Trump's repugant political posturing is red meat to his primary base.
If he wins the GOP nomination, it's highly questionable - but not impossible - whether he can draw in a wider cross section of the general population, with his hyperbole.
US media "normalising" Trump's rhetoric, could garner "offensive creditability"?
Settlement product labeling is a "EU bottom-up strategy"; provide establishment status quo coverage whilst allowing gradual erosion via freedom of choice consumerism.
It should be noted that the US administration has stopped lobbying the EU not to label.
Money-in-politics is a corrosive establishment influence on the occupation. Unfortunately, asymmetrical grass root movements are the current opposition.
The glacial groundswell of progressive change appears frustrating. However, despite Israel's unconscionable behaviour, establishment support is ebbing away. It will take another generation.
Given the growing entrenchment and ideological polarisation in Israeli society, it remains unlikely a self-turnaround will occur. It may take another generation of grassroot movements - from the international community - for Israel's South Africa moment...but it maybe "too late".
In principle, all states need to fulfill their obligations in international organisations. However, in reality, Turkey is "leveraging multidimensionally" its NATO obligations vis-a-vis Kurd state policy i.e. national interest.
Iran is attempting to transition its statecraft behaviour & perception into a "credible" regional counterweight. Her principal ME thrust is a containment policy on Islamic extremism, which represents a clear and present danger to itself & her allies. On a longer-term and considerably aspirational, is a "multi-layered" engagement policy with existing regional adversaries, beyond a "cold-peace".
Meanwhile, nurtured "Manichaen societies" are - already - instinctively dismissive of compounded overtures. Iran will remain a "hard-sell" for years to come.
"Utopian public justice" maybe virtuous. On balance, however, a partial body shot is reasonably sustainable, given the pervasive ramifications on a knocked-out status quo.
Chilcot's scope changes, access to classified documents and the maxwellisation process et al have prolonged the anticipated publication of the enquiry. Meanwhile, selected inquiry leaks via the media have been tempering the public's opinion on any potential "smoking gun".
Criticsim of Blair and a wider establishment body is anticipated. This maybe the best-worst outcome for Blair; dilution of function from questionable advise.
Investigating nefarious activities are generally prudent. However, current imbalances - e.g. Citizens United - have been crafted to give greater admission to certain interest groups vis-a-vis the public. Diluting a narrow influence, is likely to be more equitable.
In theatre of wars, state to proxy interventionism are engaged in spheres of influence. Regaining tactical ground in Aleppo, maybe subjective, but it provides Russia with a relatively tangible PR result.
Syria's policy is currently a quagmire of competing state interests and securing a common realignment - if achievable - will require time. Whilst pellucidity would appear ideal; paradoxical statecraft nuances does not make good political posturing.
The US providing weaponry to the Democratic Forces of Syria inclusive of YPG Kurds appears counterproductive, given the fluidity of proxy alliances on the ground. However, on the anti-Assad state sponsorship spectrum, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are currently the most intransigent in Russia's attempts in restablising Syria. The US has implicitly acquiesced to Russia's policy and is working to bring-to-heel Turkey's inflexiblity via Kurd proxies.
A pre-civil war status needs to be re-established before a relatively orderly transition can take hold. Otherwise, we could be looking at a multifaceted civil war lasting a decade or more; similar to Lebanon (1975 to 1990).
The policy - of overthrowing Assad - was not achieving its goal and that third party state sponsorships and its proxies had become the ante of continued stalemate of Syria's civil war. Russia's policy of military intervention - with self interest - is to torque the ante. Ultimately, Syria's development towards democratisation should be the underlying goal.
Militias aligning themselves with different political objectives - aganist a common foe - are likely to prolong the civil war, as in-fighting occurs when victory is insight e.g. the collapse of the Najibullah government in Afghanistan.
The fluidity of the Syrian opposition(s) have yet to legitimise a consensus and Russia's counter-balance has tacit support from the US. However, overtures will need to occur for relative sustainability.
