It seems most unlikely that Iran will surrender is capacity to make nuclear weapons, even if, through fatwas and government-to-government agreements, it eschews possession of these weapons. The fact that Israel has nuclear weapons is typically cited as a key Iranian concern. And Iran need only look at No. Korea to see the effectiveness of nuclear arms as a deterrent to military action by more powerful states.
Nevertheless, the mortal threat to Iran is a Sunni bomb. There is such a thing;,it’s in the hands of the Pakistanis, and Pakistan’s is a remarkably unstable government beset by the Taliban. Given the antipathy toward Shi’ites that is evident in Pakistan and throughout much of the Sunni world, Iran would seem to have the most to fear in the long run from a Sunni bomb falling into zealots hands.
If that conclusion is correct then there is nothing the US or Israel can do ultimately to assuage Iranian apprehensions about the Shi’a being obliterated by Sunni zealotry that has acquired nuclear weapons. Those apprehensions are justified. The best we can hope for from these negotiations is therefore that Iran will abide by an agreement to keep its nuclear weapons technology on stand-by. It is inconceivable that Iran will not want it known among the Salafists and their ilk that Iran is prepared for a fight to the death for its survival – a death that seems sorely desired in many parts of their neighborhood.
It seems most unlikely that Iran will surrender is capacity to make nuclear weapons, even if, through fatwas and government-to-government agreements, it eschews possession of these weapons. The fact that Israel has nuclear weapons is typically cited as a key Iranian concern. And Iran need only look at No. Korea to see the effectiveness of nuclear arms as a deterrent to military action by more powerful states.
Nevertheless, the mortal threat to Iran is a Sunni bomb. There is such a thing;,it’s in the hands of the Pakistanis, and Pakistan’s is a remarkably unstable government beset by the Taliban. Given the antipathy toward Shi’ites that is evident in Pakistan and throughout much of the Sunni world, Iran would seem to have the most to fear in the long run from a Sunni bomb falling into zealots hands.
If that conclusion is correct then there is nothing the US or Israel can do ultimately to assuage Iranian apprehensions about the Shi’a being obliterated by Sunni zealotry that has acquired nuclear weapons. Those apprehensions are justified. The best we can hope for from these negotiations is therefore that Iran will abide by an agreement to keep its nuclear weapons technology on stand-by. It is inconceivable that Iran will not want it known among the Salafists and their ilk that Iran is prepared for a fight to the death for its survival – a death that seems sorely desired in many parts of their neighborhood.