Muqtada al-Sadr and the Sunnis
Mickey Kaus of Kausfiles saw the Mehr report that I linked to yesterday and inquired,
' [I was baffled] by how Sadr could be negotiating to form an alliance with Sunnis at this point. It would be a big service to other non-experts if you could explain how this is possible. . .'
I replied on the fly, but here is a slightly revised version, below. I referred to the possibility of a Sadrist alliance with some Sunnis in this post on Dec. 20.*
It is an abiding paradox of contemporary Iraq that the Mahdi Army and the Sunni Arab guerrillas are slaughtering each other daily, but that young Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr (the leader of the Mahdi Army) has a better political relationship with Sunni Arab MPs and leaders than any other Shiite.
During the first siege of Fallujah in late March and April of 2004, Muqtada's Sadrists sent aid convoys to the besieged Sunnis there. In spring of 2005, the Association of Muslim Scholars (hardline Sunni) accused the Shiite Badr Corps paramilitary of having formed anti-Sunni death squads inside the special police commando units of the Ministry of the Interior. This open accusation caused a political crisis between AMS and the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the Shiite fundamentalist party that sponsors the Badr Corps. It was Muqtada al-Sadr who engaged in shuttle diplomacy to calm the two parties down. He could play this role because he had credibility with both sides.
From his side, Muqtada makes a distinction between "Sunnis" on the one hand, and "Saddamis" and "Nawasib" on the other. (Nawasib are those Sunnis who have a violent hatred for the Shiites and the family of the Prophet, and nowadays in Iraq "al-Qaeda" would be such a group in Muqtada's eyes.)
So many Sunni fundamentalist MPs and officials of the Iraqi Accord Front (some of them rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood) are acceptable to Muqtada. He would argue that the Mahdi Army is not killing Sunnis, only Saddamis and Nawasib.
From the Sunni Iraqi side it makes most sense to think of it in negative terms. Most Sunni Arabs in Iraq now hate the United States and Iran. Muqtada hates the United States and expresses resentment of Persian dominance of Shiism. So if you think of them as Iraqi nativists, they have a lot in common. If the fundamentalist Sunnis could gain the Sadrists as allies, they would have a better chance of getting rid of the Americans, their main goal in life. And, allying with Shiite Islamists who are perceived as real Iraqis isn't so hard for them.
The hardline Salafis in the mold of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and the hardline neo-Baathists, both ethnically Sunni, reject this strategy of talking to Muqtada.
In contrast, the National Dialogue Front led by secularist Salih Mutlaq is said to be tight with Muqtada. Some elements of the Sunni fundamentalist Iraqi Accord Front are also relatively friendly to him. A politically connected Iraqi explained all this to me as though it was the most natural thing in the world.
I agree that it is baffling. But it isn't just the Iranians who perceive it this way.
Mickey kindly followed up:
'(Also, is there a possibility that if we leave a Sadr-Sunni alliance could actually produce relative stability?)'
I replied,
About your last question, it is a really interesting one. It would require a kind of mixture of Iraqi nationalism and pan-Islam.
You could argue that the Northern Alliance (i.e. the current government) in Afghanistan pulled this off, with an alliance of the Jami'at-i Islami (Afghanistan Muslim Brotherhood) and the Hazara Shiites (the Vahdat Party was Khomeinist in the 80s and 90s).
But somehow I fear that the Iraqis as things now stand couldn't pull this off, and that if the US left the Sadrists and the Sunni fundamentalists would gradually fall on one another. Dislike of the US presence is after all among the main things they have in common, and that would be gone.
----
*I had written:
' It would also be possible for Muqtada and allies to put together a significant bloc:
Da`wa: 22
Sadrists: 32
Fadila: 15
Salih Mutlak's list: 11
Mishaan Juburi list: 3
Part of the Iraqi Accord Front?: 10?
