By Julie M. Norman, UCL
(The Conversation) – Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, declared on May 5 that his government intends to intensify military operations and indefinitely reoccupy Gaza. The announcement has dashed hopes for a permanent ceasefire and the release of the remaining hostages held by Hamas.
The plan, which was unanimously approved by Israel’s security cabinet, includes displacing Gaza’s 2.1 million inhabitants to a single “humanitarian area” on less than a quarter of Gaza’s territory. This will result in Palestinians leaving “in great numbers to third countries”, said Israel’s far-right finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich.
It is tempting to view the plan as another move by Netanyahu to placate the hard-right members of his coalition. It can also be viewed as a pressure tactic on Hamas – a threat to force the militant group to agree to a short-term ceasefire ahead of the visit of the US president, Donald Trump, to the Middle East from May 13.
However, Netanyahu’s announcement is much more than rhetorical sabre-rattling. Israel’s recent operations in Gaza indicate that the plan should be taken literally and seriously. Since March, when the war in Gaza resumed following a temporary ceasefire, Israel has declared about 70% of the enclave either a military “red zone” or under evacuation.
The new plan affirms what many have long feared: that expanding territorial control is not merely a short-term military tactic but a long-term occupation. In my view, this will only bring more suffering for Palestinians, less security for Israel, and more instability to the region.
The humanitarian crisis in Gaza cannot be overstated. Many observers have described the current situation as the worst of any time during the past 18 months.
The flow of humanitarian aid to Gaza has been politicised and widely criticised throughout the war, often slowing to a trickle. However, at least some aid trucks were allowed to pass into the Strip from late October 2023, shortly after the war began. This was followed by a surge of aid during the ceasefire in January and February 2025.
But no food, fuel or medicines have entered Gaza since early March. This has led to near-famine conditions and the breakdown of the few remaining healthcare services.
Israel’s proposed plan would forcibly move Gazans, nearly all of whom have already been displaced multiple times, into militarised “sterile zones” in the south. Humanitarian aid would be managed there by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and private US companies.
UN agencies and international NGOs operating in Gaza have rejected this plan as contravening humanitarian principles. They have likened it to “de facto internment conditions”.
Complicating Israeli security
Deteriorating humanitarian conditions, combined with further displacement, will only create more security challenges for Israel. Entrenched occupation fuels armed resistance and further mobilises insurgency.
The US saw this following its 2003 invasion of Iraq, which resulted in over 8,000 US military personnel and contractors being killed. Israel has repeatedly faced the rise of armed militant groups in response to prolonged military occupations in Lebanon, Gaza and the West Bank.
Hamas has already dismissed further ceasefire talks in the wake of the new plan, and the group is seemingly having no trouble recruiting new members to its military wing. This has ensured a costly deployment for IDF ground troops.
It goes without saying that Hamas should release all of the remaining hostages – and should have done so long ago. But Hamas now sees little incentive to do so when Israeli ministers are calling for what appears to be the complete destruction of Gaza, with or without a hostage release.
A renewed occupation of Gaza will also further complicate regional dynamics. Arab states that have promised billions of dollars for Gaza’s reconstruction, alongside a credible plan for a two-state solution, will balk at subsidising Israeli military control.
The stalled US-backed normalisation deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which has long been sought both by the Trump and Biden administrations, will probably be pushed even further back. It may even be abandoned entirely if Israel retrenches in Gaza.
“Gaza 34,” Digital, Midjourney, 2025
And any US involvement in Israel’s new Gaza plan could complicate negotiations between the US and Iran over Tehran’s nuclear programme. The Iranian foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, has already accused Netanyahu of dragging the US into a “disaster” in the Middle East by “attempting to brazenly dictate” what Trump can and cannot do in his diplomacy with Iran.
But perhaps most importantly, the reoccupation of Gaza – coupled with incursions, annexations and settlement expansion in the West Bank – communicates in no uncertain terms that the Israeli government is torpedoing any pathway to a two-state solution.
This has long been clear to Palestinians and many onlookers. Most realists accepted that any moves towards Palestinian self-determination would be non-starters in the aftermath of the October 7 attacks on southern Israel.
However, Israel’s friends in the international community, especially in Europe, have been holding on to the hope that Israel would eventually come back to the two-state framework. This latest plan calls their bluff.
France and the UK are already in discussion about possibly recognising Palestine as a state at a conference in June. The UK has long preferred recognition as part of a peace process towards two states, rather than a symbolic gesture.
But a retrenched “capture” of Gaza, combined with another massive civilian displacement, may speed up serious consideration of this recognition – while there is still Palestinian territory left to recognise.
Julie M. Norman, Senior Associate Fellow on the Middle East at RUSI; Associate Professor in Politics & International Relations, UCL
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
© 2025 All Rights Reserved