Lebanon Crisis
Veteran reporter Nicholas Blanford explains what is happening in Lebanon.
1. Fath al-Islam is a splinter guerrilla group established last December that has links to the international Salafi Jihadi movement (which some call "al-Qaeda" as shorthand). Its leader has ties to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. It is tiny, with at most 300 fighters, and not all of them may be Palestinian. It is opposed by all the major Palestinian political groups, including Hamas and the PLO. It is, according to CNN, extremely well armed. It appears to have an international network. One of the Fath al-Islam guerrillas killed on Sunday had engaged in a terror attack on Germany. It is a little unlikely that this group has any significant relationship to the secular Alawi Baath government of Syria, despite what the Lebanese politicians allege.
2. The group, which robbed a bank and functions as a small local Mafia, has used the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp (pop. 30,000) in north Lebanon as a base. There are thousands of Palestinian refugees in the camp, displaced there from their homes in Galilee by Zionist forces in 1948. Once Israel was formed, these refugees from the fighting were locked out of their former home by Israeli PM David Ben Gurion. Because Lebanon has a Christian political elite, Beirut did not give the Palestinians citizenship, since they are 85% Sunni and it would have upset the demographic balance of the country. Also, the Palestinians of Lebanon generally insist that they will some day go home to Palestine (Israel) and fiercely reject "tawtin" or naturalization as "Lebanese." Their stateless condition has left the Palestinian population of Lebanon poverty-stricken and barred from certain occupations, including medicine! If you think about it a little bit, you see the analogy between their condition and that of 19th century Jews in some parts of Europe, confined to ghettoes and forbidden from certain occupations.
A clickable map of the refugee camps in Lebanon with information about each can be found here. For an anthropologist's exploration of the culture of the camps, see Julie Peteet's article in the Journal of the International Institute at the U of Michigan. Here is her piece with some history of the situation. See also Professor Peteet's recent book. Also
3. A 1969 accord prevents Lebanese military forces from going into the camps. Anyway, hand to hand fighting in them would produce a high death toll. Firing on a camp full of civilians by the Lebanese government is deeply troubling. Note that the Tripoli Sunni Muslim townspeople appear, however, to approve of the attack on Fath al-Islam. The camps are locally seen as nests of criminality and breeding grounds of terror.
4. Although it is usually said that there are 400,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, a country of 3.8 million, Palestinian demographer Khalil Shikakli has argued that there are actually only a couple hundred thousand left there. Many have been given temporary visas of various sorts by Germany, Scandinavian countries, etc., and have emigrated to a precarious perch in Europe, where they seldom have a permit to work and so remain in limbo (the Palestinians have now become the symbol of vulnerable statelessness; in the contemporary world, not having a state is the closest thing to slavery.) Their statelessness makes the Palestinians in their camps open to exploitation by mafias and terrorists who thrive where states cannot operate with transparency. The camps are thus analogous to the wilderness of Sinai or the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
Until there is a comprehensive settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem, this sort of trouble will go on in the Middle East. And all that time, the Zionist Right will blame the Palestinians for being dispossessed.


8 Comments:
Maybe the United States can show the Lebanese the correct way to run a refugee camp.
From the Secure Borders, Economic Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 2007 (The immigration 'reform' bill)
SEC. 137. INCREASE OF FEDERAL DETENTION SPACE AND THE UTILIZATION OF FACILITIES IDENTIFIED FOR CLOSURES AS A RESULT OF THE DEFENSE BASE CLOSURE REALIGNMENT ACT OF 1990.
a) Construction or Acquisition of Detention Facilities-
(1) IN GENERAL- The Secretary shall construct or acquire, in addition to existing facilities 1 for the detention of aliens, at least 20 detention facilities in the United States that have the capacity to detain a combined total of not less than 20,000 individuals at any time for aliens detained pending removal or a decision on removal of such aliens from the United States subject to available appropriations.