Sadr could find enough deputies to block the formation of a new government. '
posted by Juan Cole @ 1/04/2007 06:30:00 AM
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26 Comments:
Sadr has always been the Shiite with the best relations with the Sunnis. He has always been the nationalist who wants to hold the country together and remove the Americans.
The puzzling thing is that if the US wants to enlist the Sunnis to sideline a Shiite faction, why the faction it is trying to sideline isn't Hakim's faction. That question can be answered by a parable.
There is a story of a hunter who traps a monkey by putting a shiny piece of metal into a gourd (a natural bottle with a narrow entrance). The monkey can slip his hand into the gourd, but when he holds the metal, his fist cannot escape the gourd.
The US wants bases in Iraq. Hakim, at the moment, claims to be willing to allow the US to have its bases. So the US is siding with Hakim, but Hakim wants to break Iraq and keep the Southern oil for the Shiites, which makes the Sunnis unable to compromise, and therefore unable to stop fighting, which means the US cannot leave. The US has sided with the Kurds for the same reasons with the same results since 2003.
Someone should tell the monkey, you are not going to get the shiny metal. Let go of it and at least get your hand out. Someone should tell the US, you are not going to get long term bases. Drop that idea and at least leave before Iraq gets worse.
The United States claims it wants national reconciliation, but it wants that reconciliation with the condition that the US military gets to stay. If reconciliation is possible, and I still think it is, reconciliation that allows for a long term US presence is not possible. If the Sunnis can resolve all of their disagreements with the Kurds and Shiites, they cannot resolve all their disagreements *plus* leave the US with a long-term military presence in their country. As hard as it would be without the US, the US demand makes it impossible.
Remember, the Saudis, the most corrupt, weak and cowardly members of the Arab nation already kicked the US out. There is no way self-respecting Arabs, even Shiites, are going to leave the US there. There is no way Iraq's Sunni generals are going to come to an accomodation that leaves the US there.
The monkey wants to pull harder, and get its hand out with the prize. The US wants to surge and subdue the Iraqis who oppose a US military presence so that it can leave an intact Iraq with a US military presence. Somebody should tell the monkey you do not have enough muscles to break the gourd and get your hand out with the prize. Somebody should tell the US it does not have enough troops to subdue the entire country of Iraq and force them to accept a long-term military presence.
The best strategy for the US is to give up, contain hostile Iran and Iraq from aircraft carriers in the Gulf, and accept that Iraq was hostile to the US and Israel through a humiliating defeat in Kuwait, then through an extensive bombing campaign and the harshest sanctions ever, and then through a failed occupation that included the replacement of one anti-US leader by another. It is not possible to use force to make Iraq non-hostile to the US and Israel. Just accept it. Contain Iraq from the Gulf and from the bases in UAE for as long as you have them.
Trying to hang on means you just bleed troops until Iran decides it wants to really push the US out for whatever reason, such as that the US became too aggressive about the nuclear issue. Then the US leaves Saigon style, for a complete humiliation and the end of any pretense of US power in the Middle East.
Let me see if I have this right:
American GIs have to stay in Iraq getting attacked and killed every day at a cost of 2 billion dollars a week just so that Sunnis who hate us and Sadrists who hate us can go on marginally agreeing with each other occasionally only because they both hate us; and if we left they would just fight each other instead of their common enemy: us. This sounds incredibly like some sort of Iraqi reverse-flypaper figure-of-speech counter-occupation "theory." Try selling it to Cindy Sheehan, the mother of some dead American GI flypaper.
Furthermore, even though the Sunnis and the Shiites kill more and more of each other the longer American GIs stay in Iraq (not preventing them from doing this killing), American GIs still have to stay in Iraq anyway, because the soothsayers predict that if the GIs leave and stop not preventing the increase in killing, that the killing will just increase without them. If you want a classic definition of an emotionally self-inflicted quagmire tautology, there you have it. Like we used to say in Vietnam: "We are the unwilling led by the unqualified to do the unnecessary for the ungrateful; and we're here because we're here because we're here because we're here."
