Tahrir 5 Years Later: The Hurdles to Democratization & Arab Youth Revolts

By Juan Cole | (Informed Comment) | – –

A frequently met-with Western political and often journalistic narrative of the 2011 youth revolts in the Arab world is that idealistic young people came out into the streets and managed to overthrow four dictators, but then the essential Arab nature (violent, fanatical, tribal and sectarian) came out and derailed any move toward democracy. The Arabs then fell back into dictatorship or spiraled down into civil war. In other words, the revolts were about democratization and the WOGs just aren’t up to it because of flaws in national character.

Social scientists don’t think there is something peculiar about Arabs. Rather, they do big studies of lots of instances of countries moving from authoritarian to more democratic forms of government and try to discover the (non-racial) reasons for failure and success. They’ve put their finger on some important correlates.

Larry Diamond points to an acceleration of the breakdown of democracy since 2006, after the four-decade “3rd wave” in which the number of democracies tended to increase and human and civil rights improved. But since 2006, not only have a lot of democracies regressed toward authoritarianism but the rate at which they are doing so has increased. In short, the Arab world’s regressions are not unusual in the contemporary world. One thinks about the excitement about post-Soviet eastern Europe, and how disappointing Hungary and even Poland are, not to mention Ukraine.

Adam Przeworski finds a strong correlation between successful democratic transitions and relatively high per capita income. Conversely, such attempts to move from dictatorship to more open forms of governance have a high rate of failure in poor countries. For twenty years Mali was extolled as one of Africa’s rare democratic successes. Then in 2012 abruptly democracy ended in Mali and the country fell to pieces. The country’s nominal per capita annual income is $672, so the odds were always stacked against it.

The nominal per capita income of the countries where there were significant 2011 youth revolts are as follows:

Bahrain $23,899
Libya $4,745
Tunisia $3,985
Egypt $3,436
Morocco $3,077
Syria $1,821
Yemen $1,235

These countries just weren’t very promising candidates for democratization, with the exception of Bahrain. Of the non-Gulf countries where there were substantial demonstrations, Libya had the highest per capita income. But it was an oil state and most of the oil income went to the Gaddafi family and the state bourgeoisie. Dividing it by the 6.5 million Libyans is silly. Ordinary people in Libya, especially in the east, were often not well off. When I was there in 2012 I was shocked at how little it looked like an oil state. Benghazi isn’t as nice as Amman in Jordan, and Jordan has very little income.

Syria and Yemen are poorer than Vietnam and Uzbekistan, neither a beacon of democracy. Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco are poorer than Belarus, Thailand and Iran, all authoritarian states.

Bahrain failed despite its income because the Sunni Arab monarchy and elite could not make a bargain with the Shiite majority. Factions within the nation have to be able to trust one another in order to risk having an election. Moreover, the oil wealth isn’t exactly equitably shared with the Shiite peasants.

Related book:

The New Arabs: How the Millennial Generation is Changing the Middle East

Some poor countries manage to keep having regular elections– India is the most significant example here. But it has a long tradition of elections going back to the early twentieth century and one of its main political parties, which still has substantial grassroots, i.e. Congress, was founded in the 19th century. No Arab country has a parliamentary party with a continuous history of campaigning and grassroots organizing at all analogous to Congress. (Egypt only had one party from the 1950s through the 1970s, the Nasserist “Rally.” Syria only really has had the Baath since the late 1960s. Etc.)

Not only does a low per capita income make it less likely that a transition to democracy will be successful, but Diamond points out that where the economy turns down during the transition, that raises the chances of failure.

The economy turned down in all the Arab revolt countries in 2011-2015 with the exception of Morocco. Tunisia and Egypt got a lot of income from tourism, which declined steeply after the revolutions. So that Tunisia managed to have a relatively successful transition despite poverty and despite a slowing economy is a testament to its people’s and its politicians’ dedication and willingness to compromise.

Another issue is the relationship of the military to the state in each of these countries.

Tunisia has almost no military, only something like 35,000 men under arms. deposed dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali came to power in a coup, so he kept the army small to make sure some other officer did not do that to him. The sheer smallness of Tunisia’s military and its unavailability for repression of large public gatherings is probably a major reason for its relative success in moving toward democracy.


