the Shiite militias or “Popular Mobilization Forces” as a formal part of the Iraqi military — a sort of national guard.

After 2018, when ISIL was rolled up, the US kept several thousand troops in Iraq for mop-up operations and to continue to train the new Iraqi army.

Israel is accused of committing covert ops against Iraqi Shiite militias inside Iraq, blowing up a weapons depot in 2019.

In Syria, the government of Bashar al-Assad initially faced a rebellion by civil society groups in 2011, but attacked the demonstrators militarily and turned the struggle into a civil war. It took on sectarian tones, since most rebels were Sunnis, while the elite of the government were Alawi Shiites. Lebanon’s Hezbollah came in on the side of Damascus, as did the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps. The Party of God Brigades came up from Iraq along with some other Shiite militias. With help from the Russian air force, the Shiite militias defeated the Sunni rebels and drove their remnant into the far north Idlib province.

In the east of Syria, the US enlisted the YPG Syrian Kurdish militia as ground troops to defeat ISIL in Raqqa and Deir al-Zor provinces, with US air support. The US put in a small number of its own troops, embedded with the YPG. After ISIL was defeated, the US maintained a small military presence in Syria’s southeast. Again, they aimed to mop up ISIL and prevent it from reconstituting itself, and to lend continued support to the YPG in these largely Arab provinces. It is alleged that they also attempt to block Iranian activities, including shipments of weapons to Lebanon’s Hezbollah, on behalf of Israel. Further, they may be helping the Kurds siphon off oil from fields in the southeast, denying the petroleum wealth to Damascus. If this latter charge is true, it is a war crime.

On January 3, 2020, Trump blew away al-Muhandis and Soleimani at Baghdad International Airport. Soleimani had just come on a civilian airliner with a diplomatic passport to negotiate better relations with Saudi Arabia via the good offices of then Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi.

The Party of God Brigades went to war with the US troops in the country, subjecting the Iraqi bases that housed them to rocket and drone strikes. The Iraqi parliament demanded that Abdul Mahdi find a way to kick US troops out of Iraq (he never did).

Since October 7, the Party of God Brigades’ secretary-general, Ahmad al-Hamidawi, has branded the US an equal partner in the Israeli war on Gaza and it and other Shiite militias have launched dozens of attacks on US bases. None had resulted in a fatality until Sunday.

In a historical irony, one of the reasons some Neocons around George W Bush wanted to invade Iraq was to stop it from being a danger to Israel. Over two decades later, the PGB hit a school in Eilat with a drone, and the US, having destroyed the secular Baath Party, is at war with political Shiism in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Maybe the problem is US policy in the region, and maybe no number of wars and conquests are going to reshape the Middle East in ways really favorable to that policy?

From attacks by rebels in the Red Sea to raids in northern Israel and the Oct. 7, 2023, assault by Hamas, Western analysts have pointed a finger of blame toward Iran.

Regardless of how involved Tehran is directly in the planning and carrying out of such incidents, the accusations get at a broader truth: In Middle Eastern geopolitics, Iran’s strategy of aligning with violent nonstate actors – notably Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen – influences the regional balance of power.

As experts in Iran’s relationship with its network of proxies, we understand that Iran’s connection with each group is distinct yet interlinked, revealing Tehran’s regional objectives. From southern Lebanon to Gaza to Yemen, these alliances shape the political landscape and highlight the nature of influence and control in proxy warfare. It serves as a counterweight to Iran’s relatively limited conventional military capabilities, forming a key part of its foreign policy.

Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’

Managed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran’s paramilitary security service that answers only to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, these regional groups form what Tehran has labeled the Axis of Resistance.

The relationship between the groups and Tehran is designed to serve as a balance against both U.S. influence in the region and that of Washington’s regional allies, including Israel and Saudi Arabia.

But to characterize the Axis of Resistance as straight proxies is slightly off. Rather, Iran’s approach – spanning Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and the Palestinian territories – is to extend its influence through strategic partnerships. While based on shared objectives and ideologies, these alliances allow varying degrees of autonomy. Iran provides resources and coordination, but each group maintains its own agenda and local support base, functioning more as partners than proxies. And the relationship between Iran and each member of this Axis of Resistance is unique.

Hezbollah: Iran’s pivotal partner

Established in the early 1980s, Hezbollah – a Shiite militant organization – emerged with direct assistance from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, primarily as a response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Aiming to establish an Iranian-influenced base on Israel’s border, Tehran provided training, financial support and weaponry, bolstering Hezbollah’s growth and capabilities.

