Iraq Swindled of Millions by US Firms
Instability Spills over onto Lebanon's Nasrullah
Guerrilla violence killed 11 in Iraq on Saturday, including a British soldier in Basra. Guerrillas set off two car bombs in Baghdad, one that targeted police in a Shiite area. In a separate incident, a US soldier was killed in a bombing near Fallujah.
The War against the Shiite bakers in Iraq goes on unabated.
The London Times predicts a second war of liberation for Baghdad. Apparently the US military despairs of getting out of Iraq if the new Iraqi government cannot at least control the capital. They are therefore planning to have the new Iraqi military try to do effective counter-insurgency, clearing and holding Baghdad neighborhoods now infested with guerrillas.
The guerrillas in Iraq are nasty pieces of work, and I really wish they could be defeated by the forces of the elected Iraqi government. These are people that blow up children buying ice cream cones, or that bomb a wedding and then come back later and bomb the consequent funeral. But I just very much doubt that they can be defeated this way. Too many Sunni Iraqis support them by now, and hate the US and its Iraqi allies. And, the new Iraqi military is too listless and sectarianized to make something like this work over the long term.
Farah Stockman reports in the Boston Globe that US companies swindled the Iraqi government out of hundreds of millions of dollars. Then Paul Bremer's Coalition Provisional Authority blithely granted them amnesty just before it was dissolved. ' ''In effect, it makes Iraq into a 'free-fraud zone,' " said Alan Grayson, a Virginia attorney who is suing . . . ' Well, I'm just glad that the Bush administration was able to teach those hopelessly corrupt Middle Easterners the high standards of the American way of doing business. CPA apparently stood for "The Crooks are the Police Around here."
The US is just handing out weaponry and munitions to Iraqi police with no oversight and no accounting, according to a US government memo that the Chicago Tribune has gotten hold of. There are worries about the US inadvertently arming death squads, in contravention of the Leahy amendment. Well, we all remember what Dick Cheney said to Patrick Leahy.
Hamza Hendawi of AP has a perceptive piece on the recent attempted assassination of Shaikh Hasan Nasrullah, a clerical leader of the Shiite fundamentalist Hizbullah (Hezbollah) Party in Lebanon. He says there is some evidence that it was a plot by Salafi Jihadis, who belong to a militant revivalist stream of Sunni Islam, and who were seeking to avenge the deaths of Sunni Iraqis at the hands of Shiite mobs in recent disturbances in Iraq. As Hamza notes, this motivation suggests in a most worrisome way that Iraq's instability is beginning to spill over into the rest of the region. Hizbullah is now in the Lebanese government, but has had frictions with Druze, Christians and pro-Hariri Sunni Muslims because it continues to defend Syria. The other forces blame Syria for the assassination of former Sunni prime minister, Rafiq al-Hariri.
Borzou Daragahi of the LA Times presents an interesting analysis of the flurry of activity by the major Shiite clergymen of Najaf to end the political deadlock. They are afraid, he says, that if the (Shiite religious) United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) does not resolve the crisis itself, a "national unity government" will be imposed from above by fiat, perhaps led by secular ex-Baathist Iyad Allawi. They also want to forestall a process whereby the Shiite prime minister is chosen essentially by the Sunnis in parliament, because of a split within the Shiite bloc.
A spokesman for the UIA, MP Rida Jawad Taqi, came out early Sunday morning to say that the problems would be resolved within 24 hours. Al-Sharq al-Awsat explains that there will be pre-arranged candidates for president, prime minister and speaker of the house, who are broadly acceptable. But there have been many such breathless statements and promises. We'll see.
There are increasing signs that Ibrahim Jaafari, to whom the Kurds and Sunni Arabs and Americans object, will step aside for another candidate from his Dawa Party (a key component of the UIA coalition). My suspicion is that the Sunnis were trying to ensure that the prime minister would be from the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), another UIA component, in hopes that SCIRI would then give up the Ministry of the Interior. That ministry has been accused of allowing elements of the paramilitary, Iran-trained Badr Corps to infiltrate its special police commando units, and then to carry out death squad attacks on Sunni Arabs suspected of links to the guerrilla movement.
