The 'wanted to be fooled' element is key, and probably too generous a phrasing. There's a lot of talk of hinsight in this article, but most of the content - Chalabi's and the INA's and INC's lack of credibility and the personal advantages the invasion offered them, the burn notice on Curveball and his relationship with INC , that the mobile biological labs were both implausible and most closely resembled weather balloon platforms the Iraqi's were known to possess, that the Neo-cons had long had designs on Iraq as part of their wider geo-political goals - were utterly discredited long before the invasion, along with most of the other evidence offered. It was obvious at the time that there were no unconventional weapons in Iraq, and no plausible evidence in the posession of the West to support their presence. The media maniuplation in the lead-up was, as a student of history, fascinating to watch but essentially farcical. It seemed, even at the time, highly unlikely that most of the propents of the war really believed their propaganda.
It seemed obvious to me, and many others at the time that, in the memorable words of the Downing Street memo, "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy". The argument that the West was misled by treacherous foreigners pursuing their own agendas is the revisionism intented to let the allies of the architects of the war survive politically; but it is no more plausible today than it was at the time.
Also, be wary of the idea that the US simply hadn't realised the dangers of post-war secretarian governance, and the place of Iraq in the wider cold war between the West's local allies and Iran (here, oddly, presented as some kind of disinterested warnings of chaos from the Saudis). There were reports of extensive conflict between branches of US government as to whether they should install a new strongman as a puppet (which would make their prize easier to control and guarantee their ability to use Iraq to further their regional hegemony, but undermine the official justifications for the war), or construct some sort of democratic government, and trust that their occupation of the country and control of political and electoral machinery would enable them to dictate the course of the elections and shut out the threat of Irianian influence over the government long-term. The latter approach seemed to be going well in Afghanistan and was what was eventually chosen. That proved a serious miscalculation.
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The 'wanted to be fooled' element is key, and probably too generous a phrasing. There's a lot of talk of hinsight in this article, but most of the content - Chalabi's and the INA's and INC's lack of credibility and the personal advantages the invasion offered them, the burn notice on Curveball and his relationship with INC , that the mobile biological labs were both implausible and most closely resembled weather balloon platforms the Iraqi's were known to possess, that the Neo-cons had long had designs on Iraq as part of their wider geo-political goals - were utterly discredited long before the invasion, along with most of the other evidence offered. It was obvious at the time that there were no unconventional weapons in Iraq, and no plausible evidence in the posession of the West to support their presence. The media maniuplation in the lead-up was, as a student of history, fascinating to watch but essentially farcical. It seemed, even at the time, highly unlikely that most of the propents of the war really believed their propaganda.
It seemed obvious to me, and many others at the time that, in the memorable words of the Downing Street memo, "the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy". The argument that the West was misled by treacherous foreigners pursuing their own agendas is the revisionism intented to let the allies of the architects of the war survive politically; but it is no more plausible today than it was at the time.
Also, be wary of the idea that the US simply hadn't realised the dangers of post-war secretarian governance, and the place of Iraq in the wider cold war between the West's local allies and Iran (here, oddly, presented as some kind of disinterested warnings of chaos from the Saudis). There were reports of extensive conflict between branches of US government as to whether they should install a new strongman as a puppet (which would make their prize easier to control and guarantee their ability to use Iraq to further their regional hegemony, but undermine the official justifications for the war), or construct some sort of democratic government, and trust that their occupation of the country and control of political and electoral machinery would enable them to dictate the course of the elections and shut out the threat of Irianian influence over the government long-term. The latter approach seemed to be going well in Afghanistan and was what was eventually chosen. That proved a serious miscalculation.