Mr D, I agree that there is now rough parity (maybe a slight advantage for anti-Gadaffi) since NATO's intervention. I referred to stalemate because I was thinking the no-fly zone came when the Libyan pilots and other military officials were defecting, which suggested a wobbling regime. I've rechecked the sequence of events and discovered I mis-remembered - the Gadaffi counter-offensive was in full swing by that time. Apologies. I haven't found time to write a blog post about all this yet, but I stand corrected on the order of events.
On the other hand, revolutions and civil wars are by their nature unpredictable, and this may be why they were concerned about longer-term stability.
By the way, I said oil price was *a* strategic issue in Libya, not 'the primary concern' (in contrast to Iraq). As we've seen this week, refugees were a strategic issue too for the European governments (in a rather disgusting way - freedom's ok, but don't come here when you get attacked).
Support for my view that oil price was a strategic issue came a couple of weeks back from UK Foreign Secretary William Hague, who said in an interview with the Sunday Times that:
Libya is a pivotal state for Britain and Europe. Further unrest in north Africa would create a wave of unwanted immigration, new breeding grounds for terrorists and, most importantly, have "terrible economic consequences [for] the price of oil", he says. "We can't stand aside". Other trouble spots are therefore not so much of a concern: the Ivory Coast, for example.
(http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/Middle_East/libya/article598761.ece, paywall unfortunately but contact me via http://www.fuelonthefire.com for more details)
Joe, you make a good point about political reductionism, which is a trap we should be careful to avoid. Governments are not monolithic, nor omnipotent.
I don't think oil was the ONLY reason for the war in Iraq either - but it was the most important one. When Western powers look at the Middle East, they can't help but to see through a lens of oil, despite their claims (which they most likely actually believe) to the contrary. Why else are they so sensitised to humanitarian issues or security threats there, compared to those in the rest of the world?
One of the arguments I make in Fuel on the Fire is that the oil agenda was never as simple as to physically 'take the oil' (a la Donald Trump). And while governments were concerned to ensure their own companies got a share of the spoils (as in the prewar documents above), that was a secondary (and complementary) aim. The primary strategic issue was to expand global oil production through foreign investment, so as to keep the long-term oil price down. So far of course they haven't done very well at that, but they are hopeful that the current contracts in Iraq will deliver.
The rationale of military intervention in Libya is more complex than in Iraq. Certainly embarrassment at being on the wrong side in Tunisia (Sarkozy) and Egypt (Obama) was a factor. But there was also an oil issue, which was that many of the oilfields lie around the centre/north of the country. So, one argument goes, a strategic issue was that if the pro- and anti-Gaddafi forces were evenly matched, the front line of the war might continually pass across those fields, disrupting their production and pushing the price up. Hence intervening on one side.
This is a more short-term oil price concern than was at play in Iraq, which was over long-term production capacity. Indeed, things happened very quickly in Libya, compared to the Iraq war, which its advocates had called for for years.
In short, I think the one view that's more far-fetched than "it's ALL about oil" is that it has "literally NOTHING to do with oil" (Rumsfeld).
Juan, apologies for rather hijacking this comments board.
Hi, Daniel, sorry I'm getting a bit ahead of myself here. I've given that doc to another journalist as an exclusive, but it'll be out in the next few days. Contact me through http://www.fuelonthefire.com and I'll get back to you as soon as it's out.
But just to clarify: the point was that if Iraqi wells, flow stations, pipelines etc were in terrible condition, the Iraqis might need foreign companies to come in and rebuild them.
They secured the fields (which would suffer irreparable geological damage if set alight) but allowed the Iraqi infrastructure to be comprehensively looted.
So protect the oil (US wants it) but get rid of the Iraqi facilities (US wants them out of the way). One of the other docs I reveal shows Pentagon planners concerned that to repair the infrastructure would weaken the arguments for foreign investment!
As for Blair, we had a TV comedy drama over here just before he left office, called the Trial of Tony Blair. It was very funny and well-made, but also hugely enjoyable because the prospect of him being locked up for war crimes was immensely satisfying, even a relief. Sadly there's no prospect of it in reality.
Chinese and Russian (Lukoil not Gazprom) companies had signed with Saddam; Total had agreed terms but not signed. No doubt those contracts were a strategic factor (though not the only one) in those 3 countries' decision not to support the US/UK war.
Interestingly, Shell also negotiated with Saddam - a fact it doesn't draw much attention to these days! At the time in the 1990s, Shell referred to the country as "East Jordan", which also probably wouldn't go down very well in Iraq...
I agree - that was precisely the companies' fear, that US companies would automatically get a piece, and that Russian, French and Chinese would get theirs as a bargaining chip. One part of the documents I found quite amusing was that at one stage the companies said for god's sake don't let it go to the French (ie Total) - anyone but the French... So the companies' euphemism was that they wanted a 'level playing field' - but only between US and UK companies. It was an echo of the US' Open Door Policy after the 1st World War - the door should be open, and the playing field level, only to companies of certain nationalities.
One minor correction, Juan. This may have been unclear in the Indy, but I got >1,000 docs on Iraqi oil issues from the whole period 2000-2010 (not just prewar), and I use them (and interviews etc) to tell the full story of what happened. I gave the Indy 5 of the docs for yesterday's piece, and another 4 for today's.
Anyway, great blog.
I'm going to start posting the documents on my website. tommorrow insh'allah. Finally, just to let you know that although Fuel on the Fire is out this week in Britain, Ireland and India, it won't be out in the USA for a few months.
