Hello,
Just three points:
(1.) I think any comparison of Al-Nahda or even the Turkish Ak-Party to the actual CDU -- the German Christian Democrates -- is mistaken. The CDU has become quite liberal (in the sense of pluralistic, not left-wing) over the last two or three decades. In fact, a German journalist compared the moderate members (!) of Al-Nahda to the CDU of the 20s.
(2.) The AK-Party of Turkey is hopefully on the way to become a more an more moderate Muslim Party on a level with the CDU, but you shouldn't forget that they face and have faced a strong secular opposition in Turkey. In 2002 (or 2003?) they tried to make adultery a legal crime; only when there was a huge outcry in public, they buried the idea -- hopefully for good. So the AK-Party had to become more moderate if it wanted to stay the number one party in Turkey.
(3.) So the interesting question is how Al-Nahda will develop in the course of the coming month and years. Will it move in the direction of the AK-Party or move to (resp. stay) where the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt is today?
I have to mention just one point:
I don't know exactly what Seymour Hersh wrote, but what I can say from reading the article on Lebanon Now is that Aviv Kochavi doesn't say that Iran has just a civil nuclear program. He just says that they are not currently working on a nuclear bomb. I think this is something quite different. Having a bomb "on the shelf", i.e. all the capacities to built a bomb within a short time, is exactly what it means to have a military nuclear program!!! Whether Iran actually decides to take the last step and built a bomb depends on their strategical calculus. Sanctioning Iran and containing it, is exactly one way to convince them that they shouldn't even try to achieve these capacities.
Bye the way: As Rafsandjani noted in the 90s, Iran doesn't need to have 200 hundreds nuclear war heads to destroy Israel, three are enough if two of them hit their target. This should not imply that Iranian radicals want a nuclear war, not at all, because they know they would lose it. They just want to feel save enough to be able to give their proxies a carte blanche.
I disagree, Younis is absolutely correct in his criticism of NATO. It is acting much too slowly and inconsistently. In general, it is doing less than it could do.
The problem is that NATO is not fulfilling UN Res 1973 even if one interprets it narrowly: NATO has done little to nothing to protect civilians under bombardment by Gaddafi forces in the West (Zintan etc). NATO does far to little to protect the people of Ajdabia from Gaddafi's forces near/in Brega; NATO hat totally failed concerning Misrata (which is due to the difficulty of fighting snipers with aircrafts...a strategical disaster)
Secondly, from a strategical point of view, the West has bound itself by letting NATO run the mission (with the sublimal Gaddafi friendly Turks and Greeks on board). Gaddafi won't go away just by our wishful thinking. He and his son's have to be under huge pressure. With the front line somewhere around Brega they probably don't feel too uncomfortable.
It is absolutely absurd to intercept a boat with ammunition for Misrata where people are fighting for their survival against force largely superior to them. The Turks know this, but I don't think that they want Gaddafi to go; they probably hope for a stalemate with one of Gaddafi's son remaining in charge. Well, seen from Benghazi with such friends as the Turks you don't need enemies anymore...
As I said: If you can't help them from the air, you have to help them so that they can help themselves.
Tweets from ChangeinLibya from AbdulFattah Younis’s press conference in Benghazi:
"Why did NATO stop a small fishing trawler from giving aid to Misrata? These people are getting massacred daily
Misrata hasn’t had water for 30 days, and when people started drinking from wells, Gaddafi blocked the sewage pipes.
NATO is treating us like beggars, giving us an air strike every other day while people in Misrata are killed daily
The reaction time of NATO is extremely slow. We give them the co-ordinates of Gaddafi militias daily
NATO takes 8 hours to act on the information we give them, and by then it is too late for the strikes to do any good
If NATO continues to stall, we will take our case to the United Nations and find another solution
We have our own jets, and even when we request permission for a flight, we are denied
They don’t let us use OUR own jets, and their jets take hours to act. How can we allow this? This doesn’t help at all
Our problem and bottleneck now is NATO (laughs) – they are the ones taking hours to use the info we give them"
This is exactly confirming my complaints. NATO isn't doing its job! Although I am in general not susceptible to conspiracy theories, I think it was probably part of the deal with Turkey that NATO should not support the opposition too strongly. Or, what would be even more disullusioning, NATO is not able to act.