(Adapted from Wikimedia with thanks )

Egypt’s military in contrast is enormous (some 450,000 men), and in some ways it has been in power since 1952. The 2011 overthrow of dictator Hosni Mubarak (himself a former Air Force officer) took the form of a military coup. In 2013, the Egyptian military, having watched the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood government adopt a whole series of unpopular policies, intervened in conjunction with massive street rallies to make a coup.

In Libya, Syria and Yemen, the military was an arm of the regime, commanded by relatives of the president for life. In each case it was deployed to crush the revolutions. The NATO intervention stopped the Gaddafi tank corps from wiping out rebellious cities such as Benghazi, but the downside is that the army collapsed when the regime did. Libya has no national army and this situation has contributed to its chaos.

In Syria the army was deployed against the people. It drove them to arm themselves and provoked a civil war.

In Yemen the overthrown president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, still had a lot of units of the military who were loyal to him. He persuaded them to ally with the Houthi rebels of Saadeh, Zaydi Shiites, to overthrow Saleh’s successor, Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, last year this time. An aggressive intervention against Saleh in favor of Mansour Hadi was launched by the Saudis and their allies.

In Bahrain, the army is a Sunni instrument of Sunni power.

The revolutions in the Arab world were in some part derailed by deep divisions between nationalists and religious fundamentalists. Some of the supposed sectarianism actually has this character. This struggle has been prominent in Libya, Egypt and Syria.

Finally, the right wing authoritarianism of many of the Gulf oil states, especially of Saudi Arabia, meant that they were willing to bankroll extremist authoritarian groups, whether officer corps or religious fundamentalists in preference to democrats, and were willing to pay officer corps to crush populist movements like the Muslim Brotherhood.

Looked at in the light of these social science findings, the failure of most Arab states to transition to democracy is unsurprising. Poor countries in Africa, Asia and Central America have had the same difficulties. It is nothing to do with Islam or Arabs (‘Arab’ is just a speaker of a language, not an ethnic group). It is everything to do with lack of development.

The good news is that development will eventually take place in the Arab world, and a rising standard of living will impel people to take more control over their lives. Moreover, just as 1968 in eastern Europe was a proving ground for the later Velvet Revolution, so Arab youth now have experience in mobilizing.

11 Responses

  1. In Bangkok, Thailand, in 2014, middle and upper class protestors demanded the removal of the elected head of state. When she scheduled new elections, they protested the elections. They don’t like democracy now because they always lose to the party supported by the upcountry , rural poor. So the military again stepped in and took over. There are Bangkok citizens who think they should have a greater say than their country cousins. Likewise, there’s a class of Egyptians who think there’s a group who should be excluded from elections. When divided groups are unwilling to compromise, democracy must wait.

  2. Couple of nitpicks about the map-South Sudan should probably be separate from Sudan by now, the grace period on that is running out. :P

    Also, Palestine seems to be marked government overthrown for some reason. Obviously, its government was unchanged so that’s really accurate in any sense.

  3. What does ‘wog’ mean in US English? In British slang, it’s a bit old fashioned, but is a slur of about the same level as ‘nigger’. It’s the sort of insult that racists would use prior to a violent assault. It’s really shocking for a Brit to read, even if it’s being used ironically to mock racist thinking. I think there’s a similar transatlantic gap in understanding of the word ‘paki’. link to theguardian.com

    To the point of the comment, your point about Tunisia’s small army (and small, less militarised police?) makes sense. One lesson for dictators from the Arab Spring looks to me to be that if you’re going to be corrupt, you want to at least share the spoils with a wide and deep military/security state, like in Egypt or Algeria, rather than just building palaces for your family like in Tunisia.

  4. Does median income correlate better with democratic transitions? I’d guess that might be why Bahrain is an outlier. On the other hand, I don’t know whether you can get reliable data in more authoritarian countries.