Pardon me, professor, but I don't want to pay one more dime in taxes or sacrifice one more American life just to keep the Iraqi Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds -- and Turkmen and Christians, too -- from doing to each other what they will do to each other whether we stay in Iraq or leave. They don't have to kill each other if they don't want to. They appear to want to. They'll stop when they don't see anything to gain by killing each other any more. American GIs can do nothing about any of this and so they should come home now. Enough with the self-fulfilling prophecies of "blood baths" that will supposedly happen if we don't keep feeding more GIs and billions of American tax dollars into the blood bath in which we already currently wallow. Time to pull the plug.
About your last question, it is a really interesting one. It would require a kind of mixture of Iraqi nationalism and pan-Islam. (...)
But somehow I fear that the Iraqis as things now stand couldn't pull this off, and that if the US left the Sadrists and the Sunni fundamentalists would gradually fall on one another. Dislike of the US presence is after all among the main things they have in common, and that would be gone.
I think that this mixture of Iraqi nationalism and pan-Islamism, aka the alliance between the Sadrists and the Sunnis parties is the best hope of stability in Iraq right now. Your second paragraph reflects a creepiing US feelings of superiority toward other cultures, that if the US didn't find the solution noone other would find it. I'd be more confident in the Iraqis; their nationalism and pan-arabism or pan-islamism isn't a new invention it is a long culture, contrary to the Shiite/Sunni divisions which have been stirred and used by the Americans. The Americans fear that alliance a lot, because the two sides requests their departure and I'm sure that their intelligence services in Iraq are creating a lot of rumors implicating the Mehdi Army in the sectarian strifes against the Sunni.
That said, your analysis of the Sunnis/Sadrists relationship is a great piece.
Earlier in this ongoing occupation of Iraq, Muqtada al-Sadr had openly called for an alliance of the Sunni insurgents in Fallujah and the Jaish Mehdi in Najaf and other areas - this took place in 2004 when the Sadrists were under attack by the US. That brief period of possible coordination fell apart as the nature of the violence became increasingly sectarian thanks to al-Zarqawi's terror attacks on Shiite targets.
If the Sunnis and al-Sadr form an alliance, in my view, it will be an alliance forged on their common hostility to the US forces in Iraq.
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Agreed. Sadr and the Sunni parliamentarians share a pan-Islamist perspective and a nationalist perspective - with the Arab nationalist foundation and dislike of Iran that SCIRI lacks.
Most importantly, they desire a unitary Iraq with a strong central government, and they reject federalism. The one thing that unites Arab nationalists, even of the Islamist variety, is a rejection of Kurdish autonomy. This is really what the federalism issue is all about.
I fear that the civil war will merely shift from the temporary and anomalous Shia'-Sunni conflict back to the standard Arab-Kurdish conflict which has always defined and destabilized Iraq. I fear 2010 will be another repeat of 1921, 1946, 1963, 1974-76, 1983-88, 1991-2006.
The only solution in Iraq is a just solution for the Kurds. Unfortunately, the Kurds will take an inflexible maximalist position on Kirkuk itself, and Sadr and the Sunni nationalist parties have never been comfortable with the existing Kurdish autonomous zone. They will certainly refuse to compromise on extending a Kurdish zone to areas that are currently occupied by the Kurds and not contested, such as Khanaqin, sections of NE Ninevah governorate (Aqrah, Bardarash, Shaykhan), and areas north and east of Kirkuk city.
No doubt Sadr will try to reach out to the Islamist Kurdish parties. However, these parties are not popular, even with institutional corruption and a fair amount of internal dissent toward the KDP and PUK. The one exception is in Hawraman (Hallabja area), which is linguistically and culturally a little different. Islamist party support there can be interpreted at least in part as a sub-regional phenomenon, the same way KDP has support in Bahdinani-speaking areas, and PUK is dominant in Surani speaking areas.
