"Traditionally, Iran has claimed to represent all Muslims, hoping to transcend the sectarian divide." With Shia comprising less than 15% of Muslims, it makes perfect sense to avoid a sectarian war, a war that, if numbers matter, the Iranians cannot win. For the same reason, it makes perfect sense for the Iranians to keep Israel's Sunni neighbors focused on their common enemy, Israel.
"Traditionally, Iran has claimed to represent all Muslims, hoping to transcend the sectarian divide." With Shia comprising less than 15% of Muslims, it makes perfect sense to avoid a sectarian war, a war that, if numbers matter, the Iranians cannot win.
Stopping an expansionist tyrant is far different from intervening in an internal conflict between competing interests (economic, political, sectarian, etc.). Unfortunately, knee-jerk interventionists don't see a difference. Hence, the historical revisionists' depiction of WWII as a war of liberation, liberation of Germany. Does choosing sides between Sunnis and Shiites (whether within one nation such as Syria or between nations in the region) advance the prospects for peace? Does it advance American interests? Does it enhance American security? Is Saudi Arabia our ally and friend, even though the 9/11 terrorists were Sunnis from Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia is known to support Sunni extremists, and Saudi Arabia is neither a democracy nor a free nation. Is Iran our enemy and a threat, even though the vast majority of Iranians want to be more like us, and even though Shiites comprise less than 15% of Muslims (Sunnis more than 85%). According to John Stuart Mill (in his principles for intervention), non-intervention not intervention should be the default position. For the interventionists, however, intervention is the default position.
A significant majority of Egyptians prefer Shariah Law, not just the Brotherhood; in Egypt, as in most countries in the middle east, it's impossible to separate church and state. Hence, terms such as "conservative" and "liberal" have entirely different meanings than they do in the west. I don't care for Islamist for the same reason I don't care for Christianist: in both cases, it's used as a pejorative, not simply a descriptive. Fundamentalist suffers from the same weakness. What distinguishes the two poles in Egypt is the level of tolerance, or intolerance, of the other, with one end of the pole marked by intolerance and the other end marked by, not tolerance, but a moderate level of tolerance; pluralism, it's not. But the differences in Egypt are not nearly as broad as the differences in, say, Syria or Iraq, which are sectarian differences (Sunni and Shiite), in which the other is a heretic and his death is God's will. In Egypt, the differences can be bridged; in Syria and Iraq, they can't.
"Traditionally, Iran has claimed to represent all Muslims, hoping to transcend the sectarian divide." With Shia comprising less than 15% of Muslims, it makes perfect sense to avoid a sectarian war, a war that, if numbers matter, the Iranians cannot win. For the same reason, it makes perfect sense for the Iranians to keep Israel's Sunni neighbors focused on their common enemy, Israel.
"Traditionally, Iran has claimed to represent all Muslims, hoping to transcend the sectarian divide." With Shia comprising less than 15% of Muslims, it makes perfect sense to avoid a sectarian war, a war that, if numbers matter, the Iranians cannot win.
Stopping an expansionist tyrant is far different from intervening in an internal conflict between competing interests (economic, political, sectarian, etc.). Unfortunately, knee-jerk interventionists don't see a difference. Hence, the historical revisionists' depiction of WWII as a war of liberation, liberation of Germany. Does choosing sides between Sunnis and Shiites (whether within one nation such as Syria or between nations in the region) advance the prospects for peace? Does it advance American interests? Does it enhance American security? Is Saudi Arabia our ally and friend, even though the 9/11 terrorists were Sunnis from Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia is known to support Sunni extremists, and Saudi Arabia is neither a democracy nor a free nation. Is Iran our enemy and a threat, even though the vast majority of Iranians want to be more like us, and even though Shiites comprise less than 15% of Muslims (Sunnis more than 85%). According to John Stuart Mill (in his principles for intervention), non-intervention not intervention should be the default position. For the interventionists, however, intervention is the default position.
A significant majority of Egyptians prefer Shariah Law, not just the Brotherhood; in Egypt, as in most countries in the middle east, it's impossible to separate church and state. Hence, terms such as "conservative" and "liberal" have entirely different meanings than they do in the west. I don't care for Islamist for the same reason I don't care for Christianist: in both cases, it's used as a pejorative, not simply a descriptive. Fundamentalist suffers from the same weakness. What distinguishes the two poles in Egypt is the level of tolerance, or intolerance, of the other, with one end of the pole marked by intolerance and the other end marked by, not tolerance, but a moderate level of tolerance; pluralism, it's not. But the differences in Egypt are not nearly as broad as the differences in, say, Syria or Iraq, which are sectarian differences (Sunni and Shiite), in which the other is a heretic and his death is God's will. In Egypt, the differences can be bridged; in Syria and Iraq, they can't.