I see, to my surprise, that some Arab oil countries like Saudi Arabia and Oman also have universal health care, or in the case of the VAE are in the proces of getting it (I can't make out in what category Qatar falls). Does that, however, inlude the millions of migrant workers in those countries? If not - as I suspect - , does that not make it a bit strange to talk of UNIVERSAL health care in these cases?
A few months ago, I read a piece titled: "the World Oil Politics of the Lybian Revolt". A quote: "The oil politics could also provoke NATO or other intervention. Although Saudi Arabia is pumping extra petroleum (500,000 barrels a day), it is probably not actually replacing what has been lost from Libyan production. Brent crude hit $114 a barrel on Sunday. The world is skating on the edge of petroleum prices so high that they could push the global economy back into recession. Will NATO governments really risk taking a bath in their next elections because they declined to implement a no-fly zone over Libya and bring a quick end to what is for them not only a humanitarian crisis abroad but also a potential oil crisis at home?" Author: Juan Cole. Here is the link: https://www.juancole.com/2011/02/the-world-oil-politics-of-the-libyan-revolt.html
It may be true that there is no direct connection between oil COMPANIES and this war. But there is a defenite connection between this war and the oil factor in a more general sense, as Juan Cole himself has indicated in the quoted piece.
"Unlike in Egypt, where except for a day or two the Mubarak regime avoided direct physical confrontation of the demonstrators"... That is a bit carelessly formulated, to say the least. Riot police forcefully attacked demonstrators on 25 january, after some initial hesitaion. Confrontations continued on 26 and 27 January, and culminated in heavy street fighting, not just in Cairo but in Suez and Alexandria, on 28 January. Then, there were the attacks on demonstrators on 2 and 3 February, attacks in which undercover securuty agents heavily participated (to use an understatement). That is six days of armed attacks on demonstrators, not two...
Please, let us not exaggerate the regime's tendency to avoid confrontation with the mass movement. It may somewhat apply to the army (which did a good-cop-routine). It does not apply to the regime as such.
I see, to my surprise, that some Arab oil countries like Saudi Arabia and Oman also have universal health care, or in the case of the VAE are in the proces of getting it (I can't make out in what category Qatar falls). Does that, however, inlude the millions of migrant workers in those countries? If not - as I suspect - , does that not make it a bit strange to talk of UNIVERSAL health care in these cases?
A few months ago, I read a piece titled: "the World Oil Politics of the Lybian Revolt". A quote: "The oil politics could also provoke NATO or other intervention. Although Saudi Arabia is pumping extra petroleum (500,000 barrels a day), it is probably not actually replacing what has been lost from Libyan production. Brent crude hit $114 a barrel on Sunday. The world is skating on the edge of petroleum prices so high that they could push the global economy back into recession. Will NATO governments really risk taking a bath in their next elections because they declined to implement a no-fly zone over Libya and bring a quick end to what is for them not only a humanitarian crisis abroad but also a potential oil crisis at home?" Author: Juan Cole. Here is the link: https://www.juancole.com/2011/02/the-world-oil-politics-of-the-libyan-revolt.html
It may be true that there is no direct connection between oil COMPANIES and this war. But there is a defenite connection between this war and the oil factor in a more general sense, as Juan Cole himself has indicated in the quoted piece.
"Unlike in Egypt, where except for a day or two the Mubarak regime avoided direct physical confrontation of the demonstrators"... That is a bit carelessly formulated, to say the least. Riot police forcefully attacked demonstrators on 25 january, after some initial hesitaion. Confrontations continued on 26 and 27 January, and culminated in heavy street fighting, not just in Cairo but in Suez and Alexandria, on 28 January. Then, there were the attacks on demonstrators on 2 and 3 February, attacks in which undercover securuty agents heavily participated (to use an understatement). That is six days of armed attacks on demonstrators, not two...
Please, let us not exaggerate the regime's tendency to avoid confrontation with the mass movement. It may somewhat apply to the army (which did a good-cop-routine). It does not apply to the regime as such.