Abbas's underlying message was economic pressure. The dog and pony show (peace process) has had its day in the sun, and he got a green light to close shop. The Oslo Accord acts as a subsidy for Israel's occupation; by sub-contracting the PA with EU/US funding.
From the outset, US policy on Syria had very limited chance of success, given the political constraints the Obama administration was experiencing: (1) US public apprehension for significant military intervention and; (2) The sensitive P5+1 negotiations were taking place and heavier US involvement – than what was proposed - in Syria could play into the hands of the Iranian hardliners, who were looking for opportunities to scuttle the impending agreement. Meanwhile, Russia re-inserted itself as a more active player to secure a diplomatic agreement on Syria’s chemical weapons and play a more muscular role- yet to be tested - against Daesh, by exploiting the US realignment of offshore balancing via Tehran. It’s still too early to assume whether this geo-political strategy will generate relative stabilisation, but its consequences of human tragedy can be felt today.
Naturally, the civil war has fractured Syrian unity. Bearing that in mind, Bashar al-Assad is likely to maintain his de-facto position until a viable unifying body can coalesce. This terrible epic will continue; with no end in sight.
Yes; Iran's -if fruitful- rapprochement will eventually diminish Israel's demonisation tool box and its options for deflecting their occupation, whilst claiming perpetual victimhood. However, Israel does not want to be treated as a normal state because it will erode their special status with the US; thus affecting their impunity.
Cruz is strategically pandering as a stalking horse; principally for Trump, Carson & Rubio. His malleable rhetoric is aligned to the top 4 to 5 GOP primary contenders to win over his opponents' primary base, if and when they falter. Cruz is only focused on the nomination and the general election is another story.
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Trump's repugant political posturing is red meat to his primary base.
If he wins the GOP nomination, it's highly questionable - but not impossible - whether he can draw in a wider cross section of the general population, with his hyperbole.
US media "normalising" Trump's rhetoric, could garner "offensive creditability"?
Dr. Cole's equanimity is a positive influence in a reactionary environment.
It is imperative that strategic policy responses are NOT decontextualised into a dualism crusade.
Settlement product labeling is a "EU bottom-up strategy"; provide establishment status quo coverage whilst allowing gradual erosion via freedom of choice consumerism.
It should be noted that the US administration has stopped lobbying the EU not to label.
Money-in-politics is a corrosive establishment influence on the occupation. Unfortunately, asymmetrical grass root movements are the current opposition.
The glacial groundswell of progressive change appears frustrating. However, despite Israel's unconscionable behaviour, establishment support is ebbing away. It will take another generation.
Given the growing entrenchment and ideological polarisation in Israeli society, it remains unlikely a self-turnaround will occur. It may take another generation of grassroot movements - from the international community - for Israel's South Africa moment...but it maybe "too late".
In principle, all states need to fulfill their obligations in international organisations. However, in reality, Turkey is "leveraging multidimensionally" its NATO obligations vis-a-vis Kurd state policy i.e. national interest.
This is non-exclusive state behaviour.
This Vienna conference is a " desideratum clearing-house" for the stakeholders. Agreeing to disagree at this juncture.
Iran is attempting to transition its statecraft behaviour & perception into a "credible" regional counterweight. Her principal ME thrust is a containment policy on Islamic extremism, which represents a clear and present danger to itself & her allies. On a longer-term and considerably aspirational, is a "multi-layered" engagement policy with existing regional adversaries, beyond a "cold-peace".
Meanwhile, nurtured "Manichaen societies" are - already - instinctively dismissive of compounded overtures. Iran will remain a "hard-sell" for years to come.
Proposed "imbedded" special-ops are also to be engaged as "human shields" to contra current Russian attacks on US-backed rebels.
"Utopian public justice" maybe virtuous. On balance, however, a partial body shot is reasonably sustainable, given the pervasive ramifications on a knocked-out status quo.
Chilcot's scope changes, access to classified documents and the maxwellisation process et al have prolonged the anticipated publication of the enquiry. Meanwhile, selected inquiry leaks via the media have been tempering the public's opinion on any potential "smoking gun".
