Yes, I absolutely agree. In the case of Egypt, the alliance is crucial to US dominance in the region, and the aid is what secures the alliance. If the US cut the aid they may as well gift-wrap Egypt and sent it to Xi Jingping for Christmas.
I assume the bully-boy posturing is mainly for domestic consumption. But I can't believe that the US will really upset one of their most important alliances over a trivial issue: this vote has few consequences beyond the symbolic. So isn't Trump just going to look foolish in front of his supporters when he backs down? I'm trying to find an intelligible reason for this action but I can't. In the ongoing debate about whether Trump an evil genius who acts the clown to distract attention while he asset-strips the US, or whether he is really is a clown who's in way over his head, this incident suggests the latter.
This seems hopeful, but... I thought the issue with next year's midterms was that there are far more Democrats in swing seats up for re-election, whereas the Republicans up for re-election are mostly in safe seats. So it's difficult to compare this midterm with previous ones, and the Republicans have a built-in advantage even without further voter suppression. Please correct me if I'm wrong!
I also wonder how much Trump voters even know about this stuff, because in the parallel universe that is Fox News, it doesn't get discussed. As long as the economy keeps performing reasonably well, there's plenty of material for Fox's propagandists to work with.
On the other hand, I guess, Republican congresspeople still care about the "fake news media," no matter what Trump says about it, so possibly the continuing scandals could motivate them to attempt some kind of internal coup.
This is a good and detailed account of the case against intervention. I think some of your points are really important and not well understood. But I'm troubled by some of the others, where I think you go a bit far and make some unconvincing analogies. I'm not sure this undermines your case - I just don't know what I think about intervention.
Your most important point, in my opinion, is that the casualty rates in Iraq were fairly similar to Syria, and that the Iraq example in general does not suggest that US intervention would improve matters.. This links to a wider point that needs emphasis. There is an argument going round about Syria along the lines of, "well this is what happens when the US doesn't intervene." It rests on the fundamentally false premise that outside intervention has not played a significant role in the Syrian conflict. For one thing, despite the lack of direct US intervention prior to the anti-ISIS strikes, the US has been thoroughly involved (and other western powers) from the beginning, helping to channel financial and military aid to the rebels. No matter the justice of the rebels' cause (and I think it's very just), funneling weapons into a war zone exacerbated the conflict. More importantly, while US intervention in Syria may be relatively minor compared to other recent interventions, foreign intervention in general has been huge and it's precisely the internationalization of the conflict that has caused such carnage. This includes foreign intervention on behalf of the rebels (Turkey, KSA, Qatar) which put far more weapons into the country than the US did, and foreign intervention on behalf of the regime (Iran, Russia), without which it probably would have collapsed some time ago. So the "well this is what happens when the US doesn't intervene" argument rests on the assumption that US intervention is qualitatively different from the intervention of other powers, and as your point (7) and Iraq shows, this isn't the case.
Your analogy with Libya in point 5 does not persuade me. Of course, the intervention there has not gone well. And I agree that the intervention did not abide by the UNSC resolution, with troubling consequences for international law. But however bad Libya is, it's nowhere near as bad as Syria. Syria is already a failed state split between warring militias. So the argument that we shouldn't intervene in Syria because it might end up like Libya doesn't work.
I'm also troubled by the implications of your point 6, which leans too close to the "there are no good guys" idea. It seems to assume that there is no appetite among Syrians to oppose the jihadists, which is demonstrably wrong. Syrian rebels have successfully opposed Daesh and Jabhat al-Nusra on several occasions, and they have been best able to when the pressure from Assad's bombing has lessened. The reason that mainstream rebels are now collaborating with Jabhat al-Nusra in Aleppo is that Assad and Russia have forced them into that position: hundreds of thousands of civilians' lives were at stake in the Aleppo siege, the families of the rebels. It's actually remarkable how much the Syrian opposition has resisted the jihadist presence given their circumstances. Just a couple of months ago, there were protests in Idlib province against Jabhat al-Nusra: unarmed civilians chasing jihadist fighters off the streets.
I think the hierarchy of evil suggested by this argument is also troubling. The jihadists are awful people, for sure. But they have not killed and tortured on anything like the scale of the Assad regime. Maybe they would have done if they'd had access to an air force - but they haven't. To say that we shouldn't stop an actual genocide because it might lead to a hypothetical one is morally problematic. From a western perspective, it seems like sacrificing Syrians for western interests (because a jihadi government is more threatening to us than Assad is).
On your point 1, you are absolutely right about the impact on international law of previous US unilateralism. But I think the problem is far more difficult than you're admitting. Not only Iraq, but also the recent Libya intervention is cited by other powers that violate international law. With Russia, we can also include the intervention against Serbia in the list of US actions that have led to Russia's current aggressive foreign policy. Perhaps Russia would not be so heavily involved in Syria were it not for the US record over the past couple of decades: Russia's argument is that international law tries to stop Russia defending its interests but gets ignored whenever the US wants to trample on Russia's interests.