Mr D, I agree that there is now rough parity (maybe a slight advantage for anti-Gadaffi) since NATO's intervention. I referred to stalemate because I was thinking the no-fly zone came when the Libyan pilots and other military officials were defecting, which suggested a wobbling regime. I've rechecked the sequence of events and discovered I mis-remembered - the Gadaffi counter-offensive was in full swing by that time. Apologies. I haven't found time to write a blog post about all this yet, but I stand corrected on the order of events.
On the other hand, revolutions and civil wars are by their nature unpredictable, and this may be why they were concerned about longer-term stability.
By the way, I said oil price was *a* strategic issue in Libya, not 'the primary concern' (in contrast to Iraq). As we've seen this week, refugees were a strategic issue too for the European governments (in a rather disgusting way - freedom's ok, but don't come here when you get attacked).
Support for my view that oil price was a strategic issue came a couple of weeks back from UK Foreign Secretary William Hague, who said in an interview with the Sunday Times that:
Libya is a pivotal state for Britain and Europe. Further unrest in north Africa would create a wave of unwanted immigration, new breeding grounds for terrorists and, most importantly, have "terrible economic consequences [for] the price of oil", he says. "We can't stand aside". Other trouble spots are therefore not so much of a concern: the Ivory Coast, for example.
(http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/Middle_East/libya/article598761.ece, paywall unfortunately but contact me via http://www.fuelonthefire.com for more details)
The original documents on which the two Independent stories were based (and Juan's post above) are now available online, at: http://www.fuelonthefire.com/index.php?page=documents
Please check them out!
Joe, you make a good point about political reductionism, which is a trap we should be careful to avoid. Governments are not monolithic, nor omnipotent.
I don't think oil was the ONLY reason for the war in Iraq either - but it was the most important one. When Western powers look at the Middle East, they can't help but to see through a lens of oil, despite their claims (which they most likely actually believe) to the contrary. Why else are they so sensitised to humanitarian issues or security threats there, compared to those in the rest of the world?
One of the arguments I make in Fuel on the Fire is that the oil agenda was never as simple as to physically 'take the oil' (a la Donald Trump). And while governments were concerned to ensure their own companies got a share of the spoils (as in the prewar documents above), that was a secondary (and complementary) aim. The primary strategic issue was to expand global oil production through foreign investment, so as to keep the long-term oil price down. So far of course they haven't done very well at that, but they are hopeful that the current contracts in Iraq will deliver.
The rationale of military intervention in Libya is more complex than in Iraq. Certainly embarrassment at being on the wrong side in Tunisia (Sarkozy) and Egypt (Obama) was a factor. But there was also an oil issue, which was that many of the oilfields lie around the centre/north of the country. So, one argument goes, a strategic issue was that if the pro- and anti-Gaddafi forces were evenly matched, the front line of the war might continually pass across those fields, disrupting their production and pushing the price up. Hence intervening on one side.
This is a more short-term oil price concern than was at play in Iraq, which was over long-term production capacity. Indeed, things happened very quickly in Libya, compared to the Iraq war, which its advocates had called for for years.
In short, I think the one view that's more far-fetched than "it's ALL about oil" is that it has "literally NOTHING to do with oil" (Rumsfeld).
Juan, apologies for rather hijacking this comments board.
Hi, Daniel, sorry I'm getting a bit ahead of myself here. I've given that doc to another journalist as an exclusive, but it'll be out in the next few days. Contact me through http://www.fuelonthefire.com and I'll get back to you as soon as it's out.
But just to clarify: the point was that if Iraqi wells, flow stations, pipelines etc were in terrible condition, the Iraqis might need foreign companies to come in and rebuild them.
They secured the fields (which would suffer irreparable geological damage if set alight) but allowed the Iraqi infrastructure to be comprehensively looted.
So protect the oil (US wants it) but get rid of the Iraqi facilities (US wants them out of the way). One of the other docs I reveal shows Pentagon planners concerned that to repair the infrastructure would weaken the arguments for foreign investment!
As for Blair, we had a TV comedy drama over here just before he left office, called the Trial of Tony Blair. It was very funny and well-made, but also hugely enjoyable because the prospect of him being locked up for war crimes was immensely satisfying, even a relief. Sadly there's no prospect of it in reality.
Chinese and Russian (Lukoil not Gazprom) companies had signed with Saddam; Total had agreed terms but not signed. No doubt those contracts were a strategic factor (though not the only one) in those 3 countries' decision not to support the US/UK war.
Interestingly, Shell also negotiated with Saddam - a fact it doesn't draw much attention to these days! At the time in the 1990s, Shell referred to the country as "East Jordan", which also probably wouldn't go down very well in Iraq...
I agree - that was precisely the companies' fear, that US companies would automatically get a piece, and that Russian, French and Chinese would get theirs as a bargaining chip. One part of the documents I found quite amusing was that at one stage the companies said for god's sake don't let it go to the French (ie Total) - anyone but the French... So the companies' euphemism was that they wanted a 'level playing field' - but only between US and UK companies. It was an echo of the US' Open Door Policy after the 1st World War - the door should be open, and the playing field level, only to companies of certain nationalities.
One minor correction, Juan. This may have been unclear in the Indy, but I got >1,000 docs on Iraqi oil issues from the whole period 2000-2010 (not just prewar), and I use them (and interviews etc) to tell the full story of what happened. I gave the Indy 5 of the docs for yesterday's piece, and another 4 for today's.
Anyway, great blog.
I'm going to start posting the documents on my website. tommorrow insh'allah. Finally, just to let you know that although Fuel on the Fire is out this week in Britain, Ireland and India, it won't be out in the USA for a few months.