Just this past weekend of July 4, US-led coalition aircraft targeted the ISIS stronghold of Raqqa in Syria. It was one of the “largest deliberate engagements to date,” said a coalition spokesman, and it was executed “to deny [ISIS] the ability to move military capabilities throughout Syria and into Iraq.” The scale of these responses gives a hint both to how concerned we are about such groups–and to how badly we misunderstand how to deal with them.

ISIS–the self-proclaimed “Islamic State”–is the monster of our times, our Grendel. Every pundit, commentator, armchair warrior and presidential candidate, declared and otherwise, claims to have a strategy to defeat them. A steady stream of political statements offering answers to “what do we do about them?” have gotten progressively more hawkish.

Would-be presidents have given us options ranging from bombing ISIS “back to the 7th Century” (Rick Santorum), increasing the number of American troops in the fight (Lindsey Graham), and “look for them, find them and kill them” (Marco Rubio, quoting an action movie).

Bold words…and every one of them will fail, because they are far too idealistic to work in reality. If the candidates want realism, they’ll have to advocate something else: peacebuilding.

“War as utopian idealism” and “peacebuilding as hard-nosed realism” sounds like an absurd joke.

Here’s why it isn’t.

War is just politics by other means

Carl Von Clausewitz, one of history’s foremost military strategists and right at the foundation of American strategic teaching, famously called warfare an “extension of politics by other means.”

What he meant by that is that if military action is going to be successful, it cannot stand alone or direct itself. Unless it grows out of and complements a solid, sustainable political strategy, it will fail.

That was true in his day of formalized warfare; in today’s world, it’s even more critical an insight, because what the world faces in ISIS isn’t a war among uniformed armies and sovereign nations.

This conflict and others like it around the world are rooted in people, not states. It’s rooted in ideology and religion, in sectarian frictions, in political exclusion and social marginalization, in resources and access.

That’s a long list of root causes and conditions that do not respond to force and cannot be bombed out of existence.

In other words, if “defeat ISIS” isn’t couched within a clear, realistic plan to do the human, political, diplomatic and development work necessary to fix the problems that gave it rise, the mission will fail.

In its failure, it will leave behind the seeds of a new threat in fertile soil, just as ISIS itself grew from the roots of al-Qaeda even after the bloom was cut off above.

Peacebuilding, at its heart, means doing the hard work of correctly analyzing the causes and conditions that lead to violence and instability. It means identifying ways of breaking those causes down, and then doing the even harder work of helping to build healthy, resilient social and political structures in their place.

It’s work that’s usually dismissed as an exercise in starry-eyed, utopian idealism by a policy community dominated by the philosophy of nation states and Realpolitik. And yet over the last few years, the fallacy of that dismissal has become increasingly clear.

General James Mattis told Congress flatly that “if you don’t fully fund the State Department, then I need to buy more ammunition.” General Phipps, former commander of the 101st Airborne Division in Afghanistan, when asked about peacebuilding outreach to men he’d fought not long before, replied “That’s how wars end… we can’t kill our way out of this.”

The least effective tool against terrorism is war

Serious research centers have arrived at the same conclusion: the RAND Corporation, as far back as 2008, advised that outside military intervention is bar none the least effective way to make terrorist groups go away.

Ending the kind of conflicts we see most often today requires building inclusive governance and rule of law far more than it requires the defeat of a fighting force on the battlefield.

“Peacebuilding” is a broad category of work, which seeks to address the root causes of conflict and instability within populations and systems of governance. In conflicts that involve people more than states, any answer other than this shows a lack of understanding. Beginning now rather than waiting for the battlefield victory is an imperative, because it’s only through this work that the next battle gets less likely.

In fact the battlefield options – however satisfying they may seem in a tactical sense – often cause more trouble than they’re worth. The Saudis are discovering this in their campaign against the Houthis in Yemen, which is entirely military and has no parallel political component, and is having predictably destabilizing consequences.

Yes, building peace is a long process that will take years, perhaps generations; but those years will pass whether or not we recognize the need for a more realistic foreign policy, and the only question is whether in years to come progress has been made, or the war goes on.

The discussion about ISIS, as with many others around the globe, has lost track of realism. Instead of looking at the military as an extension of politics, speakers across the board have begun to look at politics as secondary – something to worry about once the hard work of fighting’s done.

Practical actions for peace-building

What does this look like in practice? Here are four possible actions:

One: The “real battle” here isn’t with ISIS, it’s for the populations they’re trying to sway. There is no understating the power of the following scenario: An American politician saying, in a public forum, “I speak now to all of the population caught up in this fight, be you Sunni, Shiite, Yazidi, Kurd or otherwise, and I say, ‘It’s not just their destruction we have in mind – it’s your survival.”

ISIS may prove impossible to talk with, but if we’re indiscriminate and also ignore the population who is looking to the outside world for engagement and help, we’re doing nothing but feeding into the vicious cycle.