Daragani also has an excellent follow-up piece on the mystery of the attack on the Mustafa Husayniyah last month. Unfortunately, the whole episode seems still shrouded in mystery. My own best guess is that there was some sort of Sunni-Shiite struggle within the Iraqi special forces, into which the US got caught up.
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak attempted to dampen the controversy over his charge that Arab Shiites are more loyal to Iran than to their own governments, saying that he only wanted to warn against the danger of a break-up of Iraq.
posted by Juan Cole @ 4/16/2006 12:32:00 AM
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10 Comments:
This would be the 3rd liberation, I believe. Baghdad had a second liberation a year ago for the same reason: the new government means business, so there.
Baghdad was at its quietest before the 2nd liberation. That involved 40,000 troops running amock and creating havoc and grief. The reprisals that followed and the mass raids in response still continue.
"Clearing and holding" assumes that they have enough to hold the whole at the end. Do they? How do you stop people from the yet to be cleared sections coming in?
Providing water and electricity to one section at a time also assumes that there is enough for the whole at the end. Where is that going to come from?
What the Americans in their fantasy dens are trying to do is to dog-train the population. The sections who inform get more than those who don't.
The US is now like a woman-beater asking for a second chance. What the Administration will sooner or later realize is that Iraq does not want them; does not need them; and they will leave whether they like it or not. The new parliament has the power; desire; and will to order them out. Failing that, how long would the American public put up with this?
There is no us, and never will be ..... so just get out.
There Stands Jaafari, Like a Stone Wall
Perhaps unsurprisingly, in the Great Standoff to see who would be stuck with the onus of publicly declaring the unworkability of the Incredibly-Complicated Foreign-Expert-Blessed Insuperable- Vote-Barrier-Choked Iraqi Constitution, the Sunnis seem to have blinked first.
Does this mean they lose?
Reportedly, former Prime Minister Allawi, "a onetime CIA protege and leader of a secular coalition with 25 seats in parliament, said in a statement broadcast on Iraqi television that political leaders might have to create an emergency government 'that is capable of bringing Iraq to its feet and save it from its current deadly crisis.'"
With the hither-to sacred "constitution" now stabbed in the back by a former PM, no less, the way seems now clear for the US-annointed current PM Jaafari to order the arrest of Allawi and prorogue his 25-member party for attempting to subvert the Constitution.
As Allawi supporter and former(?) CIA puppet Adnan Pachachi provocatively added, the new government he sought, "would not necessarily be based on the results of the election, which we do not think reflected the voters' will, anyway." Can't get much better evidence than that of anti-democratic sentiment.
With the anti-constitutionalists out of the way, the Parliament is reduced to 250 members, of which the UIA holds 130 seats. With the Constitution clearly in shambles, Parliament could meet, adopt new emergency rules of procedure, and the UIA would elect President, PM, and Ministers more clearly to its liking. Kurds and compliant Sunnis might be let in on pieces of the action.
If the US is behind this scenario, maybe moneybags Chalabi will be left in place as Oil Minister and Chief Dispenser of Contracts, Money-bagman extraordinaire.
I must disagree with your comment that the Iraqi Army (IA) is too "listless and sectarian" to deal with the insurgency. I recently returned from a month's assignment reporting on the efforts of the Military Transition Teams (MTT) working to develop the IA. What I found was an increasingly effective fighting force that is only now beginning to flex its muscle at the brigade and division level (which is what the recently concluded and misreported Operation Swarmer was actually about.) If the U.S. military can do one thing well, it's the training of foreign armies--and this one is being rebuilt (an unfortunate necessity, courtesy of Paul Bremer) from scratch.
