This was to be expected. The Khmer Rouge hung on for years along the Thai border, the Basmachi for a decade in Central Asia and so on. ISIS is likely to slowly decay as cadres age, fighters are killed and remaining support dwindles. It won't be quick, but I don't see the conditions for the re-emergence as a major force there at the moment..
The rebel faction in a civil war almost always ends up controlled by extremists, who are the most cohesive and dedicated (Cromwell's Presbyterians, Dutch, Scottish and French Calvinists, the Bolsheviks, the Jacobins, the Communists...). So no surprise here. In this case, they lacked the critical mass, consistent outside support or control of key centres that might have carried them to a repellent victory.
A map of iran's rail network is surprisingly informative. Since 79 they have built links to Pakistan, Central Asia, China (through Central Asia), to their Indian Ocean ports. Improved links to Russia through Azerbaijan have been in progress for some time. They are building two links to the Iraqi network, and working on the Turkish link (bypass the Lake Van ferry). All this is addition to significant extensions/improvements to the internal network. They clearly aim to restore their old position as the landbridge between Europe and Inner Asia.
Barzani has been selling oil through Turkey and splitting the proceeds. He thought Erdogan would back him. But Turkey, the US, Iran, Iraq all signalled opposition. When the PUK folded (after talks with Tehran's emissary), the game was up. The KDP succession is the next flash point.
You might add the Syrians of the Syrian Arab Army, who held Deir ez-Zor for four years against very ISIS assault, who held Kuweires airbase, who have fought from Aleppo to Mayadin and spent lives eliminating the ISIS threat to towns such as Salamiyah. Alawis, yes, but also Sunni, Shi'a, Druze (like the commander in Deir ez Zor) and Christian.
I think Barzani saw his position vis-a-vis Baghdad and his Kurdish rivals weakening as the ISIS war winds down, and thought Turkey would support him as counterweight to the PKK and maybe to Baghdad as well. But he miscalculated on all fronts - neither Baghdad nor Tehran nor Ankara will tolerate Kurdish independence, although the latter two are comfortable with autonomy.
Since US policy has been a mix of the delusional and the ambiguous from the start, "constructive cooperation" is likely to be beyond it. But Egypt, Iran and Turkey all share Putin's goal of retaining a united Syria, and have at various points cooperated to that end. Since Iraq is also firmly of the same view, and Jordan edging to it, where does that leave the US?
Immigration simply postpones the problem - and not for long either. Barring catastrophes, we are simply going to have to work or way through this. But I am surprised that no mention is made of the transfer from looking after children to looking after the aged, nor consideration to the fact that, as the societies affected are mostly much richer than in the past, they can easily support extended retirement. And pensions often support manual workers, whose life expectancy is not rising.
With respect, I think this is overblown. The Kurdish calls for independence come from Barzani relatives, a discredited group. The Mosul ones are from the ex-governor's clique, an inveterate intriguer with very little support even in Ninawa.
Shi'a militia outrages have been few and swiftly condemned, but widely publicised in conservative Arab media. Sunni representation in Iraqi forces (including militias) has increased markedly.
The Sunni are not going to return to their previous position as the dominant political element. This is a grievance to many of them, but one they show signs of reconciling to.
Iran has been steadily investing in its rail network since the revolution. Now has links to Pakistan and Azerbaijan, new link to Kazakhstan, new border crossing at Sarakhs, link under construction to Herat in Afghanistan, two links to Iraqi network (one at Basra, one through Hamadan) and mooted link to Armenia as well as improving the link to Turkey. All this as well as much internal construction and improvement. It's a good gauge of its standing among its neighbours.
re Tikrit, reports I saw suggested that the reprisals were mostly Sunni on Sunni (tribes that had sided with ISIS were prevented from returning by those who had resisted and suffered ISIS punishment). A key issue for Sunnis is that they are fragmented politically in the face of the more numerous and united Shi'a and Kurds (noting that both the latter have their factions).
The fling at the Iraqi Army is unjustified. They've had their bad moments, but they have secured Baghdad, re-taken Tikrit and Baiji, cleared the area around Ramadi (and now look to take the city itself), held Hadithi and so on. As Gen Rupert Smith pointed out, the defense now has extraordinary advantages given that urban areas are so extensive and weapons like RPGs and IEDs so plentiful. If the enemies ISIS generates on every side each do their bit, it can't last long (although it will go down hard).
