You are spot-on Gary. The working assumption should be that Turkey made its decision alone without informing the U.S. or NATO. The U.S. and NATO have nothing to gain by shooting down a Russian plane and further muddying the waters.
"(A) overthrowing, via CIA officers Stephen Meads (sic) and Miles Copeland, popularly-elected Shukri al-Quatli. a Sunni Muslim, as president of Syria in 1949. after the Syrian government refused to allow an oil pipeline to run through the country – a military junta was formed and a series of unelected authoritarian regimes ruled Syria to the present"
Your comment, cited above, sounds as if your sources were Miles Copland's books, "The Game of Nations," and "The Game Player," both of which read like they are Copland's valentines to himself. It was well-known in intelligence and foreign policy circles that much of Copland's purported exploits were hyperbole.
The 1949 Syrian coup is a good example. While Stephen Meade was the U.S. military attache in Damascus, and Copland claims that he (Copland) and Meade arranged the coup, subsequent evidence pretty firmly established that a coup was already in the works, planned by the Syrian Army Chief of Staff, Col. Husni al-Za'im. The British military attache at the time said that al-Za'im had been toying with the idea of a coup since March 1947.
While Meade undoubtedly enjoyed access to al-Za'im, and Meade and Copland were kept abreast of plans for the coup, the evidence suggests that al-Za'im planned and executed the coup on his own initiative.
Glad you mentioned Malaya, SUPER390. I happen to have spent many years in Malaysia and know the history well. The British granted Malaya independence in 1957, and, of course, they left it with a well-trained army.
You may recall the "Malayan Emergency," which was a Communist attempt to take over the country. The British prevailed, using not only their own forces and assets, but a well-trained Malayan security apparatus as well. By 1957, upon independence, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) had largely been defeated, although the conflict continued until 1960. Since then, and today, Malaysia has been a prosperous Tiger in Asia. The British certainly do not have to be ashamed of the preparations they made for Malayan independence.
The analogy does not apply. The Roman's had their legions in place in occupied areas before withdrawing them and replacing them with "barbarians." The U.S. does not have "legions" in place and is not occupying Africa, so the African troops undergoing training are not "replacing" U.S. forces.
Either you're losing your edge, Mr. McPhee, or you forgot to consult your well-thumbed 3" x 5" cue cards for well-worn words and phrases to plug in. Although you did remember to use "Notagainistan," you forgot to mention "smedley Butler."
It would be wrong to think that every training exercise in which the U.S. is engaged, in Africa or anywhere else, is training for a "proxy war." Some are, of course, but not all. Even those that are training and working with foreign troops who will engage opposition forces are not necessarily doing America's bidding and serving as "proxies." Odd as it may seem, there are countries that welcome U.S. training and advice because they actually see a threat and want their troops trained to meet that threat.
A good example of a program that trained peacekeeping troops in Africa was one run by the Department of State called the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. It provided training to peacekeeping troops from various countries who could be utilized as peacekeepers when the need arose. This was not some nefarious scheme to engage in "proxy wars." It was based on the rational idea that should intervention in another Rwanda slaughterhouse be necessary, it would be far better for local, African troops to intervene than Westerners.
I don't get the slant of Mr. Turse's piece, which seems to be that U.S. training, particularly in Africa, is, and has been, all about training for "proxy wars." In fact, an argument can be made that if U.S. troops intervened in some of these conflicts, they (U.S. troops) would be proxies for what should be African troops' involvement. Were that the case, I have no doubt that we would see pieces describing it as Western "Neocolonialism."
"In an extended interview with the Bureau, Ambassador Hasan argues that US drone strikes risk significantly weakening Pakistan’s democratic institutions"
"The heads of Pakistan’s army and ISI spy service are also lobbying Washington to allow Pakistani forces to carry out any actual strikes against terrorists based on US intelligence."
The above-cited two statements by Pakistan's Ambassadors to London and Washington, respectively, can only be viewed as lame rhetorical attempts to defend the indefensible. Pakistan has no "democratic institutions" worthy of the name. Elections as such in Pakistan do not constitute "democracy." The institutions that are embedded in true democracies: rule of law, civilian control of the military, courts that can be trusted, etc., simply do not exist and never have. Drone strikes may present the Pakistani government with difficulties, but a threat to a non-existent "democracy" they are not.
