Plot to Bomb Iraqi Gov't in Green Zone
Plan to Declare Islamic Emirate in Diyala
Saudis to Build Security Wall, Fear Civil war
Al-Hayat reports [Ar.] that the Iraqi government the curfew in Baghdad succeeded in preventing a rumored "suicide car bombing conspiracy" in the capital with its sudden imposition of a one-day curfew. The plot was said to have been aimed at "sensitive sites" including the complex of government buildings in the Green Zone. (The Green Zone is the small patch of land in central Baghdad, surrounded by thick walls and Marine guards, where most Iraqi government offices and foreign embassies are located.)
If al-Hayat is right, the guerrilla movement had planned a major multi-pronged offensive for Saturday that aimed at decimating the Iraqi government.
The US military arrested a close associate of Adnan al-Dulaimi (a leader of the Iraqi Accord Front, the Sunni fundamentalist coalition in parliament). The associate was suspected of being involved in the conspiracy to set off a big string of car bombs and even to set off a car bomb inside the Green Zone. Seven other persons were also detained with regard to the plot. The US military said that Dulaimi himself was not suspected of involvement. No, only his bodyguards. How likely is that?
WaPo also reports on the plot:
' The measure was announced Friday night, a few hours after U.S. troops raided the residence of Adnan al-Dulaimi, the leader of the largest Sunni Arab coalition in Iraq's parliament, and took into custody his bodyguard, identified by Dulaimi's supporters as Khudir Farhan Zargan.
"Credible intelligence indicates the individual, a member of Dr. Dulaimi's personal security detachment, and seven members of the detained individual's cell were in the final stages of launching a series of [car bomb] attacks inside the International Zone, possibly involving suicide vests," the U.S. military said in a statement. '
The fasting month of Ramadan will end around Oct. 22 or 23, depending on which authorities people follow. The next day will be Eid al-Fitr or the Festival of the Breaking of the Fast. Iraqi intelligence learned that the guerrillas in Diyala Province (pop. 1.3 mn.) northeast of Baghdad, with its capital at Baqubah (pop. 154,000), were planning to announce the formation of the Islamic Emirate of Diyala on Eid al-Fitr. Government forces also found in a Sunni mosque plans for ethnically cleansing the Shiite minority from Diyala. Diyala is among the more violent provinces in Iraq. It had been the site of a major Baath military base, and has a Sunni majority but substantial Shiite and Kurdish minorities.
So not only was the Iraqi government nearly decapitated, but it almost formally lost control of one of its major provinces. (If the plan to declare an Emirate has been forestalled, it is nevertheless not a sign that the Iraqi government controls Diyala. It does not. The Sunni guerrillas do.)
The raid that tried to foil the guerrilla plot resulted in a number of arrests.
That's the story. But I have questions. Severe questions. Isn't it odd that such a major plot was foiled by the arrest of seven or eight people? Wouldn't it have needed hundreds? Seven or eight people could have done some damage inside the Green Zone, but not really significant damage. So the rumors that it was a coup attempt make no sense given the scale of the arrests. Then the involvement of people so close to Dulaimi is very suspicious. Was this raid a shot across the bow of the Iraqi Accord Front, a slap on the wrist for having considered such a thing? (The US certainly listens to all Dulaimi's phone calls.) Does the US need the Sunni parliamentarians so much that they can largely overlook the involvement of their close associates in terrorist plots?
As for Diyala, it seems to be in the hands of the Sunni Arab guerrilla movement already. Why would it matter if the guerrilla leaders make this declaration? How could some arrests stop them from doing so? There is something hyped about this story, too, though the apparent acknowledgment that there is an Islamist Emirate in Diyala is welcome.
Security has deteriorated so badly in Iraq that Saudi Arabia has decided to build a 550-mile-long high-tech security fence. The Saudis are afraid that if Iraq has a hot civil war, Iraqis will try to flee as refugees to Saudi Arabia. They also are afraid that the nasty characters who blow up weddings and children buying ice cream will come to Saudi Arabia at some point. The Saudi security fence is a huge vote of no-confidence in the Iraq that Bush built. Let's put it this way. Americans think of the puritanical Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia as the most militant of the Muslims. Now, the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia are saying that they are afraid of the Iraqis. What does that tell you? Or what does it tell the American public that the Saudi government views Iraq rather the way the Israeli government views the Palestinians?
