Doostdar on Iranian Dress Code
Alireza Doostdar writes:
'Thank you for debunking the lies about Iran requiring religious minorities to be “color-coded.” I just wanted to make a small comment about the actual national dress law being debated in parliament, which is supposed to regulate fashion. True, the law is in large part motivated by the “un-Islamic” slipping of headscarves and tightening of manteaus on the streets, but there is also a large element of cultural nationalism at work here, which might be comparable to Gandhi’s national dress plans. The law calls for slapping tariffs on imports of clothing from abroad to give indigenous producers competitive advantage, and banning imports of “second-hand clothes” from neighboring countries. It also calls for supporting Iranian designers and producers who come up with innovative “modern” forms of dress based on Islamic and Iranian materials and motifs. They want to encourage designers to go out and study ethnic dress styles for example to come up with more “authentic” modern styles for urban people (by which they mean, I believe, primarily women).
All this could be critiqued on many levels, but it is important I think to place it on a nationalistic plane rather than merely on one of religious zealotry. I see many parallels between this move and the U.S. Senate’s decision to make English the official language of the U.S. They’re both based on strong ideas of some sort of “national” culture--which they believe is being diluted by outside influences (in the US case, Mexican immigrants; in the Iranian, Western fashions of dress).
The other thing I wanted to point out was that Ahmadinejad himself, often to the chagrin of people in his own party and other right-wing groups, has been an outspoken critic of moves to regulate hijab, including the recent police moves to station policewomen in Tehran to instruct women with “bad” hijab to fix their scarves. Both before and after his election, he has said repeatedly that he thinks it is misguided to point at women whenever the issue of “corruption” comes up, and additionally that hijab is no where nearly as important an issue in this country as economic corruption and social injustice (I have both video and text references if you’re interested). I am very critical of Ahmadinejad on many issues, but his stance on hijab and regulating dress is not one of them. '

|
Facebook





3 Comments:
Thanks for publishing that I'd like to join my voice Alireza Doostdar - there's a lot to disagree with Ahmadinejad about, and I do, but his position on the hijab is eminently sane. There's an excellent resource for those interested in learning more about Iran -
Iran Chamber I blogged about it on both my blogs recently and always suggest it to people wanting to learn/research more about any aspect of Iran.
In the current context their podium section has a lot of material on the status of Iranian women this is particularly relevant for those wanting to understand the context in which this row has blown up:
Veiling (Hijab) and segregation of sexes in Iran -By: Massoume Price, 2002
In a wider context this is as Alireza Doostdar say a good example of "cultural nationalism" as globalisation proceeds more and more people see their culture being swamped, being "Hollywoodised" the process that the late General De Gaulle referred to as "Coca Colonisation" you hosted several comments on just this recently. Much of the rising tide of anti-Americanism is fueled by this. I'd keel over with astonishment if you didn't know several people who could give you a quick overview of context analysis as a useful discipline when analysing fiction to see the underlying social realities and attitudes. You might find applying that technique to American cultural exports a useful exercise in gaining a further insight into the roots of local hostility to American actions in the Middle East and beyond.
I couldn't find the bill, which Amir Taheri cited as "passed" in the previous week, and the rest of his article reads like it was written by, or for, the always drooling "War on Iran" mob. I archived it as it got cleaned up when recycled in the downstream media outlets (JPost and down).
Then I looked at his prior work, and the two 2003 WSJ pieces had a gem. He confused the Rajavi cult with the Jazani/Ahmadzadeh/Pouyan/Farahani founding of the Cherik-ha (Guerillas) Fadiian, and backdates armed struggle to five years before Farahani's operation at Siahkal.
That's Sumter after Appomattox in Iranian modern history. Wierd.
Politically it just doesn't make sense. Stuff I wrote earlier applies (a critique of Bilmon's Ahmadinejad-takes-out-Khamenei post) here as well.
"In the one week between the election and the run-off election, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad messaged on the economy and managed a landslide win over Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who he, and the Reform candidate, Moeen, convincingly messaged as corrupt beyond tolerance or redemption..."
"Ahmadinejad is in his first year of a probable two-termer, and setting policy, domestic and foreign, are what gate that 2nd term. Going after ["indecency" and ignoring the economy] doesn't improve the odds of beating Rafsanjani or Khatami, who, like Rafsanjani, can run for a 3rd term after being out of office for a single term, or of beating Moeen, who may have actually beaten Rafsanjani, had the dead not voted."
Cheers,
Eric
FYI:
The names referred to by Eric in his comment as "Jazani/Ahmadzadeh/Pouyan/Farahani" are surnames of the founders of this group Cherik-ha Fadaii khalq, or Iranian People's Fadaee Guerrillas. Their full names are as follows:
Masoud Ahmadzadeh
Amir Parviz Pouyan
Bijan Jazani
Aliakbar Safaii Farahani
Post a Comment
<< Home