Mr. Cole, I will venture a prediction--there will certainly be no "democracy" in Iraq, and the so-called civilian government is unlikely to ever amount to more than a fig leaf. But the IA (which in my opinion will eventually control the police function as well) will ultimately rule. It won't be pretty--at least not at first--but if, as and when the U.S. draws forces down, it won't be American fingers on the triggers, and the media, as it usually does where foreigners kill foreigners, will yawn and move on. Nevertheless, the future of the country--whatever that may mean--is likely to reside with the IA. A "kinder, gentler" Saddam? Who knows? But in my view, after conversations with many, many Iraqis, if today the choice was between law and order or "democracy," it's the former by a long, long mile.
You wrote: "The guerrillas in Iraq are nasty pieces of work". Which groups do you mean? As experts like Anthony Cordesman confirm, most resistance groups don't "blow up children buying ice cream cones"
And do you "really wish they could be defeated by the forces of the elected Iraqi government", that means among others forces like the "wolf brigade", shiit militias and death squads controlled by the Ministry of the Interior?
Mr. Miller: You say you observed the Iraqi Army for a month and believe it is becoming an effective unit. Your articles at http://www.worldnetdaily.com are a little shy on some details.
Your latest articles report you witnessed troops in fresh uniforms on a drill. Did you accompany them on any neighborhood patrol or field mission?
If you were embedded in an Iraqi unit under the supervision of a US officer, would that allow you to predict how the unit would function after the foreigner is gone?
Will Sunni troops will obey a Shia or Kurd officer and shoot up a "safe house" full of Sunni insurgents. What of the allegation that the police and army aren't riddled with insurgent or militia infiltrators. And how can an Iraqi soldier obey any "neutral" orders and not fear a revenge killing against his kin?
How many different interpreters did you have? Sunni, Shiite, or Kurd? Remember the parable of the blind men and the elephant.
Any opinion of M. Etheringon's memoir? He saw no concensus view or "national" interest, but only a multitude of clan, sect, and local interests.
You may be right that the futur ruler of Iraq will be whoever controls the army, but any chance this "Saddam lite" will be a Shiite? How would someone like Muqtada al Sadr fit into the emerging order?
You say it was a mistake to disolve the old army. What of Bremers claim, concurred by Gerecht, that that army simply ceased to exist, that it melted away, and that it would have been impossible to get Shia recruits to report to the existing officers?
Any opinion on search and destroy "sweeps" do any good or simply increase resentment? Don't the insurgents get tipped off and clear out before any government forces arrive?
As US troops eventually withdraw and Iraqi fingers are at the gun triggers, will you yourself "yawn and move on"? Or might there be some important lessons?
Al Jazeera has posted a story (14 April), quoting a Raw Story article (13 April), on the use of MEK in Special Operations activities in Iran. It quotes both UN and UK officials and how alarmed at this sort of activity on the part of the US, namely, using known terrorist groups as proxies.
Jim Koch: All excellent questions, and most calling for answers of the prophetic variety--of which I am already on uncertain ground to have ventured just one--that the IA would eventually control Iraq, with or without fig leaf of civil government.
What I can report is the consensus view that large enclaves of the IP are little more than insurgents and often criminals garbed in police uniform. The IA is by no means trusted by Iraqis, but is much more closely controlled by American advisors, and thus, is widely regarded (among U.S. advisors) as being far less corrupt. I had the opportunity to interview several high-ranking IA field officers, and was impressed.
The IP is a very different story. In fact, you too can join the IP for about $10--the price I paid to a local seller who openly sold, inside the IZ, IP uniforms and arm patches!
My translators included many Shias and Sunnis, but no Kurds, partly (I think) because of where I was ditty-bopping--Baghdad and Diyala Province. It's become past practice now to inquire about a translator's faith--generally done by asking where he or she is from. Not science, but it works. Certain comments can be adjusted for bias although I was less inclined to do that this time around, since the communities (and views) these men and women represented were, in fact, a large part of the story.
Regarding the dissolution of the old IA, I must report a nearly unanimous view by current senior U.S. commanders, that it was a major blunder. (Of course, no serving U.S. officer will mention any names responsible although they will critique the policy.) I have read Bremer's rationalizations and must disagree with him. One reason for having a viceroy is the necessity of(occasionally) jamming down the locals' throats otherwise unpopular decisions. Were the choices limited to dissolution or maintenance? I don't believe they were--indeed, the point of the exercise was to keep employed several hundred thousand military aged men, and this could have been done, without empowering them along the lines of the old IA.