Nawaf Obaid, director of the Saudi National Security Assessment Project, said, ". . . the feeling in Saudi is that Iraq is way out of control with no possibility of stability. The urgency now is to get that border sealed: physically sealed." He added that the Saudis are especially concerned about massive immigration of asylum seekers into the traditionally Shiite area of al-Hasa, where Saudi petroleum is. He said, "If and when Iraq fragments there's going to be a lot of people heading south and that is when we have to be prepared . . ."
The Iraqi Ministry of Immigration has revealed to Al-Sharq al-Awsat that in the past two months, 80,000 Iraqis have registered with the government as having been internally displaced. Since February, altogether the internally displaced come to some 250,000, according to the Ministry.
Ministry official Hamdiyah Najaf warned that "the condition of these displaced persons is extremely bad." Some are living in tattered tents and lack the most basic needs of life. Others have been forced to live with relatives in distant cities. Still others are sleeping on the ground. She said that there was very little repatriation of the displaced, almost none in fact. (This allegation contradicts earlier Iraqi government statements on the matter).
What follows is not an attack on persons, or valued colleagues. It is an attack on an intellectual framework. And by attacking it I would like to get analysts to rethink the framework. So, with all due respect, these periodic Brookings charts on Iraq statistics in the NYT have been completely useless and largely misleading. The fact is that many of the statistics are phony. This latest one says that the unemployment rate in Iraq is 30 percent. I challenge that. I challenge Brookings to prove it. I say that in Kirkuk, Ninevah, Diyala, al-Anbar, Salahuddin, Babel and Baghdad provinces (nearly half the country), the whole concept of going to work is almost meaningless for many residents because of the horrible security conditions. And I doubt things are humming along in Basra or Maysan either. The recent reduction in the number of attacks on US troops is also a mirage, because the US military has just run fewer convoys off base and so been less exposed to roadside bombs. When they do run a convoy, it is as likely to be attacked as ever. Oil production in August briefly spiked, though it still was not at the level of 2.8 to 3 million barrels a day typical of pre-US Iraq (pace what the op-ed alleged on the basis of one month). But in September the production fell again to only 1.8 mn. barrels a day.
And they actually say that "the economy has shown some improvement." What?? Is there improved manufacturing productivity? Is Iraq producing more steel? Pharmaceuticals? Anything? Are retail sales up? No!. There is no improved ordinary economy. It is a mess, a hellhole. The only "improvement" in the Iraqi economy would be because of high petroleum prices. But because the oil industry is state owned and profits go straight to the government, this sector is disconnected from everyday livelihoods. There is no evidence that the oil income is getting out into the pockets of ordinary Iraqis. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that much of the petroleum income is being skimmed off by militias and tribes via smuggling, producing a collapse of security in Basra, Iraq's third-largest city. There is no mechanism for auditing where the oil money is going. Saying that increased petroleum prices are producing an improvement in the Iraqi economy is like saying that increased gambling receipts by the Sicilian Mafia are a sign of an improved economy.
All along the way, these Brookings charts have been fantastically optimistic given the actual situation on the ground, and the whole idea that a country where there is no government to speak of and no indigenous army to speak of and 60,000 people a year being tortured, butchered and tossed mutilated in the streets by fanatical paramilitaries connected to government parties--that such a country is generating reliable statistics on employment and the economy is just a non-starter. Why aren't people more suspicious of numbers like those given for "unemployment"? And I guarantee you that there has been no improvement in the Iraqi economy this year such as real Iraqis would notice it. In fact, the professional classes are fleeing the country and shopkeepers close up at 2 pm if they manage to open at all. There are over half a million economic refugees in Jordan, and God knows how many in Syria. Improvement in the economy, my eye.


10 Comments:
THANK YOU, Juan.
Thank you very much. I've read a lot of economic history. I've done polling, by phone and in person.