I have to admit that I find NATO's inaction as regards the front at Brega and the crimes committed by Gaddafi's forces in the far West of the country (e.g. Zintan) deeply troubling. Even if one interprets Res. 1973 more narrowly, in order to protect civilians it is of outmost importance to hold Gaddafi's troops away from Adjabia and the best way to do that is helping the opposition forces to take Brega. NATO's noncommitment here is frustrating. I think NATO is simply not fulfilling its mandate properly, either due to a lack of will or a lack of capability.
Prof Cole writes:
„Another significance of the strike is that it may well discourage soldiers loyal to Qaddafi from trying to attack the rebels, and may encourage them to defect to the Benghazi government. So far the NATO strikes on Qaddafi convoys have been intermittent, and so many commanders may have thought that the risks are bearable. But if the strikes become more consistent they will likely take a psychological toll.“
Well, the strikes aren't nearly powerful enough to keep Gaddafi's forces away from Brega. At the moment (6pm GMT+2) Gaddafi's forces are attacking the opposition forces with rockets and forcing them to retreat. I said from the beginning that the coalition forces would have to be more ''merciless'' towards Gaddafi's troops if the air attacks are meant to have some psychological effect on them and their commanders in Tripoli. NATO's inaction will only prolong this whole conflict.
Many opposition fighters complain that the airstrikes have become less effective since NATO took over command → lack of firepower, overview or Turkey's obstructive influence on engagement rules?
As regards NATO's briefing today:
Misrata is probably the worst case to focus on with airpower. Actually, I think it is simply impossible to free Misrata from the air. What should be done is sending well equipped opposition forces to Misratah via boat so that the resistance fighters there can clear the streets of Gaddafi's forces on their own.
Hello Prof Cole,
Maybe you have already seen this discussion about the implications of M. K.'s probable defection. From 18:41 on the question is raised what the prospects are and both commentators share the view that the rebels should be more supported and be equipped. A view I share:
Very interesting point of view. I tend to agree with the overall strategy (no regime change by military conquest but by collapse of the regime from within) behind it, but I have some critical notes on how we achieve this goal:
First, what about Misrata? Obviously, it is not possibly to free Misrata by air strikes. It seems to me that it is only a matter of time until Misrata will fall completely to Gaddafi's forces. Strengthening their hold on the West of the country. Apart from that strategic issue, the people in Misrata are suffering and there has to be done something. What about sending well-equipped anti-Gaddafi-forces via ships to Misrata to enforce the resistance there? The harbour has to be made safe for humanitarian aid ships.
Second, as regards the East: I think it is decisive that Gaddafi looses important oil cities like Brega and Ras Lanuf! This would increase the pressure on the regime and would accelerate its dissolution. NATO should try to cripple Gaddafi forces in the East as much as possible so that the opposition could dig in 60km east of Sirte thereby establishing a kind of stable front line. This would give them some time to built a better organized "army" and gain international recognition. The pro-Gaddafi clans in Sirte have to be won over through negotiations assuring them that there will be a place for them in a post-Gaddafi Libya and that they don't have to fear reprisal. If Sirte changes its allegiance the game is over for Gaddafi.
In a nutshell: Gaddafi's inner circle must loose any hope of being able to keep the West of the country under their control for a longer period or even of pushing the opposition forces back to Benghazi. I think providing some weapons to the opposition forces and training them is crucial, sending the clear signal that the Coalition powers won't let Gaddafi win this war. He won't be able to survive militarily in the long run.
