Informed Comment

Thoughts on the Middle East, History, and Religion

Juan Cole is President of the Global Americana Institute

Wednesday, September 03, 2008

Bombings in Mosul, Baghdad kill 11;
Maliki's Conflict with Kurds Deepens;
Anbar Sheikhs Angered by US Handover

DPA reports that "Seven people were killed in a car bombing in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul city Tuesday . . . a suicide bomber detonated his explosives-laden vehicle near an Iraqi army checkpoint in the eastern al-Quds neighbourhood, killing seven people and wounding seven. . . In Baghdad twin attacks that targeted police patrols left four people dead and 14 injured, the Voice of Iraq (VOI) news agency reported."

Reuters has more.

Among the dead was one US soldier, who died in a non-combat related incident.

Kurdistan president Masoud Barzani calls the al-Maliki government "totalitarian," comparing it to Saddam's tyranny. He warns that if a referendum is not held soon in Kirkuk province over whether it will join the Kurdistan Regional Government that Barzani heads, he will act to support the Kirkuk council's call for the city to be annexed into Kurdistan. Barzani's frustrations are clearly boiling over in this interview, and signal how near a military confrontation his Peshmerga security forces are with the Iraqi army and other Iraqi groups such a s Arabs and Turkmen.

Jonathan Steele's sources underline that if the Iraqi army insists on going into Kurdish regions in the north of Diyala Province, there could be a military confrontation between it and the Peshmerga. The crisis over control of security in the city of Khanaqin remains unresolved.

Joost Hilterman writing at Abu Aardvark also sees the situation as dire.

Time reports that America's tribal allies in al-Anbar province are angry that the US turned the province over to the Iraqi government. The Awakening Council and tribal leaders fear that the Baghdad government will use its control over the police and army to benefit the Iraqi Islamic Party, which currently controls the province but was elected with only 2% of the vote in January, 2005. The IIP is part of the Iraqi Accord Front, made up of Sunni fundamentalists, who recently rejoined the al-Maliki government. Money graf:


' Only a handful of the 40 or so Awakening leaders attended the ceremony in Ramadi, a snub that Sheikh Natah says was intended as a clear message to the government. At heart is a power struggle between the Awakening council and the Iraqi Islamic Party . . . Unlike the last time around in 2005, the Sunni tribal elders are eager to contest the polls, and say they wanted U.S. troops to remain in Anbar until after the elections to help ensure a free and fair ballot. They also want their key ally, police chief Major General Tareq Youssef al A'sal al Dulaimi, reinstated to the position he was ousted from just a few days ago. (Dulaimi was removed for unspecified "administrative" reasons.) The Awakening members say Dulaimi's sudden removal, which was approved by the Interior Ministry, has cemented their fears that their local Sunni rivals in the Iraqi Islamic Party are maneuvering to gain control of Anbar's 28,000-strong police force and purge it of tribal loyalists. . . . "If the Islamic Party continues to pressure the government to remove the Awakening members from the security forces ... then there is a high likelihood that Anbar will return to violence," Sheikh Natah says.'


Al-Hayat reports in Arabic that the US military has decided not to hand over security to the Iraqis in 6 ethnically mixed provinces until after the US elections. They include Salahuddin, Mosul, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk and Hilla. The 12 provinces in which the US has given the lead to Iraqi forces on security are more ethnically or religiously homogeneous, in the Shiite south or the Kurdish north.

AP reports that Baghdad is still very dangerous despite lowered death tolls from political violence:
' Small scale bombings and shootings persist in the capital — each a reminder that the war is not over and that Baghdad remains a place where no trip is routine and residents are still guided by precautions. Most won't drive at night. Many try to avoid heavily clogged streets, remembering that suicide bombers and other attackers intent on killing large numbers of civilians favor traffic jams or congested areas . . . [in August] at least 360 civilians were killed and more than 470 wounded in violence throughout the country, according to an Associated Press count. '


That would be 4,320 civilians killed in political violence every year if the level stayed that low. (I take it this number excludes killed 'insurgents' and Iraqi security forces, so that actual number of war-related deaths would be much higher annually.)

It is estimated that 75,000 persons have died in the civil war in Sri Lanka since 1982, or 2800 a year.

Iraq is higher, just with regard to civilian casualties.

The Kashmir conflict is estimated to have killed 70,000 persons since 1988, or about 3500 a year.

Iraq is higher.

In the Lebanon Civil War of 1975-1990, it is estimated that at least 100,000 persons were killed, 75,000 civilians and 25,000 military.

If we extrapolated out Iraq's August death rate for civilians over 15 years, that would be 64,000 or not far from the toll in Lebanon's war.

Let me repeat: The level of violence at this moment in Iraq is similar to what prevailed on average during one of the 20th century's worst ethnic civil wars! It is still higher than the casualty rates in Sri Lanka and Kashmir, two of the worst ongoing conflicts in the world.

Only in an Orwellian society could our press declare the relative decline in monthly death tolls in Iraq to constitute "calm" in an absolute sense.

And that is if the August levels are taken as the baseline and if the numbers continue to be that low. If we averaged deaths during the previous 12 months, the baseline would be much higher.

The current Iraq Civil War is one of the world's most deadly continuing conflicts, worse than Sri Lanka and Kashmir and on a par with the 15-year long Lebanon Civil War!