An Islamist and Arab nationalist government has nothing to offer the Kurds and is not going to be able to replace or undermine the tribally-based (KDP) or secularist (PUK) political parties. It's hard to see a peaceful outcome.
The far right and far left in Weimar Germany regularly cooperated against centrist governments in the Reichstag in the early 1930s. This did not presage a stable coalition government between the Nazis and Communists.
(I deleted the original version of this, where I'd mistyped "Iran" for "Iraq" near the top. Bad oops. So here's the corrected version.)
Juan, it is long overdue that you start educating your readers more thoroughly in this way. Other people-- Reidar Visser, Badger, and I venture to add myself-- have been doing a much better job of explaining the nuances of intra-Shiite politics inside Iraq. And that includes deconstructing the "spin" that the US spinmeisters have been propagating which has sought to put all the blame for the transgressions of Shiites onto the shoulders of the Sadrists... Including the atrocious acts of anti-Sunni sectarian hatred that somebody-- presumed to be Shiites-- has been committing in the past 18-plus months.
This, despite the evidence that the Bushist "allies" from SCIRI/Badr have committed far worse anti-Sunni atrocities than the Sadirts, and that the Sadrist political leadership has all along worked hard to keep its political lines open with Sunni resistance people.
The Bush administration people have sought to put their strongly anti-Sadrist spin on this issue in an attempt, I presume, to try to "justify" to the US public why they thought it was necessary to pursue a campaign to marginalize and if possible militarily suppress the Sadirists. (The political part of that campaign, w/ respect to lining up an anti-Sadr alliance inside Iraq, has not been going too well. But maybe the plans for the military part of it still persist?)
The US MSM has been only too happy to lap up and further purvey the spin on this from theBushists. It has been disappointing that you have also gone as far as you have, until now, to perpetuate this simplistic idea that "Sadr = bad".
And don't write off the potential strength of an appeal to a mixture of Iraqi nationalism and Islam.
(About Helena)
I've recently been learning from "Just World News" and "badger" that Juan Cole is a shameless apologist for unmentionable Crawfordite obscenities, just like The New York Times is.
I suppose it makes sense, sort of, that the good guys should now quarrel intramurally after seeing that the Crawfordites are not going to take instruction from us or from anybody else, and the American electorate least of all, when it comes to their Kiddie Krusade.
But it's a sad sort of sense.
(Did you ever really say that Sadr is badder, then?)
I wrote about the possibility of a Sadr-Sunni Insurgent alliance a little while back and tried to include some relevant historical background. I hope it adds something useful to the discussion:
Sadrists and Sunni Insurgents United for Peace and Love?
As for JHM's comment, I believe that is what a good (fellow left-of-center) friend of mine once referred to as "ah yes, the famed coherence of the left" :)
Arnold Evans ... so you're saying the monkey gets 'gored'?
Snerd
Why aren't you advising the government, Dr. Cole? It must be your competence that diqualifies you. We know how much Bush hates that quality.
Question: recall that Sistani (speaking ex cathedra, as it were) recently held that Shia unity was a "red line" that could not be crossed.
In 2004 Muqtada did not have the power to cross Sistani's red line. Has this changed?
I can appreciate the second order subtleties which would permit Sadr to join an alliance of (some) Sunnis, but is this not precluded by substantial first order problems? The American presence will not last forever.
If the Sadrists are not the ones ethnically cleansing the Sunni Arabs in Baghdad then why are the civilians of Sadr city coming under constant attacks from suicide and car bombs?
Or are the Badrists doing this as well as attacking the Sunnis with the Sadrists being the fall guys? Or is it really the US who is doing it? Or the Israelis? Or the Republican Guard Corps? Anybody but Muqtada it seems in this latest narrative.
Muqtada has had the protection of the Dawa-led government ever since it was formed in mid 2006. His people even got to execute Saddam and release a video of themselves doing it. What better evidence of kissy kissy with Dawa?