Photo by أخٌ‌في‌الله on Unsplash

This collaboration has led to Hezbollah developing a sophisticated arsenal, including advanced drone technology, chemical weapons and expanded rocket capabilities.

As a result of its involvement in the Syrian civil war and ongoing hostilities with Israel, Hezbollah has professionalized its military. By deploying troops to support the Syrian government in line with Iran’s support for the regime, Hezbollah has transitioned from guerrilla tactics to more conventional warfare. Additionally, its ongoing conflict with Israel has sharpened its military strategy and capabilities. This helped elevate Hezbollah to a notable political and military role within Lebanon’s government, which has frequently aligned with Iran’s geopolitical interests.

This evolution has also enabled Hezbollah to become a mentor and supporter for other Iran-backed groups. Hezbollah has imparted its expertise in drone operations to organizations such as Fatemiyoun in Afghanistan, Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah and Houthi fighters.

The relationship between Tehran and Hezbollah has deepened over the years, evolving from mere assistance to a robust strategic alliance. The entities share goals, strategies and materials. The close relationship between Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah and Iran’s Khamenei further cements this alliance.

Despite Iran’s considerable influence, particularly in regional conflicts, Hezbollah retains autonomy in domestic Lebanese politics and its social services.

This Hezbollah-Iran alliance is arguably more significant than Iran’s relationship with other proxies and is instrumental in Tehran’s regional strategy. It not only extends Iran’s influence in the Middle East but also serves as a counterbalance to its adversaries, notably Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Hamas: United against Israel

Emerging in the first intifada, or Palestinian uprising, of 1987, Hamas forged ties with Iran in the early 1990s. Despite the ideological differences – Hamas is predominantly Sunni Islamist, while Iran is a hard-line Shiite regime – they found common ground in their opposition to Israel and a shared vision for Palestinian liberation.

Iran’s backing of Hamas includes financial aid, military training and, crucially, the supply of rocket technology. This funding has escalated Hamas’ operational capabilities, enabling the development of a more sophisticated and far-reaching rocket arsenal.

Iran’s support has shifted the balance in Hamas’ conflict with Israel, demonstrating Iran’s influential role in regional power dynamics.

The alignment between Iran and Hamas, however, has fluctuated. In 2012, differences over the Syrian civil war introduced a rift in their relationship. Hamas’ tacit support for Sunni rebels in Syria was at odds with Iran’s allegiance to the Assad regime, leading to a temporary withdrawal of Iranian support.

However, this strain was not permanent. In subsequent years, the Iran-Hamas relationship was realigned and reinforced, evidenced by Iran’s resumption of substantial military aid. The sophisticated planning and execution of the Oct. 7 attack showed how Hamas has been able to improve its military capacity with a helping hand from Iran.

Nonetheless, the group maintains a degree of political and strategic independence, primarily focusing on Palestinian interests.

This dynamic reflects Iran’s broader regional strategy: to empower allied groups in extending its reach, while granting them autonomy to pursue specific agendas.

Houthis: Strategic ally against Saudi Arabia

Emerging in the 1990s in Yemen as a Zaidi Shia Islamist group, the Houthi movement initially focused on religious and cultural revivalism before progressively becoming engaged in Yemen’s political and military arenas.

Fueled by grievances against the central government and foreign interference in Yemen, the group shifted to an armed rebellion. This evolution was marked by growing confrontations with the Yemeni government and involvement in a wider regional conflict against a coalition led by Iran’s regional rival, Saudi Arabia. This set the stage for their alliance with Tehran.

The Houthis’ alignment with Iran was spurred by shared religious beliefs as well as opposition to both Saudi Arabia and the U.S.

The collaboration with Iran gained momentum following the Houthis’ capture of Yemen’s capital Sanaa in 2014 – a move that is believed to have triggered an escalation in Iranian support.

Support from Tehran came in the shape of sophisticated weaponry, military training and financial aid, and it has substantially enhanced the Houthis’ missile and drone capabilities. The Houthis have utilized this growing capability to challenge Saudi Arabia and, more recently, Israel

Empowered by Iranian support, the Houthis have expanded their operations to include assaults on U.S. and other international vessels in the Red Sea.

Despite the depth of Iranian support, the Houthis retain a level of autonomy, specifically in local Yemeni politics. While Iran’s influence is notable, it does not translate into outright control. Instead, the Houthis are positioned more as strategic allies within Iran’s regional agenda rather than mere proxies.

