Millennials in white, liberal N.H. poll/vote differently than millennials other parts of the country,, where Clinton is well in the lead.
Really, it doesn't matter much, because Clinton is far, far ahead where she needs to be. I don't see people in other states rushing to vote like NH.
Iowa and NH were cited by 538's polling as #2 and #3 in the most white, liberal states, right behind Vermont. Nevada is a caucus and could be fairly well challenged by Sanders, but South Carolina?! Very pro-Clinton, with strong support, even from millennials. Voting has already begun in the state, so lots of ballots are locking in Clinton's big lead there.
Really, Sanders' campaign is going to stall out pretty badly, come Super Tuesday, without the kind of demographics needed to make headway, and a definite lack of young voter registration in time for many of these upcoming contests.
GEORGE W. BUSH, NEOCON: It took a while, but the president's transformation seems to be almost complete. From a candidate who projected a smaller defense budget than Al Gore, who pooh-poohed "nation-building," who spoke very modestly of the United States being a "humble nation," we now have a president saying the following:
We will remain in Iraq as long as necessary, and not a day more. America has made and kept this kind of commitment before - in the peace that followed a world war. After defeating enemies, we did not leave behind occupying armies, we left constitutions and parliaments. We established an atmosphere of safety, in which responsible, reform-minded local leaders could build lasting institutions of freedom. In societies that once bred fascism and militarism, liberty found a permanent home.
I'm a little troubled by the phrase: "not a day more." It's as if the president still believes that a real commitment to Iraq and to the region as a whole will be unpopular at home. It needn't be - if the president makes Iraq a corner-stone of this country's commitment to a freer and therefore more stable world. Not quite a neocon - but well on the way."
So, basically, he's criticizing others for holding his prior position, in the most hypocritical of ways..
I'm not really convinced that the purpose of the surge was to pacify the country, so much as achieve a few other goals:
1> Buy time for the ANA and Afghan police to be recruited and trained up to a level where they can start to take over.
2> Deny the Taliban control of those areas where they were most successfully collecting revenue -- opium -- and recruiting locals to fight.
It does seem to me that Afghan troops have become quite measurably more effective over the last year, albeit usually when put on the defensive. They performed well in defending several bases over the past couple months, successfully ambushed many Taliban soldiers in Nuristan, held all key government facilities on the Taliban raid of Kandahar, etc.
The Taliban wanted control of those key regions back. Instead, they've had to readjust their tactics, avoiding large formation combat actions, increasingly targeting weak -- oftentimes civilian -- targets, rather than NATO or the ANA. Most notably, they've been doing considerably worse when it comes to targeting ANA and police recruitment and training centers. That's extremely important, as that, combined with significantly increased wages, greatly helps with ANA retention.
Where the Taliban do seem to be concentrating lately is Nuristan and the surrounding environs, which is very difficult territory for NATO to control. Indeed, in that province, the rough terrain has allowed the Taliban to coordinate actions with a couple hundred troops at a time, sweep into small towns, and take control. However, it should be asked: does that matter? Is that region of economic value to the Taliban? Have they been able to effectively recruit there? Are they able to effectively project force out of there against important targets, without taking heavy casualties?
I'm not convinced that they're gaining much there by occupying it, any more than the US might gain by having FOBs there. What they are doing, apparently, is pissing off the locals and falling victim to the occasional attack of opportunity, losing 50-100 fighters at a time, blunting the success of their offensive.
From what I can tell, the goal is to contain the east and hold the south, while increasingly recruiting, training, and equipping more troops, while letting the special forces go after enemy leadership. To me, that seems pretty realistic.
Interesting. I noticed that only two hostile KIAs are reported so far this month on iCasualties. That doesn't sound like much of a spring offensive.
Perhaps Al Qaeda also played a pretty key role in the transition of the Taliban from direct fire confrontations to IED making / deployment. It could be that with the surge, direct fire confrontations are significantly more dangerous and costly, and that IED attacks and suicide bombing attacks have been stymied because of Al Q. supporters leaving before the spring offensive.
Theoretically, this could make a big difference, helping to improve stability, speed reconstruction amd economic growth, buy time for increased ANA training, and possibly even increase retention, as the relative threat level to Afghan forces goes down and twice the pay at half the risk starts to sound like a pretty good deal.
No telling though how much the lack of direct confrontation we seem to be seeing is related to the constant push of Coalition troops throughout the winter and the denying of traditional recruitment grounds vs. the aftereffects of the OBL raid... or simply, the unwillingness to throw themselves into the obvious traps that the coalition have laid for them.
I suspect the true goal of the surge was basically to buy time for ANA and police growth, combined with reconstruction and economic growth, and the holding and denial of traditional sources of Taliban revenue and recruitment. It sounds to me like those goals may be on the verge of succeeding, and that both the odds and success of reconciliation efforts may increase substantially as a result of how things have unfolded.