So the ideal that the world would be better if everybody obeyed international law, and that as the greatest power the US has a really important role to play in setting the example, is a compelling one. But, the fact remains that right now Russia (and Iran) are in flagrant violation of international law in Syria, conducting a military campaign that expressly aims at killing civilians by aerial bombardment, by starvation, and by the denial of medical care, in order to render opposition-held areas unsustainable due to lack of population. These are war crimes on a spectacular scale and allowing them to pass does nothing to promote international law. And they have the same effect on powers antagonistic to Russia (KSA, Turkey, etc.) that US unilateralism has on Russia and other anti-US rulers - although it's the biggest, the US is not the only aggressive great power! In sum, I think this problem is far more difficult - morally and politically - than you allow.
The last point I'd like to make is that your objections to safe zones and a no-fly zone rest on the assumption that they would be vigorously resisted by the Syrian regime. This doesn't seem clear. Foreign intervention on the rebels' side has been a disaster for Assad: without it he would have won. If there had been a limited intervention by the US, he would not have wanted to escalate it. In fact, his approach seems to have been to test the waters gradually with actions that might antagonize the US, to see what he could get away with. This doesn't necessarily mean a no-fly zone or safe zone would have worked: for one thing, it's not clear how much control the regime has over its armed forces, and rash acts by individual commanders might not follow strategic logic. Now, of course, the intervention of Russia massively complicates things and may make a full no-fly zone impossible. But I don't think your argument can rely on the assumption that, 3 years ago, there would have been a forceful response from Assad: it doesn't seem likely. And your objection that a safe zone could be a target for jihadist car-bombings, etc., again fails to recognize the severity of the Assad-Russia bombing campaign. A zone that was occasionally hit by a car-bomb would be far, far preferable to a town under daily indiscriminate aerial bombardment, or under siege, or both.
Your concluding paragraph is right - the most effective measure in reducing violence so far has been the Kerry-Lavrov ceasefire. A diplomatic solution would be the best thing and there should be nothing that's off the table and so standing in the way of a resolution (although I'm skeptical about whether it's possible to negotiate a solution that leaves Assad in power and the Syrian regime unreconstructed - would you lay down your arms if you thought that meant disappearing into a torture dungeon forever?) But diplomacy isn't working right now, and that's not entirely the US's fault. The main reason seems to be that Russia has decided it must push for as great a military advantage as possible regardless of consequences. After that initial ceasefire, all subsequent ceasefires announced by Russia have been entirely fictional: they say there's a ceasefire for international consumption, and then carry on bombing. So those of us who would prefer to see the US intervene diplomatically rather than militarily (me as well as you!) need to have some suggestions about how to change Russia's course.
Yes, I absolutely agree. In the case of Egypt, the alliance is crucial to US dominance in the region, and the aid is what secures the alliance. If the US cut the aid they may as well gift-wrap Egypt and sent it to Xi Jingping for Christmas.
I assume the bully-boy posturing is mainly for domestic consumption. But I can't believe that the US will really upset one of their most important alliances over a trivial issue: this vote has few consequences beyond the symbolic. So isn't Trump just going to look foolish in front of his supporters when he backs down? I'm trying to find an intelligible reason for this action but I can't. In the ongoing debate about whether Trump an evil genius who acts the clown to distract attention while he asset-strips the US, or whether he is really is a clown who's in way over his head, this incident suggests the latter.
This seems hopeful, but... I thought the issue with next year's midterms was that there are far more Democrats in swing seats up for re-election, whereas the Republicans up for re-election are mostly in safe seats. So it's difficult to compare this midterm with previous ones, and the Republicans have a built-in advantage even without further voter suppression. Please correct me if I'm wrong!
I also wonder how much Trump voters even know about this stuff, because in the parallel universe that is Fox News, it doesn't get discussed. As long as the economy keeps performing reasonably well, there's plenty of material for Fox's propagandists to work with.
On the other hand, I guess, Republican congresspeople still care about the "fake news media," no matter what Trump says about it, so possibly the continuing scandals could motivate them to attempt some kind of internal coup.
This is a good and detailed account of the case against intervention. I think some of your points are really important and not well understood. But I'm troubled by some of the others, where I think you go a bit far and make some unconvincing analogies. I'm not sure this undermines your case - I just don't know what I think about intervention.
Your most important point, in my opinion, is that the casualty rates in Iraq were fairly similar to Syria, and that the Iraq example in general does not suggest that US intervention would improve matters.. This links to a wider point that needs emphasis. There is an argument going round about Syria along the lines of, "well this is what happens when the US doesn't intervene." It rests on the fundamentally false premise that outside intervention has not played a significant role in the Syrian conflict. For one thing, despite the lack of direct US intervention prior to the anti-ISIS strikes, the US has been thoroughly involved (and other western powers) from the beginning, helping to channel financial and military aid to the rebels. No matter the justice of the rebels' cause (and I think it's very just), funneling weapons into a war zone exacerbated the conflict. More importantly, while US intervention in Syria may be relatively minor compared to other recent interventions, foreign intervention in general has been huge and it's precisely the internationalization of the conflict that has caused such carnage. This includes foreign intervention on behalf of the rebels (Turkey, KSA, Qatar) which put far more weapons into the country than the US did, and foreign intervention on behalf of the regime (Iran, Russia), without which it probably would have collapsed some time ago. So the "well this is what happens when the US doesn't intervene" argument rests on the assumption that US intervention is qualitatively different from the intervention of other powers, and as your point (7) and Iraq shows, this isn't the case.