Iran’s expanding influence

Iran’s proxy network, which extends to groups in Iraq, Syria and beyond, is a key part of Tehran’s strategy to expand its influence and confront that of Washington and its allies.

These partnerships, though seldom involving absolute control, also demonstrate Iran’s adeptness in navigating geopolitical landscapes. The Axis of Resistance allows Iran to adapt its strategy to shifting regional dynamics. For example, positioning Hamas under the Revolutionary Guard’s guidance fits a strategy to confront Israel as regional dynamics shift toward normalization between Israel and Arab states.

France 24 English Video: “Amid US strikes, Yemen rebels bask in praise, international limelight”

Such partnerships also pose a challenge to Iran’s adversaries. Deterring these proxy groups requires navigating a complex web of relationships, interests and ongoing conflicts. And this complexity, coupled with Iran’s pivotal role, has reshaped the Middle East’s geopolitical landscape, signaling a period of heightened tensions with broad international implications.

Sara Harmouch, PhD Candidate, American University and Nakissa Jahanbani, Assistant Professor at the Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy West Point

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

Zakharova made clear the reason for the unusually fierce condemnation of Israel by Moscow, saying that such attacks “lead to a decrease in the military capacity of the Syrian Armed Forces and have a negative impact on the effectiveness of efforts to combat terrorism on Syrian soil.”

Backed by the Russian Aerospace Forces, the Syrian government of Bashar al-Assad has won the civil war, but still faces challenges from hard line Muslim guerrillas based in the northern Idlib Province, which are given some cover by Turkish support. The Idlib-based Council for the Liberation of the Levant (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham or HTS) remains a threat to the Syrian government.

Russia and the al-Assad government depend on Iranian, Iraqi and Lebanese Shiite fighters to check the Sunni fundamentalist guerrillas, which angers Israel. The Israelis don’t like being direct neighbors of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, and don’t like the southern Lebanese party-militia, Hezbollah, having free run of Syria, from which they could fire rockets at Israel.

Israel and Russia have worked out a framework for security cooperation that allows Israel to strike at the Shiite militias if they stray from their mission of fighting the Sunni fundamentalists and begin plotting to hit Israel, or if they become too audacious in using Syria to import heavy weapons with which Hezbollah could confront Israel in South Lebanon.

The Israelis say that they hit Damascus Airport because it was being used to bring in weapons for Hezbollah from Iran.

While the Israeli-Russian “deconfliction mechanism” seems to work when Israel simply strikes a Hezbollah convoy, attacking Damascus Airport goes beyond just targeting Hezbollah to affecting the smooth functioning of the Baath government itself. It may also have endangered Russian personnel at the airport, and we know that in the past President Vladimir Putin has read the Israeli prime minister the riot act whenever their Syria strikes came close to hurting Russian troops.

Russia is bogged down in Ukraine and has had to draw down military personnel who had been stationed in Syria, and so Moscow feels vulnerable in Syria at the moment. Moreover, Vladimir Putin is unhappy about Israel’s neutrality on the Ukraine issue and its refusal to support Russia. In fact, although Israel refused to join the American boycott of the Russian economy, it voted against Russia both in the UN General Assembly and regarding Russia’s membership in the UN Human Rights Council because of its invasion of Ukraine.

The insecurity of Russia’s various overseas adventures helps explain why they lashed out at Israel for what Moscow sees as actions that undermine the viability of the al-Assad government and which give aid and comfort to the Sunni fundamentalist militias.

Turkey’s President, Tayyib Erdogan, is also said to be contemplating yet another incursion into Syria’s Kurdish regions, which is also a challenge to the Russian protectorate over Syria. The Syrian government says it is confronting Turkish-backed groups in its north.

It is not clear if Russia has the capability remaining strong in Syria and of nevertheless winning in Ukraine.

Lebanese voters are signalling a desire for change, with Hezbollah and its allies losing ground across the country in a parliamentary election.

Just as the recent election in Northern Ireland brought a boost for the non-sectarian Alliance Party, Lebanon’s election saw significant gains for political representatives untethered to sectarian politics. Like Northern Ireland, Lebanon’s political system is set up to share power. Its new parliament will have various sectarian blocs, revolving around Hezbollah and rival party Lebanese Forces, and a sizeable non-sectarian group campaigning on economic issues, social justice and accountability.