It's a reminder that even unwise, long, avoidable ground wars are potentially "winnable", regardless of one's ideological beliefs... depending, of course, on what your definition of winning actually is.
The person who really called the Iraq conflict/surge correctly, early on, was Prof. James D. Fearon, Dept. of Political Science, Stanford University, who testified before the House of Representatives in Sept. '06, for a committee called by Rep. Shays.
Fearon, who does statistical study of conflict, basically outlined that Iraq was, for various reasons, not a conflict which was likely to be resolved through power-sharing agreements, or be resolved at all until there was a clear winner and a clear loser, and that violence would only decrease as a result of ethnic sorting leading to more secure, defensible borders within Iraq and its cities. Specifically, he said "ramping up or staying the course amount to delay tactics, not plausible recipes for success."
The question, I guess, is whether the same thing applies to Afghanistan, and how you define success. I think that despite our likely agreement that a ground intervention in Afghanistan was incredibly unwise strategically and ultimately corrosive to our nation, the question really becomes not one of whether the US can bring about "democracy" for Afghanistan, as much as leave behind a strong "Northern Alliance"-like government, capable of enforcing its will against the Taliban.
...however, recruitment goals are being exceeded, and attacks into Taliban territory have forced the Taliban onto the defensive, thereby reducing attacks against newly trained recruits. Meanwhile, the ANA is gaining experience alongside the Marines, who are overseeing joint missions.
It seems to me that there are two schools of thought... those who believe that diplomacy is the only way that this conflict will be resolved, and those who believe that it will be resolved through military dominance, predicated upon a large, fully-trained and equipped Afghan army. I suspect Prof. Fearon would argue that statistically, the odds are likely that only military dominance will bring about the basis for reaching a power-sharing agreement.
For this reason, I suspect that a lot of this talk of reconciliation from those in the administration and military is likely window dressing, when the real goal is dominance and denial of drug wealth, population access from the Taliban.
Obviously, the Taliban are fighting pretty aggressively right now. Is it because of growth and success though... or growing desperation?
Millennials in white, liberal N.H. poll/vote differently than millennials other parts of the country,, where Clinton is well in the lead.
Really, it doesn't matter much, because Clinton is far, far ahead where she needs to be. I don't see people in other states rushing to vote like NH.
Iowa and NH were cited by 538's polling as #2 and #3 in the most white, liberal states, right behind Vermont. Nevada is a caucus and could be fairly well challenged by Sanders, but South Carolina?! Very pro-Clinton, with strong support, even from millennials. Voting has already begun in the state, so lots of ballots are locking in Clinton's big lead there.
Really, Sanders' campaign is going to stall out pretty badly, come Super Tuesday, without the kind of demographics needed to make headway, and a definite lack of young voter registration in time for many of these upcoming contests.
More relevant to Andrew Sullivan's current comments on Iraq... he actually praised and hailed GWB's transformation into a neocon warhawk: See http://sullivanarchives.theatlantic.com/index.php.dish_inc-archives.2003_02_01_dish_archive.html#90381663
"Wednesday, February 26, 2003
GEORGE W. BUSH, NEOCON: It took a while, but the president's transformation seems to be almost complete. From a candidate who projected a smaller defense budget than Al Gore, who pooh-poohed "nation-building," who spoke very modestly of the United States being a "humble nation," we now have a president saying the following:
We will remain in Iraq as long as necessary, and not a day more. America has made and kept this kind of commitment before - in the peace that followed a world war. After defeating enemies, we did not leave behind occupying armies, we left constitutions and parliaments. We established an atmosphere of safety, in which responsible, reform-minded local leaders could build lasting institutions of freedom. In societies that once bred fascism and militarism, liberty found a permanent home.
I'm a little troubled by the phrase: "not a day more." It's as if the president still believes that a real commitment to Iraq and to the region as a whole will be unpopular at home. It needn't be - if the president makes Iraq a corner-stone of this country's commitment to a freer and therefore more stable world. Not quite a neocon - but well on the way."
So, basically, he's criticizing others for holding his prior position, in the most hypocritical of ways..
I'm not really convinced that the purpose of the surge was to pacify the country, so much as achieve a few other goals:
1> Buy time for the ANA and Afghan police to be recruited and trained up to a level where they can start to take over.
2> Deny the Taliban control of those areas where they were most successfully collecting revenue -- opium -- and recruiting locals to fight.
It does seem to me that Afghan troops have become quite measurably more effective over the last year, albeit usually when put on the defensive. They performed well in defending several bases over the past couple months, successfully ambushed many Taliban soldiers in Nuristan, held all key government facilities on the Taliban raid of Kandahar, etc.
