But the 'alliance'/'non-aggression pact', or however it is described between the YPG and al Assad, how long can it last? Iran will not want to see any autonomy granted to the Kurds. Russia might think it has something to gain from it, if only to aggravate Turkey. Assad will not like it.
And what will happen in Aleppo if/ when Assad retakes it? There will likely be a reign of terror on what is left of the Sunni population there. How will the Kurds react to that?
There will undoubtedly be great ethnic bitterness but will the YPG watch over a massacre in their city? Will they not fear they could be next? Will Aleppo be divided?
But to release Nimr Al Nimr, or even to tolerate the Shia protests that will inevitably happen, will make them appear weak within the international Wahhabist movement. The Saudi strategy over the last 9 months or so has been to regain their position at the head of that movement after losing it first to Al Qaida and then ISIS/ Daesh.
I can't see them moderating their position without a serious division
From one point of view the fact that those 2 groups are incompatible is a relief. If they had been capable of coalescing it would have been a frightening coalition. But the rejection by the Brotherhood of a degree of power-sharing proposed by the military shows that the Brotherhood's confidence was underestimated.
Whilst they have alienated many/ most Egyptians they have clearly been strengthened in other parts of Egyptian society during the period of Morsi's presidency. They have what was clearly a coup, although you may be right that that was a counter-coup, and now a mass martyrdom to campaign around.
El Baradei has been humiliated - the democratic revolutionaries and workers movement are hard to see and will find it hard to organise as the military and Ikhwan move into a period of brutal conflict. It is hard to believe Sisi wouldn't have shared with the US government his intended actions if not the level of brutality he would authorise. But even if the West seriously pressured now for 'restraint' - the damage has already been done. The Algerian option seems, unfortunately, increasingly likely.
But the 'alliance'/'non-aggression pact', or however it is described between the YPG and al Assad, how long can it last? Iran will not want to see any autonomy granted to the Kurds. Russia might think it has something to gain from it, if only to aggravate Turkey. Assad will not like it.
And what will happen in Aleppo if/ when Assad retakes it? There will likely be a reign of terror on what is left of the Sunni population there. How will the Kurds react to that?
There will undoubtedly be great ethnic bitterness but will the YPG watch over a massacre in their city? Will they not fear they could be next? Will Aleppo be divided?
The Saudi coalition is held together by money and won't survive
https://beestonleftie.wordpress.com/2015/12/12/the-syrian-opposition-how-long-can-the-saudi-deception-continue/
But to release Nimr Al Nimr, or even to tolerate the Shia protests that will inevitably happen, will make them appear weak within the international Wahhabist movement. The Saudi strategy over the last 9 months or so has been to regain their position at the head of that movement after losing it first to Al Qaida and then ISIS/ Daesh.
I can't see them moderating their position without a serious division
From one point of view the fact that those 2 groups are incompatible is a relief. If they had been capable of coalescing it would have been a frightening coalition. But the rejection by the Brotherhood of a degree of power-sharing proposed by the military shows that the Brotherhood's confidence was underestimated.
Whilst they have alienated many/ most Egyptians they have clearly been strengthened in other parts of Egyptian society during the period of Morsi's presidency. They have what was clearly a coup, although you may be right that that was a counter-coup, and now a mass martyrdom to campaign around.
El Baradei has been humiliated - the democratic revolutionaries and workers movement are hard to see and will find it hard to organise as the military and Ikhwan move into a period of brutal conflict. It is hard to believe Sisi wouldn't have shared with the US government his intended actions if not the level of brutality he would authorise. But even if the West seriously pressured now for 'restraint' - the damage has already been done. The Algerian option seems, unfortunately, increasingly likely.