With Germany at the helm and regional tensions mounting, the diplomatic window may be closing
Braga, Portugal and San Marcos, Ca. (Special to Informed Comment, Feature) – France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, the European signatories of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or “Iran Deal” of 2015, known as the E3 are now actively considering the reactivation of its so-called “snapback” mechanism—an unprecedented diplomatic step that would restore sweeping United Nations sanctions on Iran and effectively isolate it from the global economy. The E3 will meet with Iran this Friday 25 July in Istanbul, and if they choose the snapback option after this meeting it could be the last straw that pushes Iran to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
By restoring the legal authority of international sanctions, the snapback would remove existing political barriers to further military operations against Iran’s nuclear program.
Western officials, including senior figures in NATO, have privately acknowledged that a multilateral sanctions framework could serve as a platform for more forceful action.
For Israel, long skeptical of international diplomacy’s ability to curtail Iran’s nuclear progress, such a shift would offer both justification and cover for future strikes, destroying facilities and activities it deems sanctions have not curtailed.
For the United States, it could legitimize a more assertive role, even without a formal return to the JCPOA.
Tehran has long warned that any move to restore U.N. sanctions would be viewed as a red line. Among the potential scenarios under discussion in Iranian political and military circles are a formal withdrawal from the NPT, an acceleration of uranium enrichment well beyond the current 90 percent threshold, or retaliatory action by proxy groups in Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. Each option carries significant risks—both for the region and for the global nonproliferation regime—but Iran’s leaders may conclude that, with diplomacy unraveling, escalation is the only remaining leverage.
Europe’s Nonproliferation Policy
For more than two decades, Europe’s approach to Iran’s nuclear program has been shaped by a combination of geographic anxiety and strategic caution. Given their proximity to the Middle East—and thus to the potential fallout of any nuclear or military escalation—European powers have consistently perceived Iran’s nuclear ambitions as a direct regional threat.
Unlike the United States or Israel, however, European states have been wary of pursuing counter-proliferation through military force. After the chaotic outcomes of Western interventions in Iraq and Libya, European policymakers grew increasingly convinced that diplomacy—not confrontation—was the only viable path forward. When the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed in 2015 during the Obama administration, European capitals greeted it as a diplomatic triumph, finally offering a framework to cap Iran’s nuclear program under an international inspections’ regime, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The IAEA repeatedly confirmed Iran’s compliance, reinforcing Europe’s confidence in the deal. Iran never actually received the sanctions relief promised to it for dismantling 80% of its civilian nuclear enrichment program, since the US Congress refused to lift third-party sanctions, preventing substantial European trade with and investment in Iran. When the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, European signatories of the JCPOA sought to distance themselves from Washington’s maximum pressure campaign.
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom even established a financial mechanism known as INSTEX, intended to allow trade with Iran—particularly for humanitarian goods—outside of the U.S.-dominated financial system. The effort was symbolic, and ultimately ineffective, but it underscored Europe’s broader commitment to preserving diplomacy. Now, however, the tone has shifted. With the Islamic Republic’s uranium enrichment levels reaching 60% (95% is needed for a bomb) and international inspectors increasingly restricted, European patience appears to have run out, especially amid reports that Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium might have survived the 12-Day war.
With the U.S. and Israel having dealt a devastating blow to Iran’s nuclear infrastructure—without sparking a regional war or imposing any direct risk to European soil—the calculus in Europe is shifting. With little left of Iran’s nuclear program to defend, European powers appear ready to re-align with Washington, politically supporting the U.S. effort to push for a new agreement—this time, one that likely leaves no room for Iranian enrichment capabilities at all.
Germany, Israel’s staunchest ally in the EU, has emerged as the most vocal proponent of reactivating the snapback clause. Chancellor Friedrich Merz, addressing Iran’s nuclear issue, went even further to say that “attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities was dirty work that Israel did for us.” French and British officials have expressed cautious agreement, signaling that Europe may be on the verge of aligning with U.S. priorities after nearly a decade of divergence.
Originally embedded in the JCPOA and enshrined in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, snapback allows any participant of the original nuclear agreement to unilaterally trigger the reimposition of all U.N. sanctions on Iran. Once activated, the mechanism bypasses the need for a new Security Council vote and automatically reinstates sanctions that were lifted in exchange for Iran’s compliance with the nuclear accord. Crucially, neither Russia nor China—both permanent members of the Council—can veto the measure, a safeguard deliberately designed to avoid diplomatic deadlock.
The Iranian Reaction
For Iran, the stakes are high. The return of U.N. sanctions would bring back a host of punitive measures: a total arms embargo, severe restrictions on its ballistic missile program, prohibitions on nuclear research, and tight limits on oil exports and financial transactions. While the country has grown accustomed to U.S. sanctions, which were unilaterally reimposed in 2018 following Washington’s withdrawal from the JCPOA under President Donald Trump, the reactivation of snapback would internationalize Iran’s isolation and compel compliance even from reluctant actors like China, India, and Turkey. Unlike American sanctions, which rely heavily on secondary enforcement and financial coercion, U.N.-mandated sanctions would be legally binding for all member states.
As the international community weighs the activation of snapback, a defining moment approaches. What was once a fragile agreement aimed at de-escalation is now becoming a vehicle for confrontation. Whether this shift will bring resolution or deepen the region’s volatility remains uncertain. But the message from Europe, particularly from Berlin, is increasingly clear: the window for negotiation is closing, and a new phase of confrontation may already be underway.
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