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6 Comments:

At 4:50 AM, Anonymous Anonymous said...

The downsizing of the Kurdish war-lords coincides with the beginning of the end of the US presence in Iraq, and with it its support.

The SOFA negotiations have now formerly stopped after Iraq refused the "final" US draft. The Americans have conveyed an Iraqi draft to Bush and asked for a 10 day period to study it which ends this week. See, in Arabic:

http://www.alsabaah.com/paper.php?source=akbar&mlf=interpage&sid=68962

The report (from al-Sabah, Maliki's mouthpiece) also says that a 6-month or one-year cover will most likely be agreed to govern the stay of US troops next year.

 
At 11:25 AM, Blogger karlof1 said...

Maliki's stonewalling the SOFA and Bush's great desire to get an "extension" of his occupation without needing to resort to the UNSC where any attempted resolution will be vetoed allows Maliki to force the US forces to ally with his in any confrontation with the Kurds; and we can be certain that a confrontation is coming. This likelihood has further agitated Kurdish leaders, who would like to be masters of their situation, and may be aware of the reality that the US will favor the Iraqi government at their expense. This makes the situation ripe for a military showdown in the near future, as Maliki and the Kurds can only wait so long, but for different reasons.

This puts the US and UK in a very difficult position. If they decide to defend the Kurds, they lose their Big Lie propaganda war against Russia as they will be doing the same in defending the Kurds as Russia did with the Ossetians and Abkhazians. (Please see Jerome a Paris's maginicent deconstruction of Brown's Guardian op/ed.) But if they back the Kurds, they will throw out any hope for their coveted Oil Bill and the SOFA. It is for all the above reasons why I see the Kurdsish leaders resorting to warfare while they still have the resources and before the Iraqi Amry gets any stronger. And it's not just oil that's at stake. Any Iraqi government will want control of the Tigris, whose value is likely more than the oil. So the strategic confrontation goes beyond oil and is much more complex. We always knew this probelm would arise at some point; that point appears to be now.

 
At 1:52 PM, Anonymous Anonymous said...

Re: Karlof1 comment.

Kurdistan is differnet. It has no strategic value on its own. There is little oil there and it can't be exported anyway. The Kurds have been used as a stick against the Iraqis since the 1920s when Mulla Mustafa al-Barazani (the father of Masood, now the president of the Kurdish region) in a bizzare move allied with Ataturk to annexe Mosul until the current alliance with Israel and USA. In addition, they have since 2003 been given a major role in the Iraqi government.

The Kurds will retreat to their mountains when the Americans leave and no one will chase them. The conflict will be in the "disputed areas" outside the existing Kurdistan borders. As the US has failed to subdue these areas despite their massive presence so far, it is hard to see how they can help the Kurds win them after they withdraw their troops, and for what?

The other big problem is Turkey, a member of NATO and a strategic US ally. They will almost certainly get involved in case of an armed conflict. How would the US deal with that, and would the Kurds risk annihilation in these flat areas where there are no mountains to shelter them?

 
At 7:01 PM, Blogger karlof1 said...

An Ethnoreligious map provides a look at Kurdish population distribution, albeit population movement is fluid in this zone. This is a map of Iraq's oil infrastructure. Note how the major oil pipeline goes through the Kurdish zone and the relation of the major oil fields. Not depicted are the very likely gas fields that have yet to be discovered. I understand the Kurds being used as "Imperial Wedges," which has driven them to want independece; and if the Armenians, Ossetians, and Georgians, then why not the Kurds? I suppose we should blame the British.

In 50 years, the oil and gas will be gone along with the need to protect the pipeline; however, the water remains. Thus my including control of the Tigris as very important for any Iraqi government, which renders the region strategic for the longterm. As for the Turks, most items I've read say they oppose an independent Kurdish nation; thus they would likely ally with an Iraqi government wanting to maintain control over the Kurds. This is another plus for Maliki and Sadr. I also think the Kirkuk referendum is a dead letter, which further inflames the Kurds. Now I would very much like to see the Kurd and Iraqi peoples agree to get along and live within the same nation. I think a political setlement is possible, but not with the current Kurdish leaders, who--like Saakashvili--thought that somehow allying with the USA would free them from their hegemonic neighbor. The referendum's demise and Maliki's steady northward movement of Iraqi military forces are overt messages to the Kurds and their leaders to end their independence fantasy and negotiate pragmaticly. Time will tell; olny 118 days until 2009.

 
At 11:29 AM, Anonymous Anonymous said...

Juan,

It can be misleading to compare various conflicts' absolute casualty numbers. I think a better comparison would be annual civilian casualties per million people. Using this metric, and using populations of 21 million, 4 million, and 28 million for Sri Lanka, Lebanon, and Iraq, respectively, you get a much better sense of the level of civilian violence. Based on the casualty numbers you gave, Sri Lanka is at 133, Iraq at 160, and Lebanon at 1,250. Clearly the current situation in Iraq is bad, but it does not appear to be the Lebanon conflict's league.

 
At 7:52 PM, Anonymous Anonymous said...

The death tolls cited here are rock-bottom figures--various polls and surveys suggest that the true death toll is anywhere from 3 to 10 times higher than what is reported in the news.

 

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