Come On, Brookings. Prove Those Statistics.
Indeed, these are the stats Ken Pollack built. Michael O'Hanlon architect.
They are as phony as a $3 bill. This was apparent to me the first time I read em...Green Zone Publishing Co.
To any who are interested in spreading the word or making polite inquiry should go to the source.
Ivo Daalder, Brookings War Party User21 can be found at http://www.tpmcafe.com/user/21/recent
The Kamp, O'Hanlon, Unikewicz chart says that Iraqi Security forces have grown magnificently. Nearly half are in "tier two" readiness! Now there are lots of "trained judges," so there must be rule of law. Right? If this is true, the US can start bringing back troops real soon.
Iraq's macro statistics are grossly distorted by the predominance of oil, volatile oil prices, and the messy cauldron of money disseminated by the state sector. It's hard to separate security expenditures from graft or real services. How much of the electrical generation serves paying clients, and how much is pilfered or used by cronies at below cost rates? How many of those "trained judges" dare show up to adjudicate disputes between Sunnin and Shia?
"It's the economy, stupid," goes the legendary adage, but economic "data" correlates only poorly to political events. Working Americans, even as their wages stagnate, vote pro-plutocrat. In the 60s, a counterculture coincided with prosperity. Iran overthrew its pro-West Shah in 1978, just as GDP was booming. Peruvians loathed Toledo, despite the best economic record in years. Economic and political causes and effects are fuzzy.
Only one rule is pretty firm: an occupier will get no credit for good but get full blame for anything that goes wrong. British rule in North America was relatively benign, and cultural divides were almost nil, but patriots hated redcoats and King George. Iraqis will hardly be kinder to the current George or his troops, agents, or loyalists.
Juan Cole:
I appreciate that your job and responsibility are not to make or suggest policy.
I also agree that the US has no policy options that will leave the United States in as strong a position as it was before the invasion of Iraq.
I also agree that we do not know exactly what the objectives of the US administration are.
For the administration to say that the goal is a democratic pro-US Iraq is internally contradictory to some degree, and we are not told between "democratic" and "pro-US" which is more important and by how much.
We also are not told exactly what "pro-US" means in the country that during the recent war held the largest pro-Hezbollah rallies outside of Lebanon.
For the administration to say that the goal is to defeat "the terrorists", when each year Iraq's hostile armed forces, the guerillas and militias have become more resourceful and there are no informed observers who see any reason for that trend to stop, is essentially to lie which leaves no hint at the truth.
So I agree that few or no people outside the administration know what the true US policy objectives are, and therefore you cannot be in a position to say what the best way to reach those objectives is.
My only contrary point is that by not saying that another strategy is better than staying the course, there is a degree to which you are tacitly endorsing staying the course.
Based on my understanding of the situation, which is admittedly incomplete, a public commitment to a full withdrawal by a certain date is a less bad option than staying the course.
A public commitment to a full withdrawal when certain objective and plausible conditions are met is another less bad option, but requires the US to have an amount of credibility that the US may not have.
Dr. Cole, while I understand why you do not make a policy prescription, I just want to express my wish that you would.
About the Saudi fence, my take on it is that the Saudis do not want a free frontier from Iran-aligned south Iraq directly to the Saudi Shiite population.
I find that sensible, from a Saudi point of view, but do not think it is enough and that the amount of pressure Iran is able to put onto the Saudi internal situation has increased by the US overthrowing Hussein and not replacing him with an obedient dictator.
I think of this as straws falling onto a camels back. We don't know when the Saudis will turn towards the Iranians (and Russia and China) and away from the US, but it pretty much has to happen - especially if the US continues its position on Israel - and it may be sudden when it does.
Mr. Evans -
Saudi turns away from the US once it's protected itself from the collapse of our dollar. Very hard for it, with maybe a trillion $ in real estate in the US. If Saudis, or their offshore front companies, start unloading all their commercial real estate here, that's a signal. There's also been talk between Saudi and the Gulf Cooperation Council about a single currency. If it's convertible for gold, that's a warning that all those OPEC votes might terminate OPEC's practice (since 1971, the year the US unpegged the $ from gold!) of having all sales be in US dollars. I don't know enough to say if those actions would insulate the Sauds enough to be worth the pain.