Hezbollah, a pro-Iranian Shia-based party, emerged in 1982 largely in response to Israel’s invasion of Lebanon. It gained prominence after the end of Lebanon’s civil war (1975-1990) and its share of parliament seats started rising in the 2000 elections. After the departure of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005, its alliance with key political players such as the other Shia-based political party, Amal, and the Christian-based Free Patriotic Movement allowed it to gradually block major policy processes deemed detrimental to its interests such as negotiations on its demilitarisation.

The Hezbollah bloc has lost ground to rivals across the spectrum. Results indicate that the pro-Thawra opposition candidates have made significant gains, capturing up to 13 seats. The Thawra name harks back to October 2019, as the state’s economy went into freefall, when an uprising of ordinary citizens, often called the Thawra, campaigned for all sectarian leaders to resign and for rights for foreign domestic workers, women and LGBTQ+ people.

In this election the Lebanese Forces party has used widespread anger against Hezbollah and its allies to increase its number of parliamentarians. Lebanese Forces has positioned itself as the main faction willing to contest Hezbollah in the power-sharing government.

Opposition gains have been secured even in areas traditionally seen as Hezbollah strongholds. In 2018, Hezbollah and its allies won 71 seats, making it the biggest faction in the parliament. Hezbollah emerged from Sunday’s election weakened as many voters blame the party for hindering an independent investigation into the Beirut port explosion which killed more than 200 people.

This national election took place as Lebanon struggled with a series of crises beginning in 2019, including an economic meltdown that left more than 75% of the population below the poverty line, in what the World Bank ranks as among the three most severe economic collapses anywhere since the 19th century. The country is also dealing with the aftermath of the port disaster. More recently Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has pushed millions close to starvation because of Lebanon’s heavy dependence on Ukrainian wheat.

Lebanon’s political power-sharing system is deliberately designed to protect the entrenched interests of the state’s powerful sectarian leaders. All seats in the 128-member parliament are reserved on a sectarian basis and the powerful factions have often functioned on behalf of other powers, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia.

For its supporters, the power-sharing system gives guarantees of political representation to the main groups and ensures that no faction can control the government.

Critics point to a number of drawbacks with the system. Some Lebanese people are reliant on their sect leaders to distribute basic services, such as healthcare. Lebanon is further crippled by paralysis and dysfunction, with the government rarely passing any new laws.

Yet, despite many barriers to change, we may be beginning to see cracks in the system to allow anti-sectarian and independent opposition candidates to emerge as a serious force in Lebanon.

In recent years, hundreds of thousands of Lebanese have voiced dissent by taking to the streets to demand an end to the state’s corrupt leaders, branded by protesters as “thieves”.

While the protests eventually ran out of steam, it built a platform for a political movement that has now gained independent parliamentary seats.

While it is tempting to suggest that Lebanon’s election has ushered in significant change, caveats are required. Voter turnout was 41%, lower than in 2018. This may point more to apathy and disillusionment than hope.

Obsolete electoral laws have not kept pace with people’s lives, and may have been a factor in the low turnout. In Lebanon, people must vote in the constituencies where they were born. With fuel prices rising and a crumbling transportation system, many could not travel to their birthplace hours away.

This result could lead to political stalemate and confrontational power-sharing. The parliament could turn into a polarised arena where parties with opposing agendas are supposed to share power. The main factions are likely to disagree on the new speaker of parliament and on the allocation of executive ministerial positions, making it difficult for the council of ministers to address the disastrous economic situation.

Factions are also likely to disagree on the new presidential candidate set to replace current president Michel Aoun five months from now at the end of his term.

Yet there is still room for optimism. The success of these independent candidates demonstrates that anti-sectarian politics can succeed in an environment designed to prohibit it flourishing. Unlikely breakthroughs in sectarian strongholds represent notable and exceptional gains.

Independent candidates have not had the array of tools at the disposal of the major sectarian parties. They do not have the economic clout to court votes or have links to powerful media networks to echo their message. They also can’t ask for support from powerful states, such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. Their candidates are more likely to be harangued and attacked by sectarian factions.

Nevertheless, their victory in Lebanon’s elections has powerful implications. It is one of the key achievements of the 2019 Thawra movement, a landmark episode that many had dismissed for not having achieved very much.