Two: Make it clear to the populations concerned that we strive to address the problems they face, not just those symptoms of the problems that we face.

Speaking to the current fight but not the problems that gave rise to it and which will still exist once the smoke clears just comes across as naive and disingenuous. Make a clear statement, for example, that we will not support repressive regimes in exchange for expedient stability, but are prepared for the long haul of achieving stability through unfailing support for the ideals of inclusive good governance that we ourselves hold dear.

Three: My research and personal experience working for organizations in the region as well as many years spent in conflict-affected areas have shown me repeatedly that the real key to peace-building (as with development overall) isn’t “what you do,” it’s “how you do it.”

The most effective “how” is to look past states to see people, and provide incentives to get the population and government alike involved in designing and negotiating their own inclusive way forward – with our support, but not with our direction. Helping to build connectivity between the two – defined through trust, partnership and locally negotiated outcomes – is a powerful programmatic outcome.

It’s also a good working definition of “good governance,” and a more terrifying thought for ISIS than any weaponry can be.

Four: Most of all, recognize that the military neither can nor should be the primary vehicle for American engagement overseas, and reprioritize funding accordingly.

The military is not trained for the jobs that peace-building entails, but USAID, the State Department and most importantly non-governmental organizations, are.

The message we send by prioritizing our own national security agenda while underfunding the agencies whose core mission and skillset is to work with good governance, justice, peace and livelihoods, is that we have no intention of doing more than eradicating symptoms while leaving the causes unchecked.

The military does have its role to play in winning a battle, but if “war” is our only lens, we will see only battlefield solutions to a set of problems that can’t be solved with those. If we want to end the problem, we need to speak to the broad population with those tools that bring life, not death.

At some point an American president will be forced to recognize that fixing problems like the ones in Iraq and Syria is too complicated to sum up in a campaign slogan or sound bite. That’s the hard truth.

The only question is how much in blood, time and treasure will be wasted before this realization hits home.

Getting rid of ISIS and groups like it certainly requires seriousness and a willingness to get hard work done — but that doesn’t just mean preparing to get bloody. It means we need to be realistic and unafraid to say, “Our strategy is to build peace.”

David Alpher is Adjunct Professor at George Mason University’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University.

This article was originally published on The Conversation.
Read the original article.

David Alpher is an Adjunct Professor at George Mason University’s School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University

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related video added by Juan Cole:

ISIS execution video shows teenagers killing Syrians in Palmyra – TomoNews

Following a month of fierce campaigning, the people of Turkey are preparing to head to the polling stations for the nation’s general election. This is set to be one of the most important elections in the history of the Turkish Republic, since its results may mean political overhaul. On June 7, the people will decide whether the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) will win an absolute majority, or be required to form a coalition government for the first time since coming to power in 2002.

Turkey is a secular parliamentary democracy. Legislative power is vested in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, while executive power is exercised by the prime minister and the Council of Ministers. Turkey also has a president whose role, at present, is largely ceremonial.

The make up of the national assembly is determined using a system of proportional representation. Political parties must win a minimum of 10% of the national vote in order to take up any seats: the highest electoral threshold of any country in the world.

The current government

The assembly is composed of 550 deputies, elected every four years. The prime minister is usually the leader of the political party which has the majority of the seats, or can form a majority coalition government. At the moment, the assembly consists of the AKP with 327 seats, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) with 135 seats, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) with 53 seats, as well as 35 independent deputies, who are part of a leftist umbrella organisation called the People’s Democratic Congress (HDK).

Ahmet Davutoglu – leader of the AKP – currently serves as prime minister. Davutoglu was foreign affairs minister between 2009 and 2014, under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (founder of the AKP). During this period, Davutoglu’s foreign policy – aimed at ensuring “zero problems with our neighbours” – was highly regarded internationally.

In 2014, amendments were introduced to the country’s 1982 constitution, dictating that the president would be directly elected for a five-year term. Former prime minister Erdoğan went on to be voted in as president in August 2014.

Hot topics

The official election campaign began in May 2015. The key players in this election include all the usual mainstream political parties. The exception is the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) – the political wing of the HDK, formed in 2012 – which is entering the general election for the first time.

As party leaders, the AKP’s Davutoglu, the CHP’s Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the MHP’s Devlet Bahceli and the HDP’s Selahattin Demirtas are all key figures in this election, and have been attending public rallies up and down the country. So far, three issues have been occupying the pre-election debate in Turkey: Erdoğan’s ambitious presidential system, Kilicdaroglu’s social and economic policies and Demirtas’ liberal and inclusive policies.

As president, Erdoğan is constitutionally required to be neutral throughout the campaign. But instead, he has taken on an active role ahead of this election, overshadowing Davutoglu to promote reforms which would hand over extended executive powers to the presidency. In particular, Erdoğan is asking the Turkish people to give the AKP 330 seats in the assembly. This would give the party the three-fifths majority required to call a referendum on the constitutional changes needed to implement Erdoğan’s Putin-style presidential system.

