Yes, Mary, that is exactly my understanding. That is what I argue with my friend is the polemic rationale for using the Daesh term (dispensing with the accent, which so far as I know, which is not very far, carries little meaning in the English).
The question concerns the non-polemical contexts, if there is such a thing. The label is intentionally insulting. It brings to mind, specifically, the disdain associated with the soles of the feet or shoes, used for trampling. Like the famous insult of flinging shoes at the despisee.
My correspondent, if I understand him, argues that "neener neener neener" has a small space in adult conversation. I am having a hard time arguing with him.
I think you have written a canonical piece on nomenclature: why Daesh vs IS*. I can't find it. It seems, these days, like a Frequently Asked Question. Can you recommend the best linked reference?
I have been arguing Daesh with a former Oxford don who pays the bills by teaching professional writing in several Gulf city-states. He argues that in objective-analytical-academic writing ISIS, or some variant (in that class I like ISIL, because the regional designation "the Levant" is useful, more so than the Franco-Britannic "Iraq and Syria") is the preferred usage. He agrees that in a range of polemic applications (which I think all useful writing on the subject must, in part, be), the "Daesh" name is "almost essential."
11. The strategy of Daesh, and Al Qaeda before it, is to eliminate the Grey Zone, where Muslims live in peace with non-Muslims. Banning settlement of Muslim refugees, from Syria or elsewhere, implements this strategy.
In the terminology (learned, alas, from an early manifestation of Tom Clancy airplane-reading whankery) of military theory, the fight over the existence, size, and health of the Grey Zone is the center of gravity of this enemy. The way to victory is to win this fight. Everything else, including decapitating, defeating, and destroying Daesh, is a side show and distraction unless it contributes to achieving this objective.
A dialectical analysis sees the AQ/9-11 Action and American Reaction producing two sythesis.
Frst, the destruction of Humpty-al-Saddam-al-Dumpty and his army produced a basis for an army and a territory. The Daesh-as-Pirates model is ingeneous and works well.
Second, the West has failed to even identify, let alone patrol, the seas in in which the AQ/Daesh barracudas swim, in the degraded overseas Muslim diaspora, from which the 9-11 attacks were launched.
Suppose that the West (could be short for Western Imperialists, Shining Light in the West, or something in between; I expect I am closer to the former expansion than is the optimistically liberal Professor Cole) succeeds in decapitating Daesh, while its Kurd allies defeat its armies.
Meanwhile, in the Talibanlieux of Brussels, Paris, Marseille and Hamburg, the hate-mongers will pour poisin into the ears of the brothers, nephews, cousins and neighbors of the last crop of foolish sick children that marched away to bloody war and did not come back, a new set of fools will practice Jihad on those of their female neighbors who challenge Hijab or go to school, the bully boys of French (and Dutch, Belgian, and German racism) will support the Western Talibans in their recruitment, and a new and larger crop of organized and organizable young extremists will grow up, ready for orders from the next manifestation of international Salafi terror.
Professor Cole, and the French, and much of their Arab-world population ask that we call them Daez, not IS/.*?/, to deny them the legitimacy associated with [I]slamic [S]tate. OK.
But wouldn't they be easier to deal with as a state? with a return address? There is clearly a strong theological argument against: the assertion of the existence of a Califate is a core claim to the allegiance they claim from the Talibanlieux. So why not take a page from George Kennan's book(s), and isolate them with strong containment? A Califate that one can't get to, and that is shunned by other states with Islamic credentials (especially Saudi Arabia) will collapse soon enough from inside.
So good answer to my comment on the TPM article, which is basically How do we know it is ISIS not Al Qaeda (for whom violence outside the "Califate" territory is the M.O.)?
Longer, from the other comment:
Fine if Hollande actually has evidence that it is ISIS.
It smelled, and smells, more like Al Qaeda to me.
ISIS theology, strategy and practice is to draw militiants in to their territory, to expand the Califate. No doubt lotsa angry young men, born in France of Algerian and other North African descent, living without hope in the dehumanizing HLM slums of north Paris and the suburbs beyond (like St Denis, where the football stadium is) have heard the call and taken up arms in Syria.
As their older siblings did a couple of decades ago, to join Jihad in Chechnya. Where they were recruited by Al Qaeda for terrorist acts. AQ remains strong across North Africa, and it had no immediate Califate objective. Rather, the Al Qaeda strategy was to strike the Great Satan wherever it was.
From an intelligence perspective, distinguishing between ISIS and AQ is very valuable. It would be a tmistake to pour fuel onto the ISIS fire while AQ is sneaking around planning more atrocities Over Here.
The Squealer-choir chants "fight them over there so they don't kill us over here." This could well be a classic and deadly case of eyes-off-the-ball.