I have seen conflicting reports of militia behaviour: some vague ones of houses being burned, but also:
- a report quoting a militia leader that strict instructions had been given to behave correctly;
- reports of militia help evacuating given to locals around Tikrit;
- an interview with a member of a Sunni unit in a Shia militia. Recruited from around Tikrit, and enthusiastic about being in a force that knew its business.
- tribal leaders in Anbar and Salahuddin calling for militia paricipation and help, as the force with the numbers and motivation to defeat Daesh.
While I think the jury is still out on this one, and we are likely to see some ugly behaviour, the picture is more nuanced than a lot of people allow.
Israel should be worrying more about Pakistan than about Iran - it looks to be well on the way to being the first major climate-change induced failed state, and the first with nuclear arms.
Interesting piece. I think it overstates Sunni solidarity (especially as linking non-Arab Turkey with Syria or Saudi). It's hard for modern states to fragment unless there are established internal lines of demarcation, as in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, so I find it hard to envisage Syria fragmenting along Sunni/Shia lines. But there is likely to be greater opportunity for Sunni in Iraq and Syria to forge alliances, possibly backed by Saudi (as observed, where the Kurds fit in will be a question). But this would push Syrian Shia across the border into Lebanon or into Iraq, strengthening Shia parties in both. And Shia, as the largest bloc in Lebanon, will retain considerable political strenght regardless of the outcome in Syria.
I would also note that Iran is in a different class economically than Syria or the petro-states. It has a large industrial sector (and sanctions are probably encouraging local development). It's closer to Turkey or Brazil as an emerging industrial power than to a petro-state. Hence the problems it poses for israle and the US.
I agree with the last comment - drones are like Tamerlane's raids - they hurt, but they don't change anything, and they focus the other side on getting even. Iraq showed the US Army as hollow, so it would be better to concentrate on making friends rather than irritating people who know you can't really afford to go to war with them.
I have the impression that Sunni resistance to Iraq's government is fuelled by a deep belief that Shia rule is illegitimate (in much the same way that C17 France could not tolerate a Protestant ruler, or England a Catholic one), and that this is more ort less true across the Arab Sunni world.
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This was to be expected. The Khmer Rouge hung on for years along the Thai border, the Basmachi for a decade in Central Asia and so on. ISIS is likely to slowly decay as cadres age, fighters are killed and remaining support dwindles. It won't be quick, but I don't see the conditions for the re-emergence as a major force there at the moment..
The rebel faction in a civil war almost always ends up controlled by extremists, who are the most cohesive and dedicated (Cromwell's Presbyterians, Dutch, Scottish and French Calvinists, the Bolsheviks, the Jacobins, the Communists...). So no surprise here. In this case, they lacked the critical mass, consistent outside support or control of key centres that might have carried them to a repellent victory.
A map of iran's rail network is surprisingly informative. Since 79 they have built links to Pakistan, Central Asia, China (through Central Asia), to their Indian Ocean ports. Improved links to Russia through Azerbaijan have been in progress for some time. They are building two links to the Iraqi network, and working on the Turkish link (bypass the Lake Van ferry). All this is addition to significant extensions/improvements to the internal network. They clearly aim to restore their old position as the landbridge between Europe and Inner Asia.
Barzani has been selling oil through Turkey and splitting the proceeds. He thought Erdogan would back him. But Turkey, the US, Iran, Iraq all signalled opposition. When the PUK folded (after talks with Tehran's emissary), the game was up. The KDP succession is the next flash point.
You might add the Syrians of the Syrian Arab Army, who held Deir ez-Zor for four years against very ISIS assault, who held Kuweires airbase, who have fought from Aleppo to Mayadin and spent lives eliminating the ISIS threat to towns such as Salamiyah. Alawis, yes, but also Sunni, Shi'a, Druze (like the commander in Deir ez Zor) and Christian.
I think Barzani saw his position vis-a-vis Baghdad and his Kurdish rivals weakening as the ISIS war winds down, and thought Turkey would support him as counterweight to the PKK and maybe to Baghdad as well. But he miscalculated on all fronts - neither Baghdad nor Tehran nor Ankara will tolerate Kurdish independence, although the latter two are comfortable with autonomy.
Since US policy has been a mix of the delusional and the ambiguous from the start, "constructive cooperation" is likely to be beyond it. But Egypt, Iran and Turkey all share Putin's goal of retaining a united Syria, and have at various points cooperated to that end. Since Iraq is also firmly of the same view, and Jordan edging to it, where does that leave the US?