At this election, the AKP does not appear to be offering anything new. With Erdoğan so fixated on gaining further powers for the presidency, Davutoglu is left singing the same old tune about the AKP’s record over 12 years in government. Throughout this time, the party has managed to secure a starting date for negotiations to allow Turkey into the European Union, completed huge infrastructure projects across Turkey, achieved an unprecedented economic growth, constructed airports, bridges and sky scrapers and sustained political stability.

But Erdoğan’s authoritarian style, the corruption cases brought against him and his ministers, increasing poverty levels and a weakening economy have all undermined the image of the AKP as a competent party – once victimised by the Turkish secular establishment for having religious roots – in the eyes of the public.

Who’s who?

Meanwhile, CHP leader Kilicdaroglu – a former clerk – has chosen not to get involved in ideological exchange with Erdoğan over the question of presidential powers. In past elections, he was criticised for going head-to-head with the president over the corruption scandals that surfaced in 2013, and over Turkey’s high levels of poverty – a move which ultimately cost Kilicdaroglu votes.

Instead, he is concentrating on reaching out to the electorate. Although it may sound unrealistic, Kilicdaroglu pledges to end poverty in Turkey within four years. This does not mean that the CHP is without sensible policies: pledges to increase the minimum wage and boost the retirement pension have been very popular so far.

The newest face in Turkish politics is HDP’s co-chair Demirtas, whose personal aptitude in delivering his message of tolerance, inclusivity and a fully fledged democracy to a greater audience has taken many people by surprise. Witty, eloquent and charismatic, Demirtas’s appearance either at public rallies or on TV broadcasts is attracting not only people from different walks of life, but also people who have affiliations with the other parties.

The HDP claims to be the party of Armenians, Islamists, Alevis, workers, women, environmentalists, LGBT activists, and representative of all oppressed groups. What’s more, the deputy candidate list is a true reflection of those groups. If HDP passes the 10% threshold, it will be the first time in the history of Turkish Republic that deputies representing some of these groups are democratically elected without disguising their true identities.

Ülkücülük

But as we enter the very last days of campaigning, it is the right-wing MHP which is gaining the most attention. Support for the MHP is fed with Turkish nationalism, based on the idealism of “ülkücülük”.

The idea of “ülkücülük” emerged in opposition to the Turkish Communist movements in the 1970s. It represents a distinctive kind of nationalism, where the well-being of the state is seen as the ultimate embodiment of the nation. According to “ülkücülük”, the state’s interests are ultimately inseparable from the nation’s interest.

While all the other political parties presented their manifesto in April, the MHP leader Bahceli waited until May. He claimed this was a choice intended to prevent the other political parties from copying the party, and ensure that the MHP’s election promises would not get lost among the other parties’ manifestos.

The MHP does put forward some progressive policies. Like Kilicdaroglu, Bahceli has promised to increase the minimum wage. The party has also pledged to officially grant Cemevis (Alevi muslims’ houses of worship) the status of official places of worship. This status has been withheld since the Turkish Republic was established in 1923, meaning that the Alevi citizens of Turkey do not have the right to worship freely or form associations in the way they wish. Turkish authorities have been heavily criticised by the EU because of this.

The Kurdish problem

Given the MHP’s position of tolerance toward the Alevi of Turkey, you might expect the party to adopt a similar line on Turkey’s long-standing and deep-rooted Kurdish problem. But this where the nationalist side kicks in: the party stands against any form of resolution to the Kurdish problem, and Bahceli is particularly sceptical about talking to the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK).

Just like the Alevi, the Kurds have long been denied any form of constitutional rights. After nearly 30 years of fighting between the PKK and the Turkish Security Forces (TSK), the capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999 and the subsequent call for a ceasefire have helped put an end to this bloody chapter in Turkish politics.

Erdoğan could be criticised for his authoritarian style, his power-hungry outbursts and his recent combative approach to peace talks with the PKK and HDP. But his valiant stance toward solving the Kurdish problem should be recognised. Up until the election campaign began, Erdoğan and the AKP had been talking to Öcalan trough the Turkish National Intelligence Organisation, and holding meetings with the Kurdish representatives to establish a solution for this problem.

If the AKP fails to gain a majority, it looks like the MHP will be the first party whose door Erdoğan and Davutoglu will be knocking on to form a coalition. As it stands, all three opposition leaders have ruled out forming a coalition with the AKP.

If Bahceli can be persuaded by the AKP, his first demand is likely to be the termination of the peace talks with the Kurds. On the other hand, if the HDP passes the threshold, people of Turkey would not only have a political party representing a range of new voices and interests, but also accelerating the consolidation of democracy in Turkey.

Gulay Icoz is Teaching Assistant at King's College London.

This article was originally published on The Conversation.
Read the original article.

Gulay Icoz is a Teaching Assistant at King’s College London

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Related video added by Juan Cole:

Euronews: “Turkey’s political parties seek crucial votes abroad ahead of general election”