As for the Pakistani army and the ISI being permitted to "carry out actual strikes against terrorists based on U.S. intelligence," the idea is laughable. Does anyone truly think that Usama Bin Laden would have been taken out if the U.S. had given the intelligence regarding his location to the Pakistani army or the ISI for action? After spiriting Bin Laden and his entourage away, the after-action report would have reported the compound empty upon entry.
The cultural argument regarding development does not apply in the case of the Palestinians for two reasons: First, the Palestinians are probably the most entrepreneurial of all Arab societies, and second, the Israeli occupation restricts Palestinian economic activity so severely that that, in itself, would overwhelm any cultural reasons that might apply.
Nevertheless, generally speaking, there is a strong case to be made for the proposition that cultural attributes are a strong determinant of a society's level of development. This idea is not just a "Cold War relic." The political-economist David Landes, in his book "The Wealth and Poverty of Nations"; the development specialist Lawrence Harrison, in several books and monographs; and the political scientist Samuel Huntington, among others, have all made a strong case that to a significant degree, culture has a huge effect on a society's level of development. (Note: You don't have to agree with Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" thesis to see the merit in his cultural argument regarding development.)
There is a reason that development specialists and others note that in 1960 South Korea and Ghana were at an equal stage of (low) development, and 30 years later South Korea had become an Asian "Tiger," while Ghana languished. And it wasn't because of the U.S. military in South Korea. It had to do with what one might call a "Confucion" set of values regarding education, scholarship, putting off instant gratification today in order to have more tomorrow, etc. There are plenty of other examples one could point to regarding those who forged ahead (Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, etc.) and those who stagnated. Cultural attributes, while not the sole determinant, have a significant role to play.
"Anybody read or seen “Even Days In May,” recently?"
If you are referring to the film "Seven Days in May," I saw it when it premiered some 45 years ago, and I saw it on Turner Classic Movies again a couple of years ago. Good movie, but the premise did not then, and does not now, apply. I know that it delights those who love to deal in conspiracy theories of the "Oliver Stone" variety (The U.S. Government--or some element of it-- is aways up to some nefarious activity, even if it appears benign, and it is always engaging in some massive coverup). Shocking as it may seem, the U.S. does occasionally act above-board and in good faith to promote a decent outcome.
You are spot-on Gary. The working assumption should be that Turkey made its decision alone without informing the U.S. or NATO. The U.S. and NATO have nothing to gain by shooting down a Russian plane and further muddying the waters.
"(A) overthrowing, via CIA officers Stephen Meads (sic) and Miles Copeland, popularly-elected Shukri al-Quatli. a Sunni Muslim, as president of Syria in 1949. after the Syrian government refused to allow an oil pipeline to run through the country – a military junta was formed and a series of unelected authoritarian regimes ruled Syria to the present"
Your comment, cited above, sounds as if your sources were Miles Copland's books, "The Game of Nations," and "The Game Player," both of which read like they are Copland's valentines to himself. It was well-known in intelligence and foreign policy circles that much of Copland's purported exploits were hyperbole.
The 1949 Syrian coup is a good example. While Stephen Meade was the U.S. military attache in Damascus, and Copland claims that he (Copland) and Meade arranged the coup, subsequent evidence pretty firmly established that a coup was already in the works, planned by the Syrian Army Chief of Staff, Col. Husni al-Za'im. The British military attache at the time said that al-Za'im had been toying with the idea of a coup since March 1947.
While Meade undoubtedly enjoyed access to al-Za'im, and Meade and Copland were kept abreast of plans for the coup, the evidence suggests that al-Za'im planned and executed the coup on his own initiative.
Glad you mentioned Malaya, SUPER390. I happen to have spent many years in Malaysia and know the history well. The British granted Malaya independence in 1957, and, of course, they left it with a well-trained army.
You may recall the "Malayan Emergency," which was a Communist attempt to take over the country. The British prevailed, using not only their own forces and assets, but a well-trained Malayan security apparatus as well. By 1957, upon independence, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) had largely been defeated, although the conflict continued until 1960. Since then, and today, Malaysia has been a prosperous Tiger in Asia. The British certainly do not have to be ashamed of the preparations they made for Malayan independence.
The analogy does not apply. The Roman's had their legions in place in occupied areas before withdrawing them and replacing them with "barbarians." The U.S. does not have "legions" in place and is not occupying Africa, so the African troops undergoing training are not "replacing" U.S. forces.
