The Russian government is being hypocritical an inconsistent in this case.
That Ukraine borders Russia (the so-called in "Russia's backyard" argument) is not sufficient grounds for a covert, and increasingly overt (at least until the ceasefire), invasion of the country. The occupation and annexation of Crimea is illegal as is Russia's military intervention in eastern Ukraine.
The claim that states can partition and occupy portions of a neighboring country because it is in its sphere of influence/"backyard" is an imperialist view. Russia was in no sense provoked to invade Ukraine. What happened is that Putin lost a political bet and tried to save face.
Civil war is still occurring in Sudan, even on this very day, over various political, social, and cultural issues, including language and identity issues.
South Kordofan, Darfur, and Blue Nile, three regions with non-Arab majorities, are riven with expanding conflicts involving rebels versus the state and its militia proxies. I would say that Sudan is not too far from becoming a failed state or is perhaps already one.
The EU is in talks with Serbia and Albania. Serbia is at or near the front of the line to join the EU next (Montenegro may be ahead). Talks with Macedonia towards membership seem to be affected by a dispute with Greece over the country's name.
"It seem absolutely clear that the three attempts Yanukovych has made to bring harsh pressure on the protesters occupying Kiev's Maidan square over the past three months, with the toughest being last night, were discussed and agreed in advance between Putin and Yanukovych," says Nikolai Petrov, a professor at Moscow's Higher School of Economics. "Unlike most Ukrainian players, whose interest is mainly in maintaining the status quo and muddling through without any radical breaks, Putin wants to win. He is absolutely interested in the scenario we see unfolding, with the opposition being crushed by force."
The pieces of evidence suggesting that Putin told Yanukovych to crackdown on the protests has been available on news sources and articles since shortly after these events occurred and can be found by diligent searches.
Yanukoyvch had to make the decisions for himself, but it is rather obvious what Putin pressed him to do.
Every time that Yanukovych met with Putin during the time of the protests in Kiev there quickly followed a significant escalation in the amount of force used by the Berkut and other police forces against the protesters. The bloodiest days of police attacks on the Maidan square occurred very shortly after Yanukovych met with Putin.
These police crackdowns ordered by Yanukovych were often followed with sudden motions towards (often limited) conciliation with the opposition (or parts of it). This zig-zag policy fits the model that Yanukoyvch faced heavy pressure from different circles as to how to handle the situation and did not stick to one course consistently. The details of the Yanukovych-Putin meetings were not made public, of course, but the correlation and timing of the crackdowns is strong.
Virtually all evidence suggests that Putin was attempting to guide Yanukovych on how to handle the surge of dissent and this guidance favored severe means to quell opposition. Putin invested a huge amount of political capital in Yanukoyvch's political survival with the 15 billion aid package.
The Ukrainian revolution was inevitable once Yanu began to deploy violence against protesters. The decision by Putin to order Yanu to attack protesters and disperse his opponents ensured that the situation in Ukraine was almost certain to escalate.
Attempted to shift the focus onto the United States will not change that. Putin erred badly and was scorched by the fires he helped to create. No reason to feel sorry for that cretin.
As for historical analogies. Be worried about scenarios somewhat akin to Hungary in 1956 and the Prague Spring and subsequent Soviet invasion. Putin may be entering his Brezhnev phase.
Putin, though the Russian government, is wrecking havoc in Ukraine (after having supported the use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria) in an effort to destroy the new authorities and disrupt the election. It is both cynical and vindictive. Putin could not accept a defeat of the magnitude he suffered by backing a loser in the form of Yanukovych.
Putin is directly and personally culpable in the problems of Ukraine in many ground. First, he ordered Yanukovych to attack and kill protestors and pushed for a violent crackdown against expression of political views by opponents of Yanukovych in Kiev. These actions actually worked against Yanukovych's political survival and thus Putin inadvertently help to destroy his own vassal.
Now, Putin is attempting to subvert the country to retaliate for his political humiliation. Putin wants to "show" that those he transgress his will pay for it dearly.
The military adventure in Crimea is meant to restore Putin's political image and cover up the damage done to his reputation.
One extremely alarming possibility is that Putin will not stop at Crimea and will begin to subvert and even occupy parts of Eastern Ukraine. Such potential deeds should not be obscured by propaganda against Ukraine or efforts to redirect attention onto the United States at the expense of what Putin is doing. Additionally, appeals to the specialness of Putin or his alleged "great" status are both false and irrelevant.
