If Omar al-Bashir, mass murderer, goes on trial that would have profound implications for both the Middle East and Africa. He seems to receive a lot of international tolerance, unlike other dictators though.
Erdogan seems very nationalistic. Maybe somewhat less so than Kemalists, yet still a hard-line nationalist.
He seems to have bigoted (and hostile) views about Armenians and dislikes Greek-Cypriots. He does not want Greek-Cypriots to drill for oil off the coast. Erdogan seems to have decided to shelve his Kurdish opening also. His policies towards the Kurds cannot be deemed to outside of a form of excluvisist Turkish nationalism (though a little bit less severe than his predecessors).
He is pro-Arab, but not favorable to many other ethnic groups in the neighborhood.
Gates is definitely not helping NATO with his constant questionable critiques of the European allies.
It was a huge gaffe when he tried to suggest that many in Europe were heavily responsible for the increasing separation of Turkey from the West and the trends in its foreign policy.
It seems fairly obvious that wanton and reckless commitment of military force to wars and operations that were not adequately thought out or were terribly ill-advised will be scaled back in the current political climate.
A growing amount of Congress members have finally come to realize that being too quick to deploy ground forces over long periods of time has been an error. This is particularly so when much of the rest of the world seems extremely reluctant to become involved in these endeavors.
The population is extremely annoyed at politicians and generals that seem to require year after year to end the existing military commitments.
The main question is what is going to happen in Afghanistan.
Why did Obama not seek Congressional support for the Libyan operation? Was it not so that there was enough support to get a resolution authorizing military strikes through?
It is quite clear that Obama takes a very expansive view of Presidential war making powers despite his effort to claim otherwise in 2008. This problem seems to be powerful self inflicting blow on the administration and will likely cause it future problems with foreign policy.
A side note: The Libyan operation seems to be increasing support for a rapid withdrawal from Afghanistan.
This has probably been discussed before, but why would NATO not have seriously investigated the possibility of calling on Egypt to assist the rebels with their army?
I have read that the Egyptian army is far more powerful than the forces under Ghaddafi's command. NATO could continue to supply air-strikes to assist the Libyan and Egyptian ground forces in this scenario. NATO could fund the whole expeditionary force if needed.
NATO seems to have basically decided that regime change is the most probable means by which the carnage in Libya will end. Therefore a sizeable (but not overly so) force from Egypt could be deploy to assist the rebels in capturing the central cities. The rebel forces would always be the ones to stage the "liberation" of the city.
Egyptian and/or Tunisia forces could help lift the siege of Misrata if they could intervene before it falls. In this scenario so the regime would likely be doomed then the international coalition, the rebels, and the Egyptian (and maybe Tunisian) forces could try to convince the Ghaddafi loyalist soldiers to ditch the regime. They could even offer to let them stage a liberation in the cities on behalf of the rebel leadership.
Of course this would be clearly be regime change and intervention in a civil war (which seems to already have happened though on a much lower level of intensity and support than this would entail), but since the collapse of the Ghaddafi run state seems to be necessary for the NATO mission to be fulfilled then it would seem a potential option.
Note: I am not advocating for or against any of these policy ideas. I am just presenting this option and trying to find out why it has not been seriously considered.
The NATO plan appears to be to seek (and promote) the unraveling of the Ghaddafi regime. The rebels, and their leadership, seem to want to advance into Tripoli and the western border or at least into central Libya.
Will a synthesis emerge?
Is NATO airpower capable of ensuring that Ghaddafi's forces cannot capture Adjabia in the coming weeks? Would Ghaddafi's forces likely hold position at Brega and the cities further west rather than risk advancing with aerial bombardment?
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If Omar al-Bashir, mass murderer, goes on trial that would have profound implications for both the Middle East and Africa. He seems to receive a lot of international tolerance, unlike other dictators though.
Erdogan seems very nationalistic. Maybe somewhat less so than Kemalists, yet still a hard-line nationalist.
He seems to have bigoted (and hostile) views about Armenians and dislikes Greek-Cypriots. He does not want Greek-Cypriots to drill for oil off the coast. Erdogan seems to have decided to shelve his Kurdish opening also. His policies towards the Kurds cannot be deemed to outside of a form of excluvisist Turkish nationalism (though a little bit less severe than his predecessors).
He is pro-Arab, but not favorable to many other ethnic groups in the neighborhood.
Gates is definitely not helping NATO with his constant questionable critiques of the European allies.
It was a huge gaffe when he tried to suggest that many in Europe were heavily responsible for the increasing separation of Turkey from the West and the trends in its foreign policy.
It seems fairly obvious that wanton and reckless commitment of military force to wars and operations that were not adequately thought out or were terribly ill-advised will be scaled back in the current political climate.
A growing amount of Congress members have finally come to realize that being too quick to deploy ground forces over long periods of time has been an error. This is particularly so when much of the rest of the world seems extremely reluctant to become involved in these endeavors.
The population is extremely annoyed at politicians and generals that seem to require year after year to end the existing military commitments.
The main question is what is going to happen in Afghanistan.
Why did Obama not seek Congressional support for the Libyan operation? Was it not so that there was enough support to get a resolution authorizing military strikes through?
It is quite clear that Obama takes a very expansive view of Presidential war making powers despite his effort to claim otherwise in 2008. This problem seems to be powerful self inflicting blow on the administration and will likely cause it future problems with foreign policy.
A side note: The Libyan operation seems to be increasing support for a rapid withdrawal from Afghanistan.
This has probably been discussed before, but why would NATO not have seriously investigated the possibility of calling on Egypt to assist the rebels with their army?
I have read that the Egyptian army is far more powerful than the forces under Ghaddafi's command. NATO could continue to supply air-strikes to assist the Libyan and Egyptian ground forces in this scenario. NATO could fund the whole expeditionary force if needed.
NATO seems to have basically decided that regime change is the most probable means by which the carnage in Libya will end. Therefore a sizeable (but not overly so) force from Egypt could be deploy to assist the rebels in capturing the central cities. The rebel forces would always be the ones to stage the "liberation" of the city.
Egyptian and/or Tunisia forces could help lift the siege of Misrata if they could intervene before it falls. In this scenario so the regime would likely be doomed then the international coalition, the rebels, and the Egyptian (and maybe Tunisian) forces could try to convince the Ghaddafi loyalist soldiers to ditch the regime. They could even offer to let them stage a liberation in the cities on behalf of the rebel leadership.
Of course this would be clearly be regime change and intervention in a civil war (which seems to already have happened though on a much lower level of intensity and support than this would entail), but since the collapse of the Ghaddafi run state seems to be necessary for the NATO mission to be fulfilled then it would seem a potential option.
Note: I am not advocating for or against any of these policy ideas. I am just presenting this option and trying to find out why it has not been seriously considered.
The NATO plan appears to be to seek (and promote) the unraveling of the Ghaddafi regime. The rebels, and their leadership, seem to want to advance into Tripoli and the western border or at least into central Libya.
Will a synthesis emerge?
Is NATO airpower capable of ensuring that Ghaddafi's forces cannot capture Adjabia in the coming weeks? Would Ghaddafi's forces likely hold position at Brega and the cities further west rather than risk advancing with aerial bombardment?