Criticsim of Blair and a wider establishment body is anticipated. This maybe the best-worst outcome for Blair; dilution of function from questionable advise.
Russia's trial balloon on multicameralism.
Investigating nefarious activities are generally prudent. However, current imbalances - e.g. Citizens United - have been crafted to give greater admission to certain interest groups vis-a-vis the public. Diluting a narrow influence, is likely to be more equitable.
Current regional power politics are being tested - in this case Turkey - via quid pro quo operational "alliance-activties".
Right "on the money"...modi operandi à la Beltway et al.
In theatre of wars, state to proxy interventionism are engaged in spheres of influence. Regaining tactical ground in Aleppo, maybe subjective, but it provides Russia with a relatively tangible PR result.
Balkanisation is underway in Syria.
Syria's policy is currently a quagmire of competing state interests and securing a common realignment - if achievable - will require time. Whilst pellucidity would appear ideal; paradoxical statecraft nuances does not make good political posturing.
The US providing weaponry to the Democratic Forces of Syria inclusive of YPG Kurds appears counterproductive, given the fluidity of proxy alliances on the ground. However, on the anti-Assad state sponsorship spectrum, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are currently the most intransigent in Russia's attempts in restablising Syria. The US has implicitly acquiesced to Russia's policy and is working to bring-to-heel Turkey's inflexiblity via Kurd proxies.
A pre-civil war status needs to be re-established before a relatively orderly transition can take hold. Otherwise, we could be looking at a multifaceted civil war lasting a decade or more; similar to Lebanon (1975 to 1990).
The policy - of overthrowing Assad - was not achieving its goal and that third party state sponsorships and its proxies had become the ante of continued stalemate of Syria's civil war. Russia's policy of military intervention - with self interest - is to torque the ante. Ultimately, Syria's development towards democratisation should be the underlying goal.
Militias aligning themselves with different political objectives - aganist a common foe - are likely to prolong the civil war, as in-fighting occurs when victory is insight e.g. the collapse of the Najibullah government in Afghanistan.
The fluidity of the Syrian opposition(s) have yet to legitimise a consensus and Russia's counter-balance has tacit support from the US. However, overtures will need to occur for relative sustainability.
Abbas's underlying message was economic pressure. The dog and pony show (peace process) has had its day in the sun, and he got a green light to close shop. The Oslo Accord acts as a subsidy for Israel's occupation; by sub-contracting the PA with EU/US funding.
From the outset, US policy on Syria had very limited chance of success, given the political constraints the Obama administration was experiencing: (1) US public apprehension for significant military intervention and; (2) The sensitive P5+1 negotiations were taking place and heavier US involvement – than what was proposed - in Syria could play into the hands of the Iranian hardliners, who were looking for opportunities to scuttle the impending agreement. Meanwhile, Russia re-inserted itself as a more active player to secure a diplomatic agreement on Syria’s chemical weapons and play a more muscular role- yet to be tested - against Daesh, by exploiting the US realignment of offshore balancing via Tehran. It’s still too early to assume whether this geo-political strategy will generate relative stabilisation, but its consequences of human tragedy can be felt today.
Naturally, the civil war has fractured Syrian unity. Bearing that in mind, Bashar al-Assad is likely to maintain his de-facto position until a viable unifying body can coalesce. This terrible epic will continue; with no end in sight.
Yes; Iran's -if fruitful- rapprochement will eventually diminish Israel's demonisation tool box and its options for deflecting their occupation, whilst claiming perpetual victimhood. However, Israel does not want to be treated as a normal state because it will erode their special status with the US; thus affecting their impunity.
Cruz is strategically pandering as a stalking horse; principally for Trump, Carson & Rubio. His malleable rhetoric is aligned to the top 4 to 5 GOP primary contenders to win over his opponents' primary base, if and when they falter. Cruz is only focused on the nomination and the general election is another story.
Israel may gradually speak less of traditional proxies vis-a-vis Russia's ME counterbalance.
Russia's containment is also to ameliorate the European refugee crisis for sanction relief.