I think the author hinted at that, that we're not sure of the direction the revolution will take, i.e. whether it'll be usurped by one faction or altogether subverted by power centers like the military.
The Iranian military and the IRGC are not a monolithic bloc. It is true that the IRGC has a vested economic and ideological interest in the longevity of the system, which was implied in the article when the author mentioned the efficacy of the security establishment, but it is not monolithic and the way in which the post-election tumult was handled has created fault lines within the rank-and-file. Furthermore, the Green Movement does enjoy wide support, but that doesn't necessarily translate into street action anymore bc of the fear the regime has created since it ordered the crackdown on June 19, 2009. Before then, people were coming out in droves:
But yes, as stated, the situation is very different in Iran than in Egypt or elsewhere bc of the IRGC and because the regime is able to call out hundreds of thousands of its own supporters, support the Mubarak or Ben Ali regime did not enjoy.
There's no real way of knowing, but Tehran's mayor put the demonstrations at June 15 at 3 million. On Feb. 11, 2010, the regime organized protests were also large, if not as large. The point is that this regime, unlike the Egyptian regime, was able and is still able to count on a large segment of society to come out in its support. Both side's claim to be a majority, that's beside the point. The point is that Iranian gov't's ability to bring in such large supporters tells us something about the possibility of the Tunisian and Egyptian movements producing similar results in Iran; that it is unlikely.
This is certainly true, but this was only temporary. In the Islamic Republic's narrative, and it is just that, a narrative, Bazargan's role was minute in the grand scheme of things: The Iranian Revolution turning (or being forced) into an Islamic one.
I think the point of the article would be have been muddied if he went into the issue of numbers, majorities, and the actual election results. That's all beside the point made.
"An interesting analysis, but based on fauly assumption. It is too soon to call Egypt’s ouster of Mubabarak a revolution."
I think the author of the article hinted at this point when she said it's too early too know the direction the revolution will take, i.e. would be usurped by the military and be absolved of being called a revolution in the first place.
Yes of course, but the Iranian gov't's narrative claim that there's succeeded because of its belief in Islam as an ideology and Khomeini as its charismatic leader. The point made in the article stands.
I think the author hinted at that, that we're not sure of the direction the revolution will take, i.e. whether it'll be usurped by one faction or altogether subverted by power centers like the military.
The Iranian military and the IRGC are not a monolithic bloc. It is true that the IRGC has a vested economic and ideological interest in the longevity of the system, which was implied in the article when the author mentioned the efficacy of the security establishment, but it is not monolithic and the way in which the post-election tumult was handled has created fault lines within the rank-and-file. Furthermore, the Green Movement does enjoy wide support, but that doesn't necessarily translate into street action anymore bc of the fear the regime has created since it ordered the crackdown on June 19, 2009. Before then, people were coming out in droves:
link to youtube.com
But yes, as stated, the situation is very different in Iran than in Egypt or elsewhere bc of the IRGC and because the regime is able to call out hundreds of thousands of its own supporters, support the Mubarak or Ben Ali regime did not enjoy.
There's no real way of knowing, but Tehran's mayor put the demonstrations at June 15 at 3 million. On Feb. 11, 2010, the regime organized protests were also large, if not as large. The point is that this regime, unlike the Egyptian regime, was able and is still able to count on a large segment of society to come out in its support. Both side's claim to be a majority, that's beside the point. The point is that Iranian gov't's ability to bring in such large supporters tells us something about the possibility of the Tunisian and Egyptian movements producing similar results in Iran; that it is unlikely.
I think what the author was focusing on was the actual protest movement, Mubarak fell in 18 days while Iran's gov't survived intact after 6 months.
This is certainly true, but this was only temporary. In the Islamic Republic's narrative, and it is just that, a narrative, Bazargan's role was minute in the grand scheme of things: The Iranian Revolution turning (or being forced) into an Islamic one.
I think the point of the article would be have been muddied if he went into the issue of numbers, majorities, and the actual election results. That's all beside the point made.
"An interesting analysis, but based on fauly assumption. It is too soon to call Egypt’s ouster of Mubabarak a revolution."
I think the author of the article hinted at this point when she said it's too early too know the direction the revolution will take, i.e. would be usurped by the military and be absolved of being called a revolution in the first place.
Yes of course, but the Iranian gov't's narrative claim that there's succeeded because of its belief in Islam as an ideology and Khomeini as its charismatic leader. The point made in the article stands.