That was what is known in military parlance as a "pre-emptive strike." Nasser had already made his intentions clear that he intended to initiate a "War of Annihilation to Drive the Jews into the Sea." He had already closed the Straits of Tiran, closing off access to Israel's southern port of Eilat. Blockading another nation's ports is internationally recognized as an act of war. Nasser also ordered the removal of U.N. peacekeepers from the Israeli-Egyptian border. In such situations, one who faces imminent attack need not await the enemy to strike first, but may launch a "pre-emptive strike" to prevent the enemy attack. Nasser was rather stupid to clearly make his intentions know, a mistake which Egypt did not repeat in 1973. The Israelis nearly lost the 1973 war due to complacency over their 1967 victory, a mistake they are certain not to repeat again with other enemies, now that they have peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan! If Syria ever stabilizes and negotiates a peace agreement with Israel, it will include return of the Golan Heights. It would be to Assad's advantage to make peace with Israel and stabilize his southern borders!
Under UNSCR 181, adopted November 29, 1947, the former British Mandate was to be divided between two states, one Arab and one Jewish. The portion of the former Mandate which was to become the Arab state was invaded by those 5 armies, as well as the part that was to become Israel. At that time, the Arab League had no intent to create the Palestinian state, but rather to divide all of the former British Mandate among themselves. The effect of the 1967 "Six Day War," was only to substitute Israeli occupation for that of Egypt and Jordan. If Egypt and Jordan were interested in Palestinian self-determination, they could have established the Palestinian state anytime between 1949 and 1967. Note that it was not until the 1993 Oslo Conference that the Arab league first recognized the right of Palestinians to a state of their own., which resulted in creation of the Palestinian National Authority. At that time, Israel also recognized a right to Palestinian statehood, which is the basis for current negotiations.
What was the Haganah doing in Israel in 1948-1949? They were exercising Israel's right under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter to "individual, or collective self-defense," in other words, "armed self-defense," which is the right of every U.N. member nation-state. When, and If, Palestinians obtain statehood, they will acquire that same right!
The occupation is the consequence of three failed "wars of aggression (1948-49, 1967 and 1973)," intended to eradicate Israel. At the post 1967 "Six Day War" Khartoum Conference, the Arabs adopted the infamous "Three No's (No negotiation, recognition, or peace with Israel)." Thus, they preferred to leave captured lands in Israeli hands, rather than trade peace for their return. Since then, in 2000 and again, in 2008, Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas, respectively, walked away from offers to return most of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and all of Gaza, in return for peace. Taking an "all, or nothing" perspective has not served the Palestinians well. At some point, Israel will argue that the captured lands have been abandoned and are thus now available for settlement. Under International Law, the victorious belligerent in war may retain captured lands, until otherwise modified by treaty. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uti_possidetis
So far, it seems that Palestinians would rather forfeit the lands than accept a treaty providing for their return to Palestinian sovereignty. They need to reject the arrogant self-centered sense of entitlement to "all the land between the river (Jordan) and the sea (Mediterranean)" and adopt a working compromise in which both parties make considerable sacrifices in the interest of peace, but neither sacrifices everything!
The "taking out" of bin-Laden, whose role has diminished in significance with the spreading of the "Arab Spring," will have a minor effect on the continued "war on terrorism." Bin-Laden's role had shrunken to that of financier, while Ayman al-Zawahiri had taken on the strategic role of selecting targets and issuing videos and press releases. The war will continue, with Zawarhiri being substituted as the primary target, now that bin-Laden has been liquidated.
The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians has degenerated into a "one to the exclusion of the other" proposition with the fractious Hamas-Fatah agreement already starting to unravel. Every effort to create a "two-state" solution, from the 2000 Barak government proposal, to the 2008 Olmert proposal, both rejected by Palestinians, has been a missed opportunity. The framework of a final status agreement, which has been documented by al-Jazeera in "The Palestine Papers,"is known and shows that agreement is possible through the narrowing of differences. If that progress is abandoned, the militarily superior Israelis will crush Gaza in a repeat of "Operation Cast Lead" and continue the occupation of the West Bank. But Israel will not want to continue the occupation into perpetuity and will seek a "modus vivendi" when Palestinians are ready. Eventually, but not in the short run, democracy will prevail in the Palestinian territories and a unified democratic and secular Palestinian polity will make the necessary compromises to achieve statehood. It may take years to create a stable democratic Palestinian consensus, before the conflict is finally resolved, but it will happen.