Mr. Koch, space limits my answers a bit, but allow me to address another of your questions, and that concerns how an army drawn from a fractured land can create national adhesion. My answer is unpleasant but integral to the nature of militaries--the army only has to create adhesion by and among its own. Promotions, paychecks, privileges, control of the government and the nation's resources may provide a basis of sectarian "forgive and forget"--among soldiers only, of course.
As long as an army maintains a monopoly on serious ordnance, it will become the only game in town--or country, as the case may be.
About the Baghdad offensive, haven't we seen this already?
A major offensive is announced in the newspapers (obviously long after the targets have found out about it but before it is supposed to happen). The army goes around blowing up whatever the target chooses to leave behind to be blown up. The target banks its propaganda coup, and operates from an area outside the original offensive zone. Then the target moves back to the offensive zone. I'll just say I doubt there will be good results from this offensive.
From the comments I'm getting confirmation that the army is being built by the Americans to be loyal to the Americans, not the civilian government. I'm not sure how that will work but it explains the reluctance of the Shiites to place the ministry of defense under a "technocrat" instead of a militia man.
The Shia are being pushed and if they snap it will be them, their militias the Sunnis, maybe some Iranian volunteers and maybe more Sunni Arab foreign fighters against the IA(?), the Kurds and the Americans. It will not be pretty. The army is looking good now. we'll see how it looks after Sistani calls them traitors.
In most of Iraq, the IA and Americans will be the force with less legitimacy, and all the Shia have to do is wait the Americans out to get Vietnam II. This will not be an easy win for the US.
Miller: Is this OK with you? As a US soldier who was told you would be liberating Iraq, does setting up a puppet pro-US dictatorship run by someone from the army match what over 2,000 of your fellow soldiers died for?
Mr. Evans: I certainly agree with your thinking that currently, the IA "tilts" towards the Americans. As you can imagine, this arises from a host of circumstances innate to the training and logistics functions--one thing that struck me (but shouldn't have, so natural is it) was the very close relationships between the U.S. NCO trainers--the real field instructors--and the Iraqi soldiers, including officers. Whether the existing tilt survives through a more mature IA is another question, but if the history of the relationship between our military and other armies they've built is any guide, the intimacy will continue.
Regarding your last question, I make it a point to be as sociopathic as possible when covering this war--things are neither good nor bad, they just are what they are. Nothing could be more irrelevant--(or more often wrong)--than anything I feel or may predict. One byproduct of this particular conflict is likely to be overdoses of humility all around.
Regarding U.S. soldiers attitudes. If they were given the same choice that I suggested in an earlier post be given to Iraqis--Law and Order or democracy, our men and women would likely opt for the former. The reason isn't hard to fathom--choice number one means they go home sitting upright in an airplane, being young and munching on in-flight peanuts. I don't doubt that there would be some--many perhaps--who might have second thoughts now or later. And there might be the inevitable flow of post-war books and memoirs regretting the whole thing. But for the moment, to get into an convoy and head outside the wire means putting your guts in your mouth and closing your legs real tight. They're braver and a lot toughter than I am--but I still think, given a choice, they'd go with law and order.
For the US to install a pro-US army to run Iraq over after the people of Iraq had a chance to vote for pro-US candidates in the civilian government and chose not to is not the way to build law and order. It is the way to build the exact opposite. It is the way to ensure that the army will have to fight everybody else in the country from a position lacking legitimacy.
This is an indication that the US prefers pro-US dictatorship and the civil war necessary to emplace that dictatorship to either democracy or to law and order.
As far as the US talent in training foreign armies, the South Vietnamese army probably had more support from the population than the Iraqi army with regard to its respective pro-US tilt. I cannot think of an example where the US trained a pro-US tilting army from a population as hostile to the US as Iraq (according to the elections) and that army was able to successfully rule the country.
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