To oppose the world trends against authoritarianism will gradually yield setbacks as more and more autocrats and semi-autocrats face increasing levels of opposition. The rapid and sudden defeat in Ukraine will not be the last time that those who bet heavily on a dictator are burned.
Being governed like the EU countries would clearly be an improvement over the present situation or to be governed like Belarus now or Moldova of much of its post Soviet history. A Putinist Russia without oil or gas would be highly questionable also.
The myth that Ukraine is just about to make a choice on whether to join the Euro zone and thus supposedly faces immediate economic catastrophe because of that alleged decision seems to be peculiarly wide spread. By the time Ukraine joins the Euro zone (if this does happen) the crisis will have been over for years, if not decades. In the worst case scenario the Euro zone will have been disbanded and the question will be irrelevant. Poland, much wealthier than Moldova, Belarus, or Ukraine does not currently use the euro at it is a member of the EU.
It is obvious that Ukraine can do much, much better than it has since 1991. Avoiding Putin-like politicians and extreme corruption will help. Adopting reforms to strength democracy, the rule of law, and to reform the economy to become more like many EU states would be an improvement. Spain, Itay, and Greece are having problems right now, but even Greece, not representative of most EU states, has a much higher per capita GNP than Ukraine (which actually faces the prospect of bankruptcy under Yanukovyvch). Putin's aid package only provides immediate short term support for the economy and would discourage reforms and weaken democracy.
I do not think that there is any significant chance of Western ground forces being deployed into Libya. Even if the rebels prove unable to defeat the Gaddafi loyalists or in the even more extreme case if somehow the Gaddafi loyalists actually win the ground war it seems unlikely that Western troops would be deployed.
There is an impossible to precisely determine, but non-negligable chance that Western governments will send military trainers to assist the rebels and will begin to provide various types of military equipment.
Imperial presidencies exist in both Washington D.C. and in Moscow.
The Russian government is being hypocritical an inconsistent in this case.
That Ukraine borders Russia (the so-called in "Russia's backyard" argument) is not sufficient grounds for a covert, and increasingly overt (at least until the ceasefire), invasion of the country. The occupation and annexation of Crimea is illegal as is Russia's military intervention in eastern Ukraine.
The claim that states can partition and occupy portions of a neighboring country because it is in its sphere of influence/"backyard" is an imperialist view. Russia was in no sense provoked to invade Ukraine. What happened is that Putin lost a political bet and tried to save face.
The political, economic, and social hegemony of certain Arab tribes in Sudan is still an issue in the country even without the South.
Civil war is still occurring in Sudan, even on this very day, over various political, social, and cultural issues, including language and identity issues.
South Kordofan, Darfur, and Blue Nile, three regions with non-Arab majorities, are riven with expanding conflicts involving rebels versus the state and its militia proxies. I would say that Sudan is not too far from becoming a failed state or is perhaps already one.
The EU is in talks with Serbia and Albania. Serbia is at or near the front of the line to join the EU next (Montenegro may be ahead). Talks with Macedonia towards membership seem to be affected by a dispute with Greece over the country's name.
There are several sources about this, but here is an excerpt from one: Link- http://news.yahoo.com/putin-pushing-crackdown-ukraine-185100169.html?.tsrc=tmob
"It seem absolutely clear that the three attempts Yanukovych has made to bring harsh pressure on the protesters occupying Kiev's Maidan square over the past three months, with the toughest being last night, were discussed and agreed in advance between Putin and Yanukovych," says Nikolai Petrov, a professor at Moscow's Higher School of Economics. "Unlike most Ukrainian players, whose interest is mainly in maintaining the status quo and muddling through without any radical breaks, Putin wants to win. He is absolutely interested in the scenario we see unfolding, with the opposition being crushed by force."
The pieces of evidence suggesting that Putin told Yanukovych to crackdown on the protests has been available on news sources and articles since shortly after these events occurred and can be found by diligent searches.
Yanukoyvch had to make the decisions for himself, but it is rather obvious what Putin pressed him to do.