The Taliban wanted control of those key regions back. Instead, they've had to readjust their tactics, avoiding large formation combat actions, increasingly targeting weak -- oftentimes civilian -- targets, rather than NATO or the ANA. Most notably, they've been doing considerably worse when it comes to targeting ANA and police recruitment and training centers. That's extremely important, as that, combined with significantly increased wages, greatly helps with ANA retention.
Where the Taliban do seem to be concentrating lately is Nuristan and the surrounding environs, which is very difficult territory for NATO to control. Indeed, in that province, the rough terrain has allowed the Taliban to coordinate actions with a couple hundred troops at a time, sweep into small towns, and take control. However, it should be asked: does that matter? Is that region of economic value to the Taliban? Have they been able to effectively recruit there? Are they able to effectively project force out of there against important targets, without taking heavy casualties?
I'm not convinced that they're gaining much there by occupying it, any more than the US might gain by having FOBs there. What they are doing, apparently, is pissing off the locals and falling victim to the occasional attack of opportunity, losing 50-100 fighters at a time, blunting the success of their offensive.
From what I can tell, the goal is to contain the east and hold the south, while increasingly recruiting, training, and equipping more troops, while letting the special forces go after enemy leadership. To me, that seems pretty realistic.
Interesting. I noticed that only two hostile KIAs are reported so far this month on iCasualties. That doesn't sound like much of a spring offensive.
Perhaps Al Qaeda also played a pretty key role in the transition of the Taliban from direct fire confrontations to IED making / deployment. It could be that with the surge, direct fire confrontations are significantly more dangerous and costly, and that IED attacks and suicide bombing attacks have been stymied because of Al Q. supporters leaving before the spring offensive.
Theoretically, this could make a big difference, helping to improve stability, speed reconstruction amd economic growth, buy time for increased ANA training, and possibly even increase retention, as the relative threat level to Afghan forces goes down and twice the pay at half the risk starts to sound like a pretty good deal.
No telling though how much the lack of direct confrontation we seem to be seeing is related to the constant push of Coalition troops throughout the winter and the denying of traditional recruitment grounds vs. the aftereffects of the OBL raid... or simply, the unwillingness to throw themselves into the obvious traps that the coalition have laid for them.
I suspect the true goal of the surge was basically to buy time for ANA and police growth, combined with reconstruction and economic growth, and the holding and denial of traditional sources of Taliban revenue and recruitment. It sounds to me like those goals may be on the verge of succeeding, and that both the odds and success of reconciliation efforts may increase substantially as a result of how things have unfolded.
It's a reminder that even unwise, long, avoidable ground wars are potentially "winnable", regardless of one's ideological beliefs... depending, of course, on what your definition of winning actually is.
In effect, I do think that the US military, as Fearon suggested with Iraq, are engaging in "delay tactics".
The thing is, I suspect that they also feel that time is on their side.
The person who really called the Iraq conflict/surge correctly, early on, was Prof. James D. Fearon, Dept. of Political Science, Stanford University, who testified before the House of Representatives in Sept. '06, for a committee called by Rep. Shays.
His testimony is here:
http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/papers/fearon%20testimony.doc
Fearon, who does statistical study of conflict, basically outlined that Iraq was, for various reasons, not a conflict which was likely to be resolved through power-sharing agreements, or be resolved at all until there was a clear winner and a clear loser, and that violence would only decrease as a result of ethnic sorting leading to more secure, defensible borders within Iraq and its cities. Specifically, he said "ramping up or staying the course amount to delay tactics, not plausible recipes for success."
The question, I guess, is whether the same thing applies to Afghanistan, and how you define success. I think that despite our likely agreement that a ground intervention in Afghanistan was incredibly unwise strategically and ultimately corrosive to our nation, the question really becomes not one of whether the US can bring about "democracy" for Afghanistan, as much as leave behind a strong "Northern Alliance"-like government, capable of enforcing its will against the Taliban.
A recent Marine Times article cited that the new Afghani troops are pretty damn useless...
http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2010/06/marine_ana_062110w/
...however, recruitment goals are being exceeded, and attacks into Taliban territory have forced the Taliban onto the defensive, thereby reducing attacks against newly trained recruits. Meanwhile, the ANA is gaining experience alongside the Marines, who are overseeing joint missions.
It seems to me that there are two schools of thought... those who believe that diplomacy is the only way that this conflict will be resolved, and those who believe that it will be resolved through military dominance, predicated upon a large, fully-trained and equipped Afghan army. I suspect Prof. Fearon would argue that statistically, the odds are likely that only military dominance will bring about the basis for reaching a power-sharing agreement.
For this reason, I suspect that a lot of this talk of reconciliation from those in the administration and military is likely window dressing, when the real goal is dominance and denial of drug wealth, population access from the Taliban.
Obviously, the Taliban are fighting pretty aggressively right now. Is it because of growth and success though... or growing desperation?