Johnboy,
That was what is known in military parlance as a "pre-emptive strike." Nasser had already made his intentions clear that he intended to initiate a "War of Annihilation to Drive the Jews into the Sea." He had already closed the Straits of Tiran, closing off access to Israel's southern port of Eilat. Blockading another nation's ports is internationally recognized as an act of war. Nasser also ordered the removal of U.N. peacekeepers from the Israeli-Egyptian border. In such situations, one who faces imminent attack need not await the enemy to strike first, but may launch a "pre-emptive strike" to prevent the enemy attack. Nasser was rather stupid to clearly make his intentions know, a mistake which Egypt did not repeat in 1973. The Israelis nearly lost the 1973 war due to complacency over their 1967 victory, a mistake they are certain not to repeat again with other enemies, now that they have peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan! If Syria ever stabilizes and negotiates a peace agreement with Israel, it will include return of the Golan Heights. It would be to Assad's advantage to make peace with Israel and stabilize his southern borders!
Johnboy,
Under UNSCR 181, adopted November 29, 1947, the former British Mandate was to be divided between two states, one Arab and one Jewish. The portion of the former Mandate which was to become the Arab state was invaded by those 5 armies, as well as the part that was to become Israel. At that time, the Arab League had no intent to create the Palestinian state, but rather to divide all of the former British Mandate among themselves. The effect of the 1967 "Six Day War," was only to substitute Israeli occupation for that of Egypt and Jordan. If Egypt and Jordan were interested in Palestinian self-determination, they could have established the Palestinian state anytime between 1949 and 1967. Note that it was not until the 1993 Oslo Conference that the Arab league first recognized the right of Palestinians to a state of their own., which resulted in creation of the Palestinian National Authority. At that time, Israel also recognized a right to Palestinian statehood, which is the basis for current negotiations.
What was the Haganah doing in Israel in 1948-1949? They were exercising Israel's right under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter to "individual, or collective self-defense," in other words, "armed self-defense," which is the right of every U.N. member nation-state. When, and If, Palestinians obtain statehood, they will acquire that same right!
The occupation is the consequence of three failed "wars of aggression (1948-49, 1967 and 1973)," intended to eradicate Israel. At the post 1967 "Six Day War" Khartoum Conference, the Arabs adopted the infamous "Three No's (No negotiation, recognition, or peace with Israel)." Thus, they preferred to leave captured lands in Israeli hands, rather than trade peace for their return. Since then, in 2000 and again, in 2008, Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Abbas, respectively, walked away from offers to return most of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and all of Gaza, in return for peace. Taking an "all, or nothing" perspective has not served the Palestinians well. At some point, Israel will argue that the captured lands have been abandoned and are thus now available for settlement. Under International Law, the victorious belligerent in war may retain captured lands, until otherwise modified by treaty. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uti_possidetis
So far, it seems that Palestinians would rather forfeit the lands than accept a treaty providing for their return to Palestinian sovereignty. They need to reject the arrogant self-centered sense of entitlement to "all the land between the river (Jordan) and the sea (Mediterranean)" and adopt a working compromise in which both parties make considerable sacrifices in the interest of peace, but neither sacrifices everything!
The "taking out" of bin-Laden, whose role has diminished in significance with the spreading of the "Arab Spring," will have a minor effect on the continued "war on terrorism." Bin-Laden's role had shrunken to that of financier, while Ayman al-Zawahiri had taken on the strategic role of selecting targets and issuing videos and press releases. The war will continue, with Zawarhiri being substituted as the primary target, now that bin-Laden has been liquidated.
The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians has degenerated into a "one to the exclusion of the other" proposition with the fractious Hamas-Fatah agreement already starting to unravel. Every effort to create a "two-state" solution, from the 2000 Barak government proposal, to the 2008 Olmert proposal, both rejected by Palestinians, has been a missed opportunity. The framework of a final status agreement, which has been documented by al-Jazeera in "The Palestine Papers,"is known and shows that agreement is possible through the narrowing of differences. If that progress is abandoned, the militarily superior Israelis will crush Gaza in a repeat of "Operation Cast Lead" and continue the occupation of the West Bank. But Israel will not want to continue the occupation into perpetuity and will seek a "modus vivendi" when Palestinians are ready. Eventually, but not in the short run, democracy will prevail in the Palestinian territories and a unified democratic and secular Palestinian polity will make the necessary compromises to achieve statehood. It may take years to create a stable democratic Palestinian consensus, before the conflict is finally resolved, but it will happen.