Informed Comment

Thoughts on the Middle East, History, and Religion

Juan Cole is President of the Global Americana Institute

Friday, December 09, 2005

Talabani to Meet with Resistance Leaders;
Shiite Coalition in Friction


Al-Hayat: President Jalal Talabani [Ar. ULR] is preparing a meeting in Sulaimaniyah to be attended by the Americans and by leaders of the underground Sunni Arab guerrilla movement. US Ambassador Khalilzad has announced that he would be willing to talk to any groups save the Saddamists (direct cronies and strong supporters of the overthrown dictator) and the jihadi terrorists (e.g. the group of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi). Talabani, a Sunni Kurd, has been trying to reach out to elements of the Sunni Arab resistance for the past couple of months, using clan leaders and clerics as intermediaries. An initial agreement of principles is said to have been reached, but of course the guerrilla leaders will want certain guarantees. Earlier contacts between the US Department of Defense and the guerrilla leaders faltered because the guerrillas had demanded an upfront commitment of the US to a withdrawal timetable, which the Bush administration rejected. And then the US began large-scale sweeps in Anbar province against guerrilla positions.

Al-Hayat's sources say that several changes have occurred in the arena of guerrilla action in 2005, which have benefited the Iraqi nationalist groups that reject attacks on civilians and the practice of "excommunicating" (takfir) other Muslims. The method of "national resistance" has instead gained advantages over the bloody tactics of the jihadis, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Ansar al-Islam. More than 50 guerrilla bands, including "Phalanges of the 1920 Revolution," "the Army of Islam," "The Army of Holy Warriors", "Holy Warriors of the Armed Forces," are actually led, despite their Islamist names, by officers of the former Iraqi military. They have decided to unite their ranks and will soon announce a Front for the Iraqi Resistance, which will comprise all these guerrilla groups. They will adopt joint military and political stances. This front will be led by a "Consultative Council" that includes former officers, clerics and clan elders. It will be charged with working to prevent attacks on civilians and with promoting dialogue for the purpose of "expelling the occupiers."

Al-Sharq al-Awsat says that UN envoy Ashraf Qazi visited Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani on Thursday, in the run-up to next Thursday's elections. He said that Sistani had blessed UN work in Iraq and urged that it help the country rebuild and move toward social harmony.

The same source says that there is substantial election-related violence in Iraq, with attacks on political offices and assassinations. (These don't seem to be being reported, pace Mr. Rumsfeld, above). A member of the list of Mithal Alusi was killed on Thursday, and the office of secular ex-Baathist Iyad Allawi was again attacked in the Shiite holy city of Karbala.

The trial of Saddam Hussein is highly polarizing for the Iraqi public, according to Borzou Daragahi of the LA Times. Making Shiites and Sunnis live through his massacre of Shiites at this particular juncture strikes me as a bad idea. And, the trial has been conducted in a completely inept way. The Shiite witnesses have sometimes repeated hearsay, or they were children in 1982, as Riverbend notes.

Now the Baghdad Press Club was founded by the US military. This finding is the result of continued investigation of Pentagon attempts to shape Iraqi press reporting. The Club journalists were actually given monetary rewards.

Ed Wong of the NYT reports on the tensions in the United Iraqi Alliance, the coaltion of Shiite religious parties, which has now included the Sadr movement of Muqtada al-Sadr. Sadrists are keen rivals of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, and the militias of the two parties have fought. Wong raises the question of whether the Sadr/SCIRI rivalries are enough to break up the coalition, giving an opening to the secularists and Kurds to outmaneuver them.

Similar speculation about the UIA's ability to stay together was voiced in January, 2005, and those concerns were overblown. It should be remembered that the Iraqi government has on the order of $17 billion a year in petroleum revenue. Being the dominant party means that your deputies and cabinet members get to control the revenue, which turns into political patronage and power. I predicted last January that the UIA would stay together, because the alternative was to allow someone else to monopolize that money. But Wong is right that Muqtada and the Sadrists are a wild card, one could imagine him pursuing a scorched earth policy even against his own former allies.

3 Comments:

At 10:56 AM, Blogger Eric said...

As an attorney and long-time supporter of an international trial for Saddam Husayn and the highest officials of his Ba'th government, I'm concerned that the procedural shortcomings of the Iraqi trial will undercut the legitimacy of its outcome.

There isn't much doubt that Saddam committed substantial violations of international humanitarian law.

There also isn't much doubt that the Iraqi legal system was so compromised by the Ba'th government's lawlessness that it doesn't have the procedural and substantive resources to address Saddam's crimes. A strong, well-established legal system would be sorely tested by a trial like this (imagine, for example, how the U.S. would have been riven by the public capital trial of Robert E. Lee in 1866).

Regarding Riverbend's objections to hearsay, I'm not sure that it's appropriate to comment on Iraqi evidence law based on watching "The Practice." The elaborate evidentiary rules used in common-law courts are intended to prevent a lay jury from hearing evidence that sounds convincing but isn't. If a judge is hearing the evidence--which is generally the case in civil-law systems like Iraq's--there isn't a particular reason to worry about excluding evidence.

Judges can make the same calculation that Riverbend made--that a report of an out-of-court hearsay declarant's unsworn statement isn't the same as in-court testimony--and give the statement the weight it deserves.

 
At 12:18 PM, Blogger Wild Bill said...

Sadr and his movement have struck me as undermining the general assumption that Iran is gaining decisive sway in Iraq. Given SCIRI, and to lesser extents Dawa and PUK's, strong links to Iran, it would seem that the only way for Sadr to gain traction as an independent political movement is as a nationalist Iraqi Shia movement as opposed to a stalking horse for Iran. While undoubtedly Iran seeks to influence Sadr, it would seem that he would relegate his movement to redundancy and/or absorption by Sciri/Dawa if he did not maintain a disinctive nationalist posture viz Iran.

If that is so, the negative impression of Sadr in the West notwithstanding, would he not actually enhance the opportunity for a rapprochment with nationalist Sunnis (as opposed to the Baathists/Salafist whom he undoubtedly despises)? This may be the case since he would not seem to support the relegation of Iraq to an Iranian satellite--which is an outcome that so worries secular Shia and the nationalist Sunnis.

I ask this to question whether (1) the handwringing over Iranian ascendency in Iraq is exaggerated; and (2) that Sadr is actually a threat to peace in Iraq (he seems more a threat to entrenched political interests than a radical endangering a political solution).

 
At 1:25 PM, Blogger johnMccutchen said...

Military historian Bevin Alexander Defense and the National Interest, The US is Backing Out of Iraq, proposes what I would describe as the Juan Cole Plan for Over the Horizon Presence.


He predicts that once the irritant of US ground combat is removed, the Shia and Sunni will turn on the insurgency and wipe it out, the price for the Shia - oil and non-sectarian state in exchange for unity..that may be wishful thinking..

 

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