John Nagle, Professor in Sociology, Queen’s University Belfast and Tamirace Fakhoury, Associate Professor of Political Science, Aalborg University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

The meeting was in part a way for Bennett to escape US pressure on Israel to condemn Russia more forthrightly. Although the U.S. gives Israel billions every year, Tel Aviv either declines to or has been unable to offer the U.S. very much in return. It may offer some intelligence, but it was the Syrian Kurds and the Iraqi Shiites who helped the US defeat ISIL, for instance.

Only after vigorous US lobbying did Israel even decide to vote against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the UN General Assembly. The US also convinced Israel to lobby the United Arab Emirates, which has extensive business ties to Russia, to vote against Moscow, as well.

It is possible that the far-right Bennett also is wary of the precedent of boycotting aggressor states who invade and occupy their neighbors, since most of the world views Israel’s seizure and occupation of the Palestinian Territories in 1967 in the same light that they view Putin in Ukraine.

Anyway, a vote at the UN General Assembly is pretty toothless.

Now, Germany has accepted significant hardship by placing the Nordstream 2 gas pipeline in jeopardy, and other allies are taking an economic hit by stopping their trade with Russia. Israel isn’t willing to make those sorts of sacrifices.

It would not even be a big sacrifice. Israel does only a minor amount of business with Russia annually, importing $1.5 bn in goods and services annually and exporting $500,000 mn. In contrast, Israel’s exports globally in 2021 were $135 billion.

In some ways, Israel is over the barrel, since Russia is its de facto neighbor, given the heavy presence of the Russian military in next-door Syria. Israel also has a big population of Russian immigrants, some 900,000 recognized Russian Jews and another 300,000 or 400,000 Russians who are not recognized by the Chief Rabbi as Jews because they had a Russian Orthodox mother. It is not clear that all of these Russians have distanced themselves from Russian nationalism, and strongly condemning Russia or breaking with it diplomatically and economically could become a domestic political issue.

Last week Israel had expressed concern about continued security coordination in Syria, but received reassurances from Moscow on that score. The Russian ambassador said that the coordination had proved its effectiveness and would continue.

Russia intervened in Syria in 2016 to prop up the Baath regime of President Bashar al-Assad, using massive aerial bombardment of civilian cities. Iran had already intervened, inviting into the country Shiite paramilitary auxiliaries in the form of the Lebanese party-militia Hezbollah and Iraqi militias to reinforce the ground troops of the Syrian Arab Army that had been depleted by desertions. Russia entered into an alliance of convenience with Iran and its allies. Israel was of two minds about Russia propping up al-Assad, but most of its security analysts preferred the Baath dictator to the Muslim extremists who were prominent among the rebels. But, Hizbollah getting battle experience and having the run of the entirety of the Israeli border, being stationed in both southern Lebanon and in Syria was unacceptable to Israel. Moreover, the Israelis did not want Iran using Damascus airport to bring in rockets for Hezbollah to take by truck overland to Lebanon.

The Israelis lashed out at Hezbollah weapons convoys in Syria, which annoyed Russia since Hezbollah was helping defeat the rebels and achieve the goal of keeping al-Assad in power. President Vladimir Putin, however, got really furious when Israeli strikes on Hezbollah came close to injuring Russian technicians and support troops at Syrian Arab Army bases. Putin told the Israelis there would be hell to pay if they killed Russian troops. On the other hand, Putin was annoyed with Hezbollah for using the Syrian intervention to plot out potential attacks on Israel and for moving Iranian weaponry to Lebanon.

So the two sides appear to have worked out an understanding. Russia did not mind if the Israels hit Hezbollah while it was engaged in arms smuggling or other extracurricular activities but should not interfere with Hezbollah’s fight against Sunni rebels or endanger Russian personnel. Israel would avoid any air strikes anywhere near Russian army troops.

So Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett was afraid that if Israel boycotts Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, Russia might cease trying to restrain Hezbollah and might unleash the Lebanese Shiites on Israel.

The Russian embassy in Tel Aviv told the Bennett government that it had an opportunity for a “smart and diplomatic approach” on the Ukraine issue. The ambassador said he had provided Israel proof that Ukraine had committed war crimes, justifying the Russian invasion, saying Moscow’s goal was to protect the [ethnic Russian] population of Donbass and to uproot Nazism [this is ridiculous – JC]. That is, the Israelis should sit down and shut up.

In essence, Putin is blackmailing Tel Aviv with his position in Syria and his ability to rein in or unloose Hezbollah. Israel has acquiesced in the blackmail.