Hello,
Just three points:
(1.) I think any comparison of Al-Nahda or even the Turkish Ak-Party to the actual CDU -- the German Christian Democrates -- is mistaken. The CDU has become quite liberal (in the sense of pluralistic, not left-wing) over the last two or three decades. In fact, a German journalist compared the moderate members (!) of Al-Nahda to the CDU of the 20s.
(2.) The AK-Party of Turkey is hopefully on the way to become a more an more moderate Muslim Party on a level with the CDU, but you shouldn't forget that they face and have faced a strong secular opposition in Turkey. In 2002 (or 2003?) they tried to make adultery a legal crime; only when there was a huge outcry in public, they buried the idea -- hopefully for good. So the AK-Party had to become more moderate if it wanted to stay the number one party in Turkey.
(3.) So the interesting question is how Al-Nahda will develop in the course of the coming month and years. Will it move in the direction of the AK-Party or move to (resp. stay) where the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt is today?
I have to mention just one point:
I don't know exactly what Seymour Hersh wrote, but what I can say from reading the article on Lebanon Now is that Aviv Kochavi doesn't say that Iran has just a civil nuclear program. He just says that they are not currently working on a nuclear bomb. I think this is something quite different. Having a bomb "on the shelf", i.e. all the capacities to built a bomb within a short time, is exactly what it means to have a military nuclear program!!! Whether Iran actually decides to take the last step and built a bomb depends on their strategical calculus. Sanctioning Iran and containing it, is exactly one way to convince them that they shouldn't even try to achieve these capacities.
Bye the way: As Rafsandjani noted in the 90s, Iran doesn't need to have 200 hundreds nuclear war heads to destroy Israel, three are enough if two of them hit their target. This should not imply that Iranian radicals want a nuclear war, not at all, because they know they would lose it. They just want to feel save enough to be able to give their proxies a carte blanche.
I disagree, Younis is absolutely correct in his criticism of NATO. It is acting much too slowly and inconsistently. In general, it is doing less than it could do.
The problem is that NATO is not fulfilling UN Res 1973 even if one interprets it narrowly: NATO has done little to nothing to protect civilians under bombardment by Gaddafi forces in the West (Zintan etc). NATO does far to little to protect the people of Ajdabia from Gaddafi's forces near/in Brega; NATO hat totally failed concerning Misrata (which is due to the difficulty of fighting snipers with aircrafts...a strategical disaster)
Secondly, from a strategical point of view, the West has bound itself by letting NATO run the mission (with the sublimal Gaddafi friendly Turks and Greeks on board). Gaddafi won't go away just by our wishful thinking. He and his son's have to be under huge pressure. With the front line somewhere around Brega they probably don't feel too uncomfortable.
It is absolutely absurd to intercept a boat with ammunition for Misrata where people are fighting for their survival against force largely superior to them. The Turks know this, but I don't think that they want Gaddafi to go; they probably hope for a stalemate with one of Gaddafi's son remaining in charge. Well, seen from Benghazi with such friends as the Turks you don't need enemies anymore...
As I said: If you can't help them from the air, you have to help them so that they can help themselves.
Tweets from ChangeinLibya from AbdulFattah Younis’s press conference in Benghazi:
"Why did NATO stop a small fishing trawler from giving aid to Misrata? These people are getting massacred daily
Misrata hasn’t had water for 30 days, and when people started drinking from wells, Gaddafi blocked the sewage pipes.
NATO is treating us like beggars, giving us an air strike every other day while people in Misrata are killed daily
The reaction time of NATO is extremely slow. We give them the co-ordinates of Gaddafi militias daily
NATO takes 8 hours to act on the information we give them, and by then it is too late for the strikes to do any good
If NATO continues to stall, we will take our case to the United Nations and find another solution
We have our own jets, and even when we request permission for a flight, we are denied
They don’t let us use OUR own jets, and their jets take hours to act. How can we allow this? This doesn’t help at all
Our problem and bottleneck now is NATO (laughs) – they are the ones taking hours to use the info we give them"
This is exactly confirming my complaints. NATO isn't doing its job! Although I am in general not susceptible to conspiracy theories, I think it was probably part of the deal with Turkey that NATO should not support the opposition too strongly. Or, what would be even more disullusioning, NATO is not able to act.