Furthermore, Muqtada has said publically over and over again, right from the beginning, he intends Iraq to be a SHIITE ISLAMIC state. That is, totally subject to Shiite religious Law, not Sunni. And certainly not secular. Or even tolerant of secular.
His latest pretences to be inclusive of Sunni/secular "nationalism" have to be judged in that light.
The Sunnis and Baath are sophisticated political operators. Why would they buy any of it for a moment, Mr Dhari's comments notwithstanding? Why wouldn't they view him an opportunistic power grabber having had some experience of that syndrome themselves?
And thank you Dr Cole for your meticulous chronicling of this story. Anybody wanting to refresh themselves on the appearance of Muqtada in the last days of the invasion, the establishment of the Mahdi Army, the rise of the Sadrists as a social movement and Muqtada's preaching on the future of Iraq only need to read Dr Cole's archives and make up their own minds as to his intentions.
Oh, and further to my last, since Dr Cole mainly translates from Arab media sources he can hardly be accused of succombing to Bush Spinmeisters. Or can he?
Lewy14 wroteIn 2004 Muqtada did not have the power to cross Sistani's red line. Has this changed?
Wasn't Sistani's remark rather directed at SCIRI/Badr ? Sistani's statement came just after the US unveiled an attempt to build a new coalition in parliament, where the Sadrists were sidelined and where the SCIRI would have collaborated with the Kurds, some Sunnis and Allawi.
It seemed clear during 2004, as the Sunni and Shia insurgents co-operated in the way Juan describes, that the US was facing its ultimate nightmare in Iraq; a unified national resistance. Its doubtful that the US could've faced down such a movement even - especially - if peaceful tactics to end the occupation had been adopted. Such a national Iraqi coalition could well have been durable. National liberation movements tend to form a major part of the national mythology that can bind a country together through the years.
At the time, Sistani's role in ending the battle of Najaf seemed decisive in ending the hope of such a movement emerging. Understandably Sistani wanted to end the violence, especially since it was desecrating the holy city. But did he not also want to see the US occupation used as the vehicle to deliver maximum power to the Shia majority? Did he not fear, as many other Shia and Kurdish figures seem to, that if the US left a more favourable accomodation would have to be made with the Sunnis than would otherwise be the case? After all, isn't Sistani, like so many holy men, rather less withdrawn from the temptations of the material world than his office demands?
How much different might things be now if, at the time of the battle of Najaf in 2004, Sistani had made a statement to the effect that the US occupation was causing so much bloodshed as to be no longer tenable, that US troops should leave on a short timetable, and that a national unity government of all groups should be formed pending free elections to be held upon the departure of the last Western soldier? Could al-Qaeda have been sidelined? Would sectarianism have wilted in the face of a national political will?
This is not to wag the finger at irresponsible Iraqis, which would plainly be most hypocritical for any US/UK citizen (e.g Pelosi in her speech yesterday). Its to demonstrate the distorting, possibly fatal effect a foreign occupation has had on the politics of the new Iraq. Most countries have ambitious politicians and public figures. But not every country has some of those figures backed by an occupying army, thus hampering the nation's own ability to mediate and settle disputes in the public interest. Most countries have sectarian divisions, but not all have the socio-political-economic conditions to foster conflict instead of compromise. Those conditions in Iraq have been created by the occupation, not the natural tendency of the barbarians to slaughter each other in the absence of Western supervision.
David Wearing
The Democrat's Diary
$2 billion a day here, $2 billion a day there...pretty soon you're talking real money!!?? How soon before we leave this quagmire and let Saudi Arabia and Iran get it on for real?? www.minor-ripper.blogspot.com
Christiane,
Yes, Sistani was talking to SCIRI et al - but presumably his "red line" of Shia unity applies to Sadr as well. An alliance of Sadr with (some) Sunni would split the Shia.
I think David Wearing has a point about Sistani's pronouncemts being understood as motivatied by Shia maximalism. And Barbara has a point about anyone making a deal with Sadr finding themselves eventually cut out of the loop (literally, likely).
