I agree with you, "Justice is not a factor when the victor and the violator are one and the same." But disagree on the view that the Nuremberg Trials were merely "victor's justice." The court followed already existing rules of law making higher officials responsible, even corporation presidents, United States v Dotterweich, 320 US 277; 64 SCt 134; 88 LEd 48 (1943), and of course, the 1920's treaties banning wars of aggression.
Pursuant to the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Nuremberg era precedents, The Nurnberg Trial, 6 FRD 69 (1946), government officials including judges can be prosecuted for aiding and abetting such criminal acitivity. See, e.g., U. S. v Alstötter et al. ("The Justice Case") 3 T.W.C. 1; 6 L.R.T.W.C. 1; 14 Ann. Dig. 278 (1948) (these are cases holding judges liable).
See also Application of Yamashita, 327 US 1; 66 S Ct 340-379; 90 L Ed 499 (1946), and Application of Honmo, 327 US 759; 66 S Ct 515-517; 90 L Ed 992 (1946) (these are cases holding government officials liable for acts of subordinates, and imposing death penalty for those acts).
A similar culpability concept applies to private sector perpetrators, United States v Park, 421 US 658, 672; 95 S Ct 1903; 44 L Ed 2d 489 (1975) (holding private sector official, the company president, criminally liable for subordinates' illegal acts).
I agree with you, "Justice is not a factor when the victor and the violator are one and the same." But disagree on the view that the Nuremberg Trials were merely "victor's justice." The court followed already existing rules of law making higher officials responsible, even corporation presidents, United States v Dotterweich, 320 US 277; 64 SCt 134; 88 LEd 48 (1943), and of course, the 1920's treaties banning wars of aggression.
Pursuant to the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Nuremberg era precedents, The Nurnberg Trial, 6 FRD 69 (1946), government officials including judges can be prosecuted for aiding and abetting such criminal acitivity. See, e.g., U. S. v Alstötter et al. ("The Justice Case") 3 T.W.C. 1; 6 L.R.T.W.C. 1; 14 Ann. Dig. 278 (1948) (these are cases holding judges liable).
See also Application of Yamashita, 327 US 1; 66 S Ct 340-379; 90 L Ed 499 (1946), and Application of Honmo, 327 US 759; 66 S Ct 515-517; 90 L Ed 992 (1946) (these are cases holding government officials liable for acts of subordinates, and imposing death penalty for those acts).
A similar culpability concept applies to private sector perpetrators, United States v Park, 421 US 658, 672; 95 S Ct 1903; 44 L Ed 2d 489 (1975) (holding private sector official, the company president, criminally liable for subordinates' illegal acts).