London (Special to Informed Comment; Feature) – China-US geopolitical rivalries have manifested in many arenas from esoteric ones like export controls over semiconductor chips, to high profile trade wars and confrontations over Taiwan. The outcome of the two sides’ efforts to entrench their control over the physical infrastructure that underlies the digital world of the internet promises to be one of the more important of these conflicts. Regions like the Middle East that both US and Chinese technology companies hope to expand their physical cable networks and other digital infrastructure into are increasingly have a choice between two competing sets of networks. This introduces potential bottlenecks and duplication into global telecommunications networks, but also allows regional states to leverage their integration into either Chinese or US infrastructure for their own long term benefits.
A China-Centric Internet Architecture?
Beijing incorporates expanding international digital connectivity under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) using the moniker of the “Digital Silk Road” in an effort to leverage China’s technological footprint globally. Doing this offers Beijing more advantages than greater profits for Chinese technology companies like Huawei Marine Networks (renamed as HMN Technologies) for closing digital connectivity gaps between regions. A larger Chinese digital infrastructure footprint globally gives China more influence over the internet’s global governance and technology standards bodies at agencies like the UN, in keeping with Beijing’s long-term strategy. It also allows China access to large pools of foreign data, despite its own increasingly severe laws on cross-border data transfers in China.
Chinese state-backed cable laying companies like HMN Technologies have entered Middle Eastern markets enthusiastically, per US think tank the Atlantic Council. Its Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative found that of the 62 subsea telecommunications cables carrying internet traffic through the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, 13 were owned, constructed or upgraded by Chinese companies, making their security suspect to US actors. The initiative said China aims to capture 60% of the global subsea cable market by 2025. Given such cables carry 95% of global communications and data flows, MENA countries will increasingly rely on Chinese digital infrastructure when transmitting their sensitive data.
A Bird In The Hand
Middle Eastern governments are not unaware of the risks from espionage of entrusting these data flows to Chinese actors. However, these states also have concerns about US snooping on digital infrastructure built or run by US technology companies like Google, Meta or Amazon. Moreover, a China-centric digital infrastructure model has benefits from the point of view of many Middle Eastern governments. China tends to approve large BRI-related infrastructure projects rapidly, often rolling these out more quickly than their Western counterparts or international entities like the World Bank, who have more stakeholders to consult with first.
The authoritarian Chinese regime is also less prone to sudden policy shifts than the democratic and highly partisan US. The re-election of President Donald Trump saw the US cancel many of his predecessor President Joe Biden’s Green New Deal initiatives (designed to support US clean energy development and electric vehicle manufacturing onshoring). Trump said he had “ended the [Biden] administration’s insane electric vehicle mandate, saving our auto workers from economic destruction.” Western governments and technology firms are also more vulnerable than Chinese actors to pressure from rights groups and public opinion to suspend their funding or work on digital infrastructure projects in the Middle East if a crisis breaks out.
A Chinese-MENA Subsea Spiderweb?
Chinese state-owned carriers are working on numerous subsea cable projects in the Middle East at present. China Telecom, China Mobile and China Unicom are backing the EMA (Europe‑Middle East‑Asia) Cable Project in conjunction with Telecom Egypt and Zain Saudi Arabia. This rivals a US-backed project called SeaMeWe-6 (Southeast Asia-Middle East-Western Europe-6) and will link Hong Kong with Singapore, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and France. The US project will also link Singapore to France via Egypt and Saudi Arabia, allowing states participating in the two rival projects multiple redundancies in their subsea infrastructure. China’s foreign ministry said Beijing “has always encouraged Chinese enterprises to carry out foreign investment and cooperation,” without commenting on the EMA Cable Project directly when it began in 2023.
Meanwhile, China-based Hengtong Group is working with HMN Technology to build the Pakistan & East Africa Connecting Europe cable network. Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030” and the United Arab Emirate’s “We the UAE 2031” have included Chinese firms in work on projects like the Bay of Bengal Gateway, in addition to regional MENA operators like Oman’s Omantel. In June, Hong Kong-headquartered PCCW Global signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Zain Omantel International, Telecom Egypt and Sparkle to build the Asia-Africa-Europe-2 subsea cable network. Mohamed Nasr, Managing Director and CEO of Telecom Egypt, said: “The construction of AAE-2 is a continuation of our success stories as a global data connectivity provider and is another testament to our commitment to driving digital connections through major collaborations. AAE-2 will also benefit from accessing and cross-connecting with other subsea cables using our WeConnect ecosystem. We are thrilled to embark on this transformative project that will reshape the future of digital infrastructure.” In short, Chinese digital infrastructural frameworks are increasingly being embedded in national development agendas in MENA countries, as part of the region’s economic digital transformation agenda.
Photo of Dubai Creek Harbour – Dubai – United Arab Emirates by Ziad Al Halabi on Unsplash
Infrastructure Vulnerability
This may leave MENA’s digitalised economies more vulnerable than before however, both to accidents and deliberate sabotage. Both the region’s Asia Africa Europe-1 (AAE-1) cable and its PEACE cable link between Singapore and France were damaged after beginning operations; in March and last December respectively, causing technical issues that took many months to repair and disrupting internet traffic. Subsea cables in shallow seas are vulnerable to accidental damage from ship’s anchors, while some are targeted for deliberate sabotage for political reasons, always a possibility in MENA given the heightened tensions between global, regional and non-state actors there. In 2024, journalists and think tanks postulated that the Houthi militia in Yemen could sabotage subsea cables as a way to pressure Western and local allies of Israel. In Europe and Taiwan, the officers of ships involved in damaging subsea cables in the Baltic and Taiwan Strait have been investigated and even jailed on the grounds of sabotage.
Conclusion
Despite the potential new vulnerability being introduced into MENA countries, China’s rolling out of its Digital Silk Road under the auspices of the BRI has been a commercial and developmental success there, strengthening Beijing’s global influence. Moreover it has brought benefits to local actors as well, allowing them to benefit from US-China technology competition to increase the number of digital infrastructure projects benefiting their region. Local MENA companies have also benefited from Chinese and US largesse. The two superpowers seem unlikely to entirely displace one another in the struggle for MENA’s digital infrastructure. As a result, ERI expects the region to receive a more rapid integration into the global digital economy than perhaps might have been the case during earlier decades when the US held a stronger monopoly on digital internet infrastructure like subsea cable construction.
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