Juan Cole, your site is a great resource. Thank you.
Let me start with the premise that the main reason the US is in Iraq has to do with oil and ultimately the recycling of petrodollars back into the US economy. In the interest of brevity I won't elaborate on my reasons for assuming this, but take it from me that it is a good assumption.
SCIRI appears to be compliant with the long term goals of the US at this point. Muqtada and the Sunnis want the US out. A Muqtada-Sunni political alliance is the worst fear of the US at this point. (It wouldn't be great for the Kurds, either, and Iran would not be enthusiastic about it) Pragmatically, such a coalition would probably be the best way to stop the civil war as well and it might actually gain wide acceptance among Iraqis.
Such a government though would quickly ask the US to leave. This is why I believe that the US is trying to stoke tensions between the Sadrists and the Sunnis, and in fact been since at least 2004. I would not at all be surprised if the Saddam execution video was cooked up by US intelligence. It certainly fits their agenda.
The US wants sectarian strife to continue, because it gives us a rationale to stay in Iraq until we can build SCIRI and the puppet parties (Allawi and Chalabi) into a stable seat of power.
We are discussing these issues at www.strategytalk.org if anyone is interested.
Snerd: The moral is that the monkey stays stuck in the gourd until the hunter decides to come and kill him. The other moral is that the US soldiers stay stuck in Iraq until Iran decides to come and kill them.
Barbara: Sadr got a lot of votes, and is more popular now than he was during the last election. Read this blast from the past in Juan Cole's archives - August 4, 2006:
I was told by an American official who had been in Baghdad that Iraqi provincial elections had been postponed because there are indications that Muqtada al-Sadr's movement is growing in popularity in the Shiite south and his lists might sweep to power.
Elections seem to be still "postponed". (At what point does postponed become cancelled?) So as much as you don't like Sadr or trust him, he is a legitimate power in Iraq, and US attempts to sideline him are just examples of how amateur US policy Iraq is.
I will say this, Sadr does not have to lie to us. If he favors attacks on Sunnis, he can say so without anything to fear. He consistently speaks out against these attacks and consistently publicly orders those under his control to refrain from them. The US is already trying to topple him and failing - encouraging attacks on Sunnis would probably make him more and not less appealing to his direct base.
I sometimes sense a tone of bragging in US intelligence reports that some elements in the Mehdi Army may not be loyal to Sadr. Death squads have acted to advance US interests with plausible deniability recently in Central America. But if Sadr says he wants Sunnis to be able to live comfortably in Iraq and Iraq to remain united (which Hakim does not say), the only reason Sadr would say this is because he means it.
David Weaney: Sistani called for a withdrawal schedule this year. Maliki stood up to Sistani and put off the demand for a withdrawal schedule. Let's say Khalizad won that battle. Bush still lost the war, because US troops in Iraq are not accomplishing any strategic aim for the US, they are just hostages for Iran - just expensive but worthless ornaments of US imperial power, a little like a shiny piece of metal in a gourd.
So if Sistani had called for the US to leave after the Sadr uprising, the US would not have left, and the US would today be in the same position it is in now - stupidly trying to maintain a military presence in a country where nobody important wants a US military presence.
The only what-if is what if the US had learned the lesson of Vietnam and not tried to use force or coercion to change Iraq's foreign policy or alignments. Nothing else could have produced a different outcome.
In April 2004 Sistani and the establishment clerics were under sustained siege from the Sadrists in Najaf and Karbala. The Sadrists had been gradually escalating this challenge to Sistani et al ever since the fall of Baghdad.
Surely this would have been the main reason Sistani did not back a united front ... apart from understandable skepticism as to the true motives of the Baath insurgency. What reason did the Shiites have to trust the Baath after the bombing of the Iman Ali Shrine in Najaf and the murder of Ayatollah al-Hakim in the preceding August? (It was even able to be speculated at the time that the Sadrists had reason to be responsible, not the Baath - another example of Sadrist/Baath common interests).