But there's one more thing Saudi would need - a way to protect itself from American military retaliation, both to its own lands and the tanker routes. The key to that is Iran. Iran holds most Saudi exports hostage via the Straits of Hormuz, but Iran in turn is held hostage by the US Navy. I believe that Iran, Russia, and China are about to complete a land network for oil and gas to prevent US Navy blackmail. Can the Saudis accept the humiliation of having to connect to that network via Iran? If I were king I'd do it in exchange for a guarantee that Iran would keep its hands off the Shiite-majority province where all the oil is. Kuwait and the GCC have no choice but to follow along.
I guarantee you, name any amount of oil you can imagine, and China and Russia can buy it all, with real, non-IOU dollars, gold, or goods.
Mr. Slay:
That is very interesting.
1- Cutting off Saudi Arabia's oil militarily means economic disaster for everyone in the world except the US. The US could do it, and it can threaten it, but nobody thinks it would actually happen. The US does not need the rest of the world, including its closest allies, berserk with rage at it.
2- Saudi Arabia would rather not be in the US camp. Until recently, SA spontaneously provided 70% of Hamas' funding. That is in line with what SA considers its moral responsibility. SA is now boycotting Hamas, against its own ideals, because of a sense of hopelessness in the face of the West, especially the US.
So if Iran can apply 45 units of pressure to support Hamas and the US can apply 55 units of pressure against, Saudi Arabia may well go along with Iran, and do what it considers the right thing to do. Doing that and similar things in Lebanon and the like is what I mean when I say "turn towards Iran against the US"
If the Shiites can threaten to hang the royal family from lampposts, the US threat to seize real estate assets will be meaningless.
Post-Iraq, Iran and Saudi Shiites are more able to develop that threat. It is not a threat to be executed, but a threat that allows the Shiites to negotatiate their status in the country from a position of strength.
So the US better hope the Saudis build a good fence. Because if Iran is able to get arms to the Saudi Shiites, Iran and the Saudi Shiites will be able to apply a whole lot of pressure. That would be a much realler threat than that the US Navy will cut off Europe's oil.
The problem is that like the US fence with Mexico, there are still ways to get people or equipment across the border.
So my conclusion is that the fence is a step in the right direction, from a Saudi point of view, but the US invasion of Iraq makes Saudi participation in an anti-Iran alliance much more expensive, and it was already expensive.
Has the US seized Syrian assets? Because if that marks a limit of freedom to act against US regional interests, I expect Saudi Arabia to already be seriously considering that and eventually to go there.
We're not supposed to notice the oil. I wonder if there is anyone abroad that thinks it's about anything else.
The scandal is not so much that economic statistics of the occupied territories are skewed by the AngloAmerican press.
The scandal is that statistics of the American economy are WAY the hell skewed by WAR. without all this what, ~$8 Billion USD per month Fiscal Stimulus being spat out of U.S. Treasury's printing presses, the entire souffle of Military + Petro-industrial complex that is the current U.S. economy loses all currency.
Other than WAR, the only thing being "produced" by the U.S. economy, is consumers : their carefully crafted routing through the BigBox chains, their "shopping carts", quite literally an optimum Assembly ~ Taylorism / Fordism : the new production line is the CHOW LINE at the CHAIN STORE restaurant.
The GREEN ZONE, itself non-renewable, not self-sustainable, is not only a failure apparent in IRAQ : it represents in a Petri Dish how utterly helpless, isolated; how under seige, bleeding & borrowing ~ the entire U.S. economy really is.
Without WAR, not only does the American President lose his War Powers; the American Economy loses its War Power: losing "face", will be the least of their worries : there will be no PEACE DIVIDEND; this "deal" never did pencil.
While the statistics are very questionable they are an attempt at some sort of metric - something which Rumsfeld as a modern manager had repeatedly insisted on previously.
It is telling that in Woodward's new book Rumsfeld refuses to give or come up with metrics for how well the Iraq occupation is going.
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