Either you're losing your edge, Mr. McPhee, or you forgot to consult your well-thumbed 3" x 5" cue cards for well-worn words and phrases to plug in. Although you did remember to use "Notagainistan," you forgot to mention "smedley Butler."
It would be wrong to think that every training exercise in which the U.S. is engaged, in Africa or anywhere else, is training for a "proxy war." Some are, of course, but not all. Even those that are training and working with foreign troops who will engage opposition forces are not necessarily doing America's bidding and serving as "proxies." Odd as it may seem, there are countries that welcome U.S. training and advice because they actually see a threat and want their troops trained to meet that threat.
A good example of a program that trained peacekeeping troops in Africa was one run by the Department of State called the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. It provided training to peacekeeping troops from various countries who could be utilized as peacekeepers when the need arose. This was not some nefarious scheme to engage in "proxy wars." It was based on the rational idea that should intervention in another Rwanda slaughterhouse be necessary, it would be far better for local, African troops to intervene than Westerners.
I don't get the slant of Mr. Turse's piece, which seems to be that U.S. training, particularly in Africa, is, and has been, all about training for "proxy wars." In fact, an argument can be made that if U.S. troops intervened in some of these conflicts, they (U.S. troops) would be proxies for what should be African troops' involvement. Were that the case, I have no doubt that we would see pieces describing it as Western "Neocolonialism."
"In an extended interview with the Bureau, Ambassador Hasan argues that US drone strikes risk significantly weakening Pakistan’s democratic institutions"
"The heads of Pakistan’s army and ISI spy service are also lobbying Washington to allow Pakistani forces to carry out any actual strikes against terrorists based on US intelligence."
The above-cited two statements by Pakistan's Ambassadors to London and Washington, respectively, can only be viewed as lame rhetorical attempts to defend the indefensible. Pakistan has no "democratic institutions" worthy of the name. Elections as such in Pakistan do not constitute "democracy." The institutions that are embedded in true democracies: rule of law, civilian control of the military, courts that can be trusted, etc., simply do not exist and never have. Drone strikes may present the Pakistani government with difficulties, but a threat to a non-existent "democracy" they are not.
As for the Pakistani army and the ISI being permitted to "carry out actual strikes against terrorists based on U.S. intelligence," the idea is laughable. Does anyone truly think that Usama Bin Laden would have been taken out if the U.S. had given the intelligence regarding his location to the Pakistani army or the ISI for action? After spiriting Bin Laden and his entourage away, the after-action report would have reported the compound empty upon entry.
Does Chris Woods take this stuff seriously?
The cultural argument regarding development does not apply in the case of the Palestinians for two reasons: First, the Palestinians are probably the most entrepreneurial of all Arab societies, and second, the Israeli occupation restricts Palestinian economic activity so severely that that, in itself, would overwhelm any cultural reasons that might apply.
Nevertheless, generally speaking, there is a strong case to be made for the proposition that cultural attributes are a strong determinant of a society's level of development. This idea is not just a "Cold War relic." The political-economist David Landes, in his book "The Wealth and Poverty of Nations"; the development specialist Lawrence Harrison, in several books and monographs; and the political scientist Samuel Huntington, among others, have all made a strong case that to a significant degree, culture has a huge effect on a society's level of development. (Note: You don't have to agree with Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" thesis to see the merit in his cultural argument regarding development.)
There is a reason that development specialists and others note that in 1960 South Korea and Ghana were at an equal stage of (low) development, and 30 years later South Korea had become an Asian "Tiger," while Ghana languished. And it wasn't because of the U.S. military in South Korea. It had to do with what one might call a "Confucion" set of values regarding education, scholarship, putting off instant gratification today in order to have more tomorrow, etc. There are plenty of other examples one could point to regarding those who forged ahead (Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, etc.) and those who stagnated. Cultural attributes, while not the sole determinant, have a significant role to play.
"Anybody read or seen “Even Days In May,” recently?"
If you are referring to the film "Seven Days in May," I saw it when it premiered some 45 years ago, and I saw it on Turner Classic Movies again a couple of years ago. Good movie, but the premise did not then, and does not now, apply. I know that it delights those who love to deal in conspiracy theories of the "Oliver Stone" variety (The U.S. Government--or some element of it-- is aways up to some nefarious activity, even if it appears benign, and it is always engaging in some massive coverup). Shocking as it may seem, the U.S. does occasionally act above-board and in good faith to promote a decent outcome.
Since when do educated people speak "Valley Girl."?