Your analogy with Libya in point 5 does not persuade me. Of course, the intervention there has not gone well. And I agree that the intervention did not abide by the UNSC resolution, with troubling consequences for international law. But however bad Libya is, it's nowhere near as bad as Syria. Syria is already a failed state split between warring militias. So the argument that we shouldn't intervene in Syria because it might end up like Libya doesn't work.
I'm also troubled by the implications of your point 6, which leans too close to the "there are no good guys" idea. It seems to assume that there is no appetite among Syrians to oppose the jihadists, which is demonstrably wrong. Syrian rebels have successfully opposed Daesh and Jabhat al-Nusra on several occasions, and they have been best able to when the pressure from Assad's bombing has lessened. The reason that mainstream rebels are now collaborating with Jabhat al-Nusra in Aleppo is that Assad and Russia have forced them into that position: hundreds of thousands of civilians' lives were at stake in the Aleppo siege, the families of the rebels. It's actually remarkable how much the Syrian opposition has resisted the jihadist presence given their circumstances. Just a couple of months ago, there were protests in Idlib province against Jabhat al-Nusra: unarmed civilians chasing jihadist fighters off the streets.
I think the hierarchy of evil suggested by this argument is also troubling. The jihadists are awful people, for sure. But they have not killed and tortured on anything like the scale of the Assad regime. Maybe they would have done if they'd had access to an air force - but they haven't. To say that we shouldn't stop an actual genocide because it might lead to a hypothetical one is morally problematic. From a western perspective, it seems like sacrificing Syrians for western interests (because a jihadi government is more threatening to us than Assad is).
On your point 1, you are absolutely right about the impact on international law of previous US unilateralism. But I think the problem is far more difficult than you're admitting. Not only Iraq, but also the recent Libya intervention is cited by other powers that violate international law. With Russia, we can also include the intervention against Serbia in the list of US actions that have led to Russia's current aggressive foreign policy. Perhaps Russia would not be so heavily involved in Syria were it not for the US record over the past couple of decades: Russia's argument is that international law tries to stop Russia defending its interests but gets ignored whenever the US wants to trample on Russia's interests.
So the ideal that the world would be better if everybody obeyed international law, and that as the greatest power the US has a really important role to play in setting the example, is a compelling one. But, the fact remains that right now Russia (and Iran) are in flagrant violation of international law in Syria, conducting a military campaign that expressly aims at killing civilians by aerial bombardment, by starvation, and by the denial of medical care, in order to render opposition-held areas unsustainable due to lack of population. These are war crimes on a spectacular scale and allowing them to pass does nothing to promote international law. And they have the same effect on powers antagonistic to Russia (KSA, Turkey, etc.) that US unilateralism has on Russia and other anti-US rulers - although it's the biggest, the US is not the only aggressive great power! In sum, I think this problem is far more difficult - morally and politically - than you allow.
The last point I'd like to make is that your objections to safe zones and a no-fly zone rest on the assumption that they would be vigorously resisted by the Syrian regime. This doesn't seem clear. Foreign intervention on the rebels' side has been a disaster for Assad: without it he would have won. If there had been a limited intervention by the US, he would not have wanted to escalate it. In fact, his approach seems to have been to test the waters gradually with actions that might antagonize the US, to see what he could get away with. This doesn't necessarily mean a no-fly zone or safe zone would have worked: for one thing, it's not clear how much control the regime has over its armed forces, and rash acts by individual commanders might not follow strategic logic. Now, of course, the intervention of Russia massively complicates things and may make a full no-fly zone impossible. But I don't think your argument can rely on the assumption that, 3 years ago, there would have been a forceful response from Assad: it doesn't seem likely. And your objection that a safe zone could be a target for jihadist car-bombings, etc., again fails to recognize the severity of the Assad-Russia bombing campaign. A zone that was occasionally hit by a car-bomb would be far, far preferable to a town under daily indiscriminate aerial bombardment, or under siege, or both.
Your concluding paragraph is right - the most effective measure in reducing violence so far has been the Kerry-Lavrov ceasefire. A diplomatic solution would be the best thing and there should be nothing that's off the table and so standing in the way of a resolution (although I'm skeptical about whether it's possible to negotiate a solution that leaves Assad in power and the Syrian regime unreconstructed - would you lay down your arms if you thought that meant disappearing into a torture dungeon forever?) But diplomacy isn't working right now, and that's not entirely the US's fault. The main reason seems to be that Russia has decided it must push for as great a military advantage as possible regardless of consequences. After that initial ceasefire, all subsequent ceasefires announced by Russia have been entirely fictional: they say there's a ceasefire for international consumption, and then carry on bombing. So those of us who would prefer to see the US intervene diplomatically rather than militarily (me as well as you!) need to have some suggestions about how to change Russia's course.