I have to admit that I find NATO's inaction as regards the front at Brega and the crimes committed by Gaddafi's forces in the far West of the country (e.g. Zintan) deeply troubling. Even if one interprets Res. 1973 more narrowly, in order to protect civilians it is of outmost importance to hold Gaddafi's troops away from Adjabia and the best way to do that is helping the opposition forces to take Brega. NATO's noncommitment here is frustrating. I think NATO is simply not fulfilling its mandate properly, either due to a lack of will or a lack of capability.
Prof Cole writes:
„Another significance of the strike is that it may well discourage soldiers loyal to Qaddafi from trying to attack the rebels, and may encourage them to defect to the Benghazi government. So far the NATO strikes on Qaddafi convoys have been intermittent, and so many commanders may have thought that the risks are bearable. But if the strikes become more consistent they will likely take a psychological toll.“
Well, the strikes aren't nearly powerful enough to keep Gaddafi's forces away from Brega. At the moment (6pm GMT+2) Gaddafi's forces are attacking the opposition forces with rockets and forcing them to retreat. I said from the beginning that the coalition forces would have to be more ''merciless'' towards Gaddafi's troops if the air attacks are meant to have some psychological effect on them and their commanders in Tripoli. NATO's inaction will only prolong this whole conflict.
Many opposition fighters complain that the airstrikes have become less effective since NATO took over command → lack of firepower, overview or Turkey's obstructive influence on engagement rules?
http://af.reuters.com/article/libyaNews/idAFLDE7340W020110405?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0
As regards NATO's briefing today:
Misrata is probably the worst case to focus on with airpower. Actually, I think it is simply impossible to free Misrata from the air. What should be done is sending well equipped opposition forces to Misratah via boat so that the resistance fighters there can clear the streets of Gaddafi's forces on their own.
Hello Prof Cole,
Maybe you have already seen this discussion about the implications of M. K.'s probable defection. From 18:41 on the question is raised what the prospects are and both commentators share the view that the rebels should be more supported and be equipped. A view I share:
http://www.youtube.com/user/AlJazeeraEnglish#p/u/9/iocwUrLHyNo
Very interesting point of view. I tend to agree with the overall strategy (no regime change by military conquest but by collapse of the regime from within) behind it, but I have some critical notes on how we achieve this goal:
First, what about Misrata? Obviously, it is not possibly to free Misrata by air strikes. It seems to me that it is only a matter of time until Misrata will fall completely to Gaddafi's forces. Strengthening their hold on the West of the country. Apart from that strategic issue, the people in Misrata are suffering and there has to be done something. What about sending well-equipped anti-Gaddafi-forces via ships to Misrata to enforce the resistance there? The harbour has to be made safe for humanitarian aid ships.
Second, as regards the East: I think it is decisive that Gaddafi looses important oil cities like Brega and Ras Lanuf! This would increase the pressure on the regime and would accelerate its dissolution. NATO should try to cripple Gaddafi forces in the East as much as possible so that the opposition could dig in 60km east of Sirte thereby establishing a kind of stable front line. This would give them some time to built a better organized "army" and gain international recognition. The pro-Gaddafi clans in Sirte have to be won over through negotiations assuring them that there will be a place for them in a post-Gaddafi Libya and that they don't have to fear reprisal. If Sirte changes its allegiance the game is over for Gaddafi.
In a nutshell: Gaddafi's inner circle must loose any hope of being able to keep the West of the country under their control for a longer period or even of pushing the opposition forces back to Benghazi. I think providing some weapons to the opposition forces and training them is crucial, sending the clear signal that the Coalition powers won't let Gaddafi win this war. He won't be able to survive militarily in the long run.