  5. Here’s how old I am. I think it was 1968 when a book came out (I remember the authors were Textor and Banks) that was the first real accumulation of data on various economic and social factors for, I think, close to 100 countries. So my graduate class in political development was tasked with punching out IBM cards and running regression analyses on two or three of these data sets (there must have been about 50 different variables, so we all picked different combinations) to try and find out any correlation between them. Anyone remember IBM punch cards? This was even before there were computer monitors. I mention this to show that this gives you an idea of how long political scientists have tried using social science to find out the main factors in political development. Professor Cole gives a pretty good summary of the major factors here. The late political scientist Samuel P. Huntington had two excellent contributions to this discussion, in my opinion. One, The Soldier and the State, was a good treatise on the role of the military and what factors were most likely to lead to military interventions, and if memory serves, Political Development in Changing Society. In this latter book he concluded that well developed political parties were the key to developing stable democracies. Ironically our Founding Fathers didn’t really foresee political parties, didn’t favor them, and in the case of Washington, were actually hostile toward their development. To that I would add professional bureaucracy since that is key to having an effective government. Other social scientists have pointed out the importance of a middle class. It’s kind of a truism that you care more about political freedom if you aren’t starving, but well fed. The major problems of developing countries, whether in the Middle East or elsewhere, is there is often a serious lack of stable political and social institutions. Thus, when the dictatorship falls, there is often nothing to fill in the breech. The history shows that in all countries democracy when first established rarely remains stable continuously. People tend to forget how strong sectionalism was in the early US. People for a long time identified themselves first by what state they lived in rather than being a US citizen. And then there was that little thing called the Civil War, the effects of which are still felt today. I guess you could say that the failure of democracy to take root is not only unsurprising, it’s maybe surprising how widespread democracy has finally become. 50 years ago in South America it was rare. Now it has become, although with hiccups, much more common.

  6. “Finally, the right wing authoritarianism of many of the Gulf oil states, especially of Saudi Arabia, meant that they were willing to bankroll extremist authoritarian groups…”

    This is probably the least abstract reason as to why the trajectory of the popular revolts did not lead to democratic transitions. So many of the revolutions were hampered by all the factors you mentioned in your article, and in each one Saudi Arabia directly intervened in some capacity.

    Yesterday’s NYT article on Saudi financing of rebel groups in Syria is staggering in describing the scale of their involvement. Saudi involvement in Syria turned a popular uprising for democracy into a protracted strife in which extremist groups are depopulating entire sections of Syria.

    In Bahrain, they directly intervened with their army to put down the largely peaceful protest movement for democracy. In Libya, they funneled arms that now remain with extremist groups and have destabilized Libya. In Egypt, they prodded the Egyptian military to not only depose Morsi, but to violently crush any form of protest.

    Saudi actions have been extremely shortsighted and counterproductive. Their interventions have certainly not been in the interest of the residents of the middle east, and in the long run will also not be in the interests of the Saudis. One begins to wonder, with the price of oil plummeting and subsequent Saudi’s financial woes, they would rethink their strategy of throwing money away at extremist groups. From a moral perspective, what they have been doing is unquestionably wrong, and now from a pragmatic perspective, surely they can’t continue this foolishness.

    • With friends like the Saudis, who needs enemies. George W. Bush needed them to bankroll him in business, but ordinary Americans, not so much.

  7. “the failure of most Arab states to transition to democracy”? You are showing another Western failing: impatience. It has been 5 years since this revolutionary period has started. It takes much longer than that.

    Plot out a timeline for the transition to democracy in France. List all the “empires”, “monarchies”, and “republics. Don’t forget the almost military coup of 1963.

    How about Germany, a lot of “interesting” events on their path to democracy.

    England? Lots of interesting history there, mostly blood drenched.

    How about the US? Don’t forget to add the Civil War and the Civil rights movement on our path to democracy for everyone.

    The Arab world is just starting. They will have sort out their religious issued, doing it the way Europe did. They have to throw off foreign domination and colonialism the way Africa did. They have taken the first step on a long road. We should recognize that, it is the same long road that we have traveled.

  8. The operation was technically a success, but the patient died. Let’s give the surgeons a round of applause!

  9. As another commenter pointed out, we in the west, from the catbird seat, have a tendency to expect immediate democratic transitions while overlooking our own rocky histories.

    It only took the US 80 some years and the bloodiest war in the nation’s history to start ironing out some of the major kinks in this democratic experiment.

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