By Anne Irfan, UCL
(The Conversation) – At the end of August, the Trump administration blocked Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, and 80 other Palestinian officials from attending the UN general assembly meeting in New York, which runs between September 9 and 23. The US president’s decision to revoke the Palestinian officials’ US visas comes as various European governments prepare to formally recognise the state of Palestine at the general assembly. Supporters of Palestinian statehood are proposing a central role for Abbas’ Palestinian Authority (PA) in Gaza’s future government.
Historically, the US has also supported the PA. The Oslo accords, which created the PA in the first place, were signed at the White House in 1993. US president Bill Clinton famously hosted Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and the chair of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), Yasser Arafat.
In discourse that has since become standard US policy, Clinton spoke of a so-called “two-state solution”, with security for Israel and democratic self-rule for the Palestinians. The US provided significant financial support for the PA after its establishment, with particular funding for its ample security forces.
Yet behind the scenes, the US stance on Palestinian statehood has always been murkier. A deeper look shows that the Trump administration’s recent moves blocking the PA are less of a departure from long-term US policy than they may seem. As I explain in my new book A Short History of the Gaza Strip, the US has long paired its ostensible support for the PA with policies that cripple its ability to function and undermine prospects of real Palestinian independence.
From the start, the Oslo accords were skewed in favour of Israeli interests. Under the agreement’s terms, the PA had limited autonomy over around three-quarters of the Gaza Strip and less than one-fifth of the West Bank. The Israeli military retained ultimate control and continued to seize more land for illegal settlements.
At the end of the 1990s, Clinton aligned himself closely with the new Israeli prime minister, Ehud Barak. Barak’s declared “red lines” included no Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, no Palestinian national army, no Palestinian sovereignty over any part of Jerusalem and the retention of most illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank.
Further negotiations were structured to constrain the Palestinians, culminating in the “failure” of the 2000 Camp David summit. Familiar to anyone who has followed Israeli-Palestinian affairs, Arafat has been blamed for refusing Barak’s “unprecedented” proposal. The reality is somewhat different.
As Robert Malley and Hussein Agha wrote in their 2001 book, Camp David: a tragedy of errors, “what so many viewed as a generous Israeli offer, the Palestinians viewed as neither generous, nor Israeli, nor, indeed, as an offer”. Malley served as adviser to Clinton on Arab-Israeli affairs while Agha, a senior associate member of Oxford University’s St Antony’s College has been associated with Israeli-Palestinian affairs for more than half a century – meaning they know whereof they speak.
The US’ disingenuous approach did not end when Clinton left office. During the second intifada (Palestinian uprising) from 2000-2005, the administration of George W. Bush backed Israel’s full invasion of PA-administered areas in the West Bank and Gaza. This completely undermined any chance of a two-state solution – the very “solution” that the US ostensibly supported.
In 2003, the US demanded a full restructuring of the PA’s set-up to curtail Arafat, whom Palestinians had elected president in 1996. When he died in 2004, he had spent two years under Israeli siege in Ramallah – another policy supported by the US.
Two years later, US moves to undermine the PA reached a crescendo when the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections returned Hamas as the largest party with 44% of the vote. While the elections were deemed free and fair by international observers, the Bush adminstration responded by plotting, arming and funding a coup to overthrow the new PA government.
In the end, the coup backfired, resulting in a lasting split from 2007 when Hamas seized control of Gaza and Abbas’ forces purged it from the PA in the West Bank. Since then, Palestinians in the two territories have been largely cut off from one another under two separate regimes. Abbas’ PA has been based in the West Bank while Hamas governs Gaza – where Israel has imposed a full blockade from 2007, supported by the US and Egypt.
No authority
In the two decades since, successive US administrations have effectively facilitated the Palestinian divide. In 2014, the Obama administration backed Israeli opposition to a short-lived Palestinian unity government. And when Abbas cancelled long-awaited Palestinian elections in 2021, the Biden administration stayed silent, with reports of tacit US support for the move behind the scenes.
While many western and Arab states are calling for the PA to take over Gaza’s future governance, critics point out that it has long been toothless and illegitimate.
Elected in 2005, Abbas is now 20 years into a four-year term. What’s more, his regime has delivered little for West Bank Palestinians in the nearly two decades since the split from Gaza.
“Left to right: The Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin, The U.S. president, Bill Clinton, and PLO chairman, Yasser Arafat, in the Oslo accords signing ceremony, in the white house lawn, 1993.” Vince Musi / The White House. This file is a work of an employee of the Executive Office of the President of the United States, taken or made as part of that person’s official duties. As a work of the U.S. federal government, it is in the public domain. Via Wikimedia.
He has been entirely ineffectual in countering the Israeli war on Gaza, launched after the Hamas-led attacks of October 7 2023 and widely recognised as genocide. As ministers call to resettle Gaza, Israel has continued to expand its illegal settlements in the West Bank and is openly planning ethnic cleansing.
It is important to remember that the PA was only ever created as an interim body, designed to serve for five years in the 1990s ahead of final negotiations. Its continued existence decades later is a serious indictment of the US-led so-called peace process. The reality of US treatment of the PA since the 1990s calls into question whether Trump’s recent moves are really a turning point in US policy – or simply the culmination of a long-term trend.
Anne Irfan, Lecturer in Interdisciplinary Race, Gender and Postcolonial Studies, UCL
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
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