It should be recalled that afew months later the Sadrists actually did take over Najaf, thus confirming the scope of Muqtada's ambitions. Sistani had to quit the city, conveniently taking medical treatment in London, leaving the US to save his people from the Sadrists. Sistani arrived back in time to lead a "peace" march on Najaf but by that stage Muqtada's army was well and truly beaten and Sistani his clerics saved - by the US.
Then shortly after that all the Shiite parties, including the Sadrists, stood aside and allowed the Marines to destroy/retake Fallujah without much protest at all.
Since then Sistani, SCIRI, Dawa et al have been trying to "manage" Muqtada. For his part Muqtada has been able to exploit the Baath/AlQ attacks against the Shiites to justify the murderous acts of his militia and is building an increasingly formidable terror apparatus which one imagines he will not hestitate to use against the establishment Shia religious once the Americans withdraw.
Sistani is from the "Quietist" tradition which, in westernocentric terms I gather, means he leads towards separation of church and state?
Muqtada, on the other hand, wants a Shiite republic on the Iranian model subject to religious laws as interpreted, no doubt, by him.
It is one thing to admire Muqtada for his vehement opposition to the occupation, but quite another to subscribe to him nationalist or inclusive motives.
Ipatent:
There is a common mistake I've made until recently. Just refering to the political organization headed by Hakim just by its initials - SCIRI.
The organization is the
Supreme
Council for
Islamic
Revolution in
Iraq
You have to read it slowly to let it sink in. Using the abbreviation can distort your analysis.
I hope the US is not daft enough that its plan is to enable the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq to consolidate and overcome its rivals.
You really may well be right, but it would be a very stupid plan. If the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq really does consolidate with the help of its "allies" the United States - my guess is that the result of its Islamic Revolution in Iraq would be an Islamic Republic of Iraq, coincidently(?) right next to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Barbara:
If Iraq is to remain whole, there is one major Shiite who at least is making an effort to reach the Sunnis, and that is Sadr. If you are right and Sadr cannot negotiate with the Sunnis then nobody can. The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq is not a better negotiating partner for the Sunnis than Sadr is.
The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq is today openly calling for the creation of a super-state in the south that would retain southern oil revenues and take some of the governing perogatives from Baghdad. In other words, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq is today effectively a separatist party that is just as unacceptable to Iraqi nationalists as the Kurdish separatist parties.
I have not read anything that indicates that Sadr believes that he would or should have the power to establish a theocracy headed by himself over all of Iraq.
Anyway, the Sunnis repeat again and again exactly what they want. They want a withdrawal timetable. Just like Sadr and Sistani. They want the US out. The Sunnis say they'll negotiate with the Shiites on those terms.
Neither you or I can speak for the Sunnis better than the Sunnis can speak for themselves. While you don't trust Sadr, the Sunnis would rather take their chances with him with the US gone than have the US stay.
The problem is the US does not want to go. That is the US' fault, not Sadr's.
Arnold - Your description of the political self interests of the SCIRI party is pretty accurate. Logically its maximilist aim would be a theocratic superstate for Iraq.
This analysis needs to be balanced with consideration of the maximilist aims of the other parties involved - particularly the Sadrists and the Sunni/Baath parties. The latter are committed to the overthrow of the Iraqi constitution and each are challenging the (current majority) centre - Sciri and Sistani - who in turn are backed by the Kurds.
As none of the sides is strong enough to be decisive the current untidy status quo is likely to continue. Interestingly, through all the chaos and savagery the central Iraqi govt has apparently been capable of keeping the economy ticking over, which in turn underpins the status quo.
Barbara:
We're approaching the point where we have to agree to disagree on the issues we still do not agree on.
The Sunni/Baaths are committed to the overthrow of the constitution - esp. in as far as the constitution works to dissolve the central government. That overthrow of the constitution could conceivably be accomplished through negotiation and constitutional amendments.
There is no sense in which the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq and the Kurds are the center of Iraq, except that those are the parties the US happens to favor at the moment because of their willingness to tolerate the US military.
Sadr faced off against the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq when Sadr's candidate Jaafari faced the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq's candidate Mahdi for Prime Minister. Sadr won. Sadr proved that he was the majority.
The US attempted to intervene on the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq's behalf (stupid on so many levels it is hard to fathom) but was forced to accept a face-saving defeat with the installation of Jaafari's deputy, Maliki.
The Kurds and the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq are a minority propped up by the United States. The verdict is not yet in on how stable a situation that is.
Sadr is the Iraqi center, not Hakim. Sistani agrees with Sadr on the central issues of withdrawal of the Americans and opposition to the creation of super-states. On the withdrawal of Americans, the vast majority of Iraqis also agrees with Sadr.
Sistani retired from politics earlier this year when Khalizad prevented the Iraqi parliament from ordering a withdrawal schedule. Sistani also recently vetoed the US plot to form a government without Sadr.
You seem to be asserting that Sistani backs the US/Kurdish/Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq temporary alliance that opposes Sadr. That is just not the case.
Yes, we must soon agree to disagree otherwise we will be trying Dr Cole's patience. Worse, trying his sense of humour and even worse other commenters might start petitioning him to close discussion. Fair enough.
In the meantime here are some clarifications/other points:
SCIRI (Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution etc), the KURDS and DAWA are the center of Iraq politics at this moment for three reasons:
Firstly, between them they polled more than 50 per cent or close to it of the (universal, free, democratic) vote at the Dec 2005 elections; secondly because they all publicly support the Iraq constitution as ratified by universal/free vote in Oct 2005; and thirdly because none of the three has since called for an immediate US withdrawal or even a timetable.
DAWA is interestingly/obviously the lynchpin of this "center alliance" because it has held the Prime Ministership (and therefore had the power to appoint the Cabinet) since Jan 2005. And yet it does not demand the Americans get out? Why haven't they? The answer can only be they don't(yet) see it as in their and the wider Shia self interest.
Resistance to Jafaari:
On the face of it, both in the aftermath of the Jan and Dec 2005 elections DAWA had a very good case for the PM's position, as the Sunnis had been given VP (and I think Speaker) positions in the interests of "reconciliation. " - ie In Shia/ Kurd viewpoint not because their numbers justified it but because Americans (for their own ends) were hassling them to be inclusive.
After final Dec 05 general election the UIA intra party vote to re-install Jafaari was, according to reports, carried by only just 1 vote in a caucus of 128 - this caucus representing several political parties and significant number of "independants" who are also part of the alliance. The Sadrists were a significant bloc but could not carry it on their own. Anyway, Jafaari got "up" by a bee's dick - as we say in politics in Australia. Meaning he's in trouble. Will not last.
As it happens under the Iraq constitution, voted in by a large majority in Oct 2005, the Iraq PM has to be approved of by at least a majority of the House before he/she can form a govt (possibly even a 66 per cent majority - maybe someone else can confirm this?)
The Kurdish and Sunni parties refused to accept the nomination if it went to the floor of their Parliament. So the numbers in the Parliament weren't there for Jafaari.
No doubt the US was behind this/agreedwithit/manipulated/whatever ... but when it came to crunch it was a Sunni/Kurd/Sciri alliance in the Parliament that was going to deprive Jafaari of the numbers. So Maliki emerged as the consensus candidate, agreeable to all. No wonder he says he didn't want to take on the job.
Sistani.
My impression from the time when the invasion toppled the multi decade totalitarian minority Baath regime was that all the Ayatollah has ever had to give is the Word and the Shiites will rise en masse against the occupation.
So far he hasn't. As to why not, one could speculate endlessly in the labrinth of Arab/Iraqi politics. But one thing is a a fairly safe bet: the Ayatollah will always have in mind the prospect of himself and his people again being kicked out of Najaf by the Sadrists as they were in late 2004.
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