Yes, Mary, that is exactly my understanding. That is what I argue with my friend is the polemic rationale for using the Daesh term (dispensing with the accent, which so far as I know, which is not very far, carries little meaning in the English).
The question concerns the non-polemical contexts, if there is such a thing. The label is intentionally insulting. It brings to mind, specifically, the disdain associated with the soles of the feet or shoes, used for trampling. Like the famous insult of flinging shoes at the despisee.
My correspondent, if I understand him, argues that "neener neener neener" has a small space in adult conversation. I am having a hard time arguing with him.
Sir,
I think you have written a canonical piece on nomenclature: why Daesh vs IS*. I can't find it. It seems, these days, like a Frequently Asked Question. Can you recommend the best linked reference?
I have been arguing Daesh with a former Oxford don who pays the bills by teaching professional writing in several Gulf city-states. He argues that in objective-analytical-academic writing ISIS, or some variant (in that class I like ISIL, because the regional designation "the Levant" is useful, more so than the Franco-Britannic "Iraq and Syria") is the preferred usage. He agrees that in a range of polemic applications (which I think all useful writing on the subject must, in part, be), the "Daesh" name is "almost essential."
11. The strategy of Daesh, and Al Qaeda before it, is to eliminate the Grey Zone, where Muslims live in peace with non-Muslims. Banning settlement of Muslim refugees, from Syria or elsewhere, implements this strategy.
In the terminology (learned, alas, from an early manifestation of Tom Clancy airplane-reading whankery) of military theory, the fight over the existence, size, and health of the Grey Zone is the center of gravity of this enemy. The way to victory is to win this fight. Everything else, including decapitating, defeating, and destroying Daesh, is a side show and distraction unless it contributes to achieving this objective.
A dialectical analysis sees the AQ/9-11 Action and American Reaction producing two sythesis.
Frst, the destruction of Humpty-al-Saddam-al-Dumpty and his army produced a basis for an army and a territory. The Daesh-as-Pirates model is ingeneous and works well.
Second, the West has failed to even identify, let alone patrol, the seas in in which the AQ/Daesh barracudas swim, in the degraded overseas Muslim diaspora, from which the 9-11 attacks were launched.
Suppose that the West (could be short for Western Imperialists, Shining Light in the West, or something in between; I expect I am closer to the former expansion than is the optimistically liberal Professor Cole) succeeds in decapitating Daesh, while its Kurd allies defeat its armies.
Meanwhile, in the Talibanlieux of Brussels, Paris, Marseille and Hamburg, the hate-mongers will pour poisin into the ears of the brothers, nephews, cousins and neighbors of the last crop of foolish sick children that marched away to bloody war and did not come back, a new set of fools will practice Jihad on those of their female neighbors who challenge Hijab or go to school, the bully boys of French (and Dutch, Belgian, and German racism) will support the Western Talibans in their recruitment, and a new and larger crop of organized and organizable young extremists will grow up, ready for orders from the next manifestation of international Salafi terror.
Professor Cole, and the French, and much of their Arab-world population ask that we call them Daez, not IS/.*?/, to deny them the legitimacy associated with [I]slamic [S]tate. OK.
But wouldn't they be easier to deal with as a state? with a return address? There is clearly a strong theological argument against: the assertion of the existence of a Califate is a core claim to the allegiance they claim from the Talibanlieux. So why not take a page from George Kennan's book(s), and isolate them with strong containment? A Califate that one can't get to, and that is shunned by other states with Islamic credentials (especially Saudi Arabia) will collapse soon enough from inside.
So good answer to my comment on the TPM article, which is basically How do we know it is ISIS not Al Qaeda (for whom violence outside the "Califate" territory is the M.O.)?
Longer, from the other comment:
Fine if Hollande actually has evidence that it is ISIS.
It smelled, and smells, more like Al Qaeda to me.
ISIS theology, strategy and practice is to draw militiants in to their territory, to expand the Califate. No doubt lotsa angry young men, born in France of Algerian and other North African descent, living without hope in the dehumanizing HLM slums of north Paris and the suburbs beyond (like St Denis, where the football stadium is) have heard the call and taken up arms in Syria.
As their older siblings did a couple of decades ago, to join Jihad in Chechnya. Where they were recruited by Al Qaeda for terrorist acts. AQ remains strong across North Africa, and it had no immediate Califate objective. Rather, the Al Qaeda strategy was to strike the Great Satan wherever it was.
From an intelligence perspective, distinguishing between ISIS and AQ is very valuable. It would be a tmistake to pour fuel onto the ISIS fire while AQ is sneaking around planning more atrocities Over Here.
The Squealer-choir chants "fight them over there so they don't kill us over here." This could well be a classic and deadly case of eyes-off-the-ball.