Every time that Yanukovych met with Putin during the time of the protests in Kiev there quickly followed a significant escalation in the amount of force used by the Berkut and other police forces against the protesters. The bloodiest days of police attacks on the Maidan square occurred very shortly after Yanukovych met with Putin.
These police crackdowns ordered by Yanukovych were often followed with sudden motions towards (often limited) conciliation with the opposition (or parts of it). This zig-zag policy fits the model that Yanukoyvch faced heavy pressure from different circles as to how to handle the situation and did not stick to one course consistently. The details of the Yanukovych-Putin meetings were not made public, of course, but the correlation and timing of the crackdowns is strong.
Virtually all evidence suggests that Putin was attempting to guide Yanukovych on how to handle the surge of dissent and this guidance favored severe means to quell opposition. Putin invested a huge amount of political capital in Yanukoyvch's political survival with the 15 billion aid package.
The Ukrainian revolution was inevitable once Yanu began to deploy violence against protesters. The decision by Putin to order Yanu to attack protesters and disperse his opponents ensured that the situation in Ukraine was almost certain to escalate.
Attempted to shift the focus onto the United States will not change that. Putin erred badly and was scorched by the fires he helped to create. No reason to feel sorry for that cretin.
As for historical analogies. Be worried about scenarios somewhat akin to Hungary in 1956 and the Prague Spring and subsequent Soviet invasion. Putin may be entering his Brezhnev phase.
Putin, though the Russian government, is wrecking havoc in Ukraine (after having supported the use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria) in an effort to destroy the new authorities and disrupt the election. It is both cynical and vindictive. Putin could not accept a defeat of the magnitude he suffered by backing a loser in the form of Yanukovych.
Putin is directly and personally culpable in the problems of Ukraine in many ground. First, he ordered Yanukovych to attack and kill protestors and pushed for a violent crackdown against expression of political views by opponents of Yanukovych in Kiev. These actions actually worked against Yanukovych's political survival and thus Putin inadvertently help to destroy his own vassal.
Now, Putin is attempting to subvert the country to retaliate for his political humiliation. Putin wants to "show" that those he transgress his will pay for it dearly.
The military adventure in Crimea is meant to restore Putin's political image and cover up the damage done to his reputation.
One extremely alarming possibility is that Putin will not stop at Crimea and will begin to subvert and even occupy parts of Eastern Ukraine. Such potential deeds should not be obscured by propaganda against Ukraine or efforts to redirect attention onto the United States at the expense of what Putin is doing. Additionally, appeals to the specialness of Putin or his alleged "great" status are both false and irrelevant.
To oppose the world trends against authoritarianism will gradually yield setbacks as more and more autocrats and semi-autocrats face increasing levels of opposition. The rapid and sudden defeat in Ukraine will not be the last time that those who bet heavily on a dictator are burned.
Being governed like the EU countries would clearly be an improvement over the present situation or to be governed like Belarus now or Moldova of much of its post Soviet history. A Putinist Russia without oil or gas would be highly questionable also.
The myth that Ukraine is just about to make a choice on whether to join the Euro zone and thus supposedly faces immediate economic catastrophe because of that alleged decision seems to be peculiarly wide spread. By the time Ukraine joins the Euro zone (if this does happen) the crisis will have been over for years, if not decades. In the worst case scenario the Euro zone will have been disbanded and the question will be irrelevant. Poland, much wealthier than Moldova, Belarus, or Ukraine does not currently use the euro at it is a member of the EU.
It is obvious that Ukraine can do much, much better than it has since 1991. Avoiding Putin-like politicians and extreme corruption will help. Adopting reforms to strength democracy, the rule of law, and to reform the economy to become more like many EU states would be an improvement. Spain, Itay, and Greece are having problems right now, but even Greece, not representative of most EU states, has a much higher per capita GNP than Ukraine (which actually faces the prospect of bankruptcy under Yanukovyvch). Putin's aid package only provides immediate short term support for the economy and would discourage reforms and weaken democracy.
I do not think that there is any significant chance of Western ground forces being deployed into Libya. Even if the rebels prove unable to defeat the Gaddafi loyalists or in the even more extreme case if somehow the Gaddafi loyalists actually win the ground war it seems unlikely that Western troops would be deployed.
There is an impossible to precisely determine, but non-negligable chance that Western governments will send military trainers to assist the rebels and will begin to provide various types of military equipment.