Also note that The Department of Homeland Security is actively seeking contractors to build & staff these facilities:
From GSN Homeland Security Insider:
“Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) seeks qualified companies to provide detention services for facilities in Arizona and California. Contact: rosemarie.mendoza@dhs.gov “
“The State Department is looking to buy civil disturbance equipment, including upper body protection systems, riot shields, helmets, handcuffs, gas masks and binoculars, for border security forces. Contact: Doug.Stuck@fedbid.com“
Feel free to contact these people. Tell them the Buffalo sent you…
[In Full]
>It is a little unlikely that this >group has any significant >relationship to the secular Alawi >Baath government of Syria, despite >what the Lebanese politicians >allege.
Juan, I'm always shocked at how willing you are to read 'secular and alawi' as a decisive element in determining Syria's foreign policy. The Syrians have generally demonstrated a 'realist' policy, often abandoning ideological ties or the logic of sect in service of influencing the region. If that means housing all Iraq's political parties (see Nir Rosen's article in the NYT magazine on refugees), Khaled Mashaal from Hamas, and supporting Hizbollah - they'll do it in a heartbeat. In short, I won't put it pass the Syrians to arm any group to create new havoc in Lebanon. Certainly this group - Fatah al-Islam - has grown in influence due to the Iraq war, but the Syrian's leaving Lebanon may play an equal role.
The "Opposition" is blaming the Syrians as they always do but this of course does not pass the smell test much less the hard facts.
What is more interesting and perhaps fruitful speculation is the ties between these AlQaeda trouble-makers and Saudi Arabia's Bandar per Sy Hersh's recent New Yorker piece. (via Josh Landis Syria Comment)
For those interested in conspiracy speculation that is...
some people are saying this group was financed also by Hariri and Prince bandar to fight against Hezbollah . (seymour Hersh mentioned it this summer )
Michel samaha today said the gov of |siniora knew about this group for sometime and did nothing about it . i wonder who really funds it . (Al qaeeda was funded at some point to fight the Soviets )
"Their stateless condition has left the Palestinian population of Lebanon poverty-stricken and barred from certain occupations, including medicine! If you think about it a little bit, you see the analogy between their condition and that of 19th century Jews in some parts of Europe, confined to ghettoes"
Yes, you COULD see such an analogy if you thought about it, but we're not allowed to think about such things (much less say them) in this country.
I think the date in Point 3 should be 1989, after the Amal-Palestinian camp wars.
Regarding the Syrian angle behind Fatah al-Islam, I visited the Palestnian refugee camps and wrote about the situation in Ain el-Hilweh in the summer of 2003, and the Hersh article mentioned above struck me because of the focus of the Salafist groups that I had heard discussed during my visit...
I had suspected that anti-Sudairi elements of the Saudi family might well be supporting such Salafists, especially against a Sudairi-family friend like Rafik Hariri, but I had not thought of a US-Saudi effort to bolster Salafists against Iranian-backed Shiite groups...
Ultimately, my last doubt about the Syrian backing for such Salafist groups in Lebanon is precisely the same as my doubt regarding the Iraqi-9/11 links allegations:
These Salafist groups are open to foreign recuitment because they do not believe in national identities... The Fatah al-Islam group in the Nahr el-Bared camp is suspected of having several foreigners among its ranks...
Why would a secular and Syrian nationalist regime such as the current Bashar Assad government seek to invest itself in such volatile and unpredictable Salafist groups? Surely, they can not hope to have plausible deniability in such a scenario, nor can they be assured that these elements will not strike out at Syrian interests.
Could Fatah al Islam be one of the groups mentioned by Seymour Hersh back in March as getting U.S. funds and arms by way of Saudi Arabia in order to stand up to Hezbollah?
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/03/05/070305fa_fact_hersh
It would be slightly more fair to say that the Israel right blames the Arab governments for not absorbing the Palestinians into the local Arab populations. Of course, given the ethnic and tribal nature of the countries around Israel (Lebannon, Jordan, Syria, and Egypt), that would probably have been no easier or painless then letting them back into Israel.
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