Immigration simply postpones the problem - and not for long either. Barring catastrophes, we are simply going to have to work or way through this. But I am surprised that no mention is made of the transfer from looking after children to looking after the aged, nor consideration to the fact that, as the societies affected are mostly much richer than in the past, they can easily support extended retirement. And pensions often support manual workers, whose life expectancy is not rising.
With respect, I think this is overblown. The Kurdish calls for independence come from Barzani relatives, a discredited group. The Mosul ones are from the ex-governor's clique, an inveterate intriguer with very little support even in Ninawa.
Shi'a militia outrages have been few and swiftly condemned, but widely publicised in conservative Arab media. Sunni representation in Iraqi forces (including militias) has increased markedly.
The Sunni are not going to return to their previous position as the dominant political element. This is a grievance to many of them, but one they show signs of reconciling to.
Iran has been steadily investing in its rail network since the revolution. Now has links to Pakistan and Azerbaijan, new link to Kazakhstan, new border crossing at Sarakhs, link under construction to Herat in Afghanistan, two links to Iraqi network (one at Basra, one through Hamadan) and mooted link to Armenia as well as improving the link to Turkey. All this as well as much internal construction and improvement. It's a good gauge of its standing among its neighbours.
re Tikrit, reports I saw suggested that the reprisals were mostly Sunni on Sunni (tribes that had sided with ISIS were prevented from returning by those who had resisted and suffered ISIS punishment). A key issue for Sunnis is that they are fragmented politically in the face of the more numerous and united Shi'a and Kurds (noting that both the latter have their factions).
The fling at the Iraqi Army is unjustified. They've had their bad moments, but they have secured Baghdad, re-taken Tikrit and Baiji, cleared the area around Ramadi (and now look to take the city itself), held Hadithi and so on. As Gen Rupert Smith pointed out, the defense now has extraordinary advantages given that urban areas are so extensive and weapons like RPGs and IEDs so plentiful. If the enemies ISIS generates on every side each do their bit, it can't last long (although it will go down hard).
I have seen conflicting reports of militia behaviour: some vague ones of houses being burned, but also:
- a report quoting a militia leader that strict instructions had been given to behave correctly;
- reports of militia help evacuating given to locals around Tikrit;
- an interview with a member of a Sunni unit in a Shia militia. Recruited from around Tikrit, and enthusiastic about being in a force that knew its business.
- tribal leaders in Anbar and Salahuddin calling for militia paricipation and help, as the force with the numbers and motivation to defeat Daesh.
While I think the jury is still out on this one, and we are likely to see some ugly behaviour, the picture is more nuanced than a lot of people allow.
Israel should be worrying more about Pakistan than about Iran - it looks to be well on the way to being the first major climate-change induced failed state, and the first with nuclear arms.
Interesting piece. I think it overstates Sunni solidarity (especially as linking non-Arab Turkey with Syria or Saudi). It's hard for modern states to fragment unless there are established internal lines of demarcation, as in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, so I find it hard to envisage Syria fragmenting along Sunni/Shia lines. But there is likely to be greater opportunity for Sunni in Iraq and Syria to forge alliances, possibly backed by Saudi (as observed, where the Kurds fit in will be a question). But this would push Syrian Shia across the border into Lebanon or into Iraq, strengthening Shia parties in both. And Shia, as the largest bloc in Lebanon, will retain considerable political strenght regardless of the outcome in Syria.
I would also note that Iran is in a different class economically than Syria or the petro-states. It has a large industrial sector (and sanctions are probably encouraging local development). It's closer to Turkey or Brazil as an emerging industrial power than to a petro-state. Hence the problems it poses for israle and the US.
I agree with the last comment - drones are like Tamerlane's raids - they hurt, but they don't change anything, and they focus the other side on getting even. Iraq showed the US Army as hollow, so it would be better to concentrate on making friends rather than irritating people who know you can't really afford to go to war with them.
Watch how fast denial swings into action.
Can't see "water wars" myself. Just slow misery and local competition - already happening, as you note, on the West Bank.
I have the impression that Sunni resistance to Iraq's government is fuelled by a deep belief that Shia rule is illegitimate (in much the same way that C17 France could not tolerate a Protestant ruler, or England a Catholic one), and that this is more ort less true across the Arab Sunni world.