Juan reminds us that it is not 1942, but in a sense it is. Israel has decided to become a "District 9" society, both in Gaza and much of the West Bank. Gaza is a land only nominally "outside" or separate from Israeli control. It is being isolated and controlled, even though the Israeli military does not routinely patrol its streets. Compare the Bantustans under apartheid South Africa or the way the US used Indian reservations in the 19th Century. And, yes, compare the ghettos of Poland in World War II. Differences in the degree of control and suffering? Yes, and that does matter. But this is the model, the framework, the starting point for realistic discussion of the situation.
I do not think it is the movement/organization distinction that determines whether bombing or assassination is likely to be counterproductive. See Franklin L. Ford "Political Murder", Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1985, and Irving Janis, "Air War and Emotional Stress" New York, NY: McGraw-Hill (copyright RAND), 1951. The former shows that assassination tends to be either endemic tit-for-tat, or else strengthens support for the person who is taken to be a symbol of the group or agenda he led (Henry IV of France, President Kennedy in the US). The Janis book shows that aerial bombing strengthened support for Churchill in Britain, but also for Hitler when Germany was under attack.
In my opinion, what matters is who can control the political meaning of the force being applied. In Juan's Egypt example, the government could communicate with its population as drone controllers cannot, and had the Luxor outrage to build upon as grounds for the legitimacy and urgency of its actions.
Juan reminds us that it is not 1942, but in a sense it is. Israel has decided to become a "District 9" society, both in Gaza and much of the West Bank. Gaza is a land only nominally "outside" or separate from Israeli control. It is being isolated and controlled, even though the Israeli military does not routinely patrol its streets. Compare the Bantustans under apartheid South Africa or the way the US used Indian reservations in the 19th Century. And, yes, compare the ghettos of Poland in World War II. Differences in the degree of control and suffering? Yes, and that does matter. But this is the model, the framework, the starting point for realistic discussion of the situation.
Why is ISCI now wanting Allawi?
I do not think it is the movement/organization distinction that determines whether bombing or assassination is likely to be counterproductive. See Franklin L. Ford "Political Murder", Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1985, and Irving Janis, "Air War and Emotional Stress" New York, NY: McGraw-Hill (copyright RAND), 1951. The former shows that assassination tends to be either endemic tit-for-tat, or else strengthens support for the person who is taken to be a symbol of the group or agenda he led (Henry IV of France, President Kennedy in the US). The Janis book shows that aerial bombing strengthened support for Churchill in Britain, but also for Hitler when Germany was under attack.
In my opinion, what matters is who can control the political meaning of the force being applied. In Juan's Egypt example, the government could communicate with its population as drone controllers cannot, and had the Luxor outrage to build upon